International Cooperation and Development

A Conceptual Overview

Sebastian Paulo
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Abstract

Any credible claim to implement an agenda for global development – such as currently discussed in the post-2015 process – will require integrating the broader framework of international cooperation into this effort. A wide, but vague consensus that global framework conditions matter for development has already existed in past development debates. However, good resolutions such as MDG 8 for a global partnership have shown insufficient progress in practice. This paper reviews key aspects of the relationship between international cooperation and development at a conceptual level. Drawing on a distinction between domestic and global public goods as enablers and goals of development, the paper first illustrates the role of international cooperation and its interdependence with domestic action. The framework identifies contact points in the relationship between global and domestic action and goals with the categories of provision, support, access and preservation. The second part of the paper reviews key concepts of patterns of international cooperation that represent the elements of the global governance framework to which a broadening development agenda needs to link up more strongly. Overall, the conceptual review underlines that the question of how international cooperation works has moved to the centre of development studies. Yet, an even bigger challenge than achieving cooperation in the first place might be to steer the complex architecture and processes of international cooperation towards contributing to a global agenda for development.
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<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCBS</td>
<td>Basel Committee on Banking Supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Domestic public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Financial Stability Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAVI</td>
<td>Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPG</td>
<td>Global public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 6</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 8</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Middle-income country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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1 Introduction

Realising the objectives of a widening agenda for global development – such as is being currently discussed in the process leading up to a new framework of development goals for the time after 2015 – will require global collective action (UN 2013a; ODI / DIE / ECDPM 2013). Stressing the significance of the broader structure of international cooperation and global collective action for development appears to be a commonplace argument given challenges like climate change, financial instability, transnational health challenges or food insecurity. The argument for improved international cooperation needs to be considered against the background that the domestic and local contexts are the main focus of action to promote development. This is why the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have focused primarily on domestic policies in developing countries and aid to support their implementation.

Beyond that, there is broad, but vague consensus that global framework conditions influence the prospects of these efforts. Considerations to make the global context more development-friendly have been part of earlier development debates, from demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s to MDG 8 for a global partnership. Since the end of the 1990s, the prominence of the concept of global public goods (GPGs) in the development discourse has reflected the growing attention towards global collective action. Yet, the global development agenda is still far from being consistently linked to the broader framework of international cooperation.

Integrating this framework more solidly with development efforts is one of the main challenges for making claims on implementing a global development agenda credible. The implementation of a broadening development agenda – such as might emerge from the combination of a post-MDG agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (HLP 2013) – relies on two strands of cooperation (Kaul 2013a, 2013b). On the one hand, development cooperation focuses on supporting domestic policies in developing countries with the main focus on poverty reduction. On the other hand, all countries irrespective of their level of development have an interest in engaging in international cooperation in order to provide and preserve GPGs, such as a stable climate. Both strands of cooperation function according to their respective logics, but are also highly interdependent. This paper provides a conceptual overview of the relationship between development and the broader framework of international cooperation by looking into two particular aspects:

The first part of the paper illustrates how the broader framework of international cooperation and global collective action fits into the overall context of goals and actions in development. Drawing on a conceptual distinction between domestic and global public goods as enablers and goals of development, the paper presents a framework that illustrates the role of international cooperation and its interdependence with domestic action from a GPG-perspective. The framework identifies contact points in the relationship between domestic and global action and goals with the categories of provision, support, access and preservation.

As a consequence of this close interconnection between domestic and global actions and goals, understanding how international cooperation works is an integral part of development research. To explore these questions, development studies can draw on an extensive body of literature on international relations, global governance, economic theory
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The second part of the paper reviews key concepts from some of this literature describing patterns of international cooperation. The conceptual overview is structured according to the main categories of aggregation technology, types of contribution, governance mechanisms, the role of different stages in the policy-making process, and institutional complexity. The overview highlights patterns of international cooperation representing basic elements of the global governance framework that the implementation of a broadening development agenda needs to take into account.

The conclusion discusses implications derived from the conceptual overview for making the broader framework of international cooperation and global collective action a truly integral part of a joined-up approach to reaching development objectives. The conclusion highlights two sets of challenges: First, the interdependence between the broader framework of international cooperation and development moves the question why international cooperation fails or GPGs are underprovided to the centre of development studies. Many of the global structures of cooperation have not kept pace with global changes and face pressure to adapt. At the same time, the analysis of cooperation is not a fundamental departure from research questions traditionally addressed in development studies. Collective action and cooperation have always been central to understanding development processes within and beyond the state. Second, concerns about the prospects of international cooperation stand in contrast to the abundance of cooperation that can be observed and the elaborate architecture and processes of cooperation reflected in the conceptual overview. Therefore, an equally important challenge is to steer the broader framework of international cooperation towards being an integral part of the implementation of a global development agenda, instead of merely an extra or a vague set of pledges.

2 The role of international cooperation in development

The first part of the paper defines the role of international cooperation in achieving development objectives at a conceptual level. To this end, the paper presents a framework that draws on the concept of (global) public goods. Public goods are both goals and enablers of development at the domestic and global levels. While domestic policies (potentially supported by aid) pursue goals that can be conceptualised as domestic public goods (DPGs), global collective action contributes to development by providing global public goods (GPGs). At the same time, achieving goals at one level depends on enabling factors at the other. Illustrating this interdependence between domestic and global enablers and goals, this framework defines the role of international cooperation in development with the categories of provision, support, access and preservation. Before presenting the conceptual framework, the chapter defines the concepts used in the framework and discusses the role of GPGs as enablers and goals of development.
2.1 Definition of concepts: international cooperation, global collective action and (global) public goods

The concept of international cooperation has especially been used in the literature on international relations that has debated how cooperation emerges and persists in an anarchic international system. A standard definition is that cooperation occurs when “actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others” (Axelrod / Keohane 1985: 226). Therefore, (international) cooperation describes interactions to achieve common objectives when actors’ preferences are neither identical (harmony) nor irreconcilable (conflict). The paper will use the concept as a generic term covering interactions between different types of actors (i.e. not only intergovernmental, but also transnational) and on various scales (bi- and multilateral, regional, global, etc.). The framework of international cooperation refers here to the structures and processes of policy-making beyond the nation-state and is used synonymously with global governance.¹

Economic theory uses the term collective action to analyse how actors work together in groups in order to achieve common objectives and what problems might impede collaboration (Olson 1965). Collective action theory is used to explain the (under-) provision of public goods and has been extended beyond the nation-state to global collective action and the provision of GPGs (Sandler 2004). This paper will mostly refer to international cooperation and global collective action interchangeably.

The concept of GPGs has already a long history in development research. Academia, development agencies and international organisations have used and developed the concept to grasp trans-boundary or global challenges for development. ² This paper refers to this work and keeps the definitional part to the necessary minimum.

Economic theory defines the concept of public goods in opposition to private goods (Cornes / Sandler 1996). Private and public goods are distinguished from each other with regard to the properties of the benefits they provide. In contrast to private goods, the benefits accruing from public goods are non-excludable and non-rival in consumption. A good is non-excludable if no person can be prevented from enjoying its benefits (or at least not at reasonable cost). A good is non-rival if consumption by one person does not reduce the amount available to another person. Goods that fulfil both criteria are “pure” public goods. “Impure” public goods do not meet one of these criteria: examples are “club goods”, which are non-rival but excludable, and “common pool resources”, which are non-excludable, but rival. “Pure” private and “pure” public goods can also be considered ideal types between which a range of options of how benefits spread exists (Kaul / Grunberg / Stern 1999b: 4). Moreover, “publicness in consumption” needs to be distinguished from “publicness in utility” since preferences for public goods vary among individuals. Finally, “public” and “private” properties of a good are not always naturally given, but often socially constructed and a policy choice (Kaul / Mendoza, 2003: 80/91).

The concept of public goods is closely related to the notion of collective action. The definition of a good as “public” does not only stem from its non-excludable and non-rival

¹ For the concept of global governance, see also the sub-section on governance mechanisms in Section 3.
² E.g., Kaul / Grunberg / Stern (1999a); Kaul et al. (2003); Kaul / Conceicao (2006); Sandler (2004); Barrett (2007).
properties, but also from the way it is provided: through “purposeful” collective action (in distinction to spontaneous coordination via the market mechanisms that provide private goods). However, economic theory predicts that public goods suffer from collective action problems (Sandler 2004: 17ff.). Since benefits are available even without contributing to the good, actors have an incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. In domestic political systems, the state is responsible for overcoming these problems in order to avoid underprovision of public goods.

The concept of public goods has been applied beyond the domestic level to designate challenges resulting from growing interdependencies and limits to purely national policymaking induced by globalisation. Definitions of GPGs have in common that they refer to the above definition of public goods. However, these definitions also differ considerably, especially with regard to the geographic scale to which they refer. According to Kaul / Grunberg / Stern (1999b: 11), for instance,

"a pure global public good is marked by universality – that is, it benefits all countries, people and generations. An impure global public good would tend towards universality in that it would benefit more than one group of countries, [...] a broad spectrum of the global population [...] [and it] meets needs of present generations without jeopardizing those of future generations”.

Similarly, the International Task Force on Global Public Goods defines GPGs as goods conferring benefits that “could in principle be consumed by the governments and peoples of all states” (International Task Force on Global Public Goods 2006: 2). In addition to “global”, public goods beyond the nation-state are also conceptualised as “international”, “regional” or “transnational” (e.g. Kindleberger 1986; Sandler 1998; Holzinger 2008). Authors use these other categories either in distinction to or as a synonym and precision of the concept of GPGs. Although the distinction between different geographical scales is relevant for the analysis of specific cases, this paper uses a simple dichotomy between domestic public goods (DPGs) (including national and sub-national public goods) and GPGs (including transnational, regional, international and “truly” global public goods). As is the case for the “public” property of a good, its geographic scale is often constructed by policy choice. While some goods are global by nature (e.g. the atmosphere), others have been made global, e.g. by economic openness or technical progress, and are therefore “globalised national public goods” (Kaul / Mendoza 2003: 95–96).

Another distinction exists between final and intermediate GPGs (Kaul / Mendoza 2003: 104). Final GPGs are goals, e.g. a stable climate or the eradication of a communicable disease. Intermediate GPGs are enablers; they contribute to final GPGs (e.g. international regimes and organisations, fundamental research to find a new vaccine).

### 2.2 Global public goods as enablers and goals of development

From a development perspective, the main emphasis has long been put on the role of GPGs in supporting or enabling development in poor countries. Given current trends in global development, the function as enablers remains highly relevant. But the relevance of GPGs is also changing in quality: GPGs are increasingly becoming development goals in

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3 Markets can also contribute to the provision of public goods, but need to be created to that purpose first.
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their own right. Both trends, the increasing role as enablers and the emerging significance as goals, are a consequence of a changing global development context.

To be sure, the relevance of GPGs for development has been acknowledged in many previous debates on development priorities and agendas. The understanding of development underlying the MDGs has focused on meeting basic needs in developing countries. Responsibility for achieving these goals has primarily been located at the domestic level of developing countries that can be supported by development cooperation and aid. However, the MDGs also include problems of a trans-boundary nature and mention the broader international framework conditions: MDG 6, in particular, targets communicable diseases and other health challenges that transcend borders; MDG 8 on a global partnership for development addresses the international framework conditions, such as developing “further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system.”

Before the MDGs, the Rio Earth summit in 1992 stressed the importance of the global commons, in particular a stable climate, for development by advancing the notion of “sustainable development”. In the 1970s, proponents of a NIEO criticised the structure of the global economic system as the main impediment to development in poor countries.

At the time of the first boom of the GPG concept in development studies at the turn of the millennium, the main focus was on the role of GPGs in enabling poverty reduction. In general, this consensus is still valid, but also needs to be refined in the light of a changing development landscape. These changes make GPGs, first, even more relevant as enablers of development and, second, establish GPGs as development goals in their own right.

First, the role of GPGs as enablers of development becomes more important relative to other external contributions to development such as ODA. Shifts in wealth (OECD 2010) and poverty (Kanbur and Sumner 2012) have led to a strong differentiation among developing countries. While 90 per cent of the absolute poor lived in relatively stable low-income countries (LICs) at the beginning of the 1990s, poverty now concentrates in middle-income countries (MICs) (Sumner 2010, 2012) and will increasingly be located in fragile states (Kharas / Rogerson 2012). These two main (and partly overlapping) categories of countries, MICs and fragile states, put particular demands on development policy. MICs are less dependent on ODA. Instead, other areas of international cooperation gain in

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4 MDG 8 for a global partnership for development consists of six targets: “A) Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system; B) Address the special needs of the least developed countries; C) Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small-island developing States; D) Deal comprehensively with debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term; E) In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries; F) In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.” (UN 2013b: ix-x). The indicators for these targets cover official development assistance (ODA), market access, debt sustainability, access to medicines and the use of information and communication technology (ICT). The goal has been monitored by the MDG Gap Task Force since 2007. In retrospect and in view of a “renewed global partnership” for the post-2015 development agenda, MDG 8 is seen as a useful advocacy tool to build on, but also criticised for its shortcomings. Gaps and weaknesses of MDG 8 stem partly from its position as “outlier goal” with less concrete and time-bound commitments compared to the rest of the MDGs. Moreover, MDG 8 still has a strong focus on ODA and a limited scope in terms of actors and areas covered (UN 2013a; Kenny / Dykstra 2013).
relative importance as enablers in facilitating the reduction of extreme poverty, but also in dealing with other domestic development challenges (inequality, environmental degradation, urbanisation, etc.) (e.g. Keijzer / Krätke / van Seters 2013; Sumner 2013). Many fragile states will continue to be dependent on ODA, but the provision of this assistance needs to be closely linked with other areas of international cooperation and requires a regional and global environment that is conducive to stability (e.g. OECD 2006).

Second, GPGs are more and more becoming goals of development in their own right. Severino / Ray (2009: 5) list “finding solutions for the preservation of global public goods” as one of three development objectives next to 1) “accelerating the economic convergence of developing nations with industrialised economies”; and 2) “providing for basic human welfare (conceptualised by the Millennium Development Goals framework as universal access to essential services)”.

The growth dynamics that have led to the increasing heterogeneity in the “South” have contributed to this change in perspective. The development paths of emerging (and advanced) countries, on the one hand, and pockets of persistent underdevelopment, on the other hand, strain the global commons and make the provision or preservation of GPGs more pressing. The economic rise of large and populous countries such as China, India and Brazil and the growth of the “global middle class” (Kharas 2010; OECD 2012) intensify the pressure on planetary boundaries that had already been strong as a result of the development models of advanced countries. Fragile and conflict-affected states risk undermining efforts to provide GPGs (e.g. spread of communicable diseases). All countries irrespective of their income-level share a mutual interest in solving these challenges. Merging the post-MDG agenda and the SDGs would be a step towards a “universal” development agenda on which GPGs appear as development goals in their own right.

2.3 The interdependence between domestic and global action and goals

Figure 1 defines the role of international cooperation in a framework structured around DPGs and GPGs as goals and enablers of development. This framework differentiates between provision, support, access and preservation to identify distinct functions of international cooperation from a GPG-perspective.

The vertical axis of Figure 1 illustrates the range of development goals. Thinking about what kind of problems development studies should deal with in the future Haddad (2013) distinguishes “common” and “collective” problems. “Common problems are development issues that all countries – rich and poor – are facing”, e.g. inequality, obesity, and dealing with ageing societies. Solutions to these problems do not have direct cross-border benefits and are therefore DPGs. “Collective problems are things that affect everyone and require collective action”, e.g. climate change, migration and food security. Solutions to these challenges have cross-border benefits and are therefore GPGs. Figure 1 uses this distinction for its vertical axis. In addition, it includes poverty reduction and basic needs at the same end as common problems since they share shares similar properties (i.e. as
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DPG). In sum, the vertical axis illustrates that solutions to development problems can have a GPG character (GPGs as a goal) or a DPG character (DPGs as a goal).

The horizontal axis distinguishes whether the goals are enabled primarily at the global or domestic level, i.e. either through international cooperation and global collective action or domestic policy. In other words, the primary enabling factor can have a GPG character, e.g. an international regime, or it can primarily have a DPG character and be provided through domestic public policy. However, even when the enabler is domestic, international cooperation can be relevant, e.g. to build domestic capacities through development cooperation or other forms of cooperation. The combination of the two axes leads to the aforementioned four categories of provision, support, access and preservation.

Figure 1: The interdependence of domestic and global action and goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GPGs as goals (collective problems)</th>
<th>DPGs as goals (poverty reduction and common problems)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I) Provision</td>
<td>(IV) Preservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(II) Support</td>
<td>(III) Access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own illustration

(I) Provision: Countries cooperate to provide GPGs in order to solve problems resulting from interdependence and globalisation (e.g. global trade rules, the protection of the ozone layer). This provision is not necessarily related to development concerns. On the contrary, GPGs are often provided for and by the better-off countries (Barrett 2007: 167). From the perspective of a broader development agenda including the SDGs and universal goals, GPGs such as a stable climate and biodiversity constitute more direct development goals.

(II) Support: GPGs might not be provided in the interest of poor people in the first place. But their development-orientation can subsequently be increased. International cooperation can reshape existing intermediate GPGs, i.e. international regimes, to make them more development-friendly. For instance, trade rules can limit the use of agricultural subsidies and intellectual property...
rules for medicines can be adapted to the needs of the poorest countries. Similarly, GPGs that would disproportionately benefit poor countries, but have not been provided because the most powerful global actors lack interest, can be provided to promote development (e.g. research on diseases that exist in poor countries, but considerably less in rich ones). In a similar vein, GPGs can be designed to enable the solution of common problems, for instance by providing structures for coordination (e.g. global tax cooperation) or the sharing of knowledge and best practices on issues like education (e.g. OECD).

(III) **Access:** Even if a GPG is provided and is in principle conducive to supporting development, the benefits of GPGs might still not be accessible to poor countries due to domestic constraints. One example is the so-called digital divide that prevents poor people from benefitting from global communication technologies, in particular the Internet. Another example is aid for trade that aims at lifting constraints on the ability of poor countries to benefit from the global trade system.

(IV) **Preservation:** Finally, GPGs can be enabled or harmed by domestic development. On the one hand, economic development can deplete global commons if it is not put on a sustainable path (e.g. increasing greenhouse gas emissions). On the other hand, underdevelopment can impair GPGs (e.g. the reappearance of communicable diseases in fragile or conflict-affected countries). Therefore, the preservation of GPGs requires DPGs as enablers (e.g. environmental laws, health systems).

Figure 1 provides a conceptual illustration of the interdependence inherent in a broadening development agenda. From the perspective of goals, the lower part of the framework corresponds to GPG-questions that have already been present in traditional development debates, while the upper part contains a SDG-type view on GPGs as goals in their own right. From the perspective of enablers, the right side of the framework corresponds to the focus of action on domestic policies (with potential external support, e.g. via development cooperation), while the left side is about the broader framework of international cooperation and global collective action. The interdependence that emerges from this picture stems from the fact that none of the categories showed in Figure 1 can be achieved in isolation from the others: provision, support, access and preservation form a cycle that only works as a whole.

3 **Patterns of international cooperation**

The previous section has underlined the importance of integrating the broader framework of international cooperation and global collective action into the effort of realising a broadening agenda of global development. As a consequence, how international cooperation works and why it fails (or succeeds) are central questions for development research. Different fields of study have dealt with these questions emphasising both the

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5 Another common distinction is between core and complementary activities in GPG provision. While core activities refer to what is depicted as “provision” in the framework, complementary activities assist the provision or the ability to benefit from GPGs and therefore relate to the categories of “preservation” and “access” (World Bank 2001: 110; Morrissey / Te Velde / Hewitt 2002)
difficulties of, but also the increasing need for cooperation beyond the nation-state in an interdependent and globalised world.

The literature on international relations has discussed the prospects of cooperation in an anarchic international system, confronting especially neorealists and liberal institutionalists (Baldwin 1993; Jervis 1999). Institutionalists argue that cooperation can be more than an ephemeral phenomenon, but rather a regular occurrence not only when sponsored by a hegemon, but also when facilitated by institutions (Keohane 1984). However, current pessimism about international cooperation puts into question the ability of existing institutions to adapt to power shifts and increasingly complex problems (Hale / Held / Young 2013).

In a similar vein, economic theory approaches collective action through the prism of causes of underprovision of GPGs. The theory predicts that the provision of public goods suffers from collective action problems. As benefits are available even without contributing to the good, actors have an incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. As a result, public goods tend to be underprovided. At the domestic level, it is commonly assumed that the government’s central authority facilitates the overcoming of collective action problems, by coercion if necessary. Given the lack of such an authority at the global level, prospects for solving these problems through international cooperation and global governance appear weaker than at the domestic level. Moreover, the increasing number and heterogeneity of actors at the global level bodes ill for collective action from this theoretical standpoint. Diverging preferences of actors must be brought closer together by changing incentives and “clever institutional design” (Sandler 2004: 32; Barrett 2007: 21).

In short, these perspectives point to problems in achieving and sustaining cooperation beyond the nation-state. At the same time, international cooperation is ubiquitous. On this empirical basis, various disciplines have developed a wealth of concepts to describe the architecture and processes of international cooperation. This section presents an overview of the key features highlighted in the literature of GPGs, international relations, global governance and public policy. The objective of this part of the paper is to sketch the picture of the broader framework of international cooperation to which the global development agenda needs to link up in order to meet the expectations for its implementation.

3.1 Aggregation technologies

In addition to the properties of public goods presented above (pure, impure, club, etc.), the literature on GPGs stresses “aggregation technology” as having strategic implications for GPG provision. Aggregation technology “indicates how individual contributions to the collective action influence the total quantity of the public good” (Sandler 2004: 38). The literature commonly distinguishes three ideal type aggregation technologies: summation (or aggregate effort), weakest-link, and single-best effort (Barrett 2007).

In the case of summation, “public good levels equal the sum of individual contributions” (Sandler 2004: 68). In other words, GPGs can only be supplied if all countries cooperate and contribute an equal share to the provision. Deviations from this ideal type exist: for
instance, even if all countries need to contribute, their contributions might not have to be equal, but weighted. Threshold public goods require contributions to surpass a certain level before benefits ensue. Cutting greenhouse gases to mitigate climate change is an example combining summation, weighted and threshold characteristics. Mitigation would fail if not all countries contributed to the overall effort of cutting emissions. At the same time, contributions vary according to historical responsibilities and the significance of individual countries as emitters of greenhouse gases. Moreover, benefits from mitigation will only materialise if all greenhouse-gas reductions together reach a threshold that is sufficient to keep global temperatures from rising too much.

Second, the provision of a GPG can depend on the smallest contribution. Weakest-link GPGs are similar to aggregate effort GPGs in that they require contributions from every country. In the case of weakest-link GPGs, provision risks failing because one country does not contribute, for example, due to constraints in capacity. The eradication of infectious diseases such as smallpox is a typical example of this type of GPG. The eradication of communicable diseases is only successful if they are eliminated everywhere in the world. Weakest-links, such as fragile- and conflict-affected countries, might therefore undermine complete eradication. The recent outbreak of polio during the civil war in Syria, which could spread the disease in the region, is a recent example (WHO 2013).

Finally, single-best effort GPGs are provided by one country alone when there are powerful incentives to supply a GPG unilaterally. Major scientific breakthroughs in fundamental research are an example of this type of GPG provision. Single-best efforts can also involve cooperation. For instance, their supply can require coordination as it might entail risks for others or reduce the provision of another GPG. Moreover, single-best efforts can be undertaken in small groups of actors that share the costs and risks of uncertainty. The CERN particle physics laboratory and the ITER fusion reactor are examples of countries pooling their resources to conduct fundamental research that can potentially lead to major scientific breakthroughs but requires a sustained and costly long-term engagement without guarantee of success (McCray 2010; Harding / Khanna / Orbach 2012).

In practice, the provision of GPGs often does not fit only one of these aggregation technologies. Gartner (2012: 306) finds that “many important global health challenges have the qualities of weakest-link, summation and single best-effort public goods all at the same time”. The aggregation technology might rather reflect a sequence in the provision of GPGs. In the case of global health, the sequencing would include: first, the discovery of a new drug or treatment as a single best-effort; second, financing the distribution of a drug or treatment requires the aggregate effort of a diverse range of actors (e.g. the GAVI Alliance); and finally, combating global health challenges such as communicable diseases only works if universal compliance is assured. Therefore pockets of weak compliance need to be identified by a system of surveillance and reporting.

3.2 Types of contribution

Apart from the question of how contributions add up to GPG provision, the literature on GPGs distinguishes types of contributions mobilised through collective action. Barrett
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(2007) identifies three types of contributions in the provision of GPGs: “financing and burden sharing”, “mutual restraint”, “coordination and global standards”. This section partly builds on these categories by distinguishing rule- and standard-setting, financing and knowledge as types of contribution. Differentiating between contributions and GPGs as such is sometimes difficult, as contributions might themselves be “intermediate” GPGs. “Mutual restraint” or “coordination and global standards”, for instance, reflect rules of behaviour constituting international regimes, i.e. intermediate GPGs. The overlapping definitional boundaries between contributions and GPGs also underline that GPGs are not provided independently from each other but are interrelated.

Setting rules or standards contributes to the provision of GPGs by changing and coordinating the behaviour of actors. They can agree to do something or to abstain from doing something (e.g. lowering barriers to trade or not using agricultural subsidies). Knowledge as a contribution to global problem-solving processes provides options and identifies solutions that inform changes in rules and standards or the use of finance. Knowledge relates to global policy-making in a cycle of knowledge generation, transmission and use where it can take the form of scientific and technical expertise, but also experience and implicit knowledge (e.g. Jones et al., 2012).

Financing is the type of contribution that is most highlighted in discussions about how to provide GPGs. Moreover, financing is implicitly also present in the other contributions: changing global rules can have financial implications and create winners and losers; creating knowledge entails costs as well. Typically, GPG provision involves the creation of rules at the global or transnational level, while financial implications are dealt with at the domestic level. However, the role of truly global or transnational financing instruments has substantially increased, drawing on a diverse range of innovative mechanisms from both public and private sources (Kaul / Conceicao 2006; see sections on governance mechanisms and implementation below). The trans-boundary dimension of GPG-financing is particularly relevant when the provision process is marked by asymmetry. In this case, global financing arrangements serve to compensate and redistribute in favour of those that lack incentives, would lose out too much in the short term or simply do not have the means to contribute to the provision. More generally, asymmetry requires additional arrangements for burden-sharing that can, for instance, demand varying contributions from different groups of actors (e.g. common-but-differentiated responsibilities) (e.g. Pauw et al. 2014).

3.3 Governance mechanisms

The above mentioned contributions can be mobilised through a broad range of mechanisms that have been conceptualised under the umbrella term of global governance. Over twenty years ago, the concept of global governance gave a new impetus to the study of international relations by asserting that authority can be exercised separately from territory and hierarchy (Rosenau 1992). Cooperation beyond the nation-state does not only occur as traditional diplomacy between sovereign nation-states, but is a multi-actor, multi-mechanism and multi-level process (Messner / Nuscheler 2003; Dingwerth / Pattberg

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6 In this context, the debate on the use of ODA for GPG provision is also relevant (Raffer 1999; Anand 2004; Reisen / Soto / Weithöner 2004).
The concept of global governance recognises that non-state actors – such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or firms – can be actors of public steering beyond advocacy or expertise provision (Cutler / Haufler / Porter 1999; Ruggie 2004: 3–8; Pattberg 2007: 9–13; Risse 2012: 428–430). Moreover, the global governance literature distinguishes between different mechanisms of cooperation.

The traditional mechanism of international cooperation is intergovernmental cooperation between states and the implementation of this cooperation through domestic policy-making within states. Between the two, there is a broad range of governance mechanisms that are usually subsumed under the category of networks. Networks as forms of social organisation have been studied in many different scientific disciplines.\(^7\) The central idea behind network approaches is that, in order to achieve their goals, autonomous, but interdependent actors need to work together to complementarily mobilise policy resources in situations in which these resources are widely dispersed. The remaining part of this subsection presents intergovernmental cooperation and three main categories of network governance (transgovernmental networks; transnational private governance; and transnational public-private partnerships).

**Intergovernmental cooperation**

Bi- and multilateral intergovernmental cooperation is conducted by agents officially charged to represent their country. A typical case is the negotiation and adoption of an international treaty creating legally binding rules (international hard law) that are subsequently implemented within domestic political systems. GPG provision processes often centre on intergovernmental treaty-making, e.g. the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer or the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Currently, the multilateral system is considered in crisis as important multilateral processes (trade, climate) are stalled. Multilateral cooperation remains the cornerstone of global collective action. At the same time, it has shown inflexibility in accommodating power shifts, growing heterogeneity of actors and more complex problems (Hale / Held / Young 2013; Kahler 2013). On the one hand, the crisis of multilateralism has come along with a growing role of other forms of intergovernmental cooperation such as “minilateralism” (Naím 2009), informal clubs such as the Group of 20 (G20) and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (e.g. Forman / Segaar 2006; Cooper / Farooq 2013) or regionalisation (Cooper / Hughes / de Lombaerde 2008). On the other hand, “new” governance mechanisms have emerged.

Intergovernmental cooperation deals with challenges of interdependence between territories for which governments have exclusive authority. However, the separation of authority from territory and hierarchy induced by globalisation creates a gap between what

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7 One of the most common taxonomies of modes of coordination comes from the study of business organisations where networks refer to a “distinctive form of coordinating economic activity” that can be situated between hierarchy (intra-firm organisation) and markets (Powell, 1990: 301). Public policy analysis has defined networks as a particular form of governance that reflects changes in state-society relations (Kenis / Schneider 1991; Börzel 1998; Adam / Kriesi 2007). In particular, modern societies are functionally differentiated and organised in autonomous policy subsystems that cannot be controlled entirely through hierarchical steering alone (Mayntz 1993). Networks as modes of governance have been studied under the label of “new” or “innovative” modes of governance in the literature on public policy, governance in the European Union and global governance (Mayntz 2008).
governments can do domestically and through intergovernmental cooperation, on the one hand, and what needs to be done to solve trans-boundary or global problems, on the other hand. “New” or “innovative” modes of governance have emerged to fill this gap (e.g. Koenig-Archibugi / Zürn 2006; Hale / Held 2011; Búrca / Keohane / Sabel 2013). Their conceptualisation and analysis has developed against the background of the limits of intergovernmental cooperation and draw on different interpretations of the changing role of the state in international relations. From the perspective of transgovernmental networks, the state remains the main actor, only the form of its international engagement changes. Research on transnational private governance has initially been based on the assumption that globalisation weakens public in favour of private authority. Finally, the concept of public-private partnerships has been transferred from the domestic level to global politics. From this perspective, states remain important actors given that they manage to work together with, and steer, other actors.

Transgovernmental networks

Transgovernmental relations are “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments” (Keohane / Nye 1974: 43). Broadly speaking, the particularity of transgovernmental networks is that actors with a role predominantly in domestic public policy interact directly with their foreign counterparts, circumventing actors traditionally charged with conducting foreign policy. They play a crucial role in global policy-making and have been considered to shape a “new world order” (Slaughter 2004).

Transgovernmental networks are manifestations of the “disaggregated state” (Slaughter 2004: 12). According to this reading, globalisation has changed the role of the state, but it has not reduced it. “Rather than a shift in the locus of power – from states to something else – [...] [transgovernmental networks embody] a shift in the modes by which state power is deployed and the forms by which states interact” (Raustiala 2002: 20). Transgovernmental networks imitate and respond to more flexible, mobile and global forms of interaction engaged in by private actors (Slaughter / Zaring 2007: 215). The disaggregation of the state in functionally distinct parts is closely related to the emergence of the modern regulatory state. As a consequence of globalisation, domestic regulatory structures have increasingly had to reach out beyond their jurisdiction by forming networks with their counterparts in other countries. “Structural isomorphism”, i.e. the emergence of similar regulatory structures across states, has facilitated the creation of such networks (Raustiala 2002: 13).

Transgovernmental networks have established dense webs of cooperation and communication structures in many areas associated with the modern regulatory state such as competition policy, financial regulation and environmental protection. They perform an important role in rule-making, standard-setting and the definition of best practices. They serve as focal points for the exchange of information and expertise, build capacity and they promote implementation by disseminating information and providing learning opportunities (Slaughter 2004: 171ff.). Transgovernmental networks can occur as part of international agreements and be embedded in international organisations. As part of formal structures, they prepare and often pre-determine decision-making that leads to hard law adopted according to the intergovernmental mode of cooperation. However, executive
networks also emerge independently from pre-established structures and progressively shape their own forms of institutionalisation. This type of institution-building can lead to the creation of regulatory organisations that develop soft law standards for a specific issue area.

Transgovernmental networks have emerged especially in the developed world where certain conditions have favoured their formation. The elaborate structure of committees and working groups under the Council of Ministers of the European Union consists of this type of networks. Elaborate transgovernmental regulatory structures have also emerged between the United States and the European Union as a result of a series of international agreements (Peterson / Steffenson 2009; Pollack / Shaffer 2010). The committee structure of the OECD serves as a platform where national officials exchange best practices and evaluate each other’s policies in numerous issue areas (taxation, environmental protection, education, etc.). Examples of transgovernmental regulatory organisations are the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). These networks of central bankers, financial supervisors and ministerial officials create soft law standards in the form of guidelines and best practices. Although the literature on this mode of governance has so far focused on the developed world, the role of emerging and developing countries is increasing (Slaughter / Hale 2011), as exemplified by the broadening of the memberships of the BCBS and the FSB. In the area of environmental policy, the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) is an example of a transgovernmental network with global reach.

Transnational private governance

Private governance is rule-making without governments. The defining characteristic of transnational private governance is that it “potentially organises political spaces equivalent to the effects that public steering mechanisms have” (Pattberg 2007: 52). Therefore, private governance excludes other forms of (market) interactions between private actors. In other words: private governance

“give[s] rise to institutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behaviour in a specific issue area. These structuring effects resemble the ‘public’ governing functions of states and intergovernmental institutions, and for this reason the notion of governance, and indeed authority, has been applied to private actors” (Falkner 2003: 72–73).

The study of private authority in international affairs has received growing attention since the 1990s (Cutler / Hauffer / Porter 1999; Hall / Biersteker 2002). Private governance arrangements already played a role in ordering transnational economic relations in earlier historical periods. In the 20th century, the provision of global governance came to be associated primarily with public authorities as a consequence of the expansion of the modern regulatory state. The more recent re-emergence is related to the processes of economic globalisation of the second half of the 20th century and the restructuring of state functions as a response to it (Falkner 2003: 73). Globalisation and changing patterns of

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8 Factors favouring the emergence of transgovernmental networks are “relative homogeneity of political systems; degree of trust among government officials; degree of economic development; degree of economic interdependence [...] and relative willingness of national governments specifically to delegate government functions beyond their borders to networks of national officials” (Slaughter 2004: 51).
economic activity, such as global production networks, have created scope and demand for institutionalised cooperative relations among firms across borders to develop regulation, e.g. the standardisation of procedures to reduce transaction costs. As a societal response, private governance in the form of “civil regulation” has emerged to deal with externalities from transnational economic activity (e.g. corporate social responsibility and environmental standards) (Vogel 2009; Mayer / Gereffi 2010).

Therefore, private governance arrangements exist in different forms based on varying rationales depending on the issue they address. Private rule-making is particularly widespread in the setting of financial and economic standards. Büthe and Mattli (2011) underline the significance of private governance organisations such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) by referring to them as “the new global rulers”. Internet governance is probably the most prominent example of a GPG being provided by private governance (Mueller 2010). Bodies like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) govern the addressing system and develop the common standards that make the Internet function globally. Global sustainability governance is another area of intensive private rule-making. Arrangements in this area comprise various certification and reporting initiatives that produce “private co-regulation” involving companies and the non-profit sector (e.g. the Forest Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship Council or the Global Reporting Initiative) (Pattberg 2005, 2007; Dingwerth 2008). This category of governance arrangements partly overlaps with other multistakeholder initiatives that have been conceptualised as transnational public-private partnerships and also engage, amongst others, in standard-setting.9

**Transnational public-private partnerships**

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are known from domestic policy-making where they have been advanced, for instance in the framework of New Public Management (NPM), as mechanisms to improve governance effectiveness (e.g. in infrastructure and service provision). In contrast to principal-agent relationships between the public sector and private contractors, PPPs are “horizontal” arrangements that draw on the comparative advantages of autonomous actors from both sectors to achieve common objectives (Brinkerhoff / Brinkerhoff 2011: 4/5). Beyond the domestic level, PPPs have attracted increasing attention as transnational governance mechanisms (Börzel / Risse 2005; Kaul 2006; Schäferhoff / Campe / Kaan 2009; Andonova 2010; Liese / Beisheim 2011; Pattberg et al. 2012). As “global public policy networks”, they have been advanced as “institutional innovations” to fill the “operational gap” that globalisation has caused between intergovernmental cooperation and domestic policy-making (Reinicke 1997; Reinicke / Deng 2000). In addition to functionalist arguments for the emergence of transnational PPPs, these mechanisms have also been discussed as means to close the “participation gap” in global governance by involving a broader range of actors (Andanova / Levy 2003).

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9 For an overview and differentiation of governance arrangements with participation of private actors, see Abbott / Snidal (2009). The authors map “regulatory standard-setting” (RSS) schemes in a “governance triangle” in which institutional arrangements are depicted according to actor types involved (states, firms and NGOs and various combinations of these actor types).
The literature on transnational PPPs lacks a commonly agreed definition, but several key characteristics can be identified. Broadly defined, transnational PPPs are institutionalised trans-boundary interactions between public actors (governments or international organisations) and (for-profit and/or non-profit) private actors with the objective to provide public goods (e.g. Schäferhoff / Campe / Kaan 2009: 455). PPPs establish joint governance in which the different actor groups have equal standing in setting up procedures on how to take decisions and implement actions in a clearly defined issue area (Kaul 2006: 222; Andonova 2010: 25/26). Usually, public and private actors establish a joint decision-making mechanism such as a governing board. On this basis, actors engage in co-financing and co-production of policy interventions, or delegate tasks to a non-profit organisation created for that purpose. The category of PPPs as a governance mechanism does not include arrangements in which non-state actors merely have a role in lobbying, advocacy or as expertise providers and contractors.

Transnational PPPs vary in their institutional structure and operational practice depending on the sectors they work in and the functions they perform. The literature distinguishes three types of PPP according to their main function: service provision/implementation; standard setting; and awareness-raising/knowledge exchange (Beisheim / Campe / Schäferhoff 2010: 372).

However, the functions of implementation, standard-setting and knowledge-sharing cannot always be neatly separated, but overlap to some extent. Prominent examples of transnational PPPs in the area of implementation in the health sector are the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. These PPPs pool financial resources from public and private sources and disburse these funds to support projects that are implemented by partnerships at the domestic and local levels. Transnational PPPs as means to raise and distribute additional funds are also conceptualised as “innovative financing mechanisms” (IFMs).

“[I]nnovative financing [...] comprise[s] mechanisms of raising funds or stimulating actions in support of international development that go beyond traditional spending approaches by either the official or private sectors” (Sandor / Scott / Benn 2009: 3).

In the area of standard-setting, transnational PPPs develop soft law to influence the behaviour of firms and governments, for instance, to promote more sustainable use of natural resources or corporate social responsibility. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an example for this type. Within the framework of the EITI, governments, international organisations, firms and civil society monitor jointly developed standards for the transparent use of revenues from oil, gas and mineral resources (Ölcer 2009). Another example is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to curb trade in conflict diamonds. Knowledge partnerships have the purpose to share expertise and experiences at the global level, but also promote application of this

10 Other typologies exist: Kaul (2006: 98) distinguishes seven types of transnational PPPs according to their main purpose: 1) Trading comparative advantage; 2) Pioneering new institutions (e.g. missing markets); 3) Designing rules and setting standards; 4) Advancing the frontiers of markets; 5) Brokering affordable price deals to make certain private goods more available; 6) Leveraging research and development; 7) Managing for strategic results.

11 These may consist in “new approaches for pooling of private and public revenues (…); new revenue streams [e.g. transnational taxation, bond raising] (…) [and] new incentives [e.g. financial guarantees] to address market failures or scale up ongoing development activities” (Sandor / Scott / Benn 2009: 3).
knowledge through partnerships at the local and domestic levels, including through capacity-building (Beisheim / Campe / Schäferhoff 2010: 272-73). The Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD) and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) follow this approach.

Overall, the global governance literature has developed numerous concepts to grasp the diversification of governance mechanisms at the global level. The study of these mechanisms as separate and distinct empirical phenomena has contributed to understanding global policy-making. A growing body of literature critically assesses explanations for the emergence and evaluates the effectiveness and legitimacy of “innovative” governance mechanisms as individual phenomena. Moreover, these different governance mechanisms relate to each other on a more systemic level. Multilateral/intergovernmental cooperation is still the pivot of global governance for most issues. At the same time, transgovernmental networks often form the basis for intergovernmental cooperation. Similarly, intergovernmental cooperation draws on public-private partnerships for implementation. Multilateral processes and international organisations often drive the creation of partnerships, e.g. the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) “type-2” partnerships (Pattberg et al. 2012: 1) or partnerships under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Streck 2004). In short, most of the issues that might figure prominently on a broadening agenda for global development, such as climate change or global health, rely on a mix of governance mechanisms. As part of this mix, governance mechanisms perform competing and complementary functions within the “global” policy-making process and shape (and in turn are shaped by) a complex institutional environment. The following sub-sections deal with these two aspects.

3.4 Stages of the policy process

International cooperation or the provision paths of GPGs can be conceived as a standard policy process including problem definition/agenda-setting, negotiation/decision-making, implementation, compliance monitoring/generation and evaluation. Although the entire process is relevant for any area of international cooperation, issues differ as to how critical or problematic specific stages of the process are. Each stage of the process entails distinct challenges.

Problem definition and agenda-setting

For international cooperation or a GPG provision process to be initiated, a global challenge needs to be identified, defined as a problem requiring global action, and be put on the global agenda. While some challenges impose themselves naturally because they convey a sense of urgency and immediate crisis, most challenges must compete with other issues for attention. Public policy analysis defines agenda-setting as moving an issue from the systemic (or informal) agenda (i.e. the “discussion agenda”) to the institutional (or formal) agenda (i.e. the “action agenda”) (Howlett / Ramesh / Perl 2009: 101/102).

Moving an issue from discussion to action differs depending on the issue in question: an issue can emerge from within decision-making circles on a technical matter without much public attention. Other issues might be advanced from outside the decision-making arena
in a highly public manner. Open mobilisation for an issue can also originate from the highest political level, e.g. at summits, in order to reach out to a wide range of actors whose support is required for successful implementation.\footnote{Cobb / Ross / Ross (1976) distinguish three different models of agenda-setting in domestic political systems: the outside initiative model (initiation from outside the decision-making arena, open expansion of the issue); the “mobilization model” (initiation from inside the decision-making arena, open expansion) and the “inside access model” (initiation from inside the decision-making arena, closed process).} At this stage, transnational advocacy networks (Keck / Sikkink 1998) and epistemic communities (Haas 1992) play an important role since a problem can only be on the agenda if there is awareness of the problem and possible solutions. The agenda-setting stage is crucial for the provision of GPGs whose properties as “public” or “global” are not in every case naturally given, but socially constructed and subject to policy choices (Kaul / Mendoza 2003).

**Negotiation and decision-making**

This stage of the policy-making process differs with regard to how decisions are made and to the quality of decisions. Regardless of differences according to actor types involved and varying membership structures, governance mechanisms work on the basis of decision-making procedures that have to balance requirements of efficiency, power and inclusiveness. Voting rules typically range from “one state, one vote” and unanimity to varying majority thresholds, including the reservation of veto rights for particular actors. Votes can further be weighted (e.g. according to financial contributions) and cast by groups of states and/or other actors in the form of constituencies. Notwithstanding legal procedures, negotiations do not necessarily involve an outright confrontation of positions or consist only in the trading of concessions culminating in a formal vote. Rather, decision-making often relies on the informal emergence of a consensus (Karns / Mingst 2004: 27).

Decisions made through international cooperation can have different quality. The main decision-making output is the creation of hard law through intergovernmental treaty-making. Hard law provides a legally binding commitment. But it is also difficult to reach and prone to deadlock. Other governance mechanisms produce soft law (e.g. transgovernmental networks and private governance). These rules sometimes have a strong capacity of self-enforcement, such as in the case of open standards (e.g. ISO standards, Internet protocols). In many cases, however, they reflect weak commitment and have both advantages and disadvantages. Soft law can be an effective way of dealing with uncertainty and diversity where hard law would not be reached in the first place. Moreover, in some fields entailing a high degree of technicality and fast-moving progress and change, soft law may be preferable to inflexible hard law (Abbott / Snidal 2000: 423). However, decision-making output in the form of rules and standards cannot be categorised within a clear dichotomy between hard and soft law. The range of rules rather corresponds to a continuum consisting of varying degrees of “obligation” and “precision” (Abbott et al. 2000). Moreover, hard and soft law can be closely interrelated in practice, e.g. with soft law being the preparatory step for hard law.
Implementation

Implementation is the process of putting decisions into practice. Implementation covers different types of activities: First, implementation can include further decision-making and regulatory actions that concretise a framework decision. Second, implementation entails the allocation and use of resources (e.g. finance, personnel) as well as the coordination between different actors providing these resources. The main location for the implementation is the domestic level; truly global or international implementation is the exception and specific to certain areas of cooperation (e.g. bi- and multilateral development cooperation). The standard procedure of implementation is the transposition of an international treaty into domestic law that is subsequently implemented by national or local bureaucracies and financed through the domestic tax systems of participating states (i.e. “behind-the-border cooperation”) (Kaul / Conceicao 2006: 26). Accordingly, the implementation phase has received more attention in the analysis of domestic public policy.

“Beyond the border cooperation”, i.e. implementation which is performed jointly by more than one international actor, represents a relatively small share of international cooperation activities and total interventions in the provision of GPGs (Kaul / Conceicao 2006: 39). This type of implementation is found, for instance, in transnational PPPs to finance GPG provision. Financing mechanisms are both more numerous and diverse than in the past. Most of this proliferation is due the creation of new arrangements after 1995 which increasingly include funds from non-public sources for the financing of single issues (UNDP 2005: 8–11).

Compliance monitoring/generation and evaluation

Compliance is about actors respecting commitments given at the decision-making stage. The lack of central enforcement at the global level has induced a rather negative view of the prospects for compliance in international relations. Similarly, public goods theory stresses uncertainties about compliance as a factor explaining underprovision of GPGs. This pessimistic outlook has given way to a more nuanced discussion about the complex causes of compliance (Raustiala / Slaughter 2002). The view that compliance is generally low and needs to be ensured in a decentralised self-help system has been contrasted with the “legalization of world politics”, including the proliferation of international judiciary bodies and dispute settlement mechanisms (Goldstein et al. 2000). Romano (1999: 709) describes the “enormous expansion of the international judiciary as the single most important development of the post-Cold War age.” Moreover, the debate on compliance has shifted from being considered primarily an enforcement problem to also being treated as a management issue. “Compliance problems often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of calculations of interests” (Chayes / Chayes 1993: 176). Instead, international cooperation needs to address sources of noncompliance, such as ambiguity and lack of capacity.

Broadly speaking, compliance can be considered from a legal (input-oriented) perspective (if actors do what they agreed in the decision-making stage). Alternatively, this last stage
of the process can be approached from a policy (output-oriented) perspective (if cooperation leads to intended results).\textsuperscript{13}

From a legal perspective, compliance is monitored and generated through various judicial bodies and dispute resolution mechanisms (for a recent overview, see Romano / Alter / Shany 2014). These mechanisms show varying degrees of “delegation”, i.e. “the extent to which states and other actors delegate authority to designate third parties – including courts, arbitrators, and administrative organizations – to implement agreements” (Abbott et al. 2000: 415). Delegation can be high and include binding third party decisions or low and limited to diplomatic bargaining between states. Keohane / Moravcsik / Slaughter (2000) further specify the notion of delegation with the help of the variables “independence”, “access” and “legal embeddedness”. Independence refers to the degree of influence states have on the dispute resolution body (e.g. in terms of selection and tenure or financial and human resources). Access bears on the range of actors that have standing in the proceedings. This variable can range from states having to agree to open proceedings to individuals being entitled to initiate proceedings. Legal embeddedness concerns the extent to which the enforcement of rulings is automatic or discretionary. Rulings might be subject to veto rights, rely on decentralised enforcement by states or be directly applicable in domestic legal systems. Combining these variables leads to two ideal types: interstate and transnational dispute resolution. In the first type, “states act as gatekeepers both to the international legal process and from that process back to the domestic level” (Keohane / Moravcsik / Slaughter (2000): 457). In the transnational model, the gate-keeping capacity of states does not exist or is at least reduced.

These two ideal types represent ends of a continuum along which diverse forms of dispute resolution can be situated. The inter-state model comprises intergovernmental diplomacy (e.g. UN Security Council) and intergovernmental arbitration (e.g. International Court of Justice). Multilateral dispute settlement mechanisms such as in the World Trade Organization (WTO) occupy a middle ground. They leave more room for the participation of non-state actors and rulings cannot be precluded by states. The other end of the spectrum includes transnational arbitration (e.g. International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes - ICSID) and the supranational judiciary (e.g. European Court of Justice).

Review and monitoring systems conducted by international organisations can support these judicial mechanisms. From a policy perspective, these systems are also relevant for softer forms of evaluation against commonly agreed benchmarks. Another important mechanism is peer review through which actors evaluate each other (e.g. OECD DAC Peer Review, African Peer Review Mechanism). Peer review and pressure aim to promote a process of mutual learning and socialisation leading to incremental, long-term changes in the performance of actors relative to agreed standards or goals (Pagani 2002). As in the agenda-setting phase, non-state actors (e.g. advocacy networks, epistemic communities) play an important part in the monitoring and evaluation of global policies. In the end, the success of international cooperation or GPG provision depends on how insights from this final stage feed back into the policy process.

\textsuperscript{13} See also the distinction between compliance and effectiveness (Raustiala / Slaughter 2002)
3.5 Institutional complexity

Areas of international cooperation vary with regard to the scope and institutionalisation of the issues they deal with. An issue area might be governed by a single, well-defined and integrated international regime or several overlapping ones. Issues might also initially be confined to a single regime and then evolve into a more complex matter. Yet another option is that an issue completely lacks institutionalisation of any kind and cooperation takes place in a highly fragmented environment.

International regimes are intermediate GPGs that contribute to the provision of final GPGs. They are defined as “sets of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983: 2). Regimes are a type of international institution. Institutions facilitate international cooperation, e.g. by reducing transaction costs, providing information, stabilising expectations about behaviour or enabling socialisation and learning.14

Initially, the study of regimes focused on comprehensive, integrated international regimes in which states are the central actors creating hard law in a well-defined issue area. Such regimes typically come along with a focal international organisation that takes on the regime’s administration as the states’ agent. The early regime literature addressed questions about the creation and maintenance of regimes. The main debates revolved around whether regimes are supplied by powerful states and merely reflect the distribution of power in the international system or if “institutions matter” and demand for international cooperation is the main driver in a regime’s development (Keohane 1984; Hasenclever / Mayer / Rittberger 1997).

Research interest in the effectiveness of regimes has progressively drawn attention to “institutional interaction” or “institutional interplay” (Stokke 2001). International institutions mutually influence each other and these interactions, in turn, affect their development and problem-solving performance (Stokke / Oberthür 2011). Institutional interplay gained in relevance as a research subject against the background of the increasing “legalization of world politics” (Goldstein et al. 2000) that has made the global institutional landscape denser and more intrusive (Raustiala / Victor, 2004: 278; Oberthür / Gehring 2011). Understanding the governance spaces that emerge from these interactions requires a more integrated view on the dynamics and effectiveness of global governance (Raustiala / Victor 2004) and “global governance architectures” (Biermann et al. 2009).

Such sets of institutions have been conceptualised, most importantly, as regime complexes and nested regimes (Keohane / Victor 2011). Regime complexes are defined as “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area” (Raustiala / Victor 2004: 279). Orsini / Morin / Young (2013: 29) define a “regime complex as a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are

14 The regime concept has been applied by different schools of thought in international relations. Hasenclever / Mayer / Rittberger (1997) distinguish three perspectives: interest-based theories (liberal institutionalist perspective), power-based theories (realist perspective) and knowledge-based theories (constructivist perspectives).
managed effectively.” Climate governance offers an example of an issue that has moved from an integrated to a more complex institutional setting. This area of international cooperation has developed from a single UN-sponsored treaty system with nearly universal membership to experiencing a “Cambrian explosion”. As a result, climate governance takes place in a “[highly complex institutional environment […] including multiple organizations that have diverse memberships and operate at different scales” (Keohane / Victor 2011). In nested regimes, in contrast, elemental regimes “are imbricated one within the other, like Russian dolls”, and hierarchically related to one another (Alter / Meunier 2006). The relationship between regional or sector-specific trade rules and the more general trade rules of the WTO is an example of this type of institutional interplay.

The perspective of institutional interplay and complexity is relevant for understanding the institutional landscape of a broadening agenda for global development. In particular, the literature points to implications and challenges for the governance of global development. The management of interactions between existing regimes gains in relevance relative to investments into crafting new regimes in the first place (Keohane / Victor 2011: 7). Interactions affect the performance of individual regimes and areas of global governance as a whole, depending on whether interaction is disruptive or synergetic. Accordingly, the management of institutional interplay, i.e. “conscious efforts by any relevant actor or group of actors […] to address and improve institutional interaction and its effects” (Stokke / Oberthür 2011: 6), has become increasingly important. In particular, international organisations and networks of experts and bureaucracies act as managers of institutional confusion (e.g. Abbott / Snidal 2010; Lesage / de Graaf 2013). However, institutional complexity also creates space for “cross institutional political strategies including: forum-shopping, regime-shifting, and strategic inconsistency” (Alter / Meunier 2009: 17). As a result, accountability might become diluted because it is difficult to locate which institution or actor is responsible for an issue.

4 Conclusions

The post-2015 process for setting a global development agenda raises questions about international cooperation that have already been part of previous development debates, but still remain inadequately addressed. Integrating the broader framework of international cooperation and global collective action more solidly into development efforts is one of the main challenges for making claims on implementing a global development agenda credible. This paper has presented conceptual foundations that can inform this debate.

The first section has illustrated how the broader framework of international cooperation and global collective action fits into the overall context of goals and actions in development. The framework identifies contact points between global and domestic action and goals with the categories of provision, support, access and preservation. These categories correspond to the different functions international cooperation performs with regard to development from a GPG-perspective. The second part of the paper has given an overview of key concepts from the literature on international relations, global governance and GPGs structured according to the main categories of aggregation technology, types of contribution, governance mechanisms, the role of different stages in the provision process,
and institutional complexity. The overview highlights the patterns and diversity in dealing with global problems and the provision of GPGs. International cooperation might entail any combination of the attributes presented within and across the above sub-sections (summarised in Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Summary of concepts of international cooperation from Section 3</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregation</strong></td>
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<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best-shot</td>
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<td>Weakest-link</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Source: Author’s own compilation, based on the literature referred to in Section 3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this conceptual overview, two main sets of challenges appear in view of making the broader framework of international cooperation and global collective action part of a joined-up approach to reaching development objectives:

First, the relevance of the broader framework of international cooperation for development places the question why international cooperation fails or GPGs are underprovided at the centre of development studies. To approach this question, development research can draw on and further develop an existing body of literature from economic theory, international relations/global governance and other disciplines. Overall, the conceptual overview hints at questioning dichotomist thinking on cooperation, drawing a well-defined line between the state, which solves collective action problems by top-down control, and the anarchic international system, which is fraught with free-riding. Opening the black box of the state shows that policy-making at all levels involves conflict and cooperation among actors within a given architecture of institutions and processes (or the lack thereof). Public policy analysis has long acknowledged that domestic and local policy-making is not only a hierarchical top-down process primarily using coercion and enforcement. Instead, such processes often involve cooperation in networks and negotiation systems, even if the “shadow of hierarchy” makes a difference (e.g. Ostrom 1990; Mayntz 1993; Voigt 1995).

In other words, analysing why cooperation works or fails beyond the nation-state is not a fundamental departure from research questions traditionally addressed in development studies. Collective action and cooperation have always been central to understanding development processes within developing countries: states are institutional frameworks that contribute to providing positive development outcomes when their societies are good at cooperating; states undersupply public goods when cooperation within a society is deficient. This logic applies to any scale of human interaction. After all, reform deadlock and policy failure can sound as familiar to domestic politics as they do to global governance.
Therefore, how to promote mechanisms of cooperation is a relevant question for any level of analysis. Drawing on different disciplines such as evolutionary biology, social anthropology, and economics, Messner / Guarín / Haun (2013) argue that cooperative behaviour rests on the existence of a limited number of basic mechanisms of cooperation. They identify seven fundamental mechanisms that make cooperation work: reciprocity, trust, communication, reputation, fairness, enforcement and we-identity. Working on these underlying mechanisms of cooperation is particularly relevant in a global context marked by power shifts and complex issue-linkages which characterise many challenges that are likely to figure on a broadening agenda for global development, such as climate stability, food security, peace, and global health.

Second, stressing the lack or failure of international cooperation stands in stark contrast to the abundance of cooperation that can be observed and the elaborate architecture and processes reflected in the conceptual overview. From this perspective, the challenge is not always to realise international cooperation in the first place, but to make its different parts fit together and orient them towards development. In the case of GPGs, for instance, the problem is not in every case underprovision, but often malprovision (Kaul 2012: 736). Therefore, a second set of questions relates to steering the complex architecture and processes of international cooperation towards contributing to the implementation of a broadening agenda for global development.

The policy area of development cooperation has claimed a pivotal role in promoting development-orientation in other areas of international cooperation. However, development cooperation has also struggled to strike the right balance between asserting its distinctiveness and establishing linkages with the broader framework of international cooperation. It remains unclear to what extent and how institutions and processes that have recently emerged from the policy field of development cooperation will be able to perform this steering function (e.g. the post-2015 process, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation). Ultimately, a global development agenda needs to be conceived as a cross-cutting concern that cannot be claimed by any policy area in particular. This comprehensiveness poses challenges to overcome fragmentation and sectoralisation, both at the domestic (e.g. ministerial re-organisation) and the global level (mainstreaming of development issues, coordination in forums of global governance). Achieving this also requires impetus from forums that have the potential to influence the broader framework of international cooperation in view of implementing a global development agenda (e.g. the G20).
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