

d·i·e

Deutsches Institut für  
Entwicklungspolitik



German Development  
Institute

Discussion Paper

8/2009

# Global Energy and Environmental Scenarios

Implications for development policy

*Dirk Willenbockel*



# Global energy and environmental scenarios

Implications for development policy

Dirk Willenbockel

DIE Research Project “Development Policy:  
Questions for the Future”

Bonn 2009

Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik  
ISSN 1860-0441

**Willenbockel, Dirk:** Global energy and environmental scenarios : implications for development policy / Dirk Willenbockel. DIE Research Project "Development Policy : Questions for the Future". – Bonn : DIE, 2009. – (Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ; 8/2009)  
ISBN 978-3-88985-459-9

**Dr Dirk Willenbockel**, economist (PhD London Business School), is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. His current research focuses on trade, growth and development and on the economics of climate change impacts and adaptation in low-income countries. Recent work in these areas includes projects for the World Bank, the European Commission, the ILO and the UN World Food Programme.

© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH  
Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn  
☎ +49 (0)228 94927-0  
☎ +49 (0)228 94927-130  
E-Mail: [die@die-gdi.de](mailto:die@die-gdi.de)  
<http://www.die-gdi.de>

## Foreword

This discussion paper has been produced in the framework of the research project „Development Policy: Questions for the Future“, made possible by funding from the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) which is gratefully acknowledged. This project aims to stimulate thinking about how the context that development cooperation policy responds to could change in the long-term, and has evaluated methods of futures analysis and seeks to apply these methods to analyze emerging development cooperation challenges to this end. As the present paper illustrates, future-oriented methods of analysis including scenario analysis methods have already been applied by a variety of organizations seeking to speculate on the direction that the future might take and to motivate political action. The assessment of the existing scenario analyses reviewed in this paper draws attention to key forces shaping the future of the world and highlights lessons for building a more sustainable future. In particular, the author stresses the importance of improving the integration of development and environmental sustainability strategies at the national level, within donor countries, and in the context of multilateral cooperation. Outside of the discussion of the development policy implications of the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) scenario exercises, the paper also indirectly highlights another important challenge for the development research and policy community in the future: how to ensure that knowledge generated by one organization for a specific purpose, sometimes at great expense, can be made accessible to a wider audience in the service of addressing more widely shared goals.

Erik Lundsgaarde

Bonn, June 2009



# Contents

## Abbreviations

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>Summary</b>   | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>1. Background</b>   | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>2. Methodologies of the scenario studies</b>                        | <b>5</b>  |
| 2.1 Methodological approach of the MEA scenario study                  | 5         |
| 2.2 Methodological approach of the IEA scenario study                  | 9         |
| <b>3. Main drivers of change in the scenario studies</b>               | <b>12</b> |
| 3.1 Drivers of the MEA scenarios                                       | 12        |
| 3.2 Drivers of the IEA scenarios                                       | 17        |
| <b>4. The scenario paths and implications for developing countries</b> | <b>19</b> |
| 4.1 Summary of scenario results: MEA                                   | 19        |
| 4.2 Summary of scenario results: IEA                                   | 22        |
| 4.3. Implications for developing countries                             | 23        |
| <b>5. Implications for the future of development policy</b>            | <b>25</b> |
| 5.1 The role of the environment in development policy strategies       | 25        |
| 5.2 Implications of the IEA scenarios for development cooperation      | 29        |
| 5.3 Development policy insights from the individual MEA scenarios?     | 30        |
| 5.4 Concluding remarks   | 34        |
| <b>Bibliography</b>  | <b>35</b> |

## **Tables**

|          |   |    |
|----------|---|----|
| Table 1: | Main distinguishing features of the MEA scenarios   | 7  |
| Table 2: | Quantitative simulation models employed for the MEA | 8  |
| Table 3: | Population growth in the MEA scenarios              | 13 |
| Table 4: | Per-capita GDP growth in the MEA scenarios          | 13 |
| Table 5: | Population growth in the IEA scenarios              | 17 |
| Table 6: | Per-capita GDP growth in the IEA scenarios          | 18 |

## **Boxes**

|        |   |    |
|--------|---|----|
| Box 1: | Distinguishing features of the IEA scenarios          | 11 |
| Box 2: | Evolution of main direct drivers in the MEA scenarios | 15 |
| Box 3: | Summaries of MEA scenario narratives                  | 21 |



## Abbreviations

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| ACT             | Accelerated Technology (IEA group of scenarios)  |
| AM              | Adapting Mosaic (MEA scenario)   |
| BMZ             | Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung<br>(German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) |
| CO <sub>2</sub> | Carbon dioxide   |
| CCS             | CO <sub>2</sub> capture and storage  |
| DFID            | Department for International Development, UK   |
| DIE             | Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (German Development Institute)  |
| EC              | European Commission  |
| ETP             | Energy Technology Perspectives model   |
| FSU             | Former Soviet Union  |
| GDP             | Gross domestic product   |
| G8              | Group of Eight   |
| GHG             | Greenhouse gases   |
| gt              | Giga tonnes  |
| GO              | Global Orchestration (MEA scenario)  |
| IEA             | International Energy Agency  |
| IIASA           | International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis  |
| IPCC            | International Panel on Climate Change  |
| MDG             | Millennium Development Goal  |
| MEA             | Millennium Ecosystem Assessment  |
| NGO             | Non-governmental organization  |
| NO <sub>x</sub> | Nitrogen oxide   |
| OECD            | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  |
| OS              | Order from Strength (MEA scenario)   |
| PRSP            | Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper   |
| R&D             | Research & Development   |
| SO <sub>2</sub> | Sulphur dioxide  |
| SRES            | Special Report on Emission Scenarios   |
| TG              | Techno Garden (MEA scenario)   |
| UKGECC          | United Kingdom Global Environmental Change Commission  |
| UN              | United Nations   |
| UNDESA          | United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs  |
| UNDP            | United Nations Development Programme   |



## Summary

As part of a wider review of existing scenario analyses in areas with direct relevance to the future of global development, this paper focuses on two major recent studies: the scenarios contained in the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) and the scenarios developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in support of the G8 Gleneagles plan of action on climate change, clean energy and sustainable development. The paper offers a critical appraisal of these scenarios, examines the drivers of change that are considered to influence future developments, explores the implications of the scenarios for developing countries, and outlines what types of changes in development policy could be appropriate in light of the lessons learned from these scenario exercises.

The adverse consequences of growing pressures on ecosystems due to demographic and economic drivers identified in the MEA scenario projections are most immediately felt by rural poor populations in the least developed regions of the world. The degradation of ecosystem services poses a significant barrier to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Many of the regions facing the greatest challenges in achieving these targets coincide with regions facing the greatest problems of ecosystem degradation. Significant changes in policies, institutions, and practices can mitigate many of the negative consequences of growing pressures on ecosystems. A key implication of the interdependence between environmental and development goals is the need for a meaningful integration of environmental sustainability concerns in national development plans and strategies of individual donors and intergovernmental development agencies, as well as the need for closer coordination between multilateral environmental agreements and other international institutions in the development policy sphere.

The IEA baseline scenario clearly shows that without decisive globally coordinated policy action in support of the adoption of low-carbon energy technologies, GHG emissions will continue to rise rapidly over the 21st century and exacerbate current global warming trends. However, in the presence of a supporting policy environment, emerging clean energy technologies can move the global energy system onto a more sustainable path and return world-wide energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions back to today's level by 2050. Most of the future growth in energy demand, and hence emissions, arises from developing countries. An effective follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol must therefore include the major large and fast-growing developing countries including China and India. Developed countries have an important role to play in helping developing economies to leapfrog the technology development process and to employ efficient equipment and practices through technology transfer, capacity building and collaborative research, development and demonstration efforts. It will take a huge internationally coordinated effort to achieve the positive outcomes suggested by the IEA scenarios, and development cooperation on an unprecedented scale will be required as part of this effort. Thus, an important future role of development policy must be the facilitation of the technology and knowledge transfer that is required to meet this challenge.

Overall, the scenario studies under review confirm that ecosystem degradation and global warming pose serious threats for poverty reduction and development and deserve high priority on the future development policy agenda.



## 1. Background

### *Context and aims*

This study contributes to the wider project “Development Policy: Questions for the Future” currently being undertaken by the German Development Institute (DIE) for the German Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ). The DIE project seeks to apply scenario analysis methods to investigate how the global development landscape will evolve toward the year 2030. The aim is to inform development policy planning by identifying themes that will be increasingly relevant in the coming decades and by encouraging reflection on what types of development cooperation reforms might be needed in order to adapt to the changing context in which development policy is carried out. Numerous organizations have developed scenarios to explore global issues, and the DIE project hopes to learn from existing scenario exercises.

As part of the review of existing scenario analyses in areas with direct relevance to the future of global development, this paper focuses on two major recent studies: the scenarios contained in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (Carpenter et al. 2005) and the scenarios developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in support of the G8 Gleneagles plan of action on climate change, clean energy and sustainable development (IEA 2006).

The present paper aims to offer a critical appraisal of the scenarios outlined in each of these studies, to examine the drivers of change that are considered to strongly influence future developments, to further explore the implications of the scenarios for developing countries, and to outline what types of changes in development policy could be appropriate in light of the lessons learned from these scenario exercises.

### *Policy Background and goals of the scenarios under review*

The MEA scenario study is one of four central volumes of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a four-year international program designed to assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and to establish the scientific basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems and their contributions to human well-being. Officially launched by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2001 and completed in 2005, the assessment aimed in particular to meet the respective information needs of four international conventions on ecosystems – the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention to Combat Desertification, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, and the Convention on Migratory Species. The work was conducted by an international network of scientists and other experts involving over 1,300 authors from 95 countries organized in four working groups.

The stated main objectives of the analysis conducted by the Scenarios Working Group are

*“to assess future changes in world ecosystems and resulting ecosystem services over the next 50 years and beyond, to assess the consequences of these changes for human well-being, and to inform decisions-makers at various scales about these potential developments and possible response strategies and policies to adapt to or mitigate these changes”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 450).

The IEA scenario study is part of an ongoing IEA work programme in support of the G8 Gleaneagles Plan of Action on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development. In this plan, the G8 leaders propose to take forward actions towards improvements in energy efficiency, diversification of the energy supply mix, promoting research and development of clean energy technology, financing the transition to clean energy, managing climate change impacts, and tackling illegal logging. The 2005 G8 Summit mandated the IEA to play a major role in delivering the Plan and to advise on alternative energy scenarios and strategies aimed at a “clean, clever and competitive energy future.”

Starting from the diagnosis that the predicted trends in global energy demand and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions up to 2050 under business-as-usual assumptions will not be sustainable, the main objective of the IEA scenario study is to examine the potential contributions that cleaner and more efficient energy technologies as well as changes in practices can make to improve energy security and reduce the environmental impacts of energy provision and use. The scenarios further aim to illustrate the impact of a range of policies and measures that overcome barriers to the adoption of these technologies in electricity generation, road transport, buildings and industry.

In comparison to the wide scope of the MEA, the IEA study closes in on one particular important aspect of ecosystem change, namely the technological drivers of energy-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In line with its closer focus, the published output from the IEA study takes a far more compact form than that of the MEA. While the MEA study as a whole covers well over 3,000 pages, of which around 600 pages are devoted to the scenario analysis, the IEA study is less than 500 pages in length, of which only 60 pages are devoted to the actual exposition of the scenarios, the remainder consisting of detailed background information on current and emerging technology developments and potential barriers to their implementation. As a result, the IEA study is far more amenable to a concise selective review for purposes of the present paper, and thus in the following sections more space is generally devoted to the MEA scenarios. However, it should be emphasized that this does not imply that the policy implications of the IEA study are in some sense less important than the wider policy messages emerging from the MEA scenarios not related to climate change mitigation. Indeed, it may be argued that the opposite is the case. To put it bluntly, given that climate change – which is primarily driven by energy-related GHG emissions – is very likely to be the predominant force adversely affecting ecosystems over the course of the 21st century, discrete policy efforts to preserve ecosystems in the absence of decisive global climate change mitigation action would seem to be as useful as re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.

The potential significance of both studies for development policy is evident, given that the populations most vulnerable to ecosystem degradation and harmful climate change are disproportionately located in low-income regions. Moreover, the IEA baseline scenario suggests that well before 2050 most of the world’s energy will be consumed in today’s developing countries, and thus these countries will have to play an important role in a transition to a low-carbon future. To facilitate the knowledge and technology transfers essentially required for this transition, unprecedented cooperation between developed and developing countries will be needed.

### *Organization of the paper*

The following section provides brief outlines of the methodological approaches to scenario development adopted in the two studies. Section 3 identifies the main drivers of change in the

scenarios and describes the future evolution of these drivers in the various scenarios. Section 4 provides concise summaries of the main projections of both studies and their potential implications for developing countries, while section 5 discusses potential implications for the future of development cooperation.

## 2. Methodologies of the scenario studies

### 2.1 Methodological approach of the MEA scenario study

#### *Conceptual framework*

Before turning to the methodological approach for the development of the MEA scenarios, a brief outline of the underlying conceptual framework and its constituting elements is required.

Within this analytical framework, *ecosystems* provide *ecosystem services* that affect *human well-being*. The ability of ecosystems to provide these services is influenced by *direct drivers* which are in turn conditioned by *indirect drivers*.

Here an *ecosystem* is generically defined as “a dynamic complex of plant, animal, and microorganism communities and the nonliving environment interacting as a functional unit” (Carpenter et al. 2005, 25). The operational delineation of the boundaries of an ecosystem for purposes of analysis is context-specific and depends on the questions being asked. A well-defined ecosystem has strong interactions among its components and weak interactions across its boundaries. The MEA distinguishes 10 reporting categories to present its findings, however these categories do not constitute separate ecosystems and are overlapping, i.e. any geographical point on the globe may fall into several categories.<sup>1</sup>

The MEA defines *ecosystem services* as “the conditions and processes supported by biodiversity through which ecosystems sustain and fulfil human life, including the provision of goods.” The MEA distinguishes (i) provisioning services (food, fresh water, and other biological products), (ii) supporting and regulating services (including soil formation, nutrient cycling, waste treatment, and climate regulation), and (iii) cultural services (e.g. recreational, spiritual, aesthetic). *Human well-being* is conceived to have multiple constituents, including the basic material for a good life, freedom of choice and action, health, good social relations, and security.

#### *Methodological approach to scenario development*

The approach to scenario development for the MEA uses an iterative process of qualitative storyline development and quantitative modelling in order to capture aspects of ecosystem services that are quantifiable as well as those that are difficult or impossible to express in quantitative terms. The results of the quantitative simulation models are meant to ensure the consistency of the storylines.

---

1 These reporting categories are labelled Marine, Coastal, Inland water, Forest, Dryland, Island, Mountain, Polar, Cultivated, and Urban.

In the initial organizational phase a scenario guidance team composed of chairpersons and a secretariat and a scenario panel composed of scientific experts was formed. A user needs survey as well as a series of interviews with potential users of the scenarios including representatives from the various UN environmental conventions, government representatives as well as NGO and business leaders were conducted to inform the formulation of the focal questions to be addressed by the scenarios. The selection of the range of scenarios under consideration intends to reflect the diversity of viewpoints – in particular with regard to future policy strategies – elicited in the consultations.<sup>2</sup>

Four clusters of beliefs about expected or desirable futures were distilled from the interviews and the statements of user needs. Many respondents anticipated that the future would bring increased emphasis on national security, leading to greater protection of borders with associated consequences for economic development and ecosystems. Other respondents felt that the future could, or should, bring greater emphasis on fair, globally accepted economic and environmental policies, as well as greater attention by governments to public goods. Some interviewees pointed to the prospects of technology for managing ecosystem services with greater efficiency. Still others emphasized the potential role of local adaptive capacity for flexible innovative management of socioecological systems.

The four chosen scenarios are framed in terms of contrasting evolutions of governance structures for international trade and cooperation and contrasting approaches towards ecosystem management, and aim to embrace these clusters of beliefs. Table 1 summarizes the main distinguishing features of the scenarios along these two dimensions.

Parallel to the determination of the differentiating qualitative characteristics of the four scenarios and the drafting of initial story outlines, a modelling team affiliated with a range of existing global simulation models was formed at the start of the second phase to quantify the scenarios. In consultation with the storyline team, the modelling team developed scenario-specific time paths for exogenous quantifiable indirect drivers of ecosystems change that were considered to be consistent with the storylines, as further detailed in section 3 below. These assumed time paths were then fed into the simulation models to generate projections for the quantifiable direct drivers of change in ecosystems.

Table 2 lists the core models included in the analysis. IMAGE 2.2 and AIM are both dynamic multi-region global integrated assessment models designed to capture interactions between economic activity, emission of greenhouse gases (GHG), climate and other environmental variables. WaterGAP is a highly disaggregated combined global hydrology and water use model. IMPACT is a world model of agricultural markets that distinguishes 43 regions and 32 crop and livestock commodities. To some extent, the models have been soft-linked to achieve greater consistency across simulations. For instance, the changes in crop yields due to climate change predicted by IMAGE have been used to adjust the agricultural productivity parameters of IMPACT, the IMPACT agricultural production data have served as input to the IMAGE land cover model, and the changes in irrigation within IMPACT as well as the climate projections of IMAGE have been used as inputs for the WaterGAP simulations. In addition to these global

---

2 However, in a chapter on lessons learned from the scenario building process, it is candidly admitted that the “goal of stakeholder participation must confront the reality of the scenario development process (scenarists getting carried away by their own storylines and visions of the future).”



| <b>Table 1: Main distinguishing features of the MEA scenarios</b>     |                  |   |  |
|---|------------------|---|--|
| <b>Environmental Management</b>                                       | <b>proactive</b> | <b>Governance and Cooperation</b>   |  |
|   |                  | <b>globalized</b>   | <b>regionalized</b>  |
|   |                  | <p><b>Global Orchestration</b><br/>                     A future in which global economic policies are the primary approach to sustainability. The recognition that many of the most pressing problems of the time seem to have roots in poverty and inequality leads many leaders toward a strategy of globally orchestrating fair policies to improve well-being of those in poorer countries by removing trade barriers and subsidies. Nations also make progress on global environmental problems, such as greenhouse gas emissions and depletion of fisheries.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>GO</b></p>  | <p><b>Order from Strength</b><br/>                     A future in which protection through boundaries becomes paramount. The policies enacted in this scenario lead to a world in which the rich protect their borders, attempting to confine poverty, conflict, environmental degradation, and deterioration of ecosystem services to areas outside the borders. In addition to losses of ecosystem services in poor regions, global ecosystem services are degraded due to lack of attention to the global commons.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>OS</b></p>  |
|   |                  | <p><b>Techno Garden</b><br/>                     A future in which people push ecosystems to their limits of producing the optimum amount of ecosystem services through the use of technology. Often, the technologies they use are more flexible than today’s environmental engineering. Initially these technologies are primarily developed in wealthier countries and slowly dispersed to poorer places, but later they are developed everywhere. In some cases, unexpected problems and secondary effects created by technology and erosion of ecological resilience lead to vulnerable ecosystem services that are subject to interruption or breakdown.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>TG</b></p> | <p><b>Adapting Mosaic</b><br/>                     A future in which lack of faith in global financial and environmental institutions, combined with increasing understanding of the importance of resilience and local flexibility, leads to diminishing power and influence of these institutions compared with local and regional ones. Eventually, this leads to diverse local practices for ecosystem management. The results are mixed, as some regions do a good job managing ecosystems and others do not. High levels of communication enable regions to compare experiences and learn from one another. Gradually, the number of successful experiments begins to grow.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>AM</b></p> |
| Based on excerpts from Carpenter et al. (2005, 126–28 and Figure 5.2) |                  |   |  |

models, a number of smaller models or algorithms have been used to describe some elements of biodiversity change.<sup>3</sup> The resulting model projections for the main direct drivers are summarized in section 3.

Based on the first round of simulation results, the scenario team further elaborated or adapted the storylines and a number of feedback workshops with the MEA Board and stakeholder groups were held to improve the focus and details of the storylines. The initial assumptions for the indirect drivers were adjusted in line with the revised storylines and a second round of sim-

3 For a more detailed informal exposition of the modelling approach, the linkages and limited compatibility between the various models and a discussion of the numerous uncertainties surrounding the simulation results see Carpenter et al. (2005, 152–70)

| <b>Model</b>            | <b>Institution</b>   | <b>Documentation</b>         | <b>Prediction of</b>  |
|-------------------------|--|------------------------------|---|
| <b>IMPACT</b>           | International Food Policy Research Institute                     | Rosegrant et al. (2002)      | Food supply and demand  |
| <b>WaterGAP</b>         | University of Kassel   | Alcamo et al. (2003a; 2003b) | Water use and availability  |
| <b>IMAGE 2.2</b>        | National Institute of Public Health and Environment, Netherlands | IMAGE (2001)                 | Land cover, energy demand and supply, emissions, climate, sea level |
| <b>AIM</b>              | National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan              | Kainuma et al. (2002)        | Land cover, emissions, water use and availability                   |
| <b>ECOPATH / ECOSIM</b> | University of British Columbia                                   | Pauly et al. (2000)          | Marine ecosystems change  |

Source: Own compilation

ulation results was generated followed by further revisions of the storylines. The Scenario Report readily admits that a further “*series of iterations between storyline improvement, quantification, and stakeholder feedback sessions would have helped to better harmonize the quantitative and qualitative scenarios, but time constraints limited the number of iterations*” (Carpenter et al. 2005, 150). The qualitative storylines and the quantitative simulation results are presented in two separate chapters of the Scenario Report. The exposition warns pre-emptively that “*(r)eaders may notice some inconsistencies*” between the two chapters (ibid., 228).

In the final phase, both the qualitative storylines and quantitative model simulation results were disseminated for review to interested user groups through presentations, workshops, the MEA review process, and e-mail communications. Reviewer comments were then incorporated into the scenarios. Both review and dissemination are stated to be important elements for the success of the scenario exercise, yet no further details are provided in the Scenario Report.

It is conceded that the details of the individual storyline narratives necessarily carry a highly subjective flavour:

*“The scenarios have been developed from input from all members of the Scenarios Working Group, but they have been woven into storylines by a smaller number of writers. ... Each member of the Scenarios Working Group would have written each scenario differently if it had been his or her task. The purpose of the scenarios is to get the reader thinking about how the world might develop rather than to provide predictions. The writers of later chapters of this report have drawn their own conclusions based partly on the scenario storylines but also on their own imagination.”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 226).

In line with the nature and purpose of the scenario approach, no probabilities are attached to the individual scenarios:

*“The high level of uncertainty about the future of ecosystem services also implies that is not possible to distinguish between the probability of one scenario versus another. In scenario analysis we sometimes have an intuitive sense that one scenario is more probable*

*than another, but for the MA and most scenario exercises it is not fruitful to dwell on their relative probabilities. ... other scenarios are also possible, and it is highly unlikely that any of the four scenarios ... would materialize as described. In other words, the four scenarios are only a small subset of limitless plausible futures.”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 155).

None of the four scenarios is meant to serve as a business-as-usual scenario that just extrapolates current trends in the absence of major policy shifts, and some critics consider this as a weakness of the MAE scenario approach.<sup>4</sup>

On an operational level, the MEA methodology suffers to some extent from the scheduling problems commonly encountered in large-scale assessment exercises. The various working groups had to operate in parallel rather than sequentially as would have been preferable, e.g. the findings on the current state of ecosystems in the final report of the MAE Current State working group should in principle constitute the starting point for the MAE Scenario working group, while the work of the MAE Policy Responses working group should in turn be informed by the results of the Scenario working group. As noted by the National Research Council (2007, 4–21), *“although a great effort was made to exchange information among working groups, they did not fully benefit from each other’s work. Another scheduling problem was that all of the subglobal assessments had not been completed by the end of the global assessment.”*

## 2.2 Methodological approach of the IEA scenario study

The approach of the IEA scenario study combines a detailed assessment of the status and prospects of key energy technologies and energy efficiency in the areas of electricity generation, road transport and fuels, buildings and appliances, and industry with a model-based simulation analysis.

The technology assessment includes the identification of barriers to the implementation of more energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies as well as the identification of a set of policy measures required to overcome these barriers. This assessment draws upon the expertise of the IEA’s international network for collaboration on energy technology.

The scenario analysis contrasts a business-as-usual baseline simulation on the one hand with a set of six “Accelerated Technology” (ACT) scenarios on the other hand.<sup>5</sup> The baseline assumes only technology developments and improvements in energy efficiency that can be expected on the basis of government policies already implemented, while the ACT scenarios assume that the set of policies in support of the further development and adoption of cleaner technology identified in the technical assessment are implemented with a given level of effort that does not vary across the ACT scenarios.

---

4 *“A more reasoned extension of current trends, set in context by a clear discussion of the types of interaction or event that could disrupt the model, would have been more useful”* (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2007, 25). *“... none of the scenarios was completed on a business as usual basis which would have been useful”* (UKGECC 2006).

5 For easier reference, “ACT” label is here extended to the “Tech Plus” scenario.

The various ACT scenario assumptions vary only along one dimension or uncertain driver, namely the rate of progress in overcoming technological barriers and achieving cost reductions in the development and use of energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies. More specifically, the scenarios differ in their assumptions about progress in four areas: (i) cost reductions for renewable power generation technologies; (ii) overcoming constraints to the development of nuclear power plants; (iii) developing CO<sub>2</sub> capture and storage (CCS) technologies to commercial viability; (iv) the adoption of energy efficient end-use technologies.

As shown in Box 1, the ACT Map scenario assumes progress in all four of these areas, while the other five ACT scenarios can be viewed as sensitivity analyses around this central scenario to account for the significant uncertainties that surround expected progress in each of the four areas. In contrast to the MEA Scenario Report, the IEA Report provides no procedural description of the deliberation process that led to the delineation of these scenario assumptions.

The primary tool used for the quantification of the scenarios is the IEA Energy Technology Perspectives model (ETP). ETP is a dynamic partial-analytic bottom-up model. Its geographic coverage is global with a distinction of 15 regions.<sup>6</sup> The model contains a detailed representation of fuel and technology choices throughout the energy system, from energy extraction through fuel conversion and electricity generation to end-use. ETP solves for least-cost mixes of energy technologies and fuels to meet given energy-service demand paths subject to constraints including the availability of natural resources and CO<sub>2</sub> policies. The regions identified in the model trade energy and a set of energy-intensive material inputs. The model assumes perfect foresight of future demand, fuel prices and environmental policies in the determination of dynamically optimal energy investment decisions. In order to mimic uncertainty, relatively high discount rates are used, so that expected changes in the distant future are given a low weight. Capital stock turnover is explicitly taken in account, which is important for a realistic assessment of the rate at which new technologies can penetrate the energy system.

A distinct advantage of ETP is that emerging technologies are explicitly modelled. The representation of electricity supply and demand accounts for the difference between base-load and peak demand, and the need for different plants to fill the load curve. It also allows for the intermittent nature of some renewables. The characteristics of the model allow a quite detailed analysis of competing energy options, as it draws on a large database of current and emerging technologies. The model also computes energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

However, there is no endogenous general equilibrium representation of the global economy and hence no feedback links from changes in the energy system on the structure of the economy and economic activity. Demand for energy services and energy-intensive materials is fed exogenously into the model on the basis of given population and GDP growth projections by region (see section 3) and does not respond to changes in energy prices.<sup>7</sup> These shortcomings of the ETP model and their potential implications for the degree of confidence that can be at-

---

6 Africa, Australia and New Zealand, Canada, China, Central and South America, Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, India, Japan, Mexico, Middle East, Other Developing Asia, South Korea, the US, and Western Europe. However, in the IEA Report, results are presented at a higher level of regional aggregation.

7 The IEA Scenario Report devotes only a few lines to the ETP model (IEA 2006, 45) and virtually no details of the simulation methodology are provided. The exposition above draws upon the description in Gielen/Taylor (2007) and the technical documentation in Loulou/Goldstein/Noble (2004).

**Box 1: Distinguishing features of the IEA scenarios**

**Baseline**

The baseline scenario includes the effects of technology developments and improvements in energy efficiency that can be expected on the basis of energy and climate policies in all regions already enacted or committed.

**ACT Map**

The ACT Map scenario is relatively optimistic about the rate of progress in overcoming technological barriers and achieving cost reductions in the development and use of energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies. Its assumptions are considered to be realistic in the light of the current knowledge of the technologies and historic experience with technological progress. The key features of the Map scenario are:

- Barriers to the capture and storage of CO<sub>2</sub> are overcome, although costs remain high.
- Cost reductions for renewable energy technologies, such as wind and solar, continue with increasing deployment due to learning effects.
- Expansion of nuclear power generation capacity becomes more acceptable, as problems related to waste management and nuclear weapon proliferation are addressed.
- Progress in energy efficiency accelerates due to successful implementation of best practices and policies that lead to the adoption of more efficient technologies in the transport, buildings and industrial sectors.
- Biofuels become an increasingly viable alternative to petroleum products in the transport sector. New technologies, increased crop yields and the increased feedstock availability due to agricultural sector restructuring all contribute to reduced costs for biofuels.
- Significant progress is made to reduce the costs of hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles, but costs remain high in relative terms and hydrogen makes only a minor contribution to the transport sector.

**ACT Low Renewables**

This scenario explores the impact of slower cost reductions for wind and solar energy technologies.

**ACT Low Nuclear**

This scenario reflects the limited growth potential of nuclear energy if public acceptance remains low, nuclear waste issues are not satisfactorily addressed and the problem of non-proliferation remains unresolved.

**ACT No CCS**

This scenario assumes that the technological issues facing CCS are not solved and hence CCS technologies do not become commercially available.

**ACT Low Efficiency**

This scenario assumes that energy-efficiency policies are less effective than in the Map scenario. Global average energy savings are 0.3% per year lower than in the Map scenario.

**TECH Plus**

The TECH Plus scenario makes more optimistic assumptions about the progress for promising energy technologies than is considered likely in the other ACT scenarios and is thus considered to be more speculative. This scenario assumes considerably stronger cost reductions from R&D, technology development and learning-by-doing for fuel cells, renewable electricity generation technologies, biofuels and nuclear technologies relative to ACT Map.

tached to the simulation results are not discussed in the IEA Report. Yet it should be noted that these shortcomings reflect the inevitable trade-off involved in the choice between bottom-up and so-called top-down approaches to energy modelling, given the present state of the art in this area. While top-down models can in principle capture the mentioned feedback links missing in the ETP bottom-up model, these models do at present not allow a detailed modelling of current and emerging energy technologies.

### **3. Main drivers of change in the scenario studies**

#### **3.1 Drivers of the MEA scenarios**

The conceptual framework of the MEA distinguishes indirect and direct drivers of change in ecosystems. Direct drivers unequivocally affect ecosystem processes, while the indirect drivers influence ecosystems via their impact on direct drivers. The MEA identifies five categories of indirect drivers: (i) demographic, (ii) economic, (iii) sociopolitical, (iv) scientific and technological, and (v) cultural and religious. The main direct drivers include changes in climate, plant nutrient use, land conversion, and diseases and invasive species.

##### *Demographic drivers*

Population change is obviously important because it influences demand levels for ecosystem services, CO<sub>2</sub> and other pollutant emissions, the rate of land conversion and other direct drivers of ecosystem change.

Since developments in per-capita income and other determinants of fertility, mortality and international migration rates differ across the four scenarios, the regional population projections are scenario-specific as shown in Table 1. The figures are based on IIASA projections (Lutz / Goujon 2001) which have been adapted to be consistent with the four scenario storylines with additional input from IIASA demographers (O'Neill 2005). The predicted world population in 2050 ranges from 8.1 billion in the GO to 9.6 billion in the OS scenario. The main reason for the divergence is that GO assumes higher economic growth and higher human capital investments in education and health than OS and hence a faster transition towards lower fertility and mortality rates in developing regions. However, the 2050 OECD population is substantially higher under GO than under OS, since the GO scenario assumes far higher rates of migration from low- to high-income regions.

##### *Economic drivers*

The main economic drivers in the scenarios are real GDP growth per capita and the structural transformation of consumption and production patterns associated with economic growth. The starting point for the long-run growth projections by region used in the scenarios are the World Bank (2002) Global Economic Perspectives forecasts for the period up to 2015 and the growth assumptions of the IPCC SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) for the period beyond 2015. Since the alternative futures described by the four scenarios differ in terms of their implications for long-run growth performance, the per-capita growth rate predictions from these

| <b>Table 3: Population growth in the MEA scenarios</b> |                      |              |              |                     |              |              |                 |              |              |               |              |              |              |
|--|----------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|  | Global Orchestration |              |              | Order from Strength |              |              | Adapting Mosaic |              |              | Techno Garden |              |              |              |
| Region   | 1995                 | 2020         | 2050         | 2100                | 2020         | 2050         | 2100            | 2020         | 2050         | 2100          | 2020         | 2050         | 2100         |
| <i>(million)</i>                                       |                      |              |              |                     |              |              |                 |              |              |               |              |              |              |
| Former Soviet Union                                    | 285                  | 290          | 282          | 245                 | 287          | 257          | 216             | 288          | 273          | 246           | 292          | 281          | 252          |
| Latin America  | 477                  | 637          | 742          | 681                 | 710          | 944          | 1,309           | 708          | 933          | 1,155         | 672          | 831          | 950          |
| Middle East and North Africa                           | 312                  | 478          | 603          | 597                 | 539          | 774          | 972             | 537          | 765          | 924           | 509          | 692          | 788          |
| OECD   | 1,020                | 1,136        | 1,255        | 1,153               | 1,076        | 998          | 856             | 1,079        | 1,068        | 978           | 1,117        | 1,154        | 1,077        |
| Asia   | 3,049                | 3,861        | 4,104        | 3,006               | 4,210        | 5,023        | 5,173           | 4,201        | 4,992        | 4,753         | 4,039        | 4,535        | 3,992        |
| Sub-Saharan Africa                                     | 558                  | 858          | 1,109        | 1,132               | 956          | 1,570        | 1,988           | 951          | 1,492        | 1,775         | 907          | 1,329        | 1,516        |
| <b>World</b>   | <b>5,701</b>         | <b>7,260</b> | <b>8,095</b> | <b>6,814</b>        | <b>7,777</b> | <b>9,567</b> | <b>10,514</b>   | <b>7,764</b> | <b>9,522</b> | <b>9,830</b>  | <b>7,537</b> | <b>8,821</b> | <b>8,575</b> |
| Based on Lutz / Goujon (2001) and O'Neill (2005)       |                      |              |              |                     |              |              |                 |              |              |               |              |              |              |

sources have been revised upwards or downwards for the individual scenarios as shown in Table 3.

Trade liberalization, international economic cooperation, and technology exchange foster economic performance in the two scenarios with globalized governance, while trade barriers and inward-oriented policies are assumed to contribute to lower growth rates in the OS and AM scenarios. Growth rates are higher in GO compared to TG, because in the latter investments in environmental technologies are favoured at the expense of human capital investments.

| <b>Table 4: Per-capita GDP growth in the MEA scenarios</b> |            |                      |            |                     |            |                 |            |               |            |  |
|--|------------|----------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|-----------------|------------|---------------|------------|--|
|  | Historic   | Global Orchestration |            | Order from Strength |            | Adapting Mosaic |            | Techno Garden |            |  |
| Region   | 1971-2000  | 2000-2020            | 2020-2050  | 2000-2020           | 2020-2050  | 2000-2020       | 2020-2050  | 2000-2020     | 2020-2050  |  |
| <i>(Annual growth rate in percent)</i>                     |            |                      |            |                     |            |                 |            |               |            |  |
| Former Soviet Union  | 0.4        | 3.5                  | 4.9        | 2.2                 | 2.6        | 2.6             | 4.0        | 2.9           | 4.5        |  |
| Latin America  | 1.2        | 2.8                  | 4.3        | 1.8                 | 2.3        | 2.0             | 3.0        | 2.4           | 3.9        |  |
| Middle East and North Africa                               | 0.7        | 2.0                  | 3.4        | 1.5                 | 1.8        | 1.6             | 2.4        | 1.7           | 3.3        |  |
| OECD   | 2.1        | 2.4                  | 1.9        | 2.1                 | 1.3        | 2.0             | 1.6        | 2.2           | 1.7        |  |
| Asia   | 5.0        | 5.1                  | 5.3        | 3.2                 | 2.4        | 3.8             | 4.1        | 4.2           | 4.7        |  |
| Sub-Saharan Africa   | -0.4       | 1.7                  | 4.0        | 1.0                 | 2.1        | 1.2             | 2.9        | 1.4           | 3.8        |  |
| <b>World</b>   | <b>1.4</b> | <b>2.4</b>           | <b>3.0</b> | <b>1.4</b>          | <b>1.0</b> | <b>1.5</b>      | <b>1.9</b> | <b>1.9</b>    | <b>2.5</b> |  |
| Source: Carpenter et al. (2005, Table 9.6)                 |            |                      |            |                     |            |                 |            |               |            |  |

*Sociopolitical drivers*

The two key sociopolitical drivers in the scenario are the extent of international cooperation and attitudes toward environmental policies. As outlined in section 2, the lack of consensus among stakeholders about future desirable pathways for these drivers and hence uncertainty about their actual future pathways provide the main rationale for the choice of the scenario space, i.e. the main contrasting assumptions of the four scenarios are framed in terms of different pathways for these drivers (Table 1).

*Scientific and technological drivers*

Technological change in the form of process innovations that determine total factor productivity growth are built into the per-capita GDP growth projections by scenario as outlined above in the discussion of economic drivers. Specific technological developments with particular relevance for ecosystems include future trends in energy use efficiency, irrigation and water use efficiencies, crop yield improvements, cost reductions of new energy technologies and emission control technologies.

The rate of technical progress is highest under the GO scenario, yet environmental considerations receive little attention in energy investments, as society is assumed to believe the environmental impacts of energy production to be either small or manageable by future technological change. With respect to irrigation efficiency and agricultural productivity, GO assumes that that market-oriented reform in the water sector could lead to greater investments in efficiency-enhancing water and agricultural technology, particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

In contrast, in the TG scenario, technology development is geared towards the reduction or mitigation of ecological problems, implying relatively high rates of technical progress in the development of energy-efficient technologies and low-carbon energy sources, yet lower rates of development for technologies in general.

Under AM, regionalization and higher barriers to trade and the dispersion of technologies slow down overall technological development up to 2025. Yet increased decentralized learning could at the same time build up a new basis from which technologies can be developed. Therefore, technologies under this scenario develop slowly at first but speed up later in the century. With respect to irrigation efficiency, local adaptations – including water harvesting and other water conservation technologies as well as the increased application of agro-ecological approaches – could raise efficiency levels in some regions and countries. Efficiency increases are achieved but remain geographically scattered. Similarly, local approaches are adopted for improvements in energy efficiency and the use of low-carbon fuels.

Under the OS scenario, technical progress including efficiency improvements directly affecting ecosystems will be relatively slow throughout the whole period, especially in low-income countries. With respect to irrigation efficiency and agricultural productivity, the scenario narrative envisages government cuts in irrigation infrastructure expenditures due to government budget problems as a result of low growth. A central theme of OS is securing reliable energy supplies, and this leads to a focus on developing domestic energy sources. Slow diffusion of new technologies and barriers to global energy trade contribute to a continued intensive use of domestic fossil fuels. For China and India, this implies a continued reliance on coal. This scenario is similar in character to the IPCC A2 scenario.



### *Cultural and religious drivers*

Cultural and religious drivers do not feature in the quantitative modelling analyses, but changes in culture are seen as an important part of the qualitative elements of the AM and the TG scenarios. Both scenarios assume a general shift in the way ecosystems and their services are valued:

*“In both cases decision-makers at various scales develop a proactive approach to ecosystem management, but they pursue different management strategies to reach this goal. In [TG], the supply of ecosystem services is maintained by controlling ecosystem functions via technology. In [AM], the aim is to create a set of flexible, adaptive management options through a learning approach. Culturally diverse forms of learning about and adapting to ecosystem changes are fostered. Devising ways of incorporating traditional ecological and local knowledge into management processes and protecting the cultural and spiritual values assigned to nature in various cultures become part of the developed strategies.”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 195).

### *Direct drivers*

The direct drivers of ecosystems change are functions of the indirect drivers. Paths for the direct drivers endogenously determined in the simulation analysis include GHG emissions, climate change, sea-level rise, air pollution emissions, land use and land cover change, use of nitrogen fertilizers and nitrogen loading to rivers and coastal marine systems and the disruption of landscape by mining and fossil fuel extraction.<sup>8</sup> Box 2 summarizes the pathways for the main direct drivers suggested by the model simulations for the scenarios under consideration.

|  |
|--|
| <p><b>Box 2: Evolution of main direct drivers in the MEA scenarios</b></p> <p><b>Greenhouse gas emissions</b><br/>Global annual GHG emissions rise from 10 gigatonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent (gt) in 2000 to 25 gt in 2050 under GO, to 20 gt under OS and to 18 gt under AM, and drop significantly to 7 gt under the TG scenario, which assumes strong climate change mitigation action. While annual emissions begin to decline beyond 2050 in GO and AM, they continue to climb under the OS scenario. The share of developing countries in total global GHG emissions rises strongly in all scenarios.</p> <p><b>Climate change</b><br/>The rise in global average surface temperature due to from 2000 to 2050 the atmospheric concentration of GHG as projected by the IMAGE model ranges from 1 °C under TG to 1.5 °C under OS. Global average precipitation will increase over the twenty-first century.<br/>The Scenario Report notes the large uncertainties surrounding climate model projections of spatial precipitation patterns. Changes in rainfall are not systematically reported for all scenarios</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>(continued overleaf)</i></p> |
|--|

8 The concept and categorization of direct drivers is not consistently applied across the different parts of the Scenario Report. E.g. while the presentation of the conceptual framework lists “*natural, physical and biological drivers*” as only one of seven direct driver categories (Carpenter et al. 2005, 26), the chapter on “*Drivers of Change*” states that “*(d)ivers in all categories other than physical and biological are considered indirect. Important direct (physical and biological) drivers include changes in climate, plant nutrient use, land conversion, and diseases and invasive species*” (ibid., 176). The chapter on “*Changes in Ecosystems and their Drivers*” offers yet another list of main direct driver categories (ibid., 315).

**Box 2: Evolution of main direct drivers in the MEA scenarios***(continued)***Sea level rise**

The sea level is projected to rise by 15-20 cm from 2000 to 2050 and by 40-60 cm between 2000 and 2100.

**Air pollution emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) and nitrogen oxide (NO<sub>x</sub>)**

Under GO, emission trends are balanced between increasing sources of emissions and increasing commitments to emission controls as a result of increasing demand for clean air. Global SO<sub>2</sub> emissions are expected to stabilize while NO<sub>x</sub> emissions increase between 2000 and 2050. Most of this increase occurs in Asia, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and MENA. Under TG, there are strong reductions in air pollution emissions as a result of substantial investments in emission controls and the side benefits of climate change policies. Under AM, environmental awareness is higher than under GO. Orchestration, but lower economic growth in developing regions implies less energy use but also less investment in emission control technology. The result is that SO<sub>2</sub> pollution declines in all regions except Asia. Trends for NO<sub>x</sub> are similar to those in the GO scenario. The level of SO<sub>2</sub> air pollution declines only slightly worldwide under the OS scenario. There is a significant decline in NO<sub>x</sub>-related pollution in OECD countries, and a major increase elsewhere.

**Land use and land cover change**

In the first decades of the scenario period, all scenarios show an ongoing expansion of agricultural land replacing forest and grassland. This expansion occurs mainly in poorer countries, while agricultural land in the OECD and FSU actually declines. While rapid depletion of forest area continues under OS, under TG net forest cover increases. Production of biofuels, particularly under the TG scenario, is an important category of land use, especially in the FSU, OECD and Latin America. Under OS, there is a continuous increase of agricultural area in poorer countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America due to relatively fast population growth and a limited potential to import food in Africa. As a result, the depletion of forest area continues worldwide at a rate near the historic average, only to slow down after 2050 because of slowing population growth. Two thirds of the Central African forest present in 1995 will have disappeared by 2050. Asia and Latin America lose 40% and 25% of their forest areas respectively. In other regions the rate of forest loss slows down.

AM, like OS, also assumes relatively slow yield improvement in the first decades. However, a lower increase in population and locally successful experiments in innovative agricultural systems mitigate a further expansion of agricultural land in other regions after 2040. This is particularly important for Africa. Indeed, AM shows the lowest deforestation rates for this region of all four scenarios. In contrast, however, the relatively low yield improvement causes a virtual depletion of forest areas in South Asia up to 2100. Globally, the long-term deforestation rates in this scenario are slightly above those of TG. These changes in land use will have a tremendous impact on the vulnerability of different regions. By 2050, under OS, Africa and Asia have put virtually all productive land under cultivation to fulfil the demand for crops and animal products. This clearly indicates a high vulnerability to abrupt changes in the natural system. A similar but less extreme situation occurs for Africa under GO and for Asia and Africa under both GO and TG.

These results indicate that land use change will continue to form a major pressure on ecosystem services in the four scenarios. At the same time, all four scenarios find the loss of natural forests to slow down compared with historic rates. This mainly results from increases in natural areas in industrial regions.

**Use of nitrogen fertilizers and nitrogen loading to rivers and coastal marine systems**

In three of the four scenarios, there is a further increase in nitrogen transport in rivers. The increase is in particular large under GO and AM. Only TG shows a decrease in nitrogen transport by rivers.

**Disruption of landscape by mining and fossil fuel extraction**

The biggest disruption by far will be caused by OS, where total fossil fuel use increases by more than a factor of 2.5 by 2100 compared with 2000, followed by GO with a rise in fossil fuel extraction of a factor of two over the same period. Fossil fuel use also nearly doubles under AM. The impact is likely to be the smallest under the TG scenario, because fossil fuel use substantially declines up to 2100.

Source: Carpenter et al. (2005, 314–29)

### 3.2 Drivers of the IEA scenarios

The key underlying drivers of energy provision, energy use and energy-related carbon emissions in the IEA scenarios are population dynamics, economic growth and structural change, technological change and policies towards the development and implementation of cleaner and more efficient energy technologies. In contrast to the MEA scenarios, the assumed pathways for the demographic, economic and policy drivers do not vary across the IEA ACT scenarios. Apart from the baseline scenario, the scenarios differ only with respect to the rates of technological progress in the areas of energy efficiency and low-carbon energy technology for a given path of policy effort in support of low-carbon growth. Thus, the various ACT scenarios do not contrast alternative policy strategies but explore the implications of alternative assumptions about policy effectiveness.

#### *Demographic drivers*

Population growth assumptions are based on United Nations (2004) projections. The global population rises to 9.1 billion in 2050. This figure is about 1 billion higher than the corresponding MEA projection for the OG scenario, but 0.5 billion lower than in the OS scenario and falls roughly in between the projections of the TG and AM scenarios shown in Table 1. Population growth slows over the projection period from 1% per year in 2003 to 2030 to 0.7% per year in 2030 to 2050. The population of the developing regions will continue to grow most rapidly, by 1.1% per year from 2003 to 2050 (Table 5). The share of the world population living in today's developing regions increases from 76% now to 83% in 2050.

| <b>Table 5: Population growth in the IEA scenarios</b> |                               |                  |                  |                  |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <b>Region</b>  | <b>Historic<br/>1971-2003</b> | <b>2003-2030</b> | <b>2030-2050</b> | <b>2003-2050</b> |
| <i>(Annual growth rates in percent)</i>                |                               |                  |                  |                  |
| <b>OECD</b>  | <b>0.8</b>                    | <b>0.4</b>       | <b>-0.2</b>      | <b>0.1</b>       |
| OECD North America                                     | 1.3                           | 0.9              | 0.5              | 0.7              |
| OECD Europe  | 0.5                           | 0.1              | -0.9             | -0.3             |
| OECD Pacific   | 0.8                           | 0.0              | -0.2             | -0.1             |
| <b>Transition economies</b>                            | <b>0.5</b>                    | <b>-0.3</b>      | <b>-0.1</b>      | <b>-0.2</b>      |
| <b>Developing countries</b>                            | <b>2.0</b>                    | <b>1.2</b>       | <b>0.9</b>       | <b>1.1</b>       |
| China  | 1.4                           | 0.4              | 0.1              | 0.3              |
| India  | 2.0                           | 1.1              | 0.5              | 0.9              |
| Other Asia   | 2.1                           | 1.3              | 0.9              | 1.1              |
| Middle East  | 3.1                           | 1.9              | 2.0              | 1.9              |
| Latin America  | 1.9                           | 1.0              | 0.7              | 0.9              |
| Africa   | 2.7                           | 1.9              | 1.8              | 1.9              |
| <b>World</b>   | <b>1.6</b>                    | <b>1.0</b>       | <b>0.7</b>       | <b>0.9</b>       |
| Source: IEA (2006, Table B-2)                          |                               |                  |                  |                  |

### *Economic drivers*

Assumed absolute GDP growth rates are based on projections for the World Energy Outlook 2004 and 2005, which are in turn based on IMF projections. GDP growth is expected to slow gradually in all regions to 2050. Average annual global per-capita income growth over the entire 2003-50 period is on the order of 2.0%. This is considerably lower than global per-capita income growth under the MEA OG and TG scenarios but higher than under the OS and AM scenarios. Table 6 provides a breakdown by region. All regions are expected to experience a continuing shift in their economies away from energy-intensive heavy manufacturing towards lighter industries and services.

| <b>Table 6: Per-capita GDP growth in the IEA scenarios</b>       |                               |                  |                  |                  |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <b>Region</b>  | <b>Historic<br/>1971-2003</b> | <b>2003-2030</b> | <b>2030-2050</b> | <b>2003-2050</b> |
| <i>(Annual growth rates in percent)</i>                          |                               |                  |                  |                  |
| <b>OECD</b>  | <b>2.1</b>                    | <b>1.8</b>       | <b>1.5</b>       | <b>1.7</b>       |
| OECD North America   | 1.8                           | 1.5              | 1.1              | 1.4              |
| OECD Europe  | 1.9                           | 2.0              | 1.6              | 1.8              |
| OECD Pacific   | 2.7                           | 2.0              | 1.8              | 1.9              |
| <b>Transition economies</b>                                      | <b>0.2</b>                    | <b>4.0</b>       | <b>3.5</b>       | <b>3.8</b>       |
| <b>Developing countries</b>                                      | <b>2.7</b>                    | <b>3.1</b>       | <b>2.6</b>       | <b>2.8</b>       |
| China  | 7.0                           | 4.6              | 3.7              | 4.2              |
| India  | 2.9                           | 3.6              | 3.1              | 3.3              |
| Other Asia   | 3.1                           | 2.8              | 2.2              | 2.6              |
| Middle East  | -0.2                          | 1.1              | 0.9              | 1.1              |
| Latin America  | 1.0                           | 2.2              | 2.1              | 2.1              |
| Africa   | 0                             | 1.9              | 1.8              | 1.8              |
| <b>World</b>   | <b>1.7</b>                    | <b>2.2</b>       | <b>1.9</b>       | <b>2.0</b>       |
| Source: Own calculations based on IEA (2006, Tables B-1 and B-2) |                               |                  |                  |                  |

### *Policy drivers*

The development and uptake of cleaner and more efficient energy technologies in the scenarios is driven by the following main types of policies:

- (i) Support for the research and development of energy technologies that face technical challenges and need to reduce costs before they become commercially viable;
- (ii) Demonstration programmes for energy technologies that need to prove they can work on a commercial scale and under relevant operating conditions;
- (iii) Deployment programmes for energy technologies which are not yet cost-competitive, but whose costs could be reduced through learning-by-doing;

(iv) CO<sub>2</sub> reduction incentives to encourage the adoption of low-carbon technologies. In the scenarios, policies and measures are assumed to be put in place that would lead to the adoption of low-carbon technologies with a cost of up to US\$ 25 per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>. The scenarios assume that such incentives are in place from 2030 in all countries including developing countries.<sup>9</sup> Incentives under this heading can take a variety of forms including regulation, carbon taxes, tax breaks, subsidies or trading schemes;

(v) Policy instruments to overcome other commercialisation barriers that are not primarily economic. Instruments mentioned under this heading include standards, regulations, labelling schemes, information campaigns, and energy auditing. They are considered to play an important role in increasing the adoption of energy efficient technologies in the buildings and transport sectors, as well as in industries where energy costs are low compared to other production costs.<sup>10</sup>

### *Technological drivers*

The key uncertainty addressed by the ACT scenarios is uncertainty about the rate of progress in overcoming technological barriers and achieving cost reductions in the development and use of energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies. As detailed in Box 1 in section 2, the scenarios differ in their assumptions about progress in (i) cost reductions for renewable power generation technologies; (ii) overcoming constraints to the development of nuclear power plants; (iii) developing CO<sub>2</sub> capture and storage (CCS) technologies to commercial viability; (iv) the adoption of energy efficient end-use technologies.

## **4. The scenario paths and implications for developing countries**

### **4.1 Summary of scenario results: MEA**

A summary synopsis of the qualitative storylines for the four MEA scenarios is given in Box 3. The storylines are written from the perspective of an observer who looks backwards to the present at the end of the 2050 scenario horizon.

---

9 While this assumption may be considered as overly optimistic, a critique of its “realism” at this stage would miss the whole point of the scenario analysis. The point is to explore which kind of policies need to be in place in order to enable the transition to a sustainable low-carbon future. As discussed further below, there is no denying in the IEA Report that such a transition requires decisive action and international cooperation between developed and developing countries of an unprecedented scale. It should also be noted here that in a recently published update of the IEA scenarios (IEA 2008) for the 2008 G8 Hokkaido summit, the estimated price per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions required to provide a sufficient incentive for the adoption of clean technologies has risen to US\$ 50, which implies that the policy challenge ahead is even greater than suggested by the 2006 IEA scenarios.

10 The partial-equilibrium nature of the ETP model does not allow to address the budgetary implications of these policies in a systematic manner. For a rudimentary discussion of the upfront costs and future benefits associated with the assumed policy path see IEA (2006, 57–62).

Only under the OS scenario are all provisioning, regulating, and cultural ecosystem services projected to be in worse condition in 2050 than they are today. The other three scenarios suggest that significant changes in policies, institutions, and practices can mitigate many of the negative consequences of growing pressures on ecosystems due to the drivers identified in section 3, although the changes required are large and not currently under way. At least one of the three categories of services is in better condition in 2050 than in 2000 in the other three scenarios.

The scale of interventions that result in these largely positive outcomes are substantial and include significant investments in environmentally sound technology, active adaptive management, proactive action to address environmental problems before their full consequences are experienced, major investments in public goods such as education and health, strong action to reduce socioeconomic disparities and eliminate poverty, and expanded capacity of people to manage ecosystems adaptively. However, even in scenarios where one or more categories of ecosystem services improve, biodiversity continues to be lost and thus the long-term sustainability of actions to mitigate degradation of ecosystem services is uncertain, given that the long-run side effects of losses in biodiversity are presently not well-understood.

The main projected changes in ecosystems services and their implications for human well-being can be briefly summarized as follows.<sup>11</sup> Human use of ecosystem services increases substantially under all MEA scenarios. Demand for food crops is projected to grow by 70–85% by 2050 and global water withdrawals increase by 20–85%. Correspondingly, rapid conversion of ecosystems is projected to continue over the first half of the 21st century. Roughly 10–20% of current grassland and forestland is projected to be converted to other uses between now and 2050, mainly due to the expansion of agriculture but also because of the expansion of cities and infrastructure. Habitat loss is projected to accelerate decline in biodiversity in all four scenarios. Rivers that are expected to lose fish species are concentrated in poor tropical and sub-tropical countries.

Food security is likely to remain out of reach for many people. Child malnutrition will be difficult to eradicate by 2050 and is projected to increase in some regions in some MEA scenarios, despite increasing food supply under all four scenarios. Three of the MEA scenarios project net reductions in child malnutrition by 2050 of between 10% and 60%, but undernutrition increases by 10% in OS.

Complex changes with large geographic variability are projected to occur in world freshwater resources and hence in their provisioning of ecosystem services in all scenarios. Climate change will lead to increased precipitation over more than half of Earth's surface, and this will make more water available to society and ecosystems. However, increased precipitation is also likely to increase the frequency of flooding in many areas. Increases in precipitation will not be universal, and climate change will also cause a substantial decrease in precipitation in some areas, with an accompanying decrease in water availability. A deterioration of the services provided by freshwater resources – such as fish production, and water supply for households, industry, and agriculture – is expected in developing countries under the scenarios with a reactive approach to environmental problems. Less severe but still important declines are expected in the scenarios that are more proactive about environmental problems.

---

11 This selective summary draws upon the synthesis in MEA (2005a, 71–83).

Growing demand for fish and fish products leads to an increasing risk of a major and long-lasting collapse of regional marine ecosystems.

Dryland ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to changes over the next 50 years. The combination of high rates of poverty, low per capita GDP, high infant mortality rates, a large and growing population, high variability of environmental conditions in dryland regions, and high sensitivity of people to changes in ecosystem services means that continuing land degradation could have profoundly negative impacts on the well-being of a large number of people in these regions. Local adaptation and conservation practices can mitigate some losses of dryland ecosystem services, although it will be difficult to reverse trends toward loss of food production capacity, water supplies, and biodiversity in drylands. While the MEA Scenario Report does not systematically downscale drylands by geographical region, the MEA Synthesis Report (2005, 62) points out that drylands have the lowest per capita GDP and the highest infant mortality rates of all of the MEA systems. Nearly 500 million people live in rural areas in dry and semiarid lands, mostly in Asia and Africa but also in regions of Mexico and northern Brazil (MEA 2005a, 62).

While human health improves under most MEA scenarios, under the OS scenario future health and social conditions in the North and South could diverge as inequality increases and as commerce and scientific exchanges between industrial and developing countries decrease.

The future contribution of terrestrial ecosystems to the regulation of climate is considered to be uncertain. Carbon release or uptake by ecosystems affects the CO<sub>2</sub> content of the atmosphere at the global scale and thereby affects global climate. Currently, the biosphere is a net sink of carbon, absorbing about 20% of fossil fuel emissions. It is very likely that the future of this service will be affected by expected land use change, yet due to the limited understanding of soil respiration processes there is uncertainty about the future of the carbon sink.

**Box 3: Summaries of MEA scenario narratives**

**Global Orchestration**

*The past 50 years have shown that some ecosystem services can be maintained or improved by appropriate macroscale policies. Notable successes occurred in reducing or controlling many global pollutants and in slowing, or in some cases reversing, loss of marine fish stocks. In some situations, it turned out that ecosystem services improved as economies developed. On the other hand, it appears that global action focused primarily on the economic aspects of environmental problems is not enough. In some regions and nations, ecosystem services have deteriorated despite economic advancement. Also, it was sometimes difficult to adjust large-scale environmental policies for local and regional issues. Despite some significant environmental disasters, this lesson has not yet been learned. As we look to 2100 and beyond, multiscale management of ecosystem services is a top challenge for environmental policy.*

**Order from Strength**

*Since 2000, the availability of ecosystem services has fallen below minimal needs for human well-being in some regions of the world while being maintained or even improved in other regions. Widespread loss of faith in global institutions and fear of terrorism led rich countries to favour policies that ensured security and erected boundaries against outsiders. Even in better-off areas, though, there have been some breakdowns of ecosystem services. It turned out that climate change was often more rapid than response capacity, leading to local degradation of ecosystem services in some places, even in rich nations. Overall, the current global condition of ecosystem services is highly variable and declining on average. Even the places in the best condition are at risk, although citizens of wealthy nations enjoy a tolerable level of ecosystem services and human well-being. As we look to 2100 and beyond, Earth's ecosystem*

**Box 3: Summaries of MEA scenario narratives***(continued)*

*services seem fragmented and imperilled. Problems exist at all scales, from global fisheries collapses to regions of the world where ecosystem services are sorely in need of restoration and other regions where ecosystem services are currently fine but threatened. We have learned that it is impossible to build walls that are high enough to keep out all the world's ills, but also that it is sometimes a reasonable policy to focus minimal resources on carefully protecting a few areas rather than only partially protecting everywhere.*

**Adapting Mosaic**

*The past 50 years have brought a mix of successes and failures in managing ecosystem services. Approaches to management have been heterogeneous. Some regions strengthened the centralized environmental agencies that emerged late in the twentieth century, while others embarked on novel institutional arrangements. Some approaches turned out to be disastrous, but others proved able to maintain or improve ecosystem services. Many nations have emulated the successes of other nations, and the number of successes has begun to climb by 2050. As a result, the world in 2050 is a diverse mosaic with respect to ecosystem services and human well-being. A considerable variety of approaches still exists, and regrettably some regions still cannot provide adequate ecosystem services for their people. Other regions are doing well, and remarkable successes have occurred on every continent. With respect to global-scale environmental problems, progress has been slow. As we look to 2100 and beyond, policy and ecological science face a twin challenge: to rebuild ecosystem services in the regions where they have collapsed and to transfer the lessons of regional success to problems of the global commons.*

**Techno Garden**

*Significant investments in environmental technology seem to be paying off. At the beginning of the century, doomsayers felt that Earth's ecosystem services were breaking down. As we look back over the past 50 years, however, we see many successes in managing ecosystem services through continually improving technology. Investment in technology was accompanied by significant economic development and education, improving people's lives and helping them understand the ecosystems that make their lives possible. On the other hand, not every problem has succumbed to technological innovation. In some cases, we seem to be barely ahead of the next threat to global life support. Even worse, new environmental problems often seem to emerge from the most recent technological solution, and the costs of managing the environment are continually rising. Many wonder if we are in fact on a downward spiral, where new problems arise before the last one is really solved. As we look to 2100 and beyond, we need to cope with a situation in which problems are multiplying faster than solutions. The science and policy challenge for the next 50 years is to learn how to organize socioecological systems so that ecosystem services are maintained without taxing society's ability to invent and pay for solutions to novel, emergent problems.*

Source: Carpenter et al. (2005, 129–36)

## 4.2 Summary of scenario results: IEA

The IEA ETP baseline scenario suggests that without new policies energy use more than doubles over the simulation period, while energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rise by an unsustainable 137% from 24.5 gt in 2003 to 58 gt in 2050. Most of the growth in energy demand, and hence emissions, arises from developing countries. Rapid economic growth in developing countries with large coal reserves entails an increasing share of coal in the energy mix. Coal demand nearly triples between 2003 and 2050 while oil demand increases by 93%, resulting in significant pressure on oil supply, and gas demand increases by 138%. The share of developing countries in global energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rises from 37% in 2003 to 55% in 2050.



The key message from the ACT scenarios is that in the presence of a supporting policy environment, emerging clean energy technologies that are already available today or which could become commercially available in the next decade or two, can move the global energy system onto a more sustainable path and return world-wide energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions back to today's level by 2050.

Energy efficiency improvements in the end-use sectors transport, industry and buildings make the largest contribution to CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions in the ACT scenarios. Except for the Low Efficiency scenario, energy efficiency improvements contribute between 45 % and 53 % of total emission reductions compared to the baseline. In the Low Efficiency scenario, this share falls to 31 %.

CO<sub>2</sub> capture and storage contribute a further 20 % and 28 % of emission reductions except in the ACT No CCS scenario, fuel switching between 11 % and 16 %, the use of renewables in power generation between 5 % and 16 %; nuclear energy between 2 % and 10 %, biofuels in transport for about 6 %, and other options between 1 % and 3 %.

In the ACT Map scenario, emissions return to the 2005 level by 2050, that is, 6 % higher than in 2003. In the Low Nuclear, Low Renewables, No CCS and Low Efficiency scenarios, 2050 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are somewhat higher than in the Map scenario, ranging between 9 % and 27 % above the 2003 level. In the speculative TECH Plus scenario, which entertains more extreme assumption about technical progress in low-carbon technologies, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions drop 16 % below 2003 levels by 2050.

Despite these changes, fossil fuels still supply between 66 % and 71 % of the world's energy in 2050 under the ACT scenarios. Investment in conventional energy sources is therefore considered to remain essential.

### 4.3 Implications for developing countries

The adverse consequences of growing pressures on ecosystems identified both in the backward-looking parts of the MEA as well as in the forward-looking MEA scenario projections are most immediately felt by rural poor populations in the least developed regions of the world. More than 70 % of the 1.1 billion poor people surviving on less than \$ 1 per day live in rural areas, where they are directly dependent on ecosystem services.<sup>12</sup>

MEA (2005a) emphasizes repeatedly that the degradation of ecosystem services poses a significant barrier to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Many of the regions facing the greatest challenges in achieving these targets – particularly the dry and semi-arid low-income regions in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia – coincide with regions facing the greatest problems of ecosystem degradation. Many of the targets and goals are unlikely to be achieved without significant improvement in management of ecosystems. Ecosystem degradation threatens livelihoods and is identified as one of the factors trapping people in cycles of poverty. All four MEA scenarios project progress in the elimination of hunger but the im-

---

<sup>12</sup> Sachs and Reid (2006) paraphrasing MEA (2005b,19).

improvements are slowest in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where the problem is most severe. Climate change, soil degradation, and water availability influence progress toward this goal through their effects on crop yields as well as through impacts on the availability of wild sources of food. The scenarios are thus by no means Malthusian doom-and-gloom visions and the MEA Scenario Report recognizes explicitly that the principal underlying causes of persistent hunger are economic and social rather than environmental or natural resource-related. Stated differently, none of the four scenarios suggests that absolute natural resource constraints may stand in the way of feeding the projected world population of 10+ billion people population in 2050, and the Scenario Report cites poverty, inequity and deprivation of the opportunity to earn income or to obtain land rather than environmental factors as the principal causes of persistent hunger (Carpenter et al. 2005, 499).

With respect to the child mortality MDG, the MEA study recognizes undernutrition as the underlying cause of a substantial proportion of all child deaths. As noted above, three of the MEA scenarios project reductions in child undernourishment by 2050 due to the assumption of effective policy measures, but undernourishment increases in the OS scenario. Child mortality is also significantly affected by diseases resulting from poor water quality. Diarrhea is one of the predominant causes of infant deaths worldwide. With respect to the disease MDG, again the scenarios with proactive environmental policies as well as the GO scenario record progress, but under OS it is considered plausible that health problems are exacerbated in low-income regions as changes in ecosystems influence the incidence of diseases such as malaria and cholera as well as the risk of emergence of new diseases. Finally, the environmental sustainability MDG, which includes access to safe drinking water, is obviously not achieved as long as vital ecosystem services are being degraded.

More generally, any progress achieved in addressing the MDGs of poverty and hunger eradication, improved health, and environmental sustainability is unlikely to be sustained if most of the ecosystem services on which humanity relies continue to be degraded. In contrast, the sound management of ecosystem services is seen to provide cost-effective opportunities for addressing multiple development goals in a synergistic manner.<sup>13</sup>

Or as the MEA Board has summed up the link between ecosystems degradation, poverty and development emphatically,

*“A striking part of this assessment is that the people lacking [the basic ingredients for a decent life, such as adequate food, clean water, and freedom from avoidable diseases] are generally those most vulnerable to the deterioration of natural systems. Addressing the threat to the planet’s natural assets therefore must be seen as part of the fight against poverty. To put it the other way around, development policies aimed at reducing poverty that ignore the impact of our current behavior on the natural environment may well be doomed to failure. Poverty and degradation of nature can combine into a downward spiral - poor communities are often left with fewer options to conserve their natural resources, leading to further deterioration of the land and even greater poverty” (MEA 2005b, 19).*

The potential implications of the MEA scenarios for future development policy are discussed in section 5.

---

<sup>13</sup> MEA (2005a, 2). All statements in this paragraph are based on MEA (2005a), Carpenter et al. (2005, 491–500) and Chopra et al. (2005, 551–83).

The messages from the IEA scenarios are in at least two respects important from the perspective of developing countries, although the main implications are different for different country groups, depending on their exposure to adverse climate change impacts and their current and expected future contribution to global GHG emissions as a function of level of development and population size. First, the IEA baseline scenario clearly shows that without decisive globally coordinated policy action in support of the adoption of low-carbon energy technologies, GHG emissions will continue to rise rapidly over the 21st century and exacerbate current global warming trends. It is now widely recognized that developing countries – and in particular low-income countries in tropical and sub-tropical regions – will be disproportionately affected by the adverse impacts of climate change. The combination of exposure to an already fragile environment, dominance of climate-sensitive sectors in economic activity and low autonomous adaptive capacity in these regions entail a high vulnerability to the harmful effects of global warming on agricultural production and food security, water resources, human health, physical infrastructure and ecosystems. Recent authoritative scientific assessments emphasize that even under the most optimistic assumptions about the success of future global mitigation action, an acceleration of adaptation efforts in developing countries over the next decades is essential to build resilience and reduce damage costs (IPCC 2007; Stern 2007). Without successful global climate change mitigation efforts, the adaptation burden is bound to escalate for the adversely affected countries.

Second, the IEA projections reported above demonstrate in line with other studies that an effective follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol must include at a minimum the major large and fast-growing developing countries including China and India in order to achieve a return of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to sustainable levels. As outlined in section 3, the ACT scenarios, in which global GHG emissions are returned to sustainable levels, are based on the assumption that improvements in energy efficiency and a transition to cleaner energy technology is also taking place in developing countries that contribute significantly to global emissions.

The implications of these two important messages for future development policy are addressed in the following section.

## **5. Implications for the future of development policy**

### **5.1 The role of the environment in development policy strategies**

The policy synthesis chapter of the MEA Scenario Report emphasizes the interdependence between environmental and development goals as one of its main messages (Carpenter et al. 2005, 471). A key implication of this interdependence is the need for a meaningful integration of environmental sustainability concerns in national development plans and strategies of individual donors and intergovernmental development agencies, as well as the need for closer coordination between multilateral environmental agreements and other international institutions in the development policy sphere.

Thus, MEA (2005a, 93) calls for the integration of ecosystem management goals within broader development planning frameworks, and more specifically for the mainstreaming of ecosystem management in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) preparation and updating

processes instigated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, given that the PRSPs strongly shape national development priorities in a large number of low-income countries. The MEA Policy Responses Report indeed contends that “(p)overly reduction can only work if the links between ecosystems and well-being are explicitly mainstreamed into national poverty reduction strategies like *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*” (Chopra et al. 2005, 489).

To be sure, the recognition of the need for integrated strategies towards development and environmental sustainability can hardly be considered a novel insight, and efforts to mainstream the notion of sustainability into the development discourse have been pursued with considerable progress for more than two decades. As Bass (2007) puts it, it was the 1987 Brundtland Commission Report (WCED 1987) that introduced the concept of sustainable development – defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs – into the political mainstream. The subsequent global summits in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002 led to a wide endorsement of the concept and helped to extend its reach into the arenas of business, local government and civil society. The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 as well as the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation call for an integration of economic development, social development and environmental protection as the three interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development.

These international plans express global aspirations and intentions but remain generally vague due to the need to accommodate diverse national positions and do not include specific and enforceable commitments. However, some governments have committed to the adoption of national strategies for sustainable development. Various development agencies have drafted guidelines to assist developing countries in preparing such strategies (DFID 2000; OECD 2001; UNDESA 2002). As a joint paper by DFID et al. (2002) for the Johannesburg summit points out in this context, the continuing tendency of donors to promote multiple and competing strategy frameworks creates its own challenges.

In summarizing the progress in promoting the sustainable development agenda since the publication of the Brundtland Report, Bass (2007) finds that there is now a bewildering array of sustainable development plans and strategies, but that these plans generally lack clear priorities, have little influence on budgeting, investment and public administration, and have not yet triggered the pace, scale, scope and depth of change that is needed to make development sustainable. There is now an abundance of political fora and councils that identify and debate sustainable development issues, but few have high status, or are adequately linked to the key processes of legislation and government.

With respect to the specific MEA plea for the mainstreaming of ecosystem management in PRSP processes, it should be noted that the World Bank (2004) PRSP Sourcebook in fact not only identifies the linkages between environmental conditions and poverty as a cross-cutting theme, but also argues in favour of a systematic mainstreaming of environmental management in PRSPs and their associated processes, because the quality of the environment is considered to be inextricably linked to the quality of life for poor people. The PRSP Sourcebook includes a complete chapter with guidelines to help PRSP teams integrate environmental problems and opportunities in their work and consider potential environmental and natural resource interventions in their poverty reduction strategies. It also includes a review to assess the extent of environmental mainstreaming in the PRSPs up to 2001. While the MEA Responses Report

notes these efforts to include environmental concerns in PRSPs, the approach is criticized for reducing “*proper environmental management to the provision of ‘sustainable livelihoods’*” (Chopra et al. 2005, 516).<sup>14</sup>

Since the publication of the MEA and IEA assessments, the recent Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007) as well as the Stern Review on the economics of climate change (Stern 2007) have given additional impetus to the case for a systematic integration of environmental concerns in the formulation of future development strategies.

Apart from establishing beyond reasonable doubt that most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations, the new evidence provided in IPCC (2007) shows in particular that the risks of dangerous climate change for vulnerable regions are very likely to be larger or to occur at lower increases in temperature than previously projected and assumed in the MEA scenarios. There is now higher confidence in the projected increases in droughts, heat waves and floods, as well as their adverse impacts. There is increased evidence that low-latitude and less developed areas generally face greater risk, especially in dry areas of Africa, in the Asian and African mega-delta regions, and in small island states threatened by increased frequency of storms, floods and sea-level rise. For increases in global average temperature exceeding 1.5 to 2.5 °C – as will be the case in the absence of decisive climate change mitigation action – the IPCC assessment projects major changes in ecosystems with predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem services including water and food supply.

While the MEA takes the effects of climate change on ecosystems into account, climate change is not framed as the potentially dominant driver of ecosystems change in the longer run, and the policy implications chapter of the MEA Scenario Report indeed explicitly refrains from a discussion of climate change adaptation and mitigation policy options in order to avoid stepping on IPCC territory.<sup>15</sup> This is a rather astonishing decision in view of the calls for an integration of environmental policies within broader policy frameworks elsewhere in the same Report, but it also perfectly – if involuntarily – illustrates one of the main practical obstacles to the realization of truly integrated policy approaches, namely the difficulty to step over established institutional boundaries and organizational divisions between different policy spheres.

In the light of the recent IPCC evidence, the MEA’s conception of embedding environmental management into national poverty reduction strategies appears to aim too short if climate change policy is excluded from such integrated strategies. In the words of Stern (2007), it is essential that climate change be fully integrated into development policy, and that rich countries honour their pledges to increase support through development assistance. As already noted in section 4, it is no longer possible to prevent a significant further rise in global tempera-

---

14 Given the distinctly anthropocentric perspective of the MEA conceptual framework outlined in section 2, in which the links between ecosystems and human wellbeing take centre stage, the precise point of this criticism remains unclear to this reviewer as the subsequent discussion does not develop a coherent argument in support of the cited statement. However, it is certainly correct that current PRSP implementation practices fall generally short of the corresponding aspirations of the PRSP Sourcebook mentioned above.

15 “*Although the MA scenarios contain some information on climate change and its impacts, this chapter does not assess the implications for the climate change convention; this could be done in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.*” (Carpenter et al. 2005, 473).

tures over the next few decades due to past GHG emissions, and an acceleration of adaptation measures, especially in the most vulnerable regions, is required.

The objective of climate change adaptation is to reduce vulnerability to adverse impacts. Vulnerability to adverse climate change is a function of geographical exposure, sensitivity and adaptability. As adaptive capacity rises with per-capita income, infrastructure endowments and with the level of development in general, Stern (2007, 432) concludes that “*much of what governments should do in relation to adaptation is what they should be doing anyway - that is, implementing good development practice.*”

The Human Development Report 2007/08 likewise identifies the integration of adaptation planning into wider poverty reduction strategies as a priority, but also calls for a closer coordination of international support efforts and multilateral adaptation funding mechanisms:

*“International support for adaptation has to go beyond financing. Current international efforts suffer not just from chronic underfinancing, but also a lack of coordination and coherence. The patchwork of multilateral mechanisms is delivering small amounts of finance with very high transaction costs, most of it through individual projects. While project-based support has an important role to play, the locus for adaptation planning has to be shifted towards national programmes and budgets. ... Dialogue over Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) provides a possible framework for integrating adaptation in poverty reduction planning. Revision of PRSPs through nationally-owned processes to identify financing requirements and policy options for adaptation could provide a focal point for international cooperation.”* (UNDP 2007, 15).<sup>16</sup>

With regard to international funding mechanisms to support a closer integration of environmental management into national development strategies, the MEA has sparked a debate about the merits of establishing a dedicated Millennium Ecosystem Fund financed by developed donor countries as proposed by Sachs and Reid (2006) and Bass (2006). Such proposals have met with the objection that the proliferation of new global funding mechanisms is likely to introduce new layers of bureaucracy and increase the reporting burdens for poor countries, and therefore it might be preferable to strengthen existing mechanisms such as the Global Environmental Facility, and existing UN environmental programmes.<sup>17</sup> As shown in section 5.3, the MEA scenario analysis is not designed to throw further light on this debate and a systematic discussion of proposals for future reforms of multilateral funding mechanisms to support development cooperation is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, real progress towards the integration of ecosystem management and climate change adaptation in the development strategies of low-income countries as addressed in this section will certainly require significant increases in the flow of financial resources from rich to poor countries.

There is also an urgent need for further research to extend the knowledge base required to ensure that such financial resources are channelled into uses that promise maximum returns in terms of vulnerability reduction. While the existing climate change adaptation and develop-

---

16 For a detailed discussion of the shortcomings of existing multilateral funding mechanisms and reform proposals see UNDP (2007, 186–98).

17 See e.g. the UK government’s response to the Millennium Ecosystem Fund proposal in House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2007).

ment literature is replete with extensive bullet point lists of desirable policy measures, efforts to set clear priorities are very limited. Setting priorities is important in the presence of limited funding, and this requires detailed knowledge of the costs and prospective benefits of different policy options. Yet systematic evaluations of these cost and benefits at a disaggregated geographical scale are in short supply at present. It is noteworthy that a major recent World Bank initiative on the economics of climate change adaptation with UK, Swiss and Dutch government funding is beginning to address this knowledge gap for a small subset of highly vulnerable countries. Further research in this direction for a wider set of countries should be assigned a high priority on the future development policy research agenda.

## 5.2 Implications of the IEA scenarios for development cooperation

As noted in sections 4.2 and 4.3 above, the IEA scenarios show that without an inclusion of the large and fast-growing developing economies into future global climate change mitigation efforts, the return of global energy-related GHG emissions to a sustainable path as projected by the ACT Map scenario will not materialize. Although per-capita energy consumption and per-capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in these economies are still below the corresponding OECD figures, their population size and projected GDP growth rates imply that the contribution of developing countries to GHG emissions is rapidly rising from its 2003 share of 37% and will overtake the OECD contribution well before 2050.

The IEA Report concludes that developing countries will therefore also need to consider CO<sub>2</sub> abatement policies. The Report explicitly recognizes that developed countries have an important role to play in helping developing economies to leapfrog the technology development process and to employ efficient equipment and practices through technology transfer, capacity building and collaborative research, development and demonstration efforts. It is emphasized that it will take a huge internationally coordinated effort to achieve the positive outcomes suggested by the ACT scenarios, and that cooperation between developed and developing regions on an unprecedented scale will be required as part of this effort.

This is the key message from the IEA study for future development cooperation, and this message is in line with the conclusions of other pertinent studies including the Stern Review<sup>18</sup> and the UNDP (2007) Human Development Report with its focus on climate change and development:

*“The current state of international cooperation and multilateralism on climate change is not fit for the purpose. As a priority, the world needs a binding international agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions across a long time horizon, but with stringent near-term and medium-term targets. The major developing countries have to be party to that agreement and make commitments to reduce emissions. However, those commitments will need to reflect their circumstances and capabilities, and the overarching need to sustain progress in poverty reduction. Any multilateral agreement without quantitative commit-*

---

18 “Action on climate change is required across all countries, and it need not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries. ... Even if the rich world takes on responsibility for absolute cuts in emissions of 60-80% by 2050, developing countries must take significant action too. But developing countries should not be required to bear the full costs of this action alone.” (Stern 2007, vi).

*ments from developing countries will lack credibility in terms of climate change mitigation. At the same time, no such agreement will emerge unless it incorporates provisions for finance and technology transfer from the rich nations that bear historic responsibility for climate change.” (UNDP 2007, 16).*

The exposition of the IEA scenarios generally refers to developing countries as a single bloc and no further regional breakdown is provided in the presentation of the quantitative tables and the narrative. Exceptions are repeated references to the cases of China as the world’s biggest user of coal for power generation and India as another big and fast-growing country with large coal reserves, whose involvement in the transition to a cleaner energy future is considered to be crucial.

As noted in previous sections, the ACT scenarios assume the global implementation of technologies with an incremental cost of up to \$ 25 per tonne of reduced CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2050. This shift will not happen in China, India and other emerging economies unless lasting economic incentives to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are put in place via internationally coordinated binding commitments to adopt measures that raise the effective price of carbon emissions to this level. Although climate change mitigation should be in China’s and India’s own interest, given that both countries will be affected by adverse climate change impacts, achieving the adoption of such commitments in these and other regions is one of the urgent policy challenges ahead. Once again, an important future role of development policy must be the facilitation of the technology and knowledge transfer that is required to meet this challenge.

Like the MEA, the IEA Report does not offer specific funding proposals to support the additional levels of development cooperation underlying the ACT scenarios.

### 5.3 Development policy insights from the individual MEA scenarios?

The MEA scenarios indicate that progress toward sustainable development is possible under different governance settings and along different pathways. But they also demonstrate the potential threats to ecosystems and human well-being that might emerge along these paths. As Carpenter et al. (2005, 500) point out, the choice of the actual direction and the implementation strategy rests mainly with national governments. The documentation of the relationships among driving forces, ecosystem change, and human well-being in the scenarios is intended to help governments and other actors make those choices.

In asking how the scenarios can be used to inform future development policy choices, it is crucial to bear in mind that one is faced with a problem of choice in the presence of considerable uncertainty. The MEA emphasizes that critical knowledge gaps persist in the present understanding of the robustness and resilience of ecosystems generally, the qualitative and quantitative nature of their response to human impacts and repair efforts, and the ways in which ecological processes can interact across scales of space and time.

There is a lack of theories and models that anticipate thresholds or tipping points beyond which fundamental system change or system collapse occurs. Evidently, the assessment of reactive versus proactive approaches to environmental management depends crucially on the views about ecosystem robustness and the scenario building process did not lead to a uniform viewpoint among different members of the Scenarios Working Group in this respect. The scenarios



reflect and articulate these uncertainties and associated contrary views but cannot resolve them, and hence the scenario analysis does deliberately not result in the unambiguous identification of a single best policy pathway.

Thus, while the Scenarios Working Group is unanimous that the OS scenario is unsustainable and ultimately disastrous for ecosystems and the societies that depend on them, the Scenario Report indicates that the specific assumptions about ecosystem resilience underlying the GO and TG storylines are not shared by all members of the Working Group:

*“(GO) reflects the belief of several members of the Working Group in what reform to global social and economic policy can achieve. Others find it easier to imagine disastrous outcomes from this scenario. ... (TG) explores the belief that ecological engineering will be fairly successful and produce tolerably few major unexpected breakdowns of ecosystem services. Many ... suspect that it is overly optimistic.”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 232 and 255).

In short, readers of the scenario storylines in search of specific and unambiguous policy guidelines for development policy that go beyond the general message that environmental management cannot be treated separately from other development concerns, but requires integration into poverty reduction and sustainable development efforts will be disappointed.<sup>19</sup>

As noted in section 1, the MEA is primarily geared towards the information requirements of the various UN conventions on biodiversity, desertification and wetlands. Accordingly, the main target audience for the policy implications drawn within the MEA Scenario Report consists of experts and policymakers directly concerned with decision and implementation processes under these conventions rather than the wider development policy community, although, as outlined above, the Report’s policy implications chapter also includes a brief discussion of potential implications for the achievement of the MDGs.<sup>20</sup>

The exposition of the actual storyline narratives in the MEA Scenario Report devotes between seven and ten pages to each of the four scenarios, and each of these covers the five decades from 2000 and 2050 along with a further outlook up to the end of the 21st century. So the scenario narratives contain in fact little additional information about the assumed development policy strategies on top of the very broad outlines already provided in Table 1, Box 3 and section 4 of this paper.

Let us first scrutinize the GO scenario with its emphasis on *“fair policies to improve well-being of those in poorer countries by removing trade barriers and subsidies”* (Table 1). As shown

---

19 In an evaluation of the MEA, the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2007) invited a range of environmental agencies to comment on strengths and weaknesses of the various MEA components. While the MEA as a whole was generally well-received, a number of responses questioned the usefulness of the MEA scenario analysis as a guide for policy. Criticisms include that the *“scenarios do not relate well to the more immediate context of decision making”* (Ev39) and that the *“approach was not credible enough for the results to be taken very seriously”* (Ev54).

20 The detailed catalogue of policy recommendations contained in the separate report of the MEA Policy Responses Working Group is addressed to the same audience and is not based on insights specifically derived from the MEA scenarios. Correspondingly, a review of this catalogue is beyond the remit of the present paper. However, it is worth noting, that one of the few cross-references from the MEA Responses Report to the MEA Scenario Report is a warning that *“there are a number of reasons to be cautious in the use of scenarios”* including their contingency on *“hidden and hard-to-articulate assumptions”* (Chopra et al. 2005, 5).

in Table 4 above, per-capita GDP growth rates in developing regions are highest among all scenarios, but it needs to be recalled from section 3.1 that the projected global growth rate difference across scenarios are not based on dynamic model simulations nor do the regional growth rate differences within scenarios follow endogenously from the detailed storyline narratives; instead they are based on simple *ad hoc* adjustments to given extraneous World Bank projections. As a result, the storylines for individual regions fail to establish clear causal links between policy measures and outcomes that would serve to inform the design of future development strategy. The following unabbreviated quotation from the GO scenario narrative illustrates the point:

*“In Africa, the widespread unrest and instability of the early 2000s continued until around 2010. By this time, the growing prosperity of a few nations allowed them to make virtuous investments to assist their neighbors. These initiatives spread slowly through Africa, as national leaders united to develop cooperative policies for dealing with disease and poverty and to strengthen the continent’s trading position globally. Despotic leaders were encouraged to stand down, and participatory democracy began to develop in many countries throughout the 2010s. Some African cities became centers for innovation in digital technologies”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 232).

A text box informs the reader that the nations that trigger these positive developments across Africa through investments in neighbouring countries are Botswana (a country with a population of around 1.7 million people) and Ghana (a country with an annual per-capita income of 450 Euro in 2006). What is obviously missing here is a plausible elaboration of how exactly the assumed global trade liberalization and partial debt relief policies are supposed to induce these outcomes, as no further details of changes in global development policy other than that *“the United Nations ... reinvented itself as an organization primarily focused on promoting social and economic equity”* (ibid, 232) are offered. This particular example is also illustrative of the general difficulty to derive specific policy messages for individual regions from a global-scale assessment.

Similarly, in the TG scenario a removal of subsidies and other agricultural trade barriers in combination with an increasing spread, and development of locally adapted genetically modified crops is envisaged to trigger a global transformation of agriculture involving an intensification of farm production in Asia, Africa and Latin America. With the help of foreign direct investment inflows and successful regional economic integration efforts, sub-Saharan Africa is seen to turn into *“one of the globe’s ‘breadbaskets,’ with some of the cleanest cities and most rational land use in the world”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 259). In this scenario, positive developments in developing regions are largely driven by market-oriented institutional reform including the assignment of property rights to ecosystem services rather than by discrete development policy interventions.

A new energy fund is set up under the Global Environment Facility to mitigate climate change by stimulating the development of low-carbon energy systems and this effort leads to substantial decreases in the cost of clean energy technology. In this respect, the TG scenario bears a close resemblance to the IEA ACT scenarios. Indeed, the detailed information about emerging technologies provided in the latter would seem to back up and substantiate the technology optimism displayed in the former.

Governance frameworks in the AM scenario are characterized by a general trend towards decentralization involving the devolution of power to sub-national regions with regional variation

in management techniques but a common emphasis on “learning while managing”. From a development policy perspective, it is noteworthy that this scenario envisages an increased role for a new breed of NGOs that not only rely on the participation of politically interested people but are expert networks aiming at non-profit transfer of knowledge and skills throughout the world. These organizations are considered to be “*highly flexible and ... thus able to incorporate the local contexts and peculiarities much better than the bureaucratic international or governmental aid organizations*” (Carpenter et al. 2005, 246).<sup>21</sup>

Under AM, the WTO Doha Round trade liberalization negotiations break down and trade barriers rise initially, but later a new framework for free trade under a “New Agenda for Development” emerges – however, the description of the rationale and features of this new framework remains opaque:

*“The most central tenets were: Free trade of end products certified to comply with the ecological and social standards of the region of origin, free investments in regions under the condition of a sufficient and wide-ranging participation of local people and civil society organizations as well as professional networks, free flow of labor as long as both the country of origin as well as the country of destination complied with ... minimal social standards... The decisive point of the agreement was that the conditions were no longer bound to the nation-state, but much more to the (sub-national; DW) regions. Nation states agreed to these directives with the hope that within their countries those regions benefitting from the agreements would serve as a locomotive of growth for the whole country.”* (Carpenter et al. 2005, 251).<sup>22</sup>

Climate change mitigation as a globally coordinated effort disappears from the policy agenda. In response to the increased frequency of extreme weather events due to global warming, a Global Adaptation Facility is set up under AM to provide financial assistance for adaptation measures.

Overall, the comparison of the AM with the TG scenario may be seen to inform current debates within the area of climate change adaptation and development among proponents of localized community-based adaptation approaches in low-income countries with emphasis on local environmental knowledge and learning (as favoured under AM) and proponents of technological ecological engineering approaches (as favoured under TG),<sup>23</sup> as the scenarios highlight the potential benefits and risks of both approaches. However, the MEA scenarios can of course not resolve this debate.

Perhaps the strongest message for the future of development policy comes from the OS scenario. As outlined in section 4, the combination of reactive approaches to environmental management and climate change adaptation with an absence of internationally coordinated efforts to manage the global commons is bound to lead to predominantly negative development outcomes in low-income regions with a high dependence on fragile ecosystems.

---

21 These NGOs are seen to operate in the areas of health services, water management, fishery management, labour safety and pharmacy, but the scenario narrative provides little further detail of their assumed activities or funding sources.

22 Here and in many other sections of the storyline narratives, the exposition suffers from an ostensible lack of input from specialists with expertise in the economics of international trade.

23 See e.g. Tanner and Mitchell (2008) for various perspectives on this debate.

## 5.4 Concluding remarks

The preceding review of the MEA and IEA scenarios has shown that ecosystem degradation and global warming pose serious threats for poverty reduction and development and deserve high priority on the future development policy agenda. A common feature of the two scenario projects is the avoidance of pure doom-and-gloom projections.<sup>24</sup> The broad generic message for policymakers is that the challenges are serious but policy options exist to address these challenges. If decisive and proactive action is taken, the challenges are manageable without dramatic implications for the growth aspirations of developing and developed countries. The task ahead for development policy is to assist in translating this message into concrete action.

---

<sup>24</sup> Although for policy pessimists there is a strong doom-and-gloom message between the lines.

## Bibliography

- Alcamo, J. et al.* (2003a): Development and testing of the WaterGAP 2 global model of water use and availability, in: *Hydrological Sciences* 48 (3), 317–337
- (2003b): Global estimation of water withdrawals and availability under current and “business as usual” conditions, in: *Hydrological Sciences* 48 (3), 339–348
- Bass, S.* (2006): Making poverty reduction irreversible: development implications of the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, London: International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED Briefing)
- (2007): A new era in sustainable development, London: International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED Briefing)
- Carpenter, S. R. et al.* (eds.) (2005): Ecosystems and human well-being: findings of the Scenarios Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series Vol. 2, Washington, DC: Island Press
- Chopra, K. et al.* (2005): Ecosystems and human well-being: findings of the Responses Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Series Vol. 3, Washington, DC: Island Press
- DFID (Department for International Development)* (2000): Achieving sustainability: poverty elimination and the environment: strategies for achieving the international development targets, London
- DFID (Department for International Development) et al.* (2002): Linking poverty reduction and environmental management: policy challenges and opportunities, Washington, DC: World Bank
- Gielen, D. / M. Taylor* (2007): Modelling industrial energy use: the IEA’s energy technology perspectives, in: *Energy Economics* 29 (4), 889–912
- House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee* (2007): First report of session 2006/07: the UN Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, London: House of Commons Stationary Office
- IMAGE* (2001): The IMAGE 2.2 implementation of the SRES scenarios: a comprehensive analysis of emissions, climate change and impacts in the 21st century, Bilthoven: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency [CD-ROM]
- IEA (International Energy Agency)* (2006): Energy technology perspectives 2006: scenarios and strategies to 2050, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Energy Agency
- (2008): IEA work for the G8: 2008 messages, Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Energy Agency
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)* (2007): Climate change 2007: synthesis report, Geneva
- Kainuma, M. / Y. Matsuoka / T. Morita* (2002): Climate policy assessment, Tokyo: Springer
- Loulou, R. / G. Goldstein / K. Noble* (2004): Documentation for the MARKAL family of models, Paris: Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme; online: [http://www.etsap.org/MrklDoc-I\\_StdMARKAL.pdf](http://www.etsap.org/MrklDoc-I_StdMARKAL.pdf)
- Lutz, W. / A. Goujon* (2001): The world’s changing human capital stock: multi-state population projections by educational attainment, in: *Population and Development Review* 27 (2), 323–339
- MEA (Millennium Ecosystems Assessment)* (2005a): Ecosystems and human well-being: synthesis, Washington, DC: Island Press
- (2005b): Living beyond our means: natural assets and human well-being: statement from the board, Washington, DC
- Nakicenovic, N. et al.* (2000): Special report on emissions scenarios: special report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- National Research Council* (2007): Analysis of global change assessments: lessons learned, Washington, DC: National Academies Press

- OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development)* (2001): The DAC guidelines: strategies for sustainable development: guidance for development cooperation, Paris
- O'Neill, B. C.* (2005): Population scenarios based on probabilistic projections: an application for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, in *Population & Environment* 26 (3), 229–254
- Pauly, D. / V. Christensen / C. Walters* (2000): Ecopath, ecosim, and ecospace as tools for evaluating ecosystem impact of fisheries, in: *ICES Journal of Marine Science* 57 (3), 697–706
- Rosegrant, M. W. / X. Cai / S. Cline* (2002): World water and food to 2025: dealing with scarcity, Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute
- Sachs, J. D. / W. V. Reid* (2006): Investments toward sustainable development, in: *Science* 312 (5776), 1002
- Stern, N.* (2007): The economics of climate change: the Stern review, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Tanner, T. / T. Mitchell* (eds.) (2008): Poverty in a changing climate, in: *IDS Bulletin* 39 (4)
- UKGECC (United Kingdom Global Environmental Change Commission)* (2006): Evaluating the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: messages, knowledge gaps and policy implications: report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Workshop held 3 February 2006, London
- UNDESA (United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs)* (2002): Guidance in preparing a national sustainable development strategy: managing sustainable development in a new millennium, New York
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)* (2007): Human Development Report 2007/2008: fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world, New York
- United Nations* (2002): Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August – 4 September 2002, New York
- (2005): World population prospects: the 2004 revision, New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
- WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development)* (1987): Our common future, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- World Bank* (2002): Global economic perspectives 2002, Washington, DC
- (2004): A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies, Washington, DC

## Publications of the German Development Institute

### Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft

*Messner, Dirk / Imme Scholz* (eds.): *Zukunftsfragen der Entwicklungspolitik*, 410 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1005-0

*Neubert, Susanne / Waltina Scheumann / Annette van Edig, / Walter Huppert* (eds.): *Integriertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Praxis überführen*, 314 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1111-1

*Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen*: *Armutorientierte landwirtschaftliche und ländliche Entwicklung*, 342 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0555-3

*Liebig, Klaus*: *Internationale Regulierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte und Wissenserwerb in Entwicklungsländern: Eine ökonomische Analyse*, 233 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2379-2 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 1)

*Schlumberger, Oliver*: *Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt: Ursachen, Trends und internationale Demokratieförderung*, 225 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-3114-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 2)

*Qualmann, Regine*: *South Africa's Reintegration into World and Regional Markets: Trade Liberalization and Emerging Patterns of Specialization in the Post-Apartheid Era*, 206 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-2995-4 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 3)

*Loewe, Markus*: *Soziale Sicherung, informeller Sektor und das Potenzial von Kleinstversicherungen*, 221 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2009, ISBN 978-3-8329-4017-1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 4)

[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.]

### Book Series with Routledge

*Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen*: *Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Development*, 342 p., Routledge, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-36853-7 (Studies in Development and Society 12)

*Krause, Matthias*: *The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation*, 282 p., Routledge, London 2009, ISBN 978-0-415-99489-7 (Studies in Development and Society 20)

[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.]

### Springer-Verlag

*Scheumann, Waltina / Susanne Neubert / Martin Kipping* (eds.): *Water Politics and Development Cooperation: Local Power Plays and Global Governance*, 416 p., Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-540-76706-0

### Berichte und Gutachten

[Price: 9,63 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops. This publications series was terminated and superseded by the new publications series "Studies", starting November 2004.]

## Studies

- 44 *Haldenwang, Christian von et al.*: Administración tributaria municipal en el contexto del proceso de descentralización en el Perú : los Servicios de Administración Tributaria (SAT), 141 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-480-3) (German edition: ISBN 978-3-88985-378-3 – Studies 42)
- 43 *Altenburg, Tilman et al.*: Biodiesel in India: Value chain organisation and policy options for rural development, 139 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-379-0
- 42 *Haldenwang, Christian von et al.*: Kommunale Steuerverwaltung im Kontext des peruanischen Dezentralisierungsprozesses: Das Modell der semi-autonomen Steueragenturen, 141 p., Bonn 2008, ISBN 978-3-88985-378-3 (Spanish edition: ISBN 978-3-88985-480-3 –Studies 44))
- 41 Richerzhagen, *Carmen et al.*: Energy Efficiency in Buildings in China: Policies, barriers and opportunities, 121 p., Bonn 2008, ISBN 978-3-88985-377-6
- 40 *Lundsgaarde, Erik*: Building Long-Term Scenarios for Development: The methodological state of the art with an application to foreign direct investment in Africa, 107 p., Bonn 2008, ISBN 978-3-88985-376-9
- 39 *Kosow, Hannah / Robert Gaßner*: Methods of Future and Scenario Analysis: Overview, assessment, and selection criteria, 120 p., Bonn 2008, ISBN 978-3-88985-375-2

[Price: 10,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.]

## Discussion Paper

- 7/2009 *Bhat, Ganapati*: Transfer Pricing, Tax Havens and Global Governance, 32 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-455-1
- 6/2009 *Leininger, Julia*: Think big! Future prospects of the international summit architecture – the G20, G8, G5 and the Heiligendamm Dialogue Process, 44 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 3-88985-454-4 (German edition: ISBN 3-88985-456-8 – Discussion Paper 2/2009)
- 5/2009 *Öztürk, Asiye*: Der innenpolitische Kontext des außenpolitischen Wandels der Türkei, 38 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 3-88985-457-5 (English edition: ISBN 978-3-88985-458-2 – Discussion Paper 10/2009)
- 4/2009 *Schmidt, Lars*: REDD from an Integrated Perspective: Considering overall climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation and equity issues, 43 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 3-88985-452-0
- 3/2009 *Müller, Christoph*: Climate Change Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa: An overview and analysis of scenarios and models, 47 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 3-88985-451-3
- 2/2009 *Leininger, Julia*: Think big! Zukunftsperspektiven der internationalen Gipfelarchitektur – die G20, G8, G5 und der Heiligendamm-Dialogprozess, 50 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-456-8 (English edition: ISBN 978-3-88985-454-4 – Discussion Paper 6/2009)

[Price: 6,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.]

A complete list of publications available from DIE can be found at:  
<http://www.die-gdi.de>





