Providing Global Public Goods: The Role for the G20

Presenter: Inge Kaul*

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The issue addressed

- The starting point of this presentation is the fact that we are today confronting a rising number of GPG-type policy challenges, as is by now being acknowledged in national and international policy debates, including in the debates at the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank Group last October.

- The reason for increasing policy attention being accorded to these challenges is that many GPGs are severely underprovided, generating costly crises and, in part, even posing risks of potentially catastrophic consequences.

- Why is this happening?

- I will argue that, in no unimportant measure, today’s crisis-proneness is due to the fact that we lack a well-developed, modern (i.e. current policymaking realities-reflecting) theory of GPG provision and, thus, policy advice and guidance on how to ensure that international cooperation in support of GPG provision is efficient and effective and, to this end, also development-compatible – which, today, it, all too often, is *not*.
The structure of the presentation

Section I – will summarize the main findings of the recently published edited volume on Global Public Goods (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2016), which is based on a comprehensive survey of studies that apply a public-good lens to the analysis of global challenges. The survey covers the period from the early 1970s to mid-2016, i.e. nearly half a century.*

We will see that, at present, GPG scholarship falls into two main groups: studies that I call “conservative”, because they look at GPGs through the conventional analytical lenses and research methods of their respective social-science sub-discipline; and “modern” studies, exploring what is new and different about GPGs and what institutional innovations and adjustments would be needed to effectively and efficiently address them under the current global policymaking realities.

Section II—will then explore possible next steps that could be taken to develop a systematic, well-tested GPG theory and policy practice, including how the G20 could help foster progress along these lines.

I will suggest that the G20 launch a major initiative aimed at the construction of a new architecture of international cooperation that firmly rest on two main pillars: (i) international cooperation in support of GPG provision and (ii) development assistance. This initiative could be called “The Hamburg Project”.

*See endnote 1 for additional details on the design of the survey.
Let us begin by clarifying, in Section I.1, the definition of PGs and GPGs, then, in point I.2, turn to assumptions and study designs, and finally, in I.3, to what the GPG literature says on GPG finance.

I.1 Defining public goods and global public goods

- Global public goods (GPGs) are frequently described as public goods (PGs) whose benefits, costs, or both are of global reach.
- This sounds straightforward. But, what precisely are public goods (PGs)?
- Most authors would agree that PGs are marked by publicness in consumption, that is, by being non-rival and/or non-excludable.*
- Most might also agree that goods can possess both these properties in a pure or impure form and, thus, may be pure public or impure public.
- However, it seems, there exists as yet no agreement on how impure-public a good can be to still be a PG. (See also Figure 1 shown in the next slide)

* See, endnote 2 for the definition of non-rivalry and non-excludability.
I Understanding GPGs: Where we are (2 of 16)

Figure 1: The public-private continuum

Source: Kaul et al. (2016)
As the property of non-excludability, in particular, is open to manipulation, the working definition of PGs suggested below might be a useful one – but should be subject to future research and debate so that, in due course, we may have a “standard” definition:

A two-tier definition of PGs:*

Turning then to the definition of GPGs, I would argue that we would miss what is new and different about these goods, if we were to just define them as goods whose benefits, costs, or both are of global reach.

Because, what does “global” mean in this context?

Different GPG scholars provide different answers to this question and employ different terms, when referring to GPG-type policy challenges. Some authors even use different terms in one and the same paper or book. The terms employed include (as the next slide shows): international public goods, transnational public goods, global commons, and GPGs.
I Understanding GPGs: Where we are (5 of 16)

Figure 2: The terms being used to denote global challenges with PG properties

Source: Google Books Ngram in Kaul, Blondin, Nahtigal (2016)

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So, which term is the most fitting one?

To answer this question it is helpful to turn to the scientific and technical literatures on GPGs, e.g. studies on climate change, global health, cyber security or communicable-disease control.

Based on these literatures, a rough sketch of the provision path of summation-type GPGs (and most GPGs are of this type) looks like the one shown in the next slide, viz. like a multi-level, multi-sector, multi-actor process composed of national PGs, regional PGs, intermediary GPGs and, in many cases, private goods and more or less controlled spillover and spill-in effects.
Understanding GPGs: Where we are (7 of 16)

Figure 3: The provision path of a summation-type of global challenge such as climate change mitigation.

Source: Kaul, Blondin and Nahtigal (2016)
In light of the foregoing Figure 2, it seems that the most appropriate term would be ‘global’, because it captures better than ‘inter’ or ‘trans’ the complexity of GPGs and the fact that GPGs are not only public in consumption but also public in provision.

Important is to note that both publicness in consumption and publicness in provision run counter to the basic principles of the present world order. In other words, GPGs do not respect national borders and they entail policy interdependence among states and could, thus, be controversial and contested issues, notably when countries’ preferences for these goods differ, as they are known to do.

Hence, again, as a working definition, subject to further research and debate, I would suggest the definition of GPGs set forth in the next slide:
Understanding GPGs: Where we are (9 of 16)

Defining GPGs and their distinguishing features

GPGs are marked by *publicness in consumption* that meets one or more of the following criteria:

- It **spans** several geographic regions or the global as a whole;
- It **stretches** across several generations and has long-lasting, possibly even irreversible impact;
- It **penetrates** into countries, areas beyond national jurisdiction, or both.

Besides being global public in consumptions, GPGs also tend to be global public in production, entailing policy interdependence among states and implying that, in many cases, states cannot unilaterally change the goods' provision status (form or level) but are to compelled to seek the cooperation of others, if they wish to do so.*

In other words, GPG-type global challenges entail consumption *and* policymaking interdependence.

Source: Kaul, Blondin and Nahtigal (2016)

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*See endnote 3.
I.2 Behavioral assumptions and study designs

In my view, a brief look at the current policymaking realities reveals that GPGs are complex policy challenges that do not fit well into the present governance systems and into a world of vast geographic, economic, socio-cultural and political differences.

However, many GPG studies manage to exclude and, thus, overlook this fact by, for example:

- Staying within the conventional boundaries of their respective social-science sub-discipline (e.g. public economics or international relations) – and, often, focusing their attention on only one of many dimensions and facets of GPG provision;
- Basing their study on the – largely untested -- free-rider assumption and, thus, often, interpreting observed reluctance to cooperate either as a sign of actors’ selfishness or as an indication of their bounded rationality; or doing the opposite: looking for select cases that prove that voluntary provision also occurs;
- Using as an alternative to ‘publicness in consumption’ phrases that refer to PGs and GPGs as goods that ‘benefit all’ or ‘can be enjoyed by all’, thereby brushing aside the possibility that preferences for GPGs vary;
- Assuming further that, as the institution of the state has no equivalent at the international level, leadership is essential; or alternatively, that, if only states and multilateral organizations don’t suffocate and suppress voluntarism, then bottom-up processes can achieve a lot;
- Including only very few variables into their analytical frameworks, notably variables that relate to one particular actor group or interactions between two or more actor groups in a GPG-related policy field, the GPG’s publicness in consumption, its aggregation technology and the motivation and capacity of the actors to contribute;
- Employing the case study method; and, often,
- Looking for isolated empirical evidence in the past.
The literature survey refers to analyses with a research design similar to the one just described as “micro-analytical studies”. Most of these studies focus on one of the following policymaking arenas:

- Multilateral cooperation initiatives among state actors at the international/interregional-level
- International club arrangements, notably voluntary arrangements among a small number of like-minded states
- Regional interventions addressing regional initiatives as stepping stones towards meeting global challenges
- National-level interventions, including follow-up to international agreements taken by central/federal-level government entities
- Voluntary local community initiatives of potential relevance to a global challenges (e.g. the E. Ostrom-type case studies)
- Private sector initiatives, e.g. self-regulation and GPG-related CSR
- Voluntary individual contributions, including, for example, contributions by individual actors to open software development.
I have, in this presentation, labelled the micro-analytical studies as conservative, not only because they tend to employ conventional concepts and theories but also because of their implicit message, which is:

No need to change. Just make sure that one powerful nation or a small group of powerful nations continues to exercise international leadership; or, alternatively, just allow ‘bottom-up’ initiatives to trickle up.

In contrast, the contributions that, in the literature survey, are called “macro-analytical studies” and have been labelled here as “modern” tend to:

- Focus on the goods themselves and on how GPGs fit into the overall policymaking context and into national and international governance systems; and on
- How the present governance systems could be adjusted to allow policymakers to better address GPGs.

The purpose of their research is to foster innovation and governance adjustments at the theoretical and empirical level.
I Understanding GPGs: where we are (13 of 16)

The main policy recommendations emerging from the macro-analytical studies include:

- To prepare GPG-specific *provision path analyses*, identifying the main inputs required and, based on the principle of subsidiarity and considering opportunities for economies of scale and scope, to identify potentially best providers;
- Considering the complexity of many GPGs, to appoint ‘global issue’ managers (individuals or organizational entities) to facilitate networking and information exchange among the myriad actors, who might be involved, and between them and the stakeholders concerned.
- To take into account that several GPGs have their own *systemic integrity requirements* that may demand more than what states individually and collectively are willing to do for them;
- To recognize and accept that we live in an era of *multi-polarity and* policy interdependence, in a ‘*lego world*’ (to use A.-M. Slaughter’s expression): GPG provision, notably its production side requires a relatively orchestrated delivery of inputs;
- To further accept that, under current policymaking realities, conventional power politics increasingly lose their teeth in GPG-related policy fields and need to give way to *smart power* (as J. Nye says) and to *greater openness of policymaking* to civil society organizations and the general public.

In light of the last point, one could conjecture that a *condition of more adequate GPG provision* is to match the “4 Ps” of *publicness*: publicness in consumption, provision and decision-making so that also publicness in utility results (i.e. a distribution of net-benefits from cooperation that is perceived as mutually beneficial and fair). (See next slide)
Understanding GPGs: Where we stand

Figure 4: Matching the 4Ps of publicness

Source: Kaul, Blondin, Nahtigal (2016)
I.4 GPG finance

Importantly, many GPG studies do not discuss finance issues. They may refer to the fact that sometimes “leaders” may need to offer financial incentives to motivate reluctant parties to cooperate with them, often called “side-payments” or “carrots”. This is surprising, as the notion of PGs has been developed, in the 1950s/60s, as noted, within the context and as a core concept of public finance (e.g. by R. Musgrave).

The studies that discuss finance issues consider four main topics: defining the differences and synergy between GPG finance and development assistance; assessing the costs and benefits of investing in GPGs: getting the allocations to GPGs ‘right’; and mobilizing new and additional global financial resources.

The main messages emerging from these studies are:

- In order to gain an understanding of the costs and benefits involved in addressing a particular GPG, one needs, at least, a rough sketch of the good’s provision path and the inputs required in order to achieve a desired level of adequate provision.
- The developing countries may potentially be the lowest-cost providers of GPG inputs. In such cases, income transfers from richer to poorer countries are required for reasons of fairness and global production efficiency.
- Where there is a will to resolve underprovision problems, there is a way to find the requisite money.
- Finance is more than money. Non-financial measures (e.g. differential patenting) can also contribute to getting the allocation to an issue right.
In sum

While a large part of the conventional PG theory and also a large part of other conventional theories will certainly remain valid, more new and innovative thinking will definitely be required in order to develop a systematic, full-fledged GPG theory and, based thereon, a better practice of GPG provision.
II Where to next; and what role for the G20 (1 of 7)

II.1 Where to next

Clearly, a rich research agenda is waiting to be tackled. Among the most important next steps would, in my view, be to get the GPG finance right, as this might help strengthen actors’ willingness to cooperate on GPGs, which, in turn, could strengthen their willingness to reach consensus on other needed reforms, including perhaps reforms along the lines suggested in the macro-analytical studies (see again slide 16). Four finance-related reforms appear to be especially urgent:

1—Recognizing and accepting that, today, we are facing two main operational strands of international cooperation (IC), viz. IC in support of efficient and effective GPG provision and development assistance; (see slides 21-22)

2—Making finance an integral part of GPG provision path analyses, including the financial implications of obtaining GPG inputs from developing countries and the financial implications of promoting development-compatible GPG provision;

3—Introducing a clearer distinction between the finance purposes to be met and the type of finance they may need; (see slides 23-24) and

4—Developing criteria for determining under what conditions private finance can serve public purposes.
Table 1 below (slides 21-22) indicates why a differentiation between GPG provision, including GPG finance, and development assistance would be useful and.

Not to distinguish between these two IC strands entails the risk of under-financing both, in particular, by diverting public finance from development assistance to GPG provision – without available proof that this does not impede national development efforts.

Indeed, it is worrisome to watch the present ‘beauty competition’ among development agencies, vying for being No. 1 in terms of taking climate finance out of ODA – in addition to also charging also in-country refugee costs and other expenses to their ODA budgets.

Moreover, a distinction between GPG finance and development assistance would be easily possible, if it were implemented at an upstream allocation point by, for example, offering financiers the possibility to mark and report their contributions either as development assistance or GPG finance. A new “sister” agency of OECD/DAC could be created to record and monitor GPG finance.

In addition, multilateral agencies, notably the MDBs and, in particular, the WBG could be requested that funds provided to them for GPG-related purposes be clearly labelled as GPG finance.
Where to next; and what role for the G20 (3 of 7)

Table 1: Differentiating between the two main IC strands: GPG provision and development support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Global-public-good provision</th>
<th>Development support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main rationale</strong></td>
<td>Efficiency considerations, motivated by self-interest or mixed considerations (e.g. self-interest and other-regarding concerns)</td>
<td>Concern about others, notably developing countries and poverty reduction in these countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main focus of the intervention</strong></td>
<td>The global public good to be produced</td>
<td>A particular lower-income, fragile or vulnerable developing country or group of developing countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperating parties</th>
<th>Concerned state and nonstate actors from all or several parts of the world plus other actors who could be potentially ‘best’ providers of particular inputs</th>
<th>Rich and poor countries, plus perhaps their respective development partners such as multilateral development agencies or civil society and private sector entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main intended beneficiaries</td>
<td>One’s self and, in the case of mixed-motive or altruistic actors, possibly also future generations and the Earth as a whole</td>
<td>Developing countries, perhaps especially their poor people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links between GPG provision and development support</td>
<td>Fairness and justice in international negotiations (an effective voice for all), expectations of outcome fairness and requisite capacity (i.e. development) on the part of all concerned countries</td>
<td>Development-compatible provision of GPGs, including, as and if warranted, incentive payments for the promotion of sustainable national development strategies generating global co-benefits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II Where to next; and what role for the G20 (5 of 7)

As regards the introduction of a clearer distinction between different finance purposes, international public finance (IPF) flows for GPG-related purposes could, perhaps, be categorized as follows:

1—Cost-sharing arrangements – among states for joint, collective endeavors such as the functioning of an intergovernmental organization like the United Nations or the resourcing of a global finance mechanism like, for example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria;

2—Reimbursement of costs – which richer states may be willing to pay to countries, who incurred incremental costs because they provided inputs to a regional or global public good of recognized concern over and above what they might have done, had they been guided solely by national interests, international commitments undertaken or notions of global responsibility;

3—Compensatory finance – for developing countries to adapt to and cope with the ill-effects of GPG underprovision, including negative spill-ins caused by conflict and war in neighboring countries, or future loss and damage against which no adaptation measures would provide adequate protection;

4—Payment of a price – for the supply of a good or service by one country to another country, e.g. when trading in carbon markets;

5—Incentive payments – offered in a pooled or un-pooled way to individual states or private actors to encourage them to contribute more or at a faster pace to particular global or regional public goods. An example of a pooled incentive mechanism is the instrument of an advanced market commitment (AMC). Mention can also be made of guarantees provided to encourage private actors to explore new markets; or financial support extended to states, who might otherwise not be in a position to do so, to participate in the exploration of new policy paths;

(Note: List continues on the next slide)
II Where to next; and what role for the G20 (6 of 7)

6—*Premium payments* – made by developing-country governments to an intermediary body, such as a multilateral development bank, to buy, on their behalf, insurance against specified risks.

7—*Public-policy-purpose bonds* – such as ‘green bonds’ issued by a government or multilateral organization and held by other governments, e.g. ‘donor’ governments.

Clearly, which financing instrument would be most appropriate – cash or guarantee; grant, credit or loan – is likely to vary, depending on the purpose of the transaction, the actors involved and, last but not least, on the policy challenge to be met, notably the expected distribution of costs and benefits of addressing and its urgency.

However, all the seven categories listed here are likely to require grant money, including for differential loan-pricing.

If the required type and amount of financing for these purposes would be included in the investment/finance plans of GPGs, a major step would be taken towards making GPG provision more development compatible, because there would, then, be no need to divert development assistance funds to GPGs; *and, at the same time*, developing countries would, perhaps, be more motivated also to generate GPG-compatible national development, i.e. development supportive of promoting adequate GPG provision.
II.2 What role for the G20

We seem to have reached a stage, in which, due to their growing importance, GPGs can no longer be ‘somehow’ accommodated in the existing governance systems. Reforms are required, notably reforms in public finance.

In fact, nothing less than a new architecture of international cooperation appears to be required, which would cover as distinct but interrelated strands IC in support of GPG provision and IC in support of the development of developing countries.

The G20 could, in its 2017 communiqué, decide to launch the Hamburg Project, aimed at promoting, as a matter of urgency, the construction of a new international cooperation architecture and call on the T20 to undertake relevant background research, in consultation with other scholars and experts from around the world, as well as concerned bilateral and multilateral entities involved in GPG provision and development assistance.
Conclusion

The world has changed.

We must take note of that and initiate – rather than resist – necessary policy reforms.

For too long, we, the international community, have followed a policy path marked by nationalism: putting narrowly defined national interests on top of global sustainability concerns. Concern about private benefits has been allowed to trump concern about public benefits.

As recent events and policy debates have shown, we have now reached a fork in the road: We can either continue along the path we are on or embark on an as yet “less trodden” policy path may lead us to towards a better balance between the global and the national, and between private and public. We might want to opt for the latter in the interest of achieving, as we agreed to do when adopting Agenda 2030, more inclusive and sustainable global development and growth.
A more detailed discussion on the issues raised in this presentation can be found in:


See also www.ingekaul.net/
1. The full overview of the survey is contained in the Introduction to Kaul (2016: xiii – xcii), and co-authored by Kaul, Blondin and Nahtigal. (See the references for the full quotation) The survey covers studies that apply the public-good lens to the analysis of global challenges, irrespective of whether they use GPG, IPG, TPG, CPR or another related term. The literature searches were based on these terms and other related ones, and they covered peer-reviewed journals and other professional publications in social- science disciplines and issue-specific fields. Additional texts considered included working papers and reports by think tanks and expert commissions. Although we tried to cover a wide range of studies, the compilation is not exhaustive, especially because it is concentrated on English language texts. The Introduction is followed by a selection of 29 contributions to the GPG literature, reprinted in this volume to illustrate the topics that have preoccupied scholars and how their research approaches and the scholarly debates on GPGs have evolved.

2. According to standard economic theory, a good is non-rival in consumption if its consumption by one individual does not reduce its availability for other individuals; and it is non-excludable if it is technically infeasible to exclude individuals from its consumption and/or seen as too costly and hence undesirable in economic, socio-cultural or political terms.

3. Policy interdependence may in fact be given in most GPG cases, viz. in the case of GPGs abiding by summation and weak-link aggregation technologies and, even, in the case of some best-shot goods, which often involve summation-type financing arrangements.
For more information, see:

Edited by Inge Kaul et al. and published by Oxford University Press, 1999 and 2003, respectively.

Edited by Inge Kaul and Pedro Conceição, published by Oxford University Press, New York, 2006 and recently published -→
Global Public Goods
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Edited by Inge Kaul, Adjunct Professor, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany

“Global public goods” has become one of the most influential concepts in current international relations research. This reader brings together 29 of the most authoritative papers on global public goods of the last years, from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, along with a comprehensive and insightful review article by Kaul, Blondin and Nahtigal. The book is an essential collection for both theorists and practitioners of global governance, covering areas as diverse as financial institutions, security, knowledge, health, areas beyond national jurisdiction, and global environmental change.’
– Frank Biermann, Utrecht University, the Netherlands

‘A complete and compelling text on the rising topic of global public goods. Inge Kaul’s patient cultivation of this field, over many years, has paid off in a rich harvest of clear analysis and conceptual innovation.’
– James K. Galbraith, University of Texas at Austin, US

‘Global public goods merit more attention than is often found in textbooks and the professional literature. This volume provides a welcome focus on global public-policy challenges. The multi-disciplinary perspective will be attractive to students, researchers, and practitioners in the fields of economics, international relations, and international law.’
– Arye L. Hillman, Bar-Ilan University, Israel

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The defining feature of many policy approaches and tools today is their engagement at the intersection of the public and private and the domestic and foreign policy axes.

Thank you.

*Please, send comments and observations to inge-kaul@t-online.de or via www.ingekaul.net / Kaul_DIE_24/01/2017