Abstract

The “United Nations Millennium Declaration”, endorsed in 2000, and the accompanying Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2002, have been important instruments in streamlining and coordinating international development action. Since the targets were defined, significant progress has been achieved in almost all the MDGs but there are also numerous challenges that have not been addressed with the necessary commitment by the various stakeholders. New global realities and challenges have enormous implications on new development strategies. In order to agree on a common UN post-2015 development agenda several options are on the table. As one of the key actors, the EU has an important role to play in defining a new post-2015 framework. The EU is likely to build on the current MDG approach and to maintain poverty eradication as the central objective. However, it will probably aim at a more balanced and holistic rights-based approach to the three dimensions (economic, social and environmental) of sustainable development than in the current MDG framework. As a main recommendation of the study, the EP is prompted to use its own-initiative report on the post-2015 development framework to encourage the EU as a whole to ensure a bottom-up approach at the national level in both developed and developing countries – with a broad participation of the marginalised in particular, so as to guarantee their voices are listened to and their needs seriously addressed.
This study was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Development.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE MDGS 10
   1.1 INTRODUCTION 10
   1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE MDGS 11
   1.3 ACHIEVEMENTS 11

2. BEYOND 2015 WHAT DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK? 13
   2.1 NEW REALITIES AND CHALLENGES OF THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 13
   2.2 A POST MDG DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 17
   2.3 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS) 21
   2.4 OPTIONS FOR THE PROCESS 25
   2.5 SOME KEY TOPICS FOR THE THEMATIC CONSULTATIONS 29
   2.6 WHAT SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF A FUTURE FRAMEWORK? 30
   2.7 HOW COULD A FUTURE FRAMEWORK SUPPORT IMPROVED POLICY COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT? 31

3. A STRONG EU ENGAGEMENT 32
   3.1 WHAT HAS BEEN THE EU CONTRIBUTION SO FAR? 32
   3.2 TOWARDS AN EU POSITION ON THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 35
   3.3 AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE 36
   3.4 PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EU 37
   3.5 A PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 37
   3.6 THE EUROPEAN REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT 2013 38
   3.7 THE COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 38
   3.8 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S OWN-INITIATIVE REPORT ON THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 39
   3.9 THE FUTURE PROCESS AND LESSONS STEMMING FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 40

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 41
   4.1 CONCLUSIONS 41
   4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 42

BIBLIOGRAPHY 45

ANNEXES 49
# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India and China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFOD</td>
<td>Catholic Agency for Overseas Development</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agriculture Policy</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<td>CFP</td>
<td>Common Fisheries Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIGI</td>
<td>Canadian Centre for International Governance Innovation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODEV</td>
<td>Working Party on Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUN</td>
<td>United Nations Working Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>Commission on Sustainable Development (UN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Instrument for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERD</td>
<td>European Report on Development</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
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<td>GPGs</td>
<td>Global Public Goods</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-77</td>
<td>Group of 77</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HLP</td>
<td>High-level Panel</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low-income country</td>
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<td>MDG(s)</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multiannual Financial Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWG</td>
<td>Open Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG(s)</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRC</td>
<td>United Nations Resident Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG-DESA</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPIEI</td>
<td>Working Party on International Environment Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Millennium Declaration endorsed in 2000 by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the accompanying Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2002, have been an important element for streamlining and coordinating development action. The MDGs are up for review in 2015 and this report highlights the importance of a considerable rethinking of the focus of the targets and development strategies. The European Union (EU) has an important role in preparing the ground for the discussions, taking into account the already ongoing rethinking of EU development policy.

The MDGs are in many aspects a success story. They have provided a significant boost to development assistance and linked it to measurable targets and indicators. Impressive progress has been achieved and various MDGs are on track to meet their goals, but some objectives have not been addressed sufficiently. The targets leave out some important development aspects in terms of other non-income dimensions of poverty like inequality, human rights issues, marginalisation, exclusion, etc. Refining the present MDGs is also not enough. Since the targets were developed and adopted, the world has seen important socio-economic, environmental and financial upheavals. These will not only affect the capacity to reach the MDGs goals, but may even endanger achievements to date.

Despite considerable achievements, the MDGs are increasingly considered as ‘outdated’ and reflecting inadequately the evolving needs of development aid. The main concerns can be summarised as follows:

- **Indicators present an inaccurate view of progress**: Measured at global and country level, the measurements hide pronounced geographical disparities, as well as disparities between social groups. Poverty in marginalised groups has often worsened even in countries where the MDG indicators have on average improved.

- **New challenges threaten MDGs progress and are not sufficiently addressed**. There is already a rising concern that the achievements of the MDGs may be at risk due to the existing demographic trends and social tensions. However, the last decade has revealed a growing vulnerability of developing countries to climate change, environmental degradation, and depletion of natural resources. There is a growing consensus that MDGs need to be better designed to integrate the objective of reinforcing the resilience and long-term sustainability of societies.

Challenges in the way of a UN agreement for post 2015 MDGs

The UN Development Group will have to define the agenda for the post 2015 MDGs, guided by the High Level Panel formed by the UN Secretary General. The work is daunting, as it needs to lead to a global agreement. The UN will face the following challenges:

- The UN will need to define how to achieve a process that is more inclusive, equitable and sustainable. It will need to be better linked to the Rio+20 agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, the definitions and measurability of SDGs remain too ambiguous to make them operational in the MDG discussion process. The stark divergences in opinion between the members of the UN Sustainable Development Stakeholders make it unlikely that the SDGs will make a substantial contribution to the post-2015 agenda without delaying the whole process.

- Agreement will be very difficult to reach. Despite the efforts to date, the main actors of international cooperation still have substantial problems in finding a common ground.
Discussions on the zero draft for “The Future We Want” in the run-up to the conference highlighted how deep the differences between relevant stakeholders are on these main topics.

- This includes the lack of consensus on the principles and instruments for a Green Economy, and the strong opposition to the EU’s view on this concept. The developing and emerging countries, gathered in the Group of 77 (G-77), have built a coalition opposed to many of the proposals put forward by the EU in the very ambitious “Green Economy Roadmap”, which includes timetables and indicators. Many actors in developing countries still have concerns about the concept of a Green Economy as a disguise for a new “green protectionism”. This shows, de facto, a weakness of the EU in engaging with developing countries to bring forward its vision on sustainability.

- Discussions need to take into account new relationships between countries. The world of development aid is no longer a one-way North-South relationship, with financial support and technical expertise flowing from traditional donors (mainly OECD countries) to developing countries. There is a need for reinforced dialogue and a better understanding of the role of emerging countries that are recipients and donors of aid simultaneously, and operate at the margins of traditional donor standards (e.g. OECD DAC rules).

- To develop SDGs that can be integrated into the MDGs, the UN should use the appropriate institutional framework to start a dialogue on very concrete issues such as water and energy supply, access to land, sustainable agriculture or food security, etc. – at first considering the topics which are less controversial in order to take the next step towards formulating concrete targets. The aim would be to develop a restricted number of clear SDGs.

- The on-going financial crisis will not be reversed on the short term. Developed countries will have lingering public deficits affecting the negotiations for a future MDGs architecture. New forms of development assistance, such as the expansion of financial instruments need to be at the centre of development policy.

- The risk that the consultations on MDGs retain a top-down approach is still very high. Discussions will need to ensure a participatory process in which the poor and marginalised can express their needs and priorities for a development agenda. The UN Country Teams will have to ensure as best as possible a broad-based participation, especially in countries in which participatory mechanisms are poor.

How to proceed in designing the post-2015 MDGs?

Three possible options are available:

1. Using the same goals with little changes in indicators and enlarging the timeline;
2. substantially enhancing the framework (MDG-Plus);
3. a new “One World” approach based on MDG8.

Bringing both goals and instruments together within a new framework will require a clear definition of the level at which each goal and instrument should be applied, whether it may be local, national, regional or international.

The EU role in developing the post-2015 MDGs framework

The MDGs have been a key norm for EU development policy, and the EU has made major contributions towards achieving the MDGs, including beyond ODA. The EU has been active in three major ways, namely: by engaging in the international aid effectiveness debate; by promoting policy coherence; and
by implementing GPG (Global Public Goods) approaches. In this sense, the EU is well placed to play a strong role in the design of the future MDGs.

The formulation of a post-2015 development framework provides an opportunity for moving forward on Policy Coherence for Development but also for the EU to feed its experiences into the deliberations on the post-2015 agenda.

The EU should therefore identify examples where a “whole-of-government” approach is being pursued to ensure coherence in positions adopted in different multilateral fora on ‘beyond aid’ issues, sharing experiences and examining how these could be promoted internationally.

Going forward, it will be most important for the EU to deliver on existing commitments and drive international development cooperation. Therefore, the EU should:

1. fully implement the international aid and development effectiveness commitments (Paris, Accra, Busan) throughout Europe;
2. take an ambitious stand on gearing the new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation towards discussing policy coherence and global public goods approaches for achieving development goals post-2015;
3. provide inputs in terms of financial resources, reaffirming its commitment to the 0.7% target and extend current contributions. It should develop a complementary and more comprehensive understanding of global development finance as a first step to broaden the instruments for implementing a new agenda. This includes a targeted and well-designed expansion of financial instruments mobilising multiple other funding sources.

A common and agreed position of the EU towards the post-2015 development framework does not yet exist, but the process towards this position has been initiated, for completion by mid-2013 in view of the UN special event on MDGs in September 2013. The EU being the largest donor, it is particularly well positioned to crucially contribute to the UN Special Event.

- All EU institutions should aim at facilitating the development of a strong common position that is operational. This includes improving the EU coordination process for post-2015.
- The development of a common position should be accompanied by a major diplomatic effort to promote a common understanding with developing countries during the negotiations in order to avoid a lack of groundwork, such as has been the case with the ‘Green Economy Roadmap’ for the SDGs. The EU and Member States should also engage early on with other actors by strengthening outreach activities so as to build up a high degree of agreement.

The key policy document will be a Commission Communication, to be published in early 2013. In parallel, the European Parliament (EP) will use the option of an own-initiative report in order to feed into the EU debate. These documents will serve as a basis for discussions within the Council of the EU, to be completed in May 2013.

Preliminary discussions in the Council of the EU have already taken place. They were informed by the European Commission, which introduced some guiding principles. Key elements of these include:

1. maintaining poverty eradication as the central objective;
2. building on the current MDG approach while strengthening weak or missing issues;
3. pursuing the three dimensions of sustainable development in a balanced manner (also in relation to the SDGs);
4. building coherence between the Rio+20 follow up on the inclusive green economy and the post-
2015 development agenda.

Commissioner Andris Piebalgs recently presented his views on the post-2015 development agenda,
namely, that the post-2015 development agenda should be based on a three pillar approach (MDG-
Plus, human dignity, sustainability) to deliver on the aim of providing a “Decent Life for All by 2030”.

- Pillar I, referred to as “MDG-Plus Pillar”, will focus on poverty eradication, but backed up by a set
of minimum social protection mechanisms. It would set minimum floors providing a list of basic
rights to be reached for every citizen by 2030.

- Pillar II, referred to as the “Human Dignity Pillar”, would deal with the drivers for prosperity,
creating jobs and guaranteeing justice, equity and human rights.

- Pillar III, also referred to as the “Sustainability Pillar”, would deal with good management of natural
resources, providing the context for connecting the MDG agenda with the SDG agenda.

**Specific recommendations for the European Parliament**

The key policy contribution of the European Parliament will be the own-initiative report on the post-
2015 development framework. The report is likely to favour the “one world” or “global challenges”
approach, which can be considered compatible with the Commission and Council positions stated
above. This approach would include targets for both developing and industrialised countries, with
poverty targets for the south and sustainable consumption targets for the north.

- It is recommended that the European Parliament promotes the development of a strong
coherent common EU position with this report, pushing forward the international aid and
development effectiveness agenda, implement the Policy Coherence for Development Agenda in
Europe and starting the debate on global public policies to address global challenges. The EP
Committee on Development should consider the possibility of nominating a standing rapporteur
for EU and international negotiations on the Post-MDG agenda.

- Given the experience in the international fora and the bad reception of the “Green Economy
Roadmap” by developing countries, the European Parliament should promote a reinforced
diplomatic effort and a stronger consultation of developing countries, emerging economies and
the marginalised groups in developing countries. Emerging economies like Brazil, China and India
need to be particularly involved in the discussions and negotiating processes at early stages, and
should be encouraged to actively shape the debate.

- It is recommended that the list of goals and priorities should be kept short in order for the new
development framework to remain operative. Limiting the number of priorities would apply to
both the MDG and the SDG agendas, which the Parliament should like to see merged in order to
avoid duplicity.

- The European Parliament should reiterate the need of the EU to honour its financial pledges to
the MDGs, which includes the targeted and controlled expansion of well-designed financial
instruments.

Given that the own-initiative report will not be binding and that the European Parliament is only
involved in a consultative way, it will be especially important to ensure that the key messages of the
report find their way into the Council Conclusions later this year. This can be facilitated through close
collaboration with the rotating Presidency of the Council (Ireland in the first semester of 2013), liaison
with national parliaments, hearings in the European Parliament (e.g. with participation of member state
representatives) and more generally a broadened civil society dialogue on the matter.
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE MDGS

1.1 Introduction

The Millennium Declaration endorsed in 2000 by the UN General Assembly and the accompanying Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), adopted in 2002, have been an important element in streamlining and coordinating development action. The MDGs provided a significant boost to development aid assistance and linked it to measurable targets and indicators.

Impressive progress has been achieved and various MDGs are on track to meet the 2015 deadline, but some objectives have not been addressed sufficiently. The goals leave out some important development aspects in terms of other non-income dimensions of poverty like inequality, human rights issues, marginalisation, exclusion, etc. Moreover, achievements are measured at the country level, while rural populations and marginalised groups are often left out with poorer performances hidden within average national figures. However, refining the present MDGs is also not enough. Since the targets were developed and adopted, the world has seen important socio-economic, environmental and financial upheavals.

The impacts of climate change will be felt more strongly in poorer, and often densely populated, countries. These impacts are consequential enough to reverse some of the progress accomplished through the MDGs, and can only be avoided if the social, economic and environmental resilience of the regions most affected is improved. This requires a much broader development action than what the MDG indicators captured.

On the other hand, the financial crisis has reduced the willingness and the financial space of many donor countries to contribute more, while many challenges and the financial commitments for climate change require more investment. The budgetary challenges of many donor countries will not be resolved in the very short term, and this will affect discussions on the post-2015 development agenda. This means that development policies need to use more efficiently the palette of possible financial instruments available for development.

The position of international players has also shifted politically. Many developing countries have become middle-income countries, but still face significant poverty and development challenges. A number of those developing countries have become important global economic players (in particular China, Brazil and India), making them not only development assistance recipients, but also donors. There is a need to redefine the approach to development programmes.

The issues listed above will need to be addressed in the review of the MDGs in 2015, probably leading to a substantial reassessment of the goals, if these are to continue delivering meaningful results. The report presents an overview of the performance of the MDGs and the challenges ahead. The report also highlights how a post-2015 agenda for development, when incorporating the challenges identified in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the Rio+20 Declarations, could look like. It presents the possible future policy options and how to manage the process to reach an agreement. Finally, it discusses the European Union’s internal challenges to coherently approach the post-2015 MDG discussions, taking into account that many decisions are already starting to be modelled, such as the size of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)’s development budget and the new regulations governing EU development polices.
1.2 Background to the MDGs

In 2000, the United Nations Millennium Declaration set out a series of principles aimed at supporting actions towards achieving "human dignity, equality and equity at the global level", with a focus on the most vulnerable (UN, 2000). A number of fundamental needs were identified under the heading of ‘Development and Poverty Eradication’, which sought to define poverty beyond the traditional focus on income but without specifically addressing issues of inequity. In 2002, the UN commissioned a panel of experts to translate these needs into goals supported by targets and indicators, to be achieved by 2015, i.e. the Millennium Development Goals. Due to the uneven and initially slow progress, the MDGs have been revised twice, in 2003 and 2006, to include four new targets (see Annexes 1 and 2), as well as appropriate indicators developed by the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Millennium Development Goals Indicators (UN, 2006). The MDG framework does not include mechanisms for governments’ and donors’ accountability.

1.3 Achievements

Significant progress has been achieved in almost all the MDGs, and the quality of life of hundreds of millions of people in low to middle-income countries in terms of access to basic health, education, water and other essential services has improved at an unprecedented rate (Fig.1). The MDGs have been instrumental in providing motivation, as well as targets, for this progress. They have been widely adopted in global policy discourses and have had significant impact on donors’ allocation, and to varying degrees on developing countries policies. Official Development Assistance (ODA) mobilisation has undergone a structural shift from economic and productive sectors towards social issues such as health and education. "In absolute terms, social sector bilateral ODA spending has doubled from about $20bn/year to over $40bn/year between 2000 and 2008" (Sumner, 2012: 7).

MDG1/Target1A (on income poverty), MDG3 (on gender equality in primary school) and MDG7/Target7B (on access to water) have seen most progress, and their targets are highly likely to be achieved by 2015 at the global level. Other MDGs will be nearly met, such as MDG1/Target1B (on nutrition), MDG2 (on primary school completion) and MDG4 (on child mortality) (Melamed, 2012).

Figure 1: Millennium Development Goals: Measuring Countries’ progress

1.4 Weaknesses

1.4.1 Geographical and social disparities

The achievement of these targets at the global level hides pronounced geographical disparities, as well as disparities between social groups. “At a country level, [only] half the countries will meet the income, education, gender and water MDG targets and a quarter to a third of countries will meet the targets for nutrition, child mortality and maternal mortality” (Melamed, 2012: 4). Fragile states have seen the least progress, followed by low-income countries (LIC). In particular, Africa shows very diverse results. While the poverty rate had already halved by 2010 in 10 countries, other countries in Africa fall short from reaching their targets, with striking examples of setbacks such as Nigeria (whose poverty rate increased from 49% to 77% between 1990 and 2010), the Democratic Republic of Congo (where hunger more than doubled over the same period) and Ethiopia (where the access to maternal health services is as low as 6%). Progress in the control of HIV/AIDS also varies significantly across countries. On the other hand, progress in the world’s largest nations, China and India, has been significant on almost all MDGs (ODI, 2010), which to a large extent accounts for the overall success in MDG achievement globally.

As concerns disparities at the level of social groups, the poorest and the ones living in remote rural areas, as well as members of ethnic minorities have more often than not been left out. Research by Save the Children (2010), for example, shows inequalities at the country-level in Burkina Faso regarding the MDG on child mortality, where progress was achieved nationally, but child deaths in the poorest sections of the population had actually increased. Amongst the rural populations of low-income countries, agriculture, food security and infrastructure (i.e. access to energy, transport and communications technologies) lag far behind national averages, as well as education and health levels. Data shows that globally the percentage of the extremely poor amongst agricultural workers is higher than it was fifteen years ago. Finally, two-thirds of the extremely poor live in households where the head belongs to an ethnic minority group (Melamed, 2012).

1.4.2 Measurement and indicators

Another flaw encountered in the assessment of MDGs progress relates to the calculations in terms of percentiles, which do not take into account the different starting points. Alternative calculations in absolute terms can show very different results: some of the poorest countries, that have not achieved the required percentage (relative progress) by the MDGs, might have done much more significant progress than more wealthy countries in absolute numbers. In particular, many countries in Africa will not meet their MDG targets that are measured in relative terms, even though a number of them have in fact achieved highly significant progress in absolute terms.

Another limitation in the measurement of MDGs consists in the choice of purely quantitative indicators. For example the success of MDG2 (on primary school
Millennium Development Goals and beyond 2015, a strong EU engagement

completion) is a relative case in point. Over half of the extremely poor live in households where the head has some degree of education, which shows that completion of primary school is not necessarily a determinant factor in poverty reduction. While this is partly linked to the lack of employment, evidence shows that the focus needs to shift from school attendance to the actual quality of the education provided, and that the present MDG target might have produced a perverse incentive to focus on quantity rather than quality. Moreover, completing secondary education has been found to be potentially necessary in order to see an actual effect on income.

Another issue concerning inadequate indicators is that two-thirds of the extremely poor live in households were the head has a job. This indicates that the focus should not be solely on employment, but on its quality, and the level of income it generates.

Possible perverse incentives can also be found in MDG6 (on combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases). It is argued that the focus on specific communicable diseases might have shifted the debate away from the overall quality of healthcare systems, and have encouraged ‘vertical funding’ targeted too specifically at a number of diseases.

**Time to review**

The analysis above indicates that even if the MDGs were deemed to be sufficient to guide development policy beyond 2015, there is a need to refine the way progress is measured. The following chapter argues, however, that more will be needed in addition to addressing MDGs’ limitations to reflect the growing new challenges of development policy.

### 2. BEYOND 2015 WHAT DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK?

#### 2.1 New realities and challenges of the global context

Since the Millennium Development Goals were designed, a fundamental shift in the focus of global development debates and in the order of global governance has taken place. The global economic and political landscape has also changed radically, with former developing countries in Asia (in particular China) and Latin America (in particular Brazil) becoming important economic powers, both regionally and globally. Additionally, global warming has brought the key challenges of environmental sustainability and resilience back to the forefront by underscoring their importance as cornerstones for future poverty reduction and prevention.

#### 2.1.1 Tackling poverty as an environmental sustainability challenge

The link between environmental sustainability and poverty reduction is being increasingly recognised. It is now widely accepted that environmental degradation will increasingly have an impact on development paths. A large share of the world’s poor lives in areas at risk of environmental degradation due to climate change (e.g. Bangladesh is a striking example[^1]), with negative impacts on the productivity of the agricultural and fishery sectors, inter alia. As a result, living standards degrade further and often lead to migration - the UNHCR (2012) identifies food shortage and displacement induced by climate change as a major challenge for the 21st century. The 2011 report by IDCM (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) estimates that in Asia and the Pacific alone 42 million people were displaced due to climatic events in 2010-2011.

[^1]: The risks for Bangladesh were described in a Briefing for the European Parliament in 2008. EP (2008), Climate Change Impacts and Responses in Bangladesh, Policy Department Economic and Scientific Policy, PE 400.990
Climate change thus poses a threat to the achievements of the MDGs. The 2011 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) Human Development Report warns of a significant decline in the projected Human Development Index (HDI) worldwide in the future, and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa.

Negative climate impacts caused by the existing accumulation of greenhouse gases cannot be avoided, strong mitigation policies can reduce impacts in the longer term, but the present greenhouse gas mitigation policies are not considered sufficient to ensure that the average global temperature does not increase above 2°C. The lack of action today will be strongly felt by future generations. Adaptation policies aimed at increasing the present resilience to climatic events are urgently needed, and this entails increasing the focus on environmental sustainability, as well as on a more equitable social development. The shift in thinking can already be sensed with the added importance given to the Rio+20 Sustainable Development Goals and the interest in reinforcing their link with the MDGs.

Increasing the focus on environmental sustainability is a challenge, but also an opportunity to develop better job opportunities in developing countries. The creation of better employment opportunities is an important element for a balanced economic development. Given the increasing need to protect the environment, develop ecosystem services and increase the share of energy generated by renewable sources, growing attention is being paid to the creation of green jobs and the pursuit of a green growth agenda for development (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2011). The generation of economically sustainable development programmes based on a green economy vision will require an all-round rethinking of development aid mechanisms.

2.1.2 The food security challenge

Food security is closely related to environmental conditions. Population growth is expected to exceed the 9 billion mark by 2050. Food security, which until recently was no longer a central issue, has returned as a core policy focus for the future. Not only will yields need to increase and distribution optimised, but the agricultural sector will also need to adapt to climate change and its impacts. This will require a greater focus on agricultural research, as well as managing the shifts in production to new areas which today are not appropriate for agriculture, but will become so due to the change in temperatures. Moving to a more adaptive and resilient agricultural production in developing countries will require a stronger political commitment and investment.

2.1.3 The changing landscape of development finance

While progress has been achieved on a number of MDGs, development needs and the costs of achieving them have not decreased. Not only do some MDGs still require considerable investment, but the successes are precarious. Population growth and environmental degradation already pose considerable challenges to the efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger. Preserving the achievements to date, as well as closing the remaining gaps and addressing missing issues will require a continued, if not even increased financial assistance. Despite the expansion of development aid since the introduction of MDGs, the 1970 target of raising 0.7% of GDP of rich countries for development aid has not been achieved. Only five OECD countries have reached or exceeded this level, of which four are EU member states.

While the EU is the largest ODA donor (€53 billion in 2011) and includes the OECD countries with the highest shares of ODA to GDP in the OECD, is still has only reached 0.42% of EU GNI in 2011, behind the 0.56% target for 2010, and well out of the path to the 0.7% target for 2015. It also represents a decline from 2010 by €500 million (0.44% of GNI) (European Commission, 2012a and b).

In addition, climate change exacerbates the risk of jeopardising the MDGs achievements to date. The needs to address social and environmental sustainability are as a result becoming even more pressing.
Climate change mitigation and adaptation require a considerable increase in support to developing countries, and exacerbates the competition for funds. As a response, a substantial new focus for investment, closely related to development funding – and in principle not substituting it –, was introduced in 2009 in the margin of the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) through the Copenhagen Accord. The Accord, now integrated in the UNFCCC negotiating texts, included a commitment by developed countries to contribute annually US$30 billion of additional support to developing countries for climate-related investments between 2010 and 2012, to be increased to US$100 billion from 2020 onwards.

The $30 billion increase has however not materialised, in part because the Copenhagen Accord was agreed before the effects of the global financial crisis were felt in full. Three years down the line, most developed economies are battling with large budget deficits, which are affecting their capacity and willingness to finance development and climate-related investments in third countries.

This will overshadow discussions on the post-2015 development agenda. The impact of the financial crisis has been greater than expected, and many developed countries are coming to terms with the fact that reversing the decline and bringing the economy back into a growth path will take time, possibly beyond 2015. Under these circumstances, donor countries will not easily accept increasing development finance and climate finance. This is leading to the following realities:

- The progress of several developing countries from low to middle-income economies leads to a re-evaluation of the aid to be provided to these countries (e.g. the recent decision by the UK to end financial aid to India\(^2\), or the differentiation and graduation approaches taken up by the EU with some of its developing partners). A rethinking is taking place on how to redefine what constitutes ODA assistance, and to substitute grant aid with innovative forms of financial instruments involving loans from development banks and the private sector (e.g. Núñez Ferrer et al., 2011).

- Large emerging economies, such as China or Brazil, have become donors in their own right. Developed countries therefore question the necessity to continue providing aid to them in the present form.

- Overall, there is a real risk that a number of developed countries, due to their budget deficits, reduce rather than increase their overall ODA support. The global recession is credited by the OECD as having caused a 3% decrease in development assistance by major donors in 2011 for the first time since 1997\(^3\).

Although the financial crisis may eventually ebb away, the 2015 review of the MDGs will most likely be undertaken while a number of donor countries are still struggling with their budget deficits. This will present both challenges and opportunities: The challenge consists in ensuring that despite the expected limitations to funding, development objectives are met; conversely, opportunities can be found in transforming the need to decrease expenditure into an effective instrument for the rationalisation of support. There will also be opportunities for the development of new instruments that foster the participation of other players, local and international, as donors and implementers. This may lead to better and more effective distribution of aid. Ultimately, the impact will depend on how the different instruments are designed.

\(^2\) See: [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30203e68-2a55-11e2-99bb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EqQNmCO](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30203e68-2a55-11e2-99bb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2EqQNmCO)

\(^3\) Development: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession, OECD, [http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.htm](http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.htm)
The European Union is expanding the use of financial instruments for development, which pool together grant funding from member states, the EU budget and financial institutions, in order to leverage a multiple from funds for development projects from private financial sources. This funding can complement traditional grant funding, and better discriminate between projects that are financially sustainable with partial grants and guarantees, and those that need full grant support. However, financial instruments need to be deployed with care and should not be used as a mechanism to reduce development aid. Grants will still be necessary, particularly for crucial investments in education and social structures. Financial instruments are de facto a new form of debt instrument, less costly for the donor, which can increase the vulnerability of highly indebted countries (Núñez Ferrer, Morazán et al., 2012).

2.1.4 Redefining the role of new global actors

The traditional boundary between developing and developed country has changed. This is reflected in the creation of the G-20, which integrates developing countries that have become important global players.

The case of China is particularly striking. China is still considered a developing country (ranking 90 in GDP per capita), but its economy is second to the USA and has large foreign exchange reserves. China is increasingly acting as a donor country and project implementer in developing countries, while still defending its right to be treated as a developing country in international fora such as the UNFCCC. As mentioned above, the dual role of China as a developing country and development provider raises questions on the development aid programmes in place today.

China is the largest donor-developing country, and its development initiatives create some disquiet: China is not a member of the OECD and thus does not follow DAC (Development Assistance Committee) recommendations and standards on what constitutes development aid.

While the Chinese case stands out, it is not unique. There is an increase in non-DAC donor-developing countries, such as South Africa, India, Chile, and Brazil.

“Due to their geographic and demographic dimensions, BRICS economies are tremendously influencing global development; especially in low-income countries (LIC) [...] BRICS are causing changes in the architecture of international development cooperation, not only with regard to trade and financial flows but also as emerging donors [...] Not only BRICS but also CIVETS and the “next eleven” are self-confident players perforating traditional donor-recipient patterns [...] In total, emerging donors have contributed USD 87.1 million to the World Food Programme (WFP) of the United Nations (UN) and USD 90.6 million to UN Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) in 2010 (USA: USD 4.9 respectively USD 10billion)” (Morazán et al., 2012).

A future development approach at international level cannot be neatly cut into donor members of the OECD and non-DAC member aid recipients. If effectiveness, the integration of social and

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4 The acronym “BRIC” was introduced in 2001 by Jim O’Neill in the Goldman Sachs paper “Building Better Global Economic BRICs” (O’Neill 2001). In 2006 the group met for the first time in Yekaterinburg; only in 2010 South Africa was invited to join. Since then the acronym BRICS is used whenever South Africa is included, while the term BRIC(s) means only the original group.

5 CIVETS = Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa.

6 Next Eleven = Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam (cf. chapter 2).


8 The rules for aid effectiveness of the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) only applied to OECD donors.
environmental concerns, and the avoidance of tied aid\textsuperscript{9} are to be guaranteed, those new players need to be integrated into the decision-making process on standards. This increasing role of the emerging non-traditional donors was taken very seriously at the Fourth High Level Forum on aid effectiveness. Bringing these new donors in has proven very contentious, as donor developing countries do not consider legitimate that the rules followed by OECD countries are imposed on them. With difficulty, the Busan final declaration included a commitment from the new donors, and in particular China, to align practices to the aid effectiveness rules, but under differential commitments and on a voluntary basis. China, was in fact under pressure in Busan, as Hillary Clinton put developing countries on guard against donors who were “more interested in extracting your resources than in building your capacity”\textsuperscript{10}.

The US itself made concessions, pledging to increase transparency in its own development actions.

\subsection*{2.1.5 More focus on marginal groups}

Development is no longer a clear-cut issue of high-income versus low- to middle-income countries, but increasingly needs to address growing marginalised populations within countries. Development programmes will have to shift their focus from general economic growth in developing countries towards cushioning unintended impacts, i.e. increasing inequalities and marginalisation of particular social groups that do not benefit from growth and have often even seen their living standards deteriorating. New policies requiring a participation and commitment of national and regional actors will be needed.

\subsection*{2.2 A Post MDG Development Agenda}

The United Nations has a central role to play in bringing all countries together, in order to agree on a common UN post-2015 development agenda. Thanks to its global constituency and mandate the UN is the only institution with the necessary legitimacy to gather all the member states despite their different views. According to this mandate and complying with the instructions of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon, the UN Development Group (UNDG) has developed an approach for a MDG post-2015 agenda. The final aim is to develop a “bold yet practical vision” to overcome the weaknesses and shortfalls of the current MDGs. Taking into account the criticism of the current MDGs especially regarding the lack of legitimacy (“a group of UN experts selected 18 targets from the Millennium Declaration, grouped them in eight goals, and identified 48 indicators” (Vandemoortele, 2012:2)), the UN has now the obligation to provide a different approach.

The roadmap defined by the UN includes the participation of a large number of stakeholders at various levels:

\begin{itemize}
  \item UN High Level Panel of Eminent Persons
  \item UN Task Team (UNDP and UN DESA)
  \item UNDG National Consultations
  \item UNDG Thematic Consultations
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{9} Tied aid credits are official or officially supported loans, credits or Associated Financing packages where procurement of the goods or services involved is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries, which do not include all developing countries (or Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)/New Independent States (NIS) in transition). (OECD definition: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3089)

\textsuperscript{10} Keynote at the Opening Session of the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness by Hillary Rodham Clinton, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/177892.htm
The challenge for the UNDG is to find out how to achieve a process that is more inclusive, more equitable and sustainable. The UN strategy to take up the challenge is based on three pillars of work: 1.) an inclusive national consultation process led by the UN resident coordinators (UNRCs), 2.) several thematic consultations with academia, media, private sector, employers and trade unions, civil society and decision makers on the current central challenges to the post-2015 development agenda, and 3.) a web portal and social media to allow open interaction and information exchange among a range of stakeholders.

This bottom-up approach, which represents a strong effort in mobilising actors and resources worldwide, is accompanied by an institutional approach that tries to bring together political influence and elaborated research concerning the relevant thematic issues. The results of the national and thematic consultations as well as the ideas gathered by the portal and social media will have to be analysed and aligned with findings of the Report of the UN System Task Team on Post-2015. At the end of this process everything will have to be synthesised by the UNSG including the HLP report.

**Timelines for the Post-2015 and SDG Processes**

[Diagram showing timelines for the Post-2015 and SDG Processes]

Source: own figure based on Dallo/Rubian, 2012

2.2.1 **UN High-level Panel on Post-2015**

In July 2012, UNSG Ban Ki-moon officially kicked off the post MDG process by naming a 26-member High-level Panel (HLP) that will work on a report for a global development agenda after 2015. The HLP represents different countries, regions and institutions in a well-balanced composition of members. They are led by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, the Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (see Annex 1). The EU – indirectly represented on the HLP by Commissioner Andris Piebalgs – has “a golden opportunity” to help shape the post MDG future. For the implementation of its difficult task the HLP will be supported by an independent

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11 Officially, panellists are “members in their personal capacity”, [http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/?nid=2455](http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/?nid=2455)
secretariat headed by the researcher Homi Kharas of Pakistan as senior official. The senior official will also serve as the lead author of the report.

In order to prepare the report, the HLP has to take into consideration a wide range of aspects related to long term political processes as well as to technical and legal issues such as:

- “The Millennium Declaration” and the Outcome Document of Rio+20;
- the findings of the Report of the Secretary-General’s UN Task Team for the preparation of the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda; as well as lessons learned and best practices from the MDGs;
- the findings of the various national and thematic consultations at regional and national levels coordinated by the UNDG as part of the preparations for the Post-2015 Development Agenda;
- the need to build momentum for a constructive dialogue on the parameters of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and propose innovative ways for governments, parliaments, civil society organizations, the business sector, academia, local communities to engage continuously in such a dialogue;
- the on-going work of the UN Task Team, the Special Advisor to the SG on Post-2015, the report of the Global Sustainability Panel of the Secretary-General and the findings of the Global Sustainable Development Network Initiative; as well as
- any other relevant inputs it may deem appropriate” (UNO, 2012b).

The HLP will present its report to the Secretary-General in the second quarter of 2013. This report will serve as first draft for his main report to the President of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly in September 2013.

Thus the HLP has a clear mandate and a precise time frame with clearly defined milestones which ideally allow for balanced and productive discussions. Nevertheless, the task of the panel is not an easy one since it has to propose the cornerstones for a worldwide consensus on the future development framework at a time when the impact of simultaneous crises is still persistent. Bringing together credible shared evidence, ensuring broad participation and reaching intergovernmental consensus is challenging. In addition, the HLP has to cooperate with the intergovernmental working group tasked to design the Sustainable Development Goals, as agreed at the Rio+20 conference.

The HLP has already started its work. The first meeting of the panel took place on September 25, 2012 in New York and was a good opportunity to find out about the different attitudes of the members towards a new agenda. As stated by the UN, there were a number of areas of broad consensus that emerged from the discussions: MDGs remain the basis for a new framework; the challenges of the MDG framework for the next three years are still relevant; the unfinished or unachieved goals have to be re-considered in the post-2015 agenda; and poverty eradication and sustainable development should be the central anchors in the new agenda. The HLP noted likewise the importance of reflecting and taking on the new challenges of the changing world, namely: Sustainability, inclusive growth and productive capacity, conflict, gender equality and women’s empowerment, and global partnerships (UNO, 2012c).

The central issue of the second meeting, held by the UK, was about household poverty. There were three sessions during this meeting. The first one took place on October 31 and was organised by Downing Street No. 10 and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). Several external speakers including Hans Rosling, known as a data visionary, had been invited. The following meetings in Liberia and Indonesia will focus on national development and global partnerships respectively. The first draft is expected in March 2013 and a final meeting is foreseen in May 2013 in New York.
2.2.2 UN System Task Team on Post-2015: An assessment of the proposed framework

The UN System Task Team on Post-2015 plays a key role in the post-2015 agenda setting. The Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs (USG-DESA) has been requested by the Secretary-General in September 2011 “to establish a core group of dedicated senior technical experts to coordinate system-wide preparations on on-going efforts and propose a unified vision and road map for the definition of a UN development agenda post-2015, in consultation with all stakeholders.” The Task Team is co-chaired by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and has representatives from all UN agencies and programmes, the World Bank, IMF and WTO (see Annex 2). The terms of reference for the Task Team have been defined by the Secretary-General and include:

− an assessment of on-going efforts within the UN system;
− an assessment of initiatives taken by external stakeholders including the international financial institutions, civil society, academia and the private sector;
− the development of a system-wide vision and road map for the post-2015 agenda. (UNO, 2012a)

Experts from over 50 UN institutions and the above-mentioned international organisations provided analytical inputs and expertise and presented the first report „Realizing the Future We Want for All” in June 2012 (UNO, 2012b). This report has been prepared in a very tight schedule and serves as the main input to the work of the HLP.

The report of the Task Team placed at the heart of the analysis a vision guided by the three fundamental principles of human rights, equality and sustainability. As established by the terms of reference, the report covers a broad range of challenges: from an increasing environmental footprint with growing disaster risks to rising inequalities, continuing violent conflict, rapid demographic change, rapid urbanisation and continuous migration flows. There is also the knowledge gap between and within countries, and governance and accountability deficits at various levels that require the strengthening of compliance with the rule of law. Food and nutrition security, water and sanitation, energy, and access to quality health services (including reproductive health), education, and vocational training are also of crucial importance.

The report consequently proposed an agenda format based on concrete end goals and targets. However, one of the key strengths of the MDG framework should be retained, but reorganised along the four key dimensions of a more holistic approach: 1.) inclusive social development; 2.) inclusive economic development; 3.) environmental sustainability; 4.) peace and security. (UNO, 2012c)

One strength of the report is that it focuses on policy coherence defining “development enablers” as a guide for synergies between different strategies. The development enablers are more than political “prescriptions”. Institutions have to be reformed or created at national and international level in order to achieve a new global governance to promote all the three dimensions of sustainability. The report, however, is very vague concerning the role and the scope of development enablers in the post-2015 agenda. Several CSOs criticised the ambiguous nature of the enablers and their links to the goals. The British organisation CAFOD concludes in its analysis that “[the] examples currently given as enablers are in some cases wholly repetitive with what is given in the boxes as potential goals (i.e. ‘Universal access to quality education’ as an enabler, with ‘Quality education for all’ as a goal). But the distinction between ‘enablers’ and ‘goals’ will surely be impossible. Almost anything you put in either category will be both a good in itself and a springboard for other crosscutting achievements – and many of the issues being

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12 These are among others the specific number of goals and targets and the global consensus.
mooted as enablers (for example, ‘sustainable energy for all’) have been well established as candidate goals in their own right.”

Moreover, as it comes to deal with the “Key considerations in shaping the global development agenda” the reports warns of the risk of “overloading the post-2015 UN development agenda” in the light of “the absence of guidance on the means of implementation” of the current MDG framework. Taking account of the big challenges mentioned by the report, this message appears to be quite cautious and bears potential contradictions and goal conflicts.

2.2.3 Regional and Thematic consultations

The national and regional consultations on the post-2015 development agenda are to be held by March 31, 2013 in at least 50 countries. The guidelines for the consultation have been released by the UNDG which has invited UN agencies, funds, and programmes to submit concept notes for consultations by August 17, 2012.

Country and thematic consultations are a key step in the roadmap proposed by the UNSG to a new post-2015 agenda. Nevertheless, the real contribution through national consultations depends not only on the national context but also on the ability of the Task Force to ensure a participatory process in which the really poor and marginalised can express their needs and ideas about a development agenda. Past experiences with PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) consultation however show that such consultations processes are only effective if there is a real inclusion both in terms of active engagement and access to the required relevant information and resources in order to ensure a real bottom-up process.

The UNDG has already selected 50 countries which seem to be a representative sample across some aspects which are relevant for the post-2015 agenda. Not only the development challenges (e.g. income levels) of those countries are important but also their contributions to other multilateral processes like Rio+20, or their exposure to external shocks and global crises. Therefore, High Income Countries are excluded from the sample of national consultations. However, it is expected that those countries will boost a discussion process through alternative channels. The participation of institutions (e.g. parliaments) and citizens of developed countries could be stimulated through the global web portal, the global meetings and the networks of the UNDG agencies and their partners (UN Guidelines).

The technical guidelines for the consultation processes have already been developed and provided to the UN Country Teams (UNCTs). The risk that the consultations remain in a top-down approach is still very high. The UNCT must be very careful in ensuring as far as possible a broad-based participation especially in countries in which participatory mechanisms are scarce.

2.3 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

The Rio+20 outcome document “The Future We Want” establishes “an inclusive and transparent intergovernmental process on sustainable development goals” scheduled to end by 2014, and mandates the establishment of an intergovernmental Open Working Group (OWG) that will submit a report to the 68th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in the autumn of 2013 containing a proposal for SDGs (UNO, 2012:63). The SDGs will be based thematically on the “Agenda 21” and the “Johannesburg Plan of Implementation” and will incorporate in a balanced way all three dimensions of sustainable development as well as their interlinkages. The intergovernmental SDG process should be coherent

13 See: http://post2015.org/2012/07/19/the-un-task-team-report-pretty-good-all-in-all/
with the beyond 2015 development agenda, thus contributing to the achievement of sustainable development.

2.3.1 SDG Discussions: Pre-Rio+20 and UNGA Working Group on SDGs

The concept of sustainable development was introduced for the first time as a holistic approach at the 1992 World Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro. Since then sustainable development has been defined by taking into account three main dimensions, namely the economic, the environmental, and the social dimension. Despite all efforts made at a vast number of conferences and negotiations the main actors of international cooperation still have substantial problems to find minimal levels of accordance. The Rio+20 conference, which took place in June 2012, gathered stakeholders once again, two decades later. The main topics of the Conference were: (1) a “Green Economy” in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and (2) an institutional framework for sustainable development. But not much has changed since 1992. Conflict lines today are the same as 20 years ago despite the fact that many developing countries like China or Brazil experience a strong growth dynamic, and many developed countries are facing an economic crisis. Developing countries still fight for their right to industrialise, while developed countries continue to fight for more burden sharing concerning environmental protection or pollution.

Political actors involved in international environmental policy are not always fully aligned and familiar with actors engaged in international development policy. Sometimes divergent priorities between the two groups are the reason for controversies. The UN identifies three key actors involved in the Rio+20 process: “1. Governments and heads of state gathered at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (commonly called the “Earth Summit”). 2. Non-Governmental Organisations of the UN system. 3. Citizens and organisations of civil society.”

Discussions on the zero draft for “The Future We Want” in the run-up to the conference highlighted how deep differences between relevant stakeholders are on these main topics. Developing and emerging countries, gathered in the Group of 77 (G-77), have built a strong coalition opposed in many issues to the proposals made by the EU, drafted in the very ambitious document “Green Economy Roadmap”, which includes timetables and indicators. For the G-77 the means of implementation were of critical importance and included the provision of new and additional financial resources, the fulfilment of commitments to official development assistance, solutions to the debt problem of developing countries, and addressing the shortfall of technology transfer.

It seems that the lack of consensus up to now does not depend on the traditional dividing line between rich and industrialised countries in the “north” and poor developing countries in the “south”. China traditionally favours putting poverty eradication based on economic growth in the centre of the SDG agenda, while India would like to see less concrete and mandatory goals and more “aspirational and voluntary ones”. Most African governments are concerned that a strong accent on the SDGs could undermine efforts to achieve the MDGs, while influential Latin American governments such as Mexico and Brazil aspire to more global post-2015 agenda. Major players like USA have shown little enthusiasm in discussions on MDGs and are part of those against consistent SDGs (Evans/Steven, 2012:12).

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14 Grouped in 9 socio-professional groups within an informal Stakeholder Forum: women, children and youth, indigenous peoples, local authorities, NGOs, workers and unions, businesses and industries, scientific and technological communities, farmers and peasants (the groups have their own 2 (or more) Organising Partners (OP))

15 I.e. social movements, multiple networks and thematic or socio-professional organisations, among them migrants, religious and spiritual leaders, social leaders, artists, journalists, urban planners, fishermen, lawyers, elected politicians and parliamentarians, the military, unions, educators and teachers, municipalities and cities… to name a few.
Environmental and development organisations exerted a strong lobby for a powerful outcome document – both during the preparation and the Rio+20 Conference itself. Many actors in developing countries, though, still have concerns about the concept of a Green Economy as a kind of new “green protectionism” coming from industrial countries in the form of customs duties, and border taxes for commodities not produced according to certain environmental standards, intellectual property rights to green technologies, etc.

The controversial discussions on a Green Economy show the deep mistrust between developing and industrialised countries. While there is general agreement among countries that there are “different approaches, visions, models and tools available to each country”, developing countries fear to lose their chance of improving their living standards through conventional “economic growth”. The EU considered a Green Economy an “essential tool” for achieving sustainable development. But the G-77 and China stressed that many developing countries did not even know what a Green Economy was and that they never used this type of tool before. The G-77/China resisted the EU’s language on a transition to a Green Economy, viewing it as too prescriptive.

Another issue in regard to the dispute over the SDGs is the extent to which the output is informed by scientific findings. The SDG process will be one to gauge the success of advocates, including the Rio Elders16 and the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, who have concluded that an enhanced science-policy interface is required as part of the solution to improving the quality of multilateral negotiations and their outcomes.

### 2.3.2 Intergovernmental Open Working Group (OWG)

The outcome document, however, remains quite ambiguous concerning the measurability of the SDGs. The question of measurability and implementation of the goals through clear indicators, similar to the current MDG set, remains open. But the general consensus that the “sustainable development goals should be action-oriented, concise and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all countries” (UN, 2012e:63) could be a basis for a stronger linkage to the post 2015 agenda. The EU has specifically asked for targets or goals for energy, water, resource efficiency, sustainable land use, biodiversity, and marine protection.

To reach a consensus for an SDG agenda seems to be harder, however, than in the case of a post MDG agenda. Even the membership of the SDG Open Working Group has been a case of strong divergences. By mid-November 2012, the regional groups had not yet agreed on the regional distribution of seats.

An issue that makes the SDG process difficult is the question of reforming UN structures. The universality and central role of the United Nations is broadly acknowledged in both the SDG and the post-2015 agenda. But the G-77+China preferred to establish a process under the UNGA to negotiate the SDGs, while the EU, Switzerland, Norway, and others preferred establishing a non-negotiated process driven by the UN Secretary-General. Also, the G-77+China proposed negotiation of the goals by a committee, while the EU asked for a science based process with inputs from all sectors. The G-77+China introduced a proposal that replaced “experts” with “relevant representatives” nominated by their government; suggested 47 members (rather than 30) in the committee; called for every meeting of the committee to circulate a report for information; called for the report to be reviewed by UNGA; and proposed to open the meetings to member states or other stakeholders.

Based on a Brazilian compromise text, the document attempts to placate both the EU’s concerns that the process be science-led, while protecting the G-77+China’s concerns about the rights of government

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16 [http://www.theelders.org/about](http://www.theelders.org/about)
Policy Department DG External Policies

experts to participate in the elaboration of the SDGs. The EU lost out in its demand that the Conference decision go beyond process issues, given the G-77+China’s resistance to calling for a more detailed consideration of the themes and timelines for the SDGs.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the principal body for the follow-up of the Millennium Development Goals and for promoting the implementation of “Agenda 21”. However, the reform of the multilateral system in order to better address the urgent global challenges for sustainable development has also been emphasised in the Rio+20 outcome document (UNO, 2012). A cornerstone of this institutional reform is the decision to establish a universal, intergovernmental, high-level political forum that would replace the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and call for strengthening the UNEP to allow universal membership, deeper coordination (function) within the UN system and more funding.

The UN calls governments to remain “on the same page” and to avoid duplication on work on the SDGs and the post-2015 development agenda. Up to now, however, coordination and coherence between the two processes has been very weak. Given the different dynamics between the MDG process and the SDG process, the role of Amina Mohammed, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General17 will be increasingly crucial. She was appointed by the Secretary General and is an ex-officio member of the HLP. Amina Mohammed has the role of promoting and coordinating both processes as well as reporting to the Secretary General. Her appointment can be assessed as promising given her specific experiences as a former Senior Special Assistant to the President of Nigeria on the Millennium Development Goals and a member of the High-level Panel for Global Sustainability.

2.3.3 SDGs as universal goals?

The suggestion for a set of Sustainable Development Goals has been developed by Colombia and Guatemala prior to the Conference. Due to the broad acceptance this proposal was included in the Rio+20 outcome document. According to the outcome document, the SDGs “should be coherent with and integrated into the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015, thus contributing to the achievement of sustainable development and serving as a driver for the implementation and mainstreaming of sustainable development in the United Nations system” (UNO, 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rio+20: 24 thematic areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Poverty eradication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Food security and nutrition and sustainable agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Water and sanitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Sustainable tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Sustainable transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Sustainable cities and human settlements</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Health and population</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Least developed countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Landlocked developing countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The outcome document recognises in paragraph 247 that the goals “should address and be focused on priority areas for the achievement of sustainable development”. However, there is no specific reference

to those topics and priority areas. Nevertheless, the outcome document declares the need to schedule the SDG process in line and coherence with the post-2015 process.

For the definition of a set of SDGs the reference to the “Agenda 21” and similar documents is not a substantial basis. The SDG list has been compiled without assigning any priorities between the 24 topics included in the outcome and it is still not clear where the focus will be set in order to develop an effective agenda for sustainability which goes beyond “Agenda 21”. Given the scarce consensus on the principles and instruments for a Green Economy and the strong divergences between the UNSD stakeholders it seems hardly probable that the SDGs will make a substantial contribution to the post-2015 agenda without delaying the whole process.

The task hence consists in using the institutional framework to start a dialogue on very concrete issues such as water and energy supply, sustainable agriculture or food security, etc. – at first considering the topics which are less controversial in order to take the next step of formulating concrete targets together. The aim would be to develop a restricted number of clear SDGs.

### 2.4 Options for the Process

Discussions about instruments and topics of a new MDG agenda began to intensify already in 2010 prior to the UN conference. The debate has been held not only by civil society organisations but also by several donor agencies and think-tanks especially in OECD countries. Current contributions and research embrace topics related to indicators (“the whats”) as well as important issues related to principles, strategies and institutions necessary to shape a new Agenda for development (“the hows”).

The national and thematic consultations as well as the large number of conferences and events from civil society, academia and other developmental institutions will substantially enhance the range of options and proposals for decision makers. Andy Sumner (Sumner et al., 2012) presented a valuable description of the options for the post-2015 global frameworks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>MDGs 2020/2025</strong></th>
<th><strong>MDG-PLUS</strong></th>
<th><strong>MILLENNIUM WORLD/ONE WORLD</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idea</strong></td>
<td>Same MDGs, possibly with a few changes to indicators and a new deadline of 2020 or 2025.</td>
<td>Incremental/expansion of MDG approach or ‘MDG plus’ to expand to local ownership with nationally-set goals – which could be beyond a purely human development focus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td>Existing MDGs with minimal – if any – changes or supplemented or substituted with amended or new indicators</td>
<td>Small set of 3-4 ‘inner core’ universal goals from existing MDGs – child education, health and nutrition plus a small set of ‘outer-core’ 3-4 new and locally-defined goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three possible ways could also be taken into consideration for the roadmap:

– using the same goals with little changes in indicators and enlarging the timeline;

– substantially enhancing the framework (MDG-Plus);

– a new approach based on MDG8 and called “One World”;

Predictions on timelines for the two other very ambitious options (MDG-Plus and One World) are quite hard to make in an ad hoc manner.\(^{18}\)

There are of course many other options. The option of not having any goals at all has, for instance, been discussed by Claire Melamed (2011). For the purposes of the present paper, though, the three options presented in the table above give a broad perspective in order to draw possible conclusions for EU institutions to interact with other stakeholders in the debate.

### 2.4.1 Extend the timeline while keeping the MDGs

As stated above, notwithstanding the partly substantial achievements, almost all stakeholders consider the MDGs as a still unfinished job. The fall of the global poverty rate is mainly due to the growth in Eastern Asia, especially China. Poverty reduction faces new challenges in the light of the food and energy crisis and the impact of climate change. The report of the task force clearly questioned the range of achievement of MDG1 considering that “in spite of decreasing poverty rates in sub-Saharan Africa, the absolute number of poor people increased in the region” (UNO, 2012:12). Income and wealth inequalities are moreover increasing in both developed and developing countries. Inequality has also been identified concerning the progress on MDGs 1-7: the poorest and those most discriminated on the basis of gender, age, disability, religion and ethnicity, have benefited less from MDG progress. MDG 7 (target 10 – on access to sanitation) and MDG 5 are still far off track, and there is a sizeable funding shortfall. Even if donors uphold all of their current spending commitments to the health related MDGs there is still expected to be a $28-37 billion shortfall in 2015 (Save the children, 2012).

For Melamed (2012:43) this kind of agreement “would remain within the human development territory of the MDGs, but rather than set benchmarks of progress would aim to establish a global set of entitlements for every person on the planet. So, for example, rather than the MDG of halving global poverty, a new agreement could set a global minimum income - say $1.25 per day – below which no person should fall”. This approach would have the great advantage of being clear and achievable for all countries. It would present a clear agenda and also imply a qualitative improvement of the current framework. However, the improvement would be slight and, above all, too one-sided. The methodological downside would be its

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\(^{18}\) Given the greater exigencies, one can imagine the year 2030 for option 2 and 2040/50 for option 3 considering that the ‘one world’ goals are even more ambitious.
excessive orientation towards poverty alleviation that would not involve a substantial contribution to the expectations of the environmental aspects of the SDG agenda.

Considering that some indicators are indeed not very ambitious, that progress has been uneven across countries and that a great deal of improvement has been achieved in the time before the MDG had been globally agreed, some governments in rich countries are very cautious to any attempt of enlarging the agenda. The idea of keeping the MDG agenda with slight changes and extending the timeline until 2020 or even 2025 could be an option for less engaged governments and institutions.

But can the MDGs just be extended? The idea of "finishing the job" has currently almost no supporters coming from academia or civil society – although it could become more relevant to many governments, especially if the effects of the international crisis further affect the fiscal situation of rich countries and emerging economies feel comfortable with the idea of a ‘business as usual’ scenario. Others warn of overloading the development agenda with additional topics, thus distracting the attention from the work that still has to be done until 2015.

The chances for this option to get more supporters will depend not only on the international context (financial crisis, fiscal constraints in rich countries, etc.) but also on the effects of participation in the national and thematic consultations and the range of participation of non-governmental organisations, think tanks and donor agencies. The discussion could be especially critical in emerging economies like China and Brazil, particularly on the question of whether they are willing to support the idea of a post-2015 agenda with enhanced timeline while focusing on the “bottom billion” as the lowest common denominator.

2.4.2 Keep the framework, but with different targets and a new timeline: MDG-Plus

Considering that current work in the post-2015 process is based on the findings of the Report of the UN System Task Team this could be the most realistic option. In case consultations and negotiations between relevant policy makers in the “north” and “south” are difficult, this option could include an agreement on three to four human development goals like education, health and child and mother mortality with strong focus on the “bottom billion” and a new timeline until 2025 (Sumner/Tewari, 2012:15-16). It would be the lowest common denominator.

Progress achieved in global governance like the shift from the G8 to the G20 and the broad shaped consultations process with a strong representative HLP could open the space for a somehow stronger “MDG-Plus” agenda. If national and thematic consultations take into account the principles and dimensions proposed by the UN Task Team, an MDG-Plus agenda could include additional goals concerning topics absent in the original MDG framework, like decent work, inequality, etc. or even a stronger alignment to structural causes of poverty and inequality.

A very useful impulse in this direction is the contribution edited by the Canadian Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) including the dimensions of peace and security, civil and political rights, disaster resilience, inequality, etc. (CIGI, 2012:2). CIGI's contribution is important because their “Bellagio Goals” have been developed in a consultative process and because they are accompanied by targets and indicators for measuring and monitoring. It is also relevant that the set of goals and indicators include topics that were ignored by the MDG.
2.4.3 Bringing together the SDG and the post-2015 process into a common framework

The “One World” option (Sumner, 2012) or “new terrain and new framework” (Melamed, 2012:45) is maybe the most comprehensive approach and therefore the biggest challenge in reaching a new and more ambitious agreement on key development issues. The political basis for this option could be MDG8: Develop a global partnership for development.

There exist also other concrete proposals of how to combine MDG-type social goals with sustainable and environmental goals. Oxfam’s Kate Raworth for example argues for combining social goals with environmental goals in her concept of the planetary and social boundaries. She argues that “between the social foundation and the planetary ceiling lies an area – shaped like a doughnut – which is the safe and just space for humanity to thrive in”. The post-2015 agenda should respect both boundaries and thrive towards moving into that space, so to “eradicate poverty and inequity for all, within the means of the planet’s limited resources”.

Figure 1. A safe and just space for humanity to thrive in: a first illustration

Source: Raworth, 2012
2.5 Some key topics for the thematic consultations

2.5.1 Growing inequalities within and among countries

The increase in inequality is a growing problem that affects not only the developing countries. The MDG have had no impact in reducing inequalities. Recent research about the relationship between poverty, inequality and growth indicate that for pro-poor growth policies are needed in order to reduce inequalities. A new framework for MDG targets could consider reducing inequalities, including social and redistribution policies, fiscal policies and job creation policies. Such targets should cover both vertical inequalities (income, access to land and other productive assets, etc.) as well as horizontal inequalities (gender, cultural, etc.). Gender inequalities are still persistent in wage earnings differentials, access to social life and social security. Many civil society organizations complain that instead of considering redistribution policies the MDG framework has encouraged the development of policies to address not the very poor but such which are close to the poverty line in order to achieve fast results.19

2.5.2 Ensuring climate change, food and energy security, and environmental sustainability

Another problem of the current MDG is its insufficient reference to the impacts of climate change and its weak relation to food security, adaptation and resilience. The latest World Bank report is very clear about the seriousness of these threats. “The incidence of natural disasters has increased five-fold since the 1970s…Natural disasters destroy livelihoods and may wipe out years of infrastructure investment. Deforestation, soil erosion, degradation of natural coastal protection and poor infrastructure have increased the likelihood that weather shocks will cause human disasters, especially for the poorest and most vulnerable in the LDCs, LLDCs and SIDS. It is estimated that over 42 million people were displaced by sudden-onset natural disasters in 2010.” Goals, targets and indicators related to these aspects could be a key to linking the post-2015 agenda with the SDG agenda.

2.5.3 Civil society participation

Civil society has been involved from the very beginning in discussions on the post-2015 SDG agenda. The civil society campaign “Beyond 2015” brings together more than 400 organisations and networks in developing and developed countries. The group calls for an MDG framework which is strong and legitimate, including the participation of CSOs during the whole process established by the international community to the Millennium Development Goals. Graca Machel is the only one of the five candidates nominated by Beyond 2015 who has been also included in the HLP. The need to strengthen human rights is one of the most present claims of civil society organisations (Beyond 2015, Save the Children, etc.). For Action Aid “poverty and inequality arise principally because human rights have been denied, and if we are to end poverty then it is necessary to protect, promote and fulfill the human rights of people living in poverty”. The MDGs do not sufficiently account for this relationship and are therefore not very ambitious in this regard. Save the Children argued in its report “A Fair Chance At Life” that failing to consider equity within development approaches was hampering progress.

2.5.4 Private sector involvement

The private sector is a major player that has gained much attention in policy development lately. Through job creation, infrastructure development, trade and production of consumer goods the private sector has an enormous potential for reducing poverty. At the same time, given that the main

19 See: http://www.socialwatch.org/
motivation of the private economy is to maximise profits, the private sector can play a negative role in both of human rights violation and environmental damages.

The post-2015 agenda is a process that ultimately must be approved by governments. Thus the involvement of the private sector as an agent for development somehow involves its relationship with goals, targets and indicators developed by government mandate. There are many new discussion topics as decent work, trade or economic growth involving private sector participation. In addition, both the Agenda for Change of the EU and the Development Agenda and G20 Busan declaration lately give higher importance as actors. The idea of a Green Economy as defended at Rio+20 by the EU requires the active involvement of the private sector as a major actor.

2.6 What should be the primary purpose of a future framework?

The main purpose of a future framework should be to hold international actors accountable for the achievement of globally agreed goals and thereby enable coordinated action on global development challenges. This would imply that a new framework embraces a new and broader understanding of international cooperation for achieving developing goals – one that is relevant for all countries, including rich as well as poor countries. According to the three options identified above a new framework should aspire to the One World option. Yet, a new framework should also follow a realistic approach that closely connects ambitions to actual implementation by building on the successes of the MDGs. Hence, a new framework could rather be located along the spectrum between a MDG-Plus option and the One World option. The exact specifications of the new framework will then depend on how far the goals can be expanded beyond the current focus of the MDGs and on how far the set of instruments for achieving development goals can be broadened.

The current MDGs reflect a notion of human development that was predominant in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium. Since then, however, the world has changed in major ways, including in regard to the distribution and nature of poverty, the international political and economic system, the role of aid and the ever greater urgency to address climate change (von der Hoeven, 2012). At the same time, high levels of debt in developed countries constrain spending initiatives for addressing these challenges, while a global jobs crisis particularly acute for young people is unfolding (ILO, 2012). Other global challenges include reforming the global financial system towards more resilience against policy and market failures; addressing widening disparities in incomes distributions; managing global food insecurity and respecting ecological planetary boundaries. Formulating goals that can address these challenges in a comprehensive manner is now even more urgent than at the turn of the century.

The main instrument for achieving the MDGs has been aid. Yet, finding cooperative solutions to addressing the global challenges outlined above will require a broader set of instruments. Aid continues to be an important element in the implementation of the new development agenda, and aid effectiveness will still be relevant. However, financial aid has always been only one answer among many ways to address development challenges. For instance, domestic sources and new innovative sources of funding will gain importance for all countries. A complementary more comprehensive understanding of global development finance would be a first step to broaden the instruments for implementing a new agenda. Apart from aid other policies of developed countries such as migration, environmental, energy, trade, investment or agriculture have significant impacts on developing countries. These should also be considered when thinking about how new development goals could be achieved.

The current MDG8 on the “global partnership for development” acknowledged some of these linkages. It is the only of the eight MDGs which specifies processes and instruments for reaching the other MDGs. So far this has been limited to increasing foreign aid, reducing tariffs and quotas for LDC exports and access to affordable medicine and technology. Therefore, MDG8 should be kept as a concept since it
will remain necessary to create an enabling environment for achieving global development goals. While the inclusion of these instruments is notable, MDG8 has been criticised for not including specific and time-bound targets and ignoring political economy questions of reforming global policies (Fukuda-Parr, 2012). Looking forward, one approach might be to set more specific global targets and leave individual countries to determine what they are willing to commit to specifically. This would enable peer pressure to be maintained among individual countries while recognising that different countries have varying capacities and responsibilities in addressing global development challenges. Another important aspect is enhanced policy coherence in economic, social and environmental policies. Although MDG8 includes a notion of policy coherence a post-2015 framework has to go far beyond this (von der Hoeven, 2012). In this context it has to be examined in how far the experiences of the EU regarding Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) can be relevant (see below).

Finally, bringing both goals and instruments together within a new framework will require a clear differentiation between the level at which each goal and instrument should be applied, whether it may be local, national, regional or international. Clearly, a global development framework tackling international development challenges predominantly addresses the international level. In addition, however, national level policies involve actions that are most important for explaining sustained levels of poverty or levels of growth as historical records show (Hulme/Wilkinson, 2012). Capturing both global and national dimensions adequately could be carried out through a two-tier list approach (Loewe et. al, 2012). For a first list of post-2015 goals countries should be encouraged to adapt goals to their individual national context through a participatory consultation process, in order for civil society organisations to be able to hold their governments accountable and help to set the benchmarks. For a second list of goals, countries should report their contributions to the provision of global public goods thereby ensuring that global challenges for sustainable development can be addressed adequately.

2.7 How could a future framework support improved policy coherence for development?

A coherent multilateral cooperation for development that explores the synergies of different policies and actors has the potential to maximise development results (Davies, 2011). The formulation of a post-2015 development framework provides an opportunity for moving forward on Policy Coherence for Development but also for the EU to feed its experiences into the deliberations on the post-2015 agenda.

The more universal a future framework will be the better it will be for generating policy coherence. The post-2015 framework is a significant opportunity to promote PCD in all countries, thereby overcoming the dichotomy between developed and developing countries. PCD spans four main dimensions: the first refers to the internal consistency within the aid programmes of donors; the second called ‘whole of government’ coherence, refers to the consistency between the aid and non-aid policies of a donor government; the third addresses the consistency between the aid and non-aid policies across donor countries (harmonization); and the last refers to consistency between a donor government policy and the overarching strategy at a country level (alignment) (Picciotto et al., 2005).

The EU has obliged to make efforts to improve the coherence of European policies towards promoting development. The idea of policy coherence was introduced in the 199220 Treaty on the European Union and included in the Lisbon Treaty, entered into force in 2009, stating that the Union ‘shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect

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developing countries’ (Art. 208 TFEU). The European Consensus on Development further defined that the ‘EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries’ (EU, 2005). And the consensus also clarified that “It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries’ efforts in achieving the MDGs” (EU, 2005), which underscores the linkages between PCD and the MDGs.

Therefore, a solid legal basis and policy thinking underlines the EU’s efforts towards promoting PCD. But so far institutional challenges prevent the EU from fundamentally transforming its policies to make them coherent with development objectives. For instance, the revision of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) demonstrate the difficulties for the EU to make proposals that would support rather than undermine development processes in developing countries (Klavert et al., 2011; Keijzer, 2011). PCD in the EU has also been geared towards doing ‘no harm’ to the poverty reduction objective of development cooperation as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty. The new global framework, however, should enable development Directorates-General, ministries of Member States and development agencies to closely coordinate and align their approaches with each other. This “whole of government” coherence should enable all these actors to agree on global development strategies. A systematic and coherent conceptual approach to global development that can be followed-through and implemented by all relevant actors is needed. Policy coherence of this kind would also enhance the credibility of the EU as a global development partner, which ultimately might be even more important than the mobilisation of additional aid resources.

In this context, it is also necessary to think about ways for the EU to use its’ PCD experiences, in order to influence deliberations on a future framework. The 2012 OECD DAC Peer Review of the EU recognizes that the “EU has taken a lead role in promoting such coherence, but Member States have implemented the commitments they have agreed in the EU unevenly” (OECD/DAC, 2012). Building on this leadership role the EU should also find ways to interact more strongly with emerging economies and convince these countries to join deliberations on a future framework more actively. One key to a successful engagement between the EU and emerging economies are PCD issues. Currently, the aid system is undergoing major transitions, especially in regard to the role of aid agencies in middle-income countries (Kharas/Rogerson, 2012). In middle-income countries traditional aid agencies are likely to continue to focus on equity, governance and progressive change issues, while middle-income countries themselves might be more interested in PCD. Aid often has less impact on these countries compared to policies on international migration, trade, finance, security, agriculture, investment or research and technology (Carbonnier/Sumner, 2012).

The EU should therefore identify examples where a “whole of government” approach is being pursued to ensure coherence in positions adopted in different multilateral fora on beyond aid issues, sharing experiences and examining how these could be promoted internationally. Until now, there has not been much improvement in the design and implementation of more coherent policies, but there is an urgent need to move from rhetoric to action on policy coherence for development in all international cooperation, especially for the post-2015 framework.

3. A STRONG EU ENGAGEMENT

3.1 What has been the EU contribution so far?

The MDGs have been a key norm for EU development policy, and the EU has made major contributions to achieving the MDGs. This section will assess the contribution of the EU to the MDGs and potential
Millennium Development Goals and beyond 2015, a strong EU engagement

contributions to a future framework along two main dimensions: EU aid contributions and the EU as an international actor.

Assessing the contribution of EU aid and other policies to achieving the MDGs will mostly focus on the input side since there are information gaps in credibly attributing progress on the MDGs to one donor (Bourguignon et al., 2008). This is due to the complexity of development processes that are influenced by multiple donors, different policy actors, and context-specific factors (e.g. governance structures or macroeconomic environment of individual countries). As far as possible, however, this section identifies relevant activities of the EU for achieving the MDGs and a potential post-2015 framework.

After growing for three consecutive years, in 2011 EU official aid declined by about €500 million compared to 2010, which represents a drop from 0.44% of gross national income (GNI) in 2010 to 0.42% in 2011 (European Commission, 2012b). In 2005, EU Member States had pledged to increase ODA to 0.7% of GNI by 2015 and included an interim target of 0.56% ODA/GNI by 2010, but current figures indicate that most European countries will fall short on these pledges (European Commission, 2012c). In terms of allocation of EU aid there is a clear trend towards increased aid commitments for social infrastructure. Also, in 2011 actual disbursement for social infrastructure was €3.543 billion or 38% of ODA disbursements making it the biggest sectoral share of the EU’s ODA budget (European Commission, 2012a). This corresponds with the emphasis of the MDGs on human development.

Despite the decline in aid disbursements in 2011, the EC continues to endorse its commitment to achieving the MDGs. In 2010, the EC issued a communication “A 12-point EU action plan in support of the Millennium Development Goals” and adopted Council Conclusions formulating a common position ahead of the UN MDG summit. In 2011, the EC adopted the first component of a €1 billion MDG Initiative for most off-track countries in meeting the MDGs and issued a communication on “Increasing the impact of EU development policy: an Agenda for Change”, placing quality employment, social

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**I Sectoral Breakdown of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2003 - 2011**

[Graph showing sectoral breakdown of ODA commitments from 2003 to 2011 with data from European Commission, 2012a]

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protection, sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition high on the EU’s development cooperation agenda. These documents and initiatives demonstrate that the EU and its Member States are active international drivers for achieving the MDGs. But there also remains need for the EU and its’ Member States to do more to adhere to their international development commitments as remarked by Commissioner Piebalgs (2012).

In addition to ODA contributions, the EU and Member States have been important actors on the global stage for creating and enabling a global environment for achieving the MDGs. The EU has been active in three major ways in this regard, namely: by engaging in the international aid effectiveness debate; by promoting policy coherence; and by implementing GPG approaches.

The EU and several Member States have been key drivers of the Paris–Accra–Busan process on aid and development effectiveness. But there is still a lot of unfinished business as the sobering results from the latest evaluation of the Paris Declaration have shown (Wood et al., 2011). The EU therefore needs to continue their efforts to provide aid more effectively. A recent study (Bigsten et al., 2011) for example estimated that the EU and its Member States could save up to €5 billion a year, if they continue to implement the aid effectiveness agenda. Important next steps could be a better ‘division of labour’ among the EU and the EU Member States through more ‘joint programming’ exercises, or scaling up the use of innovative aid modalities such as the EU’s MDG contracts. Further, a lot of lessons on aid effectiveness can be translated to other forms of development finance such as climate finance. A post-2015 framework provides the opportunity to reaffirm principles of aid effectiveness as well as to introduce new common standards for development finance.

Regarding policy coherence the EU has only made slow progress in implementing its own Policy Coherence for Development agenda. The EU has long-standing difficulties in reconciling domestic interests, particularly in trade, agriculture and fisheries policy, with the interests of developing countries. But as outlined above it remains crucial to make progress in promoting PCD, also for the EU’s credibility as a global actor. The role of the EU as an international actor will gain increasing importance against the background of international challenges such as climate change, which cut across national boundaries.

As a global actor the EU has the potential to help shaping global public policies for providing global goods. GPGs can be understood in the traditional sense of goods that affect everyone, from which no one can be excluded, and where use by one is not at the expense of use by another (‘non-excludability’ and ‘non-rivalry’) (Kaul et al., 1999). From an economic point of view, GPGs are those for which a large share of the benefit cannot be contained within a single country (Kremer, 2006). For instance, a country that establishes a policy to reduce carbon emissions to prevent global warming does not just benefit itself but helps all countries that would be hurt by global warming. In a similar fashion there are global problems (or ‘global public bads’) that do not respect borders and have widespread effects such as hunger, disease, pollution, climate change, financial instability, regional conflict, international crime and terrorism (Picciotto, 2011). These problems cannot be tackled by one country at a time, and stronger multilateral approaches should include global public policies to address these global problems.

Based on available evidence, the mainstreaming of the global public goods agenda in operational practice of aid agencies has been limited so far, also due to slow progress in identifying and costing global risks and their impact on developing countries (Mordasini, 2012). Thus, significant reforms of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have to take place at the institutional, organisational and operational levels in order to start addressing seriously the pressing global development challenges. Assessing GPG approaches for the EU, Furness and Måhkan (2011) find that the EU appears to be on the right track to address a more complex world and formulate policies that support a GPG approach. But the authors also stress that member states still do not have a common strategy for global development and for how best to use the EU to achieve it - the greatest problem for European development policy
remains complementarity among EU-level actors and Member States (Furness/Makhan, 2011). Thus, the EU has to develop common strategies that go even beyond PCD by continuing to reorganise external representation, in order to meet global responsibilities in providing global public goods.

### 3.2 Toward an EU Position on the Post-2015 Development Framework

In 2011, the European Union provided about €53 billion (or more than 50% of global aid) to developing countries, making it the largest donor of official development aid worldwide (European Commission, 2012). The European Commission alone manages some €11 billion of aid per year, putting it in second place among donors globally. As shown in previous chapters, much of the EU’s contribution is aimed at achieving the MDGs by 2015. However, as the deadline of 2015 draws closer, it is essential that the EU develops a firm position on the post-2015 development pathway in order to strengthen predictability, continuity and ultimately also the credibility of its development policy. In addition, the EU is currently discussing the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and must thus “choose the right mix of policies, tools and resources to be effective and efficient in the fight against poverty in the context of sustainable development” (European Commission, 2011a:3).

In the context of this paper it is important to note that currently a common and agreed position of the EU towards the post-2015 development framework does not yet exist. However, a process to reach such a position for the UN special event on MDGs in September 2013 has been initiated by the Commission with the aim to be completed by mid-2013. The key policy document for reaching a common EU position will be a Commission Communication on the future of the post-2015 development agenda due to be published early in 2013. In parallel, the European Parliament is drafting an own-initiative report on the post-2015 framework, which is equally due to be published early this year. The Commission’s Communication and the Parliament’s report will serve as the basis for the discussions within the Council of the EU, which are expected to be completed in May 2013.

**Figure 3.2.1: Key documents and processes leading to a common EU position on the post-2015 development framework**

*Source: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)*

*Note: Future dates of publications, conclusions and meetings are indicative only.*
This rest of this sub-chapter provides an overview of the key documents and processes that will impact the contents of the above-mentioned Communication and thus the subsequent EU position later on. It starts with the “Agenda for Change” and a brief overview of the ongoing negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020 and, specifically, the Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI). It then provides information on the discussions within the Foreign Affairs (Development) Council and presents some preliminary results of the Commission Consultation “Towards a Post-2015 Development Framework” and the upcoming European Report on Development 2013. Most importantly, the chapter outlines some potential elements of the upcoming Commission Communication as well as of the European Parliament’s own-initiative report, before closing with an outlook of the future process. Graph 3.2.1 provides an overview of the key documents and processes relevant for the future EU position on the post-2015 development framework.

### 3.3 An Agenda for Change

A useful reference setting the course of the future EU development policy is the “Agenda for Change” published by the European Commission in October 2011. This document reaffirms the overarching objective of poverty elimination in the context of sustainable development while seeking to focus the future EU development cooperation on two basic pillars: (1) human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance, and (2) inclusive and sustainable growth for human development. The following table summarises the various EU actions that fall in each of the two categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic policy pillars</th>
<th>EU action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (1) Human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance | • Democracy, human rights and the rule of law (incl. free and fair elections, functioning of institutions, media freedom, protection of minorities etc.)  
• Gender equality and the empowerment of women  
• Public-sector management for better service quality  
• Fair and transparent tax systems  
• Tackle corruption  
• Strengthened link with civil society, social partners and local authorities  
• Back governance reforms that promote the sustainable and transparent management of natural resources  
• Development-security nexus (incl. peace building, conflict prevention and international security) |
| (2) Inclusive and sustainable growth for human development | • Social protection, health, education and jobs  
• Business environment, regional integration and world markets  
• Sustainable agriculture and energy |

Source: European Commission, 2011a

Although the “Agenda for Change” was endorsed by the Council of the EU on May 14, 2012, its implementation remains a challenge largely dependent on the outcome of discussions on the future EU budget. On the one hand, the Council in its conclusions of May 14 clearly stated that the “Agenda for Change” will “guide the design and implementation of external action instruments under the
Millennium Development Goals and beyond 2015, a strong EU engagement

Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020” (Council of the EU, 2012a: paragraph 25). On the other hand, negotiations on the next MFF are proving more awkward than usual, being characterised by tensions between requests for increases in EU expenditure and the burden on governments to reduce budget deficits at home. Although the outcome of the negotiations is still open, current compromise proposals indicate that the budget under the “Heading IV” for “Global Europe” (i.e. EU external action including development funding) is unlikely to increase and may even decrease compared to the MFF 2007-2013. These notwithstanding, important cuts have been discussed during negotiations. Taking into consideration that the European External Action Service (EEAS) will require more financial resources as it expands, EU development funding is highly unlikely to increase in the next MFF. The same applies to the revision of the DCI. Although the Commission had initially proposed to increase funding to €23.3 billion for the new MFF, it currently looks like the DCI’s resources will not increase much from the €16.9 billion allocated in the current MFF. These budget constraints clearly set financial limits to the ambitions outlined in the “Agenda for Change”, even if the differentiated approach may free additional resources as middle income countries “graduate out of bilateral aid programmes” (European Commission, 2011b).

3.4 Preliminary Discussions in the Council of the EU

While the discussions about the MFF and the DCI are more implicitly related to the post-2015 development framework, the Council also dealt very explicitly with the post-2015 framework and follow-up to the Rio+20 summit. Preliminary discussions took place in the Foreign Affairs (Development) Council on October 15, 2012 and in the Environment Council on October 25, 2012. These discussions were informed by the European Commission, which introduced some guiding principles regarding the post-2015 development agenda. Key elements of these principles include:

- maintaining poverty eradication as the central objective;
- building on the current MDG approach, while strengthening weak or missing issues;
- pursuing the three dimensions of sustainable development in a balanced manner (also in relation to the SDGs);
- building coherence between the Rio+20 follow up on the inclusive green economy and the post-2015 development agenda.

Although there are no official conclusions of the discussions in the Council - these are expected by late May 2013 - , a related press release reflected the general thrust of the debate which favoured poverty eradication to be maintained “as the key focus of the future development agenda, while addressing possible gaps in the existing MDGs framework, such as human rights, governance, accountability, sustainable growth as well as fragility and conflict or post-conflict situations” (Council of the EU, 2012b:19).

3.5 A Public Consultation on the Post-2015 Development Framework

This public consultation ran from June 15 to September 19, 2012. It focussed on the benefits and limitations of the MDGs as well as on feasibility and potential scope and shape of a future framework. While the Commission is still in the last stages of evaluating the 121 contributions, some preliminary results presented by Commissioner Piebalgs show that “Europeans strongly support the MDGs and greatly value the development policy and commitment shown across the EU” (Piebalgs, 2012). More concretely, respondents appreciated the fact that the MDGs made poverty eradication a central aspect of development policy, although there was some scepticism whether progress in the fight against poverty was entirely due to the MDGs themselves. In a similar manner, the limits and gaps of the MDG framework were emphasised, especially related to its top-down approach and donor-led process, the
narrow focus of the MDGs, various implementation gaps and the absence of proper accountability mechanisms. Most respondents emphasised that crucial issues were not addressed by the MDGs, including human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as security, rule of law and governance. In addition, it was noted that the MDGs were not balanced enough as regards the three dimension of sustainable development and that they focussed too much on social goals (e.g. at the expense of economic indicators such as income generation, competitiveness, job creation etc.). As a result, most respondents concluded that the post-2015 development framework should have the broad goal of poverty eradication and reducing inequalities at its core, while putting an equal focus on economic, social and environmental progress.

However, an overburdening of the framework with too many dispersed goals and topics should be avoided in order not to overshadow the principal operational focus on poverty eradication. Finally, there was a general thrust that lessons learnt from the MDGs should be taken into account as well as positive aspects of the MDGs when formulating the post-2015 strategy.

### 3.6 The European Report on Development 2013

Another important input into the process of feeding the EU reflection on the post-2015 development framework is the European Report on Development (ERD) 2013 due to be published in April 2013. The ERD is an independent report, meant to inform the EU and international debate (and thus does not reflect any official EU position). However, the initiative is supported by the European Commission as well as seven Member States (DE, ES, FI, FR, LU, SE, UK). Although this fourth edition of the ERD will look more broadly at some key elements of a post-2015 global agenda in the context of new challenges and opportunities for development, it will also include some analysis about the EU's potential contributions in support of global inclusive and sustainable development.

Since the final ERD 2013 has not yet been published, this section can only reflect on some preliminary (and ongoing) discussions about its potential messages and recommendations. As regards the EU’s role, the discussions have addressed the strong ODA-focus of the MDG framework and concluded that – while considering ODA an important element of the post-2015 framework – the EU should also strengthen the development-friendliness of policies other than development policy. It was thus proposed for the EU to realise development-friendly EU policies, specifically in the areas of trade, investment and labour migration. Promoting development sensitive international regimes in these areas was also considered to benefit development majorly. In addition, the EU should push for international collective action on a variety of global public goods (GPGs), including climate change. The discussions about the ERD 2013 also dealt with how to attract support for a new global framework. One way to achieve this in potentially difficult negotiations was for the EU to support truly global goals, which would require action by all nations (including by EU Member States) and not just by the poorest (cp. UN, 2012). In any case, the post-2015 framework should build on the Millennium Declaration and on the experience of the MDGs in view of creating opportunities for inclusive and sustainable development. However, it was important to avoid a too detailed post-2015 position, in order not to constrain the EU’s flexibility during the negotiations.

### 3.7 The Commission Communication on the future of the post-2015 development agenda

As shown in Figure 3.2.1, all of the above mentioned initiatives will play a role in informing the preparation of a Commission Communication about the potential EU position and contribution to the UN process. The above analysis therefore gives several indications about the content of this Communication. However, since the Communication is still under preparation and only due to be
published in late February 2013, some of the principal elements are still under discussion. Nonetheless, Commissioner Andris Piebalgs (Piebalgs, 2012) recently presented his views on the post-2015 development agenda and it can be assumed that the Communication will draw from these ideas, which were also supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, of Cyprus (Kazakou-Marcoullis, 2012) (holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2012). In their view, the post-2015 development agenda should be based on a three pillar approach (MDG-Plus, human dignity, sustainability) to deliver on the aim of providing a “Decent Life for All by 2030” (Piebalgs, 2012). These three pillars are described in more detail below.

Pillar I, referred to as “MDG-Plus Pillar”, focuses on updating and modernising the MDGs. Taking into account unfinished business of the MDGs and filling some of the gaps outlined above, this pillar is aimed at providing decent living standards for all by setting minimum floors below which no one should fall. The “MDGs plus” would thus provide “basic rights that every citizen on the planet should expect and demand from their governments at the very latest by 2030” (Piebalgs, 2012: 5). Poverty eradication would be at the core of this pillar, “backed up by a set of minimum social protection mechanisms” (Kazakou-Marcoullis, 2012).

Pillar II, referred to as the “Human Dignity Pillar”, focuses on social equity, justice and human rights. Based on the conviction that “the MDGs alone will not guarantee a decent life” (Piebalgs, 2012: 5), the second pillar deals with the drivers for prosperity, creating jobs and guaranteeing justice, equity and human rights.

Pillar III, also referred to as the “Sustainability Pillar”, deals with good management of natural resources “from forests to fossil fuels, from minerals to soil” (Piebalgs, 2012: 5). Good stewardship under the sustainability pillar might also address “the sound use of income from natural resources and action to prevent their depletion” (ibid.). Pillar III might also provide the context for connecting the MDG agenda with the SDG agenda.

A fourth dimension might be added to these three pillars covering “peace and security” as outlined by the UN (2012), especially with reference to fragile states. Recognising the links between peace and security, development and human rights, a stronger focus of the post-2015 development framework on freedom from political persecution, discrimination and all forms of violence seems justified.

3.8 The European Parliament’s own-initiative report on the post-2015 development framework

In parallel to the Commission’s work on its upcoming Communication, the European Parliament is currently working on an own-initiative report entitled “Millennium Development Goals – defining the post-2015 framework” (Rapporteur: Filip Kaszmarek, PPE), which is due to be published in the first quarter of 2013 (February or March). This report will put an emphasis on the eradication of poverty and sustainable development as the two overarching pillars of the post-2015 framework, while also stressing the importance of human rights, good governance and security. The report is likely to favour the “one world” or “global challenges” approach. This approach would include targets for both developing and industrialised countries, with poverty targets for the south and sustainable consumption targets for the north. However, the list of goals and priorities should be kept short in order for the new development framework to remain operative. Limiting the number of priorities would apply to both the MDG and the SDG agendas, which the Parliament would like to see merged to avoid duplicity. This comprehensive common framework should be established with a view to achieving/reviewing the targets by 2025, a slightly shorter timeframe than the 15 years framework (i.e. until 2030) commonly proposed. Progress should be assessed against measurable, concrete and clear indicators.
More generally, the report will support general guidelines rather than detailed instructions for the negotiations at the UN special event on MDGs in September 2013, in order for the EU to preserve sufficient flexibility during the negotiations.

Given that the report will not be binding and that the European Parliament is only involved in a consultative way, it will be especially important to ensure that the key messages of the report will find their way into the Council Conclusions later this year. This can be facilitated through close collaboration with the rotating Presidency of the Council (Ireland in the first semester of 2013), liaison with national parliaments, hearings in the European Parliament (e.g. with participation of member state representatives) and more generally a broadened civil society dialogue on the matter.

3.9 The future process and lessons stemming from other international initiatives

After submission of the Commission Communication on the future of the post-2015 development agenda to the member states in early 2013, discussions in the Council are likely to start in February. Of course, it is not easy to foresee how long negotiations will last, but agreement on Council Conclusions and thus on an EU position towards the post-2015 development framework seems feasible by May 2013.

The EU can draw major lessons from its prior engagement in international initiatives, including multilateral negotiations and conferences. In order to achieve coherence and integration between the SDGs and the post-2015 development agenda, it is important to analyse key outcomes of processes relevant to these frameworks.

In a study by the NYU Center on International Cooperation the authors analysed multilateral agreements in three global policy regimes: environment, financial regulation and human rights (Gowan/O’Brien, 2012). The authors find that designing agreements is most likely to be successful when there is real political buy-in in advance, if the agreement fits well with existing international regimes and institutions and when the agreement enhances or adapts existing institutions rather than attempts to reshape domestic and global politics completely. Further, negotiators have to carefully weigh the breadth and depth of the agreement they want to achieve. On the one hand there are trade-offs between a narrow focus on specific problems or a broader approach tackling interrelated issues, and other hand there are trade-offs between light and heavy obligations for the actors involved.

Taking these lessons into account will be challenging for the EU. Thus, the EU should avoid to re-negotiate existing internationally agreed goals and commitments, and build on existing initiatives and agreements, such as Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States of the Busan Declaration, Education for All Initiative, Istanbul Programme of Action for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Almaty Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), Sustainable Energy for All Initiative, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, Doha Development Round of trade negotiations and the Rio+20 Summit.

From the Rio+20 Summit the EU has already learned that it can no longer postulate its values and recipes in a righteous fashion, especially against the background of shifts in the global distribution of power. Also, the financial crisis damaged the EU’s capability to advocate for a new economic model such as the green economy, and further hindered a broader diffusion of the EU positions in the final outcome document. In addition, a lot of energy was lost in EU-internal instead of external coordination processes. For example, assigning institutional responsibilities within the EU, especially among the Working Party on International Environment Issues (WPIEI), the United Nations Working Party (CONUN) and the Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) was a main challenge during the negotiation process.
For the post-MDG process it is imperative that the EU and Member States develop a common position. Also, EU coordination for the post-2015 process has to improve in several regards. First, there is a need for the EU to be more responsive and to engage with other actors much earlier during negotiation processes (“smart development diplomacy”), in order to build up a high degree of consent early on. Next, the EU should avoid being too focused on itself (“euro-centric”) and therefore needs to engage much earlier with other actors. An early and responsive engagement strategy will be a basic premise for the EU, especially in establishing partnerships and coalitions with emerging powers for instance. This also requires entrusting the EU delegation with more leeway to negotiate. Thus, future coordination processes should not focus on detailed internal proposals, but instead define general positions and “red lines” for the EU delegations in the negotiations. Finally, it is necessary to strengthen the actor-like capabilities of the EU through mainstreaming of majority decision-making and a more rigorous application of existing mechanisms in that respect.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusions

The Millennium Declaration, endorsed by 189 countries in 2000, and the accompanying Millennium Development Goals, adopted two years later, are reaching their 2015 deadline. And the EU needs to agree on a common position for their review.

The present report has identified the MDGs’ main strengths and weaknesses, and while the achievements have been substantial, the weaknesses are significant, especially in the light of the new global challenges. Not only have the MDGs failed to improve the situation of entire social groups within countries where the goals have been reached on average, but they have also not sufficiently addressed new multiple crises and the pressing need for sustainable development paths.

Climate change, growing inequalities within and among countries, food and energy security are bringing to the forefront a number of new challenges. In order to avoid losing ground on the development achievements to date, a much broader development portfolio will be needed able to capture a wider range of deprivations and progress than what the present MDG indicators can.

On the other hand, the financial crisis has reduced the willingness of many donor countries to contribute more, leading to a rethinking of the approach to development policy: increased effectiveness, the expanded use of new financial mechanisms, and the mobilisation of private actors.

One additional challenge consists in the growing importance of new non-DAC donors, many of which are still developing countries. BRICS economies are tremendously influencing global development. These new players must thus be integrated to the discussions on development aid standards and definitions.

The United Nations has a central role to play in bringing all countries together in order to agree on a common UN post-2015 development agenda. Its global constituency and mandate makes the UN the only institution with the necessary legitimacy to gather and engage all member states despite their different views. The UN calls on governments to remain “on the same page” and to avoid duplication on work on the SDGs and the post-2015 development agenda. Up to now, however, coordination and coherence between the two processes has been very weak.
4.2 Recommendations

The issues listed above will need to be addressed in the review of the MDGs in 2015, probably leading to a substantial review of the goals if the MDGs are to continue delivering meaningful results.

4.2.1 On the content and process

The EU is likely to build on the current MDG approach and to maintain poverty eradication as the central objective. However, it will probably aim at a more balanced and holistic right based approach to the three dimensions of sustainable development than in the current MDG framework. Despite the many development issues to be addressed, the EU should overcome the temptation to overburden the framework with too many dispersed goals and topics in order not to overshadow the principal operational focus of poverty eradication. It should engage proactively in designing a future framework that holds international actors accountable for the achievement of globally agreed goals and thereby enables coordinated action on global development challenges.

The new framework should be located along the spectrum between a MDG-Plus option and a “One World” Option and should be strong, aspirational yet practicable. In terms of the goals the first priority should be to link the human and sustainable development agenda, and break through the silos that each agenda has set up. As for the instruments, the EU should provide inputs in terms of financial resources, reaffirming its commitment to the 0.7% target and extend current contributions.

The EU should develop a complementary and more comprehensive understanding of global development finance as a first step to broaden the instruments for implementing a new agenda. This includes a targeted and well-designed expansion of financial instruments mobilising a multiple from other funding sources. Financial instruments can complement grant funding in areas where projects can become bankable with limited guarantees and grant support, paying particular attention not to fuel the indebtedness of vulnerable developing countries. Financial instruments should not be used to reduce development funding but to complement it. Apart from aid, other policies of developed countries such as migration, environmental protection, energy, trade, investment or agriculture bear significant impacts on developing countries. These should also be considered when thinking about how new development goals could be achieved.

With the 2015 MDGs deadline coming closer, but also within the context of the discussions about the new MFF 2014-2020, it is essential that the EU elaborates a common vision for the post-2015 development framework soon. Several ongoing activities will likely lead to such a position most likely being adopted by May 2013. In order to attract global support to address these issues during the negotiations, the EU would do well in proposing truly global goals, i.e. goals that would require action by all nations (including EU member states) and not just by developing countries.

4.2.2 Recommendations for the European Parliament (EP)

The EU’s position for the negotiations at the UN special event on MDGs will be set by the Council most likely in May 2013. The discussions in the Council will largely be based on a Communication of the European Commission due in early 2013. The European Parliament will only be involved in a consultative way. In order to maximise its influence over the output, it is therefore important for the Parliament to increase its visibility and to send a clear message to the Council. This message will be shaped in an upcoming own-initiative report on the post-2015 development framework. Given that the report will not be binding it will be necessary to ensure that the key messages of the report will find their way into the Council Conclusions later this year. This should be facilitated through close collaboration with the rotating Presidency of the Council (Ireland in the first semester of 2013), liaison
with national parliaments, hearings in the European Parliament (e.g. with participation of member state representatives) and more generally a broadened civil society dialogue on the matter (e.g. though the media). It is also recommended that the EP's Committee on Development consider the possibility of nominating a standing rapporteur for EU and international negotiations on the Post-MDG agenda.

**The EP should encourage the EU as a whole to ensure a bottom-up approach at national level in both developed and developing countries** with a wide participation of the marginalised so as to guarantee their views are listened to and their needs seriously taken into account. Countries should be encouraged to adapt goals to their individual national context through participatory consultation processes in order for civil society organisations to be able to hold their governments accountable. For a second list of goals, countries should report their contributions to the provision of global public goods thereby ensuring that global challenges for sustainable development can be addressed adequately. The EU must learn the lessons from the recent past (e.g. controversial discussions on a Green Economy), in other words: It should not arrive at the consultations with a strong prescriptive agenda and demand that others meet its targets. It is important to ask specific questions about particular topics. The EU should listen to proposals and be more prescriptive to its own constituencies.

Every global agreement needs to be supported by a broad consensus. For the post-MDG deliberation process the **EU and Member States should engage early on** with other actors by strengthening outreach activities so as to build up a high degree of agreement. EU Commission and Parliament should call on Member States to initiate active consultations with key stakeholders (parliaments, CSO, private sector) at the national level. It is important that line ministries (Environment, Development and External Relations) assume a leadership role in the consultation process.

Further, the EU should take responsibility as a global actor to **push forward the international aid and development effectiveness agenda**, implement the Policy Coherence for Development Agenda in Europe and start the debate on global public policies to address global challenges. For instance, the revision of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) demonstrate the difficulties for the EU to make proposals that would support rather than undermine development processes in developing countries. Against this background, the EP might aim at strengthening weak or missing issues such as **human rights and decent work, peace and security, governance, justice, accountability, social equity and sustainable inclusive development**. It may also aim at increasing the importance of economic issues such as income generation, competitiveness and job creation.

As for the SDG process, the EP should cooperate with both the Commission and the Council to start a dialog on very **concrete issues such as water and energy supply, sustainable agriculture or food security, etc.** – at first considering the topics which are less controversial in order to take the next step of formulating concrete targets together. The aim would be to develop a restricted number of clear SDGs. In parallel, both the EU Commission and Parliament should intensify consultations with civil society (e.g. “Beyond 2015”) regarding the character and the topic of the agenda.

Going forward, it will be most important for the EU deliver on existing commitments and drive international development cooperation. Therefore, the EU should:

- Fully implement the international aid and development effectiveness commitments (Paris, Accra, Busan) throughout Europe by ensuring compliance by all EU Members States and reflecting aid commitments in the financial mechanisms relevant to development cooperation.

- Take an ambitious stand on gearing the new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation towards discussing policy coherence and global public goods approaches for achieving
development goals post-2015, and lead by example (for other global actors) in implementing its own policy coherence for development more comprehensively.

**Emerging economies like Brazil, China and India need to be particularly involved in the discussions and negotiating processes at early stages,** and should be encouraged to actively shape the debate. Otherwise it will be difficult – if not impossible – to implement a new set of global goals. This means that the EU should develop clear priorities and inputs but not impose its views. Finally, bringing both goals and instruments together within a new framework will require a clear differentiation between the levels at which each goal and instrument should be applied, whether it is local, national, regional or international.
Millennium Development Goals and beyond 2015, a strong EU engagement

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World Bank (2010), The Millennium Development Goals and the Road to 2015 – Building on Progress and Responding to Crisis, URL: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2508
Annexes

Annex 1: The UN High-level Panel on post-2015 development goals

1. Yingfan Wang (China) Member of the secretary general's MDG advocacy group and a career diplomat.
2. María Ángela Holguín (Colombia) Foreign minister of Colombia.
3. Gisela Alonso (Cuba) President of the Cuban agency of environment.
4. Jean-Michel Severino (France) Former director general of the French development agency.
5. Horst Köhler (Germany), President of Germany 2004-10.
7. Queen Rania of Jordan An advocate for Unicef, the UN children's agency.
8. Betty Maina (Kenya) Chief executive of the Association of Manufacturers, one of Kenya's leading business organisations.
10. Andris Piebalgs (Latvia) Commissioner for development, European Commission.
11. Patricia Espinosa (Mexico) Secretary of foreign affairs.
14. Elvira Nabiullina (Russia) Economic adviser to Vladimir Putin, Russia's president.
15. Graça Machel (South Africa) A member of the Elders, an independent group of global leaders who work on human rights.
16. Sung Hwan Kim (South Korea) Minister of foreign affairs and trade.
17. Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) Minister for international development co-operation.
18. Emilia Pires (Timor-Leste) Minister of finance.
19. Kadir Topbaş (Turkey) Mayor of Istanbul and expert in urban rehabilitation.
20. John Podesta (US) Chair of the Centre for American Progress.
22. Amina Mohammed (ex officio) Special adviser to the UN secretary general on post-2015 development planning.
23. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Indonesia), President of Indonesia, Co-Chair
24. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), President of Liberia, Co-Chair
25. David Cameron, (UK), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
26. Fulbert Gero Amoussouga (Benin)
27. Izabella Teixeira (Brazil).
### Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

#### Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

**Target 1:** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day

1. Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day
2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty)
3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption

**Target 2:** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

4. Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age
5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

#### Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education

**Target 3:** Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education
7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5
8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds

#### Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

9. Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education
10. Ratio of literate women to men, 15-24 years old
11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector
12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

#### Goal 4: Reduce child mortality

13. Under-five mortality rate
14. Infant mortality rate
15. Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against measles

#### Goal 5: Improve maternal health

**Target 6:** Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

16. Maternal mortality ratio
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel

#### Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

18. HIV prevalence among pregnant women aged 15-24 years
19. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate
   19a. Condom use at last high-risk sex
   19b. Percentage of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS
   19c. Contraceptive prevalence rate
### Millennium Development Goals and beyond 2015, a strong EU engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target 8:</th>
<th>Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases</th>
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<tr>
<td>Target 9:</td>
<td>Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources</td>
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#### Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years

#### Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria

#### Proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures

#### Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis

#### Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course DOTS (Internationally recommended TB control strategy)

### Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

| 25. | Proportion of land area covered by forest |
| 26. | Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area |
| 27. | Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per $1 GDP (PPP) |
| 28. | Carbon dioxide emissions per capita and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP tons) |
| 29. | Proportion of population using solid fuels |

### Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development

| Target 10: | Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation |
| Target 11: | By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers |

### Market access

| 38. | Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty |
| 39. | Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries |
| 40. | Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their gross domestic product |
| 41. | Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity |

### Debt sustainability

| 42. | Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative) |
| 43. | Debt relief committed under HIPC Initiative |
| 44. | Debt service as a percentage of exports of... |
Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth

Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries

Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

45. Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total

46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis

47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population

48. Personal computers in use per 100 population Internet users per 100 population

The Millennium Development Goals and targets come from the Millennium Declaration, signed by 189 countries, including 147 heads of State and Government, in September 2000 (http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm). The goals and targets are interrelated and should be seen as a whole. They represent a partnership between the developed countries and the developing countries “to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and the elimination of poverty”.

Note: Goals, targets and indicators effective 8 September 2003.

1 For monitoring country poverty trends, indicators based on national poverty lines should be used, where available.

2 An alternative indicator under development is “primary completion rate”.

3 Amongst contraceptive methods, only condoms are effective in preventing HIV transmission. Since the condom use rate is only measured among women in union, it is supplemented by an indicator on condom use in high-risk situations (indicator 19a) and an indicator on HIV/AIDS knowledge (indicator 19b). Indicator 19c (contraceptive prevalence rate) is also useful in tracking progress in other health, gender and poverty goals.

4 This indicator is defined as the percentage of population aged 15-24 who correctly identify the two major ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV (using condoms and limiting sex to one faithful, uninfected partner), who reject the two most common local misconceptions about HIV transmission, and who know that a healthy-looking person can transmit HIV. However, since there are currently not a sufficient number of surveys to be able to calculate the indicator as defined above, UNICEF, in collaboration with UNAIDS and WHO, produced two proxy indicators that represent two components of the actual indicator. They are the following: a) percentage of women and men 15-24 who know that a person can protect herself/himself from HIV infection by “consistent use of condom”; b) percentage of women and men 15-24 who know a healthy-looking person can transmit HIV.

5 Prevention to be measured by the percentage of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets; treatment to be measured by percentage of children under 5 who are appropriately treated.

6 An improved measure of the target for future years is under development by the International Labour Organization.
### Official list of MDG indicators

**All indicators should be disaggregated by sex and urban/rural as far as possible.**

*Effective 15 January 2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)</th>
<th>Indicators for monitoring progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals and Targets</strong></td>
<td><strong>(from the Millennium Declaration)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day</td>
<td>1.1 Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Poverty gap ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5 Employment-to-population ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6 Proportion of employed people living below $1 (PPP) per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger</td>
<td>1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling</td>
<td>2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015</td>
<td>3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 4: Reduce child mortality</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.1 Under-five mortality rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2 Infant mortality rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against measles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal 5: Improve maternal health</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio</td>
<td>5.1 Maternal mortality ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3 Contraceptive prevalence rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4 Adolescent birth rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5 Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four visits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.6 Unmet need for family planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.A</td>
<td>Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.B</td>
<td>Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.C</td>
<td>Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Condom use at last high-risk sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Proportion of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Incidence and death rates associated with malaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Incidence, prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.A</td>
<td>Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.B</td>
<td>Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.C</td>
<td>Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.D</td>
<td>By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Proportion of land area covered by forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>CO2 emissions, total, per capita and per $1 GDP (PPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Consumption of ozone-depleting substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Proportion of fish stocks within safe biological limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Proportion of total water resources used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>Proportion of terrestrial and marine areas protected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>Proportion of species threatened with extinction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>Proportion of population using an improved drinking water source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>Proportion of population using an improved sanitation facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>Proportion of urban population living in slums</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54
Millennium Development Goals and beyond 2015, a strong EU engagement

**Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development**

| Target 8.A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system |
| Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally |

| Target 8.B: Address the special needs of the least developed countries |
| Includes: tariff and quota free access for the least developed countries’ exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction |

| Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly) |

| Target 8.D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term |

| Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries |

| Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications |

| Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States. |

| Official development assistance (ODA) |
| 8.1 Net ODA, total and to the least developed countries, as percentage of OECD/DAC donors’ gross national income |
| 8.2 Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) |
| 8.3 Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of OECD/DAC donors that is untied |
| 8.4 ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their gross national incomes |
| 8.5 ODA received in small island developing States as a proportion of their gross national incomes |

| Market access |
| 8.6 Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty |
| 8.7 Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries |
| 8.8 Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their gross domestic product |
| 8.9 Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity |

| Debt sustainability |
| 8.10 Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative) |
| 8.11 Debt relief committed under HIPC and MDRI Initiatives |

| Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services |
| 8.12 Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis |

| 8.13 Fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants |
| 8.14 Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants |
| 8.15 Internet users per 100 inhabitants |
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES

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Documents