



Economic Partnership Agreements and Food Security:

What is at stake for West Africa?

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Abbreviations

ACP	<i>African, Caribbean, Pacific</i>
BMZ	<i>German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</i>
CAP	<i>Common Agricultural Policy</i>
CBB	<i>Confédération des Betteraviers Belges</i>
CET	<i>Common External Tariff</i>
CNOP	<i>Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali</i>
CPE	<i>European Farmers Coordination</i>
COAG	<i>Coordinadora de Agricultores y Ganaderos</i>
CSS	<i>Country Support Strategy</i>
DG	<i>Directorate General</i>
EBA	<i>Everything but Arms</i>
EC	<i>European Community</i>
ECOWAS	<i>Economic Community of West African States</i>
EDF	<i>European Development Fund</i>
EPA	<i>Economic Partnership Agreement</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
FWA	<i>Fédération Wallone de l'Agriculture</i>
GATT	<i>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</i>
GSP	<i>Generalized System of Preferences</i>
IMF	<i>International Monetary Fund</i>
MDG	<i>Millennium Development Goal</i>
MFN	<i>Most Favoured Nations</i>
PAC	<i>WAEMU Common Agricultural Policy</i>
PRSP	<i>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</i>
RNC	<i>Regional Negotiating Committee</i>
ROPPA	<i>Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs Agricoles d'Afrique de l'Ouest</i>
ROW	<i>Rest of the World</i>
RPTF	<i>Regional Preparatory Taskforce</i>
SIA	<i>Sustainability Impact Assessment</i>
TWN	<i>Third World Network</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>
UNCTAD	<i>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</i>
WAEMU	<i>West African Economic and Monetary Union</i>
WHO	<i>World Health Organization</i>
WITS	<i>World Integrated Trade Solutions</i>
WTO	<i>World Trade Organization</i>

Preface

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are enshrined in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in 2000 between the European Union (EU) and states from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). They are meant to be an answer to arguably ineffective non-reciprocal trade preferences the EU granted to the ACP over the past 30 years, and to pressure for bringing EU trade relations with ACP countries in line with World Trade Organisation rules. While it is clear that the signing of reciprocal and regional trade agreements has potentially large impact on the ACP, it remains unclear quite how much so. EPAs potentially will redefine the economic framework between the ACP and the by far most important trade partner for a majority among them, the EU. The details of the agreement are not yet clear; they are currently under negotiation. The Cotonou Agreement foresees the start of the implementation period of EPAs in 2008. If that deadline is to be met and the agreements must reach the necessary threshold of ratifications to come into force, it is clear that they will be an important if not defining feature of the German EU Presidency in the area of development cooperation in the first half of 2007. It therefore seems particularly necessary and timely to look into potential effects on crucial sectors in often economically vulnerable ACP countries.

This paper is part of a series of three reports that have been written at DIE at the parallel. During February to April 2006, Clara Weinhardt, Christoph Pannhausen and Tim Seimet have conducted research on the potential impact of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) on food security. The design of the papers created deliberate overlap and aimed at complementarity between the respective foci: While Clara Weinhardt (a student of international relations science at Dresden University) explored the line of argument at the Brussels level, Christoph Pannhausen (a student of Geography, Political Science and Development Economics at Bonn University) and Tim Seimet (a student of business administration science at Marburg University) had a close and critical look at analyses on the impact on Western and Eastern/Southern Africa respectively. This triple perspective on EPAs and food security was researched during an internship of the three authors at DIE in Bonn. Their work touches on aspects of two inter-related research areas at DIE: agricultural policy and European cooperation with developing countries. The research is based on literature and some quantitative analysis (in the case of West Africa), but as an important feature, it included interviews with African and European actors in the ongoing EPA negotiations. The interviews were conducted in Brussels in March 2006; a list of interviewees can be found in all three reports.

Other than the three authors of these papers, we would particularly like to thank the interviewees in Brussels for their time and openness to discuss the issue of EPAs and food security. In the case of the study on West Africa, particular thanks go to Mr. Busse of the Hamburg Institute on World Economics (HWWA) for the kind transmission of his data.

Bonn, September 2006

Dr. Michael Brüntrup and Dr. Sven Grimm

Executive Summary

Food insecurity and famine still affect more than 800 million people across the globe. In West Africa, about 22 percent of the population is undernourished. As targeted in Goal One of the MDGs, the proportion of undernourished people is aimed to be reduced by 50 percent in 2015. EPA negotiations between the EU and West Africa have the objective to establish a trade and economic relationship for development between these two regions. As food security is essential for development, EPA negotiations should take into account the potential impacts on food security in West Africa.

According to the World Food Summit in 1996 food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Generally, three elements of food security are distinguished: Food availability, food access and food utilization. Today, global agriculture produces sufficient calories and nutrients in order to provide the whole world population with safe food. Availability of food is not the overriding problem, but lack of access to adequate food is paramount to food insecurity. Reducing inequality and fostering pro-poor growth are therefore essential for improved and sustainable livelihoods. However, it is reasonable to separate issues of food security from poverty, as food insecurity entails more aspects than mere income poverty, e.g. price fluctuations, non-functioning markets, intra-household distribution and utilization.

The Cotonou Agreement, which provides the framework for the EPA negotiations, reflects a policy shift in EU development policy from preferential market access to mutual free trade between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions, in which development is the overriding goal. This shift is partially based on the EU's own commitment to make its trade agreements compatible with the WTO rules. Moreover, the EU has the conviction that the integration of ACP countries into the world economy can be best achieved and strengthened via regional integration. The present system in force of non-reciprocal tariff preferences shall be replaced by reciprocal trade arrangements for all ACP countries. During a transition period (2000-2008), Lomé preferences remain in place while the EU and ACP countries negotiate EPAs that will gradually liberalise substantially all trade between the regions. EPAs should create positive effects for West African development as they are supposed to encourage sustained economic growth, develop the private sector, increase employment and improve access to productive resources.

The regional part of EPA negotiations with West Africa is divided into three phases:

- Phase 1: Economic and commercial integration priorities of the West African region are formulated, an EPA Reference Framework in these areas is established; a programme to enhance competitiveness and an upgrading programme is formulated and implemented.

- Phase 2: Overall EPA architecture and draft agreement on all trade-related issues are formulated.
- Phase 3: Negotiations on trade liberalisation and conclusion of the EPA mark the last phase of the negotiation.

The second phase of EPA negotiations between the EU and West Africa commenced on October 6th, 2003. The 16 West African countries are represented by delegates from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), even though Mauritania is not a member of both groupings. It is envisaged to finalize the negotiations in 2007, as the EPA would come into force January 1st 2008. The first benchmark in the negotiation process was the adoption of the Road Map for EPA negotiations on 4th August 2004. It clearly defines the two main objectives of the agreement; first, to promote the deepening of the regional integration process and second, to ensure sustainable economic development in the West African region.

Currently (July 2006), the negotiations are pending before the first phase could be finalized due to dissension between the negotiation partners. West Africa demands EU support for the expected adjustment costs in connection with the incorporation of flanking development measures into the negotiations, while the EU rejects to put this topic on the negotiation agenda. Moreover, West Africa refuses to talk about public procurement, investment and competition, known as Singapore Issues from the WTO trade talks (where they have been rejected by developing countries including African countries as topics of negotiation), which the EU would like to take on board.

With regards to regional integration efforts in West Africa, a Common External Tariff (CET) for the ECOWAS region was adopted in 2005. The CET consists of four tariff lines and is consistent with the CET of WAEMU. A transitional timeframe of three years has been set up, so that by 2008 all ECOWAS countries will apply the same external tariffs. Recently, Nigeria has modified its tariff structure to be more coherent with the CET. As Nigeria has been perceived as the major obstacle for a CET for a long time, the gradual adaptation towards the common tariff is regarded as an important step towards regional integration. The EU perceives the CET as an optimal basis for EPA negotiations as it contributes to deeper regional integration by creating a customs union.

The Common Agricultural Policy of ECOWAS (ECOWAP) is another indicator for deeper regional integration through harmonizing sectoral policies. It was adopted by ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in 2005. The policy emphasizes the leading role of agriculture in the West African economy and stresses the paramount relevance of efficient and effective family farms as the basis of a modern and sustainable agriculture in West Africa. ECOWAP contains moreover the vision to guarantee food security and secure decent incomes for agricultural workers. However, the adoption of a CET will impose severe problems on farmers of non-WAEMU members, as in many cases the old tariff lines were higher than the new CET. A drop in tariff rates will most likely result in an enlarged amount of agricultural

imports on the markets, which will thereby increasingly compete with domestic and presumably less competitive production. This development runs counter to objectives of ECOWAP to reduce dependence on imports. The situation is likely to be amplified by an EPA as it would result in an abolishment of tariffs for agricultural EU-exports.

One option to protect West African agricultural producers is to make use of the possibility to exclude about 20 % of current import values from liberalization, which is an interpretation of the WTO rules of reciprocal market-opening. Thereby, it would be theoretically possible to exclude potential sensitive products. They include poultry, beef, cereals (especially wheat and wheat flour), milk and dairy products, potatoes, edible oils, sugar and processed food products such as pasta and tomato purée. An exclusion of these goods would account for 8.75 % of total imports from the EU, thus still providing space for a considerably large share of other sensitive products.

Potential adverse impacts of EPA have been observed by West African non-state actors. Many farmers and rural development stakeholders are profoundly opposed to EPAs in their current form and also perceive the CET as a threat towards their livelihoods. They demand protective measures to be taken against the influx of cheap and subsidized EU exports. Generally participation of advocates for agricultural producers in West Africa is auspicious, as some organizations are deeply involved in the Regional Negotiating Committee (RNC) which is the principal negotiating body on the West African side. Nevertheless, lack of financial and human capacity is a hindrance towards adequately creating awareness of EPA negotiations in the rural areas.

However, the issues of sensitive products remain currently unchallenged as the negotiations are pending due to other challenges (see above). The EU focuses hence rather on the importance of trade-related issues that could be beneficial to West Africa than on the question of market access.

An analysis for all products at the HS-4 level from Matthias Busse was used to assess the trade effects for selected potential sensitive agricultural products. It is hypothesized that tariffs for the respective products will be down to zero after the EPA has been concluded. Results show that trade creation usually outweighs trade diversion for every examined product. While trade creation is associated with welfare gains, trade diversion basically entails welfare loss. This might lead to the assumption that West African countries will benefit from participating in such an EPA with regards to these products. However, while a gain in consumer surplus is likely, the effects of crowding out of domestic producers would lead to losses in producer surplus. As government revenues will also be adversely affected by preferential trade liberalization, there are some doubts whether these losses will be outweighed by gain in consumer surplus.

Net-consumers will generally face lower prices for imported food from the EU, provided that the elimination of tariffs will also be reflected in the price. Food availability would thus be enhanced. However, rural net-consumers might find it increasingly difficult to find employ-

ment in the agricultural sector as wage labourers, because production of certain crops will fall due to reduced price incentives to produce as a result of competition with EU products. Under a preferential trade liberalization scenario net-producers of food will most likely have to cope with stiff competition from the EU in some areas. Prices for some of their products will decrease and therefore reducing their incentives to produce for the market. As the vast majority of West African population depends on agriculture as their main source of income, the effect would be very pronounced. The overriding threat, especially in the short term, is that large shares of the population might have reduced access to food because of reduced incomes from agricultural production and labour. It is moreover questionable whether these people will find employment in other sectors, given the serious obstacles in terms of capacity, infrastructure, size and general lack of competitiveness of non-farm sectors in West Africa.

Therefore, in order to ensure access to food for net-producers and other vulnerable groups the definition of sensitive products might provide a temporal solution for the most important food products in the region. Hence, the list of sensitive products for West Africa should take into account food security as the paramount selection criteria. At the same time, it must be stressed that protectionist measures do not improve competitiveness of agricultural production. Thus in the long-run, it must be an aim to transform the primary sector of West Africa into an efficient and effective one.

EPA could be a new starting point to create an enhancement of competitiveness and to tackle supply-side constraints.

- West Africa should hence engage in the discussion on the still outstanding Singapore Issues, including investment, as harmonization in this area can facilitate the setup of a more efficient agriculture and a viable agro-industry, thereby contributing to food security.
- Again, for EPA to be viable in the sense of sustainable development and poverty reduction in West Africa, a long and flexible timeframe seems desirable in order to first make progress with regards to regional economic integration.
- The issue of short and medium term adjustment costs has been raised by the two negotiating partners as a major point of diverging opinions. As the financial resources of most countries are not sufficient to face the challenges ahead, innovative instruments to support countries in their efforts to achieve the MDGs seem to be necessary, as the EDF should not be diverted from its focal sectors.
- In order to improve capacity building and information sharing among the West African actors, EU member states should support appropriate initiatives.
- With regards to regional integration, harmonization of sectoral policies has been identified as one cornerstone. The adoption of ECOWAP was therefore a step in the right direction. However, coherence of policies must be ensured, especially with the CET.

Hence, ECOWAP and CET should be better interlinked, especially with respect to products important for food security.

- More in-depth studies on the effects of EPAs are necessary. The potential impacts of EPA on food security are not straightforward. They depend on social, economic and even geographical factors, which are not always quantitatively assessable due to insufficient data for multi-purpose multisector farm households. Currently, it is thus not possible to unambiguously foresee the overall effect for West Africa.
- Finally, negotiating partners should plead for adequate safeguard mechanisms that enable countries to react to potential adverse developments with regards to EPA which cannot be sufficiently addressed directly by adjustment assistance.

1 Introduction

In 2005, the West African Sahel region, once again, experienced a severe famine. About 3.6 million people were highly vulnerable and 2.5 million were in need of food aid.¹ Currently, after a rather promising harvest, many people still have to cope with food insecurity. This is caused by the early end of food reserves due to the need for many households to pay debts incurred during the famine. “The outlook for 2006 for Niger is of high concern with 3.2 million Nigerians severely or moderately food insecure and levels of malnutrition of 15.3 percent well over the WHO [World Health Organization] - defined emergency level of 10 percent.”²

Niger is only one, though one of the most severe, example of pervading food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, for example, about 16 percent of the population is undernourished. However, figure 3 illustrates that the range between relatively food secure states and food insecure countries is large. While 9% of the Nigerian population are food insecure, Sierra Leone and Liberia have an undernourished population of 50% and 46% respectively.³ The underlying causes of food insecurity are very complex and include poverty, low agricultural production, poor health and education as well as the impacts of war.⁴ In West Africa, their share has declined in the last 15 years.⁵ However, a closer look reveals that the absolute number of undernourished people in the region is not decreasing in the same manner due to population growth. In fact, the figures have increased from 1996 to 2001.⁶ This stresses the need to attribute utmost importance to ensure food security and to put it on the top of the agenda as it is essential for development as such.⁷

The importance of attaining food security has been reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). In 2001, more than 810 million people in the world were undernourished. Being aware of the number of undernourished people, already in 1996 the Heads of State and Government in the Rome Declaration on World Food Security reaffirmed everyone’s right to

1 WFP (2005), p. 17.

2 WFP (2006), p. 16.

3 See UFig. 3.

4 See Fig. 1.

5 See UFig. 4.

6 See UFig. 5.

7 This is only partly reflected in the prioritization of food security in the Country Support Strategies (CSS) of the 9th EDF. Food Security (as a heading in EU-cooperation) is one of the priority issues in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger, thus only 3 of the 16 countries of the region. However, this could be an artificial indicator of neglect of governments for the problem of food security, since there are probably other ways to pursue that goal through other prioritizations. See Table 1.

be free from hunger, the right to adequate food for everyone and the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food. Thus the status of food as a basic need was stressed. The concomitant Plan of Action envisaged reducing the *number* of undernourished people to half their level by 2015. A modified and less ambitious vision became part of the first MDG, the widely accepted general framework of any development strategy and intervention, in connection with the target to reduce poverty. The goal aims at reducing extreme poverty and hunger. The second target of that goal is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the *proportion* of people who suffer from hunger.⁸

The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) can significantly influence the countries' ability to reach the MDGs, in particular the target related to food security. Not only might it affect food availability, but it also impacts on food access. Negotiations between the European Union (EU) and West Africa⁹ have the objective to establish a partnership for development between these two regions. The deepening of the regional integration process and capacity building in order to enhance competitiveness and cooperation in trade-related matters are some of the objectives of the EPA negotiations between the EU and West Africa. As one part of the agreement, it is envisaged to establish a trade agreement, which will result in the elimination of almost all duty rates on both sides, thus being compatible with the principle of reciprocity of regional trade agreements demanded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in GATT article XXIV.

Trade liberalization entails several effects on different groups within society. Urban dwellers are differently affected than the rural population. Net producers and net consumers of food experience other impacts on their individual livelihoods. In this regard, as on the one hand the majority of West Africans is engaged in agricultural production while on the other hand the share of urban population is consistently growing,¹⁰ how are food security issues being considered and addressed within the EPA negotiations? What might be the impacts of EPA on food security for different socioeconomic groups? How can be assured that EPA will not adversely affect food security but foster and sustain it in West Africa?

After briefly outlining the concept of food security from different perspectives in section 2, section 3 gives an overview about background and objectives of the EPA negotiations between the EU and ACP regions. This is followed by a summary of the current status of EPA negotiations in West Africa in section 4. Section 5 examines likely trade effects of EPA on selected food products in West Africa, while subsequently the potential consequences for various stakeholders with regards to food security are addressed in section 6. The paper finalizes with concluding recommendations putting special emphasis on food security issues within the EPA negotiations.

8 UN Statistics Division (2005), p. 1ff.

9 West Africa entails the 15 ECOWAS member states and Mauritania, which resigned from ECOWAS in 1999.

10 See UFig. 6 and UTable 2.




Fig. 1: Underlying causes of food insecurity

2 The Concept of Food Security and Linkages to Development

The concept of food security emerged in the literature during the 1970s. Since then, numerous different dimensions and perspectives have been subsumed under this term. According to the World Food Summit Plan of Action 1996, a widely accepted definition, food security exists when “all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”¹¹ This definition involves several conditions which, when all are met, constitute a situation of food security. Generally, three elements of food security are distinguished: Food availability, food access and food utilization, always considering the crucial temporal dimension of consistency.¹²

¹¹ FAO (1996), p. 4.

¹² See Fig. 2.

- Firstly, food availability refers to sufficient quantity of food for everybody through household production or purchase (local or imported products). Food must be consistently available to all individuals, hence also emphasizing the importance of time. However, food availability is only one element of food security and therefore a necessary but insufficient condition for food security.
- Secondly, food access depends on ample purchasing power and resources as well as functioning markets to obtain adequate food. Household income, its distribution within the household at an individual level and food prices are relevant factors to be considered. Consequently, income poverty is a major constraint for access to food. Moreover, social norms and traditions can also play a profound role in determining food access, as it is illustrated by the role of women or children in many societies, making them the most vulnerable groups.
- Thirdly, food utility relates to dietary habits. It entails proper biological use of food, requiring potable water and adequate sanitation. To a large extent food utilization depends on knowledge within households of issues like food storage, processing techniques and basic principles of nutrition.¹³




Fig. 2: Pillars of Food Security

The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) definition of food security does not contain anything about the origin of food, i.e. whether it should preferably originate from local production, from food imports or from a combination of both. There are several schools of thought which provide policy guidelines how to achieve food security:

¹³ Particip (2004), p. 9 and FAO (2003a), p. 31.

- As a response to the World Food Summit in 1996, the concept of food sovereignty has been established, most prominently by Via Campesina. It states, “food sovereignty is the peoples’, countries’ or state unions’ right to define their agricultural and food policy, without any dumping vis-à-vis third countries”.¹⁴ Among other components, food sovereignty thus entails the right of countries to protect their mostly uncompetitive agricultural producers from too lowly priced imports. It is argued that “[f]ood sovereignty is a pre-condition for a genuine food security.”¹⁵
- Many countries’ food security policies emphasize the need for food self-sufficiency, achieved by trying to provide sufficient domestic production to meet a substantial part of consumption requirements.¹⁶ The advantage of this concept is to save foreign currency otherwise spent on food imports and to reduce dependence on external forces. However, the sole dependence on domestic local food production might result in adverse effects. High fluctuations in price and quantity due to seasonality of food production affect both food availability and food access for poor and vulnerable groups. Hence, drawbacks of food self-sufficiency include the dependence on food aid in case of adverse climatic variations such as droughts and floods. It is argued that “self-sufficiency makes little economic sense”¹⁷ given surplus food production in some areas of the world and high interconnectedness because of modern transportation systems.
- In the current debate the focus shifts rather away from food self-sufficiency towards the concept of food self-reliance, which recognizes comparative advantages in agricultural production. “It is easier and more profitable to earn foreign exchange to buy food imports than it is to grow water-hungry agricultural crops”¹⁸ for many countries, especially those located in arid zones frequently confronted with water scarcity. In addition, changes in consumer preferences might create a demand for food imports, as is the case for wheat products in West Africa. Food self-reliance, while subject to various interpretations, reflects a “set of policies where the sources of food are determined by international trade patterns and the benefits and risks associated with it.”¹⁹ This encompasses generally to have the means to purchase or produce food based on respective comparative advantages, meaning that producing cash crops for export complies with food self-reliance as long as it is possible to import sufficient food with the ex-

14 Via Campesina (2003), p. 1.

15 Suppan, S. (2003), p. 2.

16 FAO (2003b), p. 20.

17 Panagariya, A. (2002), p. 1.

18 FAO (2002), p. 5.

19 FAO (2003b), p. 20.

port earnings.²⁰ Food self-reliance thus reflects the increasingly liberalized global trade system.

Whichever approach is being pursued, all strategies aim at achieving food security, which is closely linked to any development efforts of a country. The fact that food security is embedded in the first MDG, demanding to halve the proportion of undernourished people by 2015, shows its importance in the international development context. It is intrinsically connected to poverty reduction, which currently is the overarching goal of development agencies. Today, global agriculture produces sufficient calories and nutrients in order to provide the whole world population with safe food. “[T]he productive potential of global agriculture has so far been more than sufficient to meet the growth of effective demand.”²¹ Regional imbalances in food supply are supposed to be adjusted through trade. Availability of food is not the overriding problem. Rather, “most international trade in food is directed towards people who [...] have the purchasing power to buy the imports.”²² A lack of income and access to adequate income is paramount to food insecurity. Reducing inequality and fostering pro-poor growth are therefore essential for improved and sustainable livelihoods.²³ “Poverty is a major cause of food insecurity and sustainable progress in poverty eradication is critical to improve access to food.”²⁴

However, food security issues go beyond mere poverty reduction. The particular target of the first MDG goal on food security is justified since it emphasizes that higher income may not be enough if it is not or cannot be converted into more and better food purchase and diligent use of food. Thus improved economic access via increased income is only one component of the access dimension of the food security concept. Functioning markets without large seasonal fluctuations are also important for food security. Moreover, questions of social access to food as well as its proper physiological utilization have to be considered. In addition, vulnerability to external shocks and the resilience of food systems must be addressed in order to guarantee the right to food.²⁵

As food security is crucial for development, any development strategy has to take account of its effects on food security. EPAs are supposed to be above all instruments for development. Besides, EPAs shall be integrated into the development policies of the ACP countries as well as into the support strategies of the EU. It is in this context that the EPA negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries are entrenched with specific impacts on food security. In the

20 FAO (2003b), p. 49.

21 FAO (2003c), p. 57.

22 CUTS (1998), p. 7.

23 FAO (2003a), p. 33.

24 FAO (1996), p. 1.

25 InterAcademyCouncil (2004), p. 12.

following chapter, the background and rationale for the EPA process under the Cotonou Agreement will be presented.

3 The EPA negotiations between the EU and ACP

3.1 Background of EPA negotiations

EU-ACP trade relations should be seen against the background of the GATT/WTO rules. They have introduced the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, which stipulates that “with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind [...] any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party [...] shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to [...] all other contracting parties.”²⁶ MFN obligations in general benefit developing countries, as they may be able to free-ride on bilateral tariff concessions exchanged between larger countries. In addition to that, developing countries can give developing countries unilaterally special market access. This is backed by the so-called Enabling Clause, introduced in 1979, which sets certain conditions that preferential market access granted by the EU has to fulfil. Hence, trade relations between ACP countries and the EU underwent various changes over the last decades, with EPAs representing the most recent development.

Since 1975, the EU’s trade relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries were characterized by a system of preferential market access.

Under the Lomé convention, dating back to 1975, the European Union granted non-reciprocal trade preferences to the then 46 ACP countries.²⁷ Amongst them are 66 former colonies of EC countries. The 48 African ACP countries account for the bulk of ACP member countries. The Lomé Convention aimed at developing the ACP trade by providing them with duty-free access to the European Union for all industrial goods and a wide range of agricultural products, excluding particularly those with a EU market order. Additionally, four protocols offered special market access terms for sugar, bananas, beef and veal, as well as rum, while some agricultural products received quota-restricted tariff preferences.

26 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, GATT (1994), Art. I, (1).

27 The Lomé convention consisted of four conventions. Lomé I (1975) was signed by 46 countries on the ACP side, Lomé II (1980) by 58, Lomé III (1985) by 65, and Lomé IV (1990) by 70 ACP countries. Today, 79 countries belong to the ACP group, of which 77 negotiate EPAs with the EU (Cuba and South Africa do not take part in the negotiations). South Africa has already concluded a free-trade agreements with the EU in 1999, as part of the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA). The absence of South Africa in EPA negotiations is critical with regard to the seven countries of the SADC EPA negotiating configuration because four of them (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with South Africa. The exclusion of South Africa from the SADC EPA thus complicates the negotiations with the regional group.

The Least Developed Countries (LDCs)²⁸ among the ACP region benefit from the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative adopted in 2001. This agreement overcomes the EU’s regional focus on the ACP countries dominating its preferential trade policy by extending non-reciprocity to non-ACP LDCs. All LDCs received immediate duty and quota free access to the EU for all products originating in LDCs, except for arms and ammunition, and except for the sensitive products sugar, bananas and rice for which longer transitional periods were set.

The non-LDC developing countries outside the ACP region profit from a non-reciprocal, preferential tariff treatment on exports of their goods into the EU. This Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) was initiated in 1968 and enlarged exemptions from Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligations to developing countries other than ex-colonies. It did not respect the MFN principle. Since the introduction of the Enabling Clause in 1979, developed countries can offer different treatment to developing countries in spite of the MFN obligation. But differential and more favourable treatment can only be accorded to developing countries, if identical treatment is offered to similarly situated GSP-beneficiaries.²⁹ This GSP system is less substantial and contains more exemptions than the Lomé Convention. Therefore, non-LDC ACP countries were privileged in comparison to other non-LDC developing countries that are excluded from the Lomé Convention. This discrimination between countries was in contrast to WTO rules established in 1995.

While the GSP system is consistent with these conditions set under the WTO law, Lomé preferences were highly criticised for its contradictoriness to the GATT.³⁰ At the same time its effectiveness was put into doubt, as the results were highly disappointing. In the 25 years of Lomé, the share of ACP exports in European markets has fallen by half, from nearly 8 % to about 3 %. The export stimulation that should have resulted from the preferential market access was muffled by the incapacity of ACP countries to produce more, better and a greater diversity of products.³¹ These supply-side constraints seem a major hurdle that has to be overcome, if ACP states aim at increasing their competitiveness. Non-reciprocal trade preferences alone have proven to be insufficient to transform the ACP economies.³² But the disappointing results under Lomé did not constitute the major driving-force for the EU’s commitment to

28 According to the Economic and Social Committee of the United Nations, the following three criteria are used for the identification of LDCs: (1) low-income criterion, (2) human resource weakness criterion, (3) economic vulnerability criterion. In addition to these criteria, the population of an LDC must not exceed 75 million (<http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/lde/lde%20criteria.htm>).

29 WTO (1979). This rule was often ignored in practice, but was assured in the 2005 WTO ruling concerning a dispute between India and the EC over the EU GSP “Drugs Arrangement” and seems to gain in importance.

30 For a short summary of the disputes on the WTO compatibility of the Lomé Convention see ECDPM (2003), chapter II.1.

31 ECDPM (2001), p.13.

32 Holland, M. (2004), p. 278.

change its trade regime with the ACP countries. While it remains unproven that reciprocal free trade agreements would lead to a major advancement for ACPs in comparison to Lomé preferences, changing the trade regime would guarantee its WTO compatibility, which is put forward as a key argument by the EU.

When assessing trade relations between the EU and ACP countries, they should be seen against a changing global context. The global trend towards lowering trade barriers leads to an erosion of the value of preferences granted to ACP states, as the preferential margin decreases. In the 1980s, the margin of preference was around 10%. In 2004, it was lower than 4% in comparison with MFN, and only 2% in comparison with GSP.³³ In addition to that, preferences are linked to the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as sanitary and phytosanitary requirements or rules of origin and their documentation. These conditions often constitute a substantial hindrance to the use of preferences. The costs needed to comply with the rules of origin are for example estimated to make up 3% of the value of the good concerned.³⁴ This might be enough to offset the advantages linked to the preferential market access, especially in highly competitive sectors. In addition, the overall costs relating to the application of rules of origin are said to be much higher in LDCs. Hence, the value of preferences granted to developing countries declines, while the role of non-tariff barriers to trade increases. Therefore, a renewal of Lomé preferences would probably have been ineffective. EPAs consistently take a different approach and go beyond establishing a trade agreement addressing other barriers to trade, including supply-side related constraints.

The outcome of the EPA negotiations and its potential impacts on food security on Sub-Saharan African agricultural markets are extremely difficult to predict, since they depend on the political sensitivities of dozens of countries, on the WTO Doha round, on the different regional agendas of the ACP groups and other factors. For an assessment of the range of options, it is advisable to look further at the objectives of EPAs as embodied in the Cotonou agreement.

3.2 Objectives of EPAs

EPAs between the EU and ACP countries are based on five major objectives, namely development, reciprocity, deepening regional integration, partnership and compatibility with WTO rules. In 2000, the Cotonou Agreement defined how the EU and ACP are going to co-operate in future on issues like political relations, development and trade. The agreement underlines that “[t]he central objective of ACP-EC cooperation is poverty reduction and ultimately its eradication; sustainable development; and progressive integration of the ACP countries into the world economy. In this context, cooperation framework and orientations shall be tailored to the individual circumstances of each ACP country, shall promote local ownership of eco-

33 Maerten (2004).

34 ECA (2005), p. 29.

conomic and social reforms and the integration of the private sector actors into the development process.”³⁵ This article underlines the importance of sustainable economic development, which should be at the centre of EPA negotiations between the EU and the six ACP regions for the purpose of eliminating absolute poverty (as stated e.g. in the EU Africa Strategy). In order to achieve sustained development, the agreement includes the liberalisation of trade between the two regions: “EPAs shall be directed at establishing free trade between the parties [...]”³⁶. On that account, maintaining and improving market access is a commitment clearly emphasised in the Cotonou Agreement. On the one hand, the liberalisation process implies that EPAs would have to improve access of ACP countries to EU markets, but on the other hand, a liberalisation process would also require ACP countries to open up their markets to the EU goods by removing almost all duties and quotas. To the main European Commission’s belief, this liberalisation process is essential, because of legal and economic reasons. Legally, the EPAs need to be WTO compatible as WTO rules demand the ACP regions to liberalise “[...]substantially all trade over the course of a transitional period”.³⁷ Economically, the European Commission claims that there is strong evidence that a gradual opening of the poor ACP regions to EU products will increase efficiency, reduce costs and bring down consumer prices and thus, ultimately, have a positive impact on food security. However, the EC seems also to be aware of the potential problems trade liberalisation could cause. That is the reason why the European Commission says that it wants to allow long transitional periods for the opening of the markets, together with slower liberalisation processes for the ACP states. Additionally, the Commission is thinking of allowing the ACP regions to exclude specified sensitive products and to develop safeguard mechanism for relevant vulnerable sectors of the economies.

Nevertheless, although trade appears to be a very vital part of the current EPA negotiations, the European Commission is eager to point out that EPAs are not just about trade but go much further. Peter Mandelson said that “EPAs [...] should no longer be conceived as trade agreements in the conventional sense where both sides are seeking mutual advantage [...]. The purpose of EPAs is to promote regional integration and economic development.”³⁸ The Commission is aware that EPAs can only operate if regional integration is strong and on a stable basis. Cotonou underlines that by describing that “[r]egional and sub-regional integration processes which foster the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy in terms of trade and private investment shall be encouraged and supported.”³⁹ Moreover, the EC says that EPAs are designed as a response to globalisation and the need to foster development. Hence, EPAs should create positive side effects as they encourage “[s]ustained economic growth, developing the private sector, increasing employment and improving access to

35 Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Article 19.1.

36 EU-EPA mandate: Directives for the negotiations of EPAs with ACP countries and regions; Article 3.1(1).

37 EU-EPA mandate: Directives for the negotiations of EPAs with ACP countries and regions; 3.2(2(1)).

38 European Commission (2006), p. 9.

39 Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Article 1(7).

productive resources.”⁴⁰ For that reason the EC is of the opinion that the EPAs will be a tool to help the poor ACP regions to improve their competitiveness in the world market, diversify their exports and on the long run increase food security.

As this report focuses on analysing the possible food security impacts of EPAs, it is amongst other things relevant to find out how the role of agriculture is seen in the current negotiation processes. Generally, it is underlined by the EC that agriculture has a key-role in the EPA negotiation process as in most of the ACP countries the majority of the people are heavily dependent on agricultural products. Article 3.3 of the EU directive for the negotiations of EPAs with ACP countries and regions describes that “[t]he agreement shall include provisions aimed at fostering food security in accordance with WTO rules.”⁴¹ It appears to be that the EU is aware of the importance of food security in ACP, where most of the people still remain heavily dependent on agricultural commodities. None the less, many (non-state) actors are of the opinion that the food security aspect is not sufficiently included in the current negotiations and much more needs to be done to ensure food security in ACP countries. Even EC staff stated that food security plays a quite marginal role in the negotiations. Obviously, this statement is in contrast with the saying that food security has a key-role in the negotiations and the EU’s development cooperation.

In summary, the EU seems to be convinced that the EPAs are able to reduce poverty as well as food insecurity in the ACP countries. However, there are also many non-state organisations with concerns about potential adverse effects of EPAs. To their view, EPAs and the liberalisation process will create even more problems than it solves, like increasing unemployment and food insecurity. Therefore liberalisation itself is not automatically a solution for poverty and food insecurity in different countries. This apparent contradiction will be analysed in this report y looking at the impacts of the EPA on the ESA countries with special regard to food security. Is it really a promising way to go for the ESA region or is it just a possibility for the EU to increase access to ESA markets? In order to get a deeper insight into the ESA negotiations, the next part of the report gives an overview over the current state of negotiation, the trade relations with the EU and key critical issues.

4 EPA negotiations between the EU and West Africa

It was decided to undertake EPA negotiations on a regional basis in order to strengthen regional integration among ACP countries. West African regional integration efforts date way back to 1975 when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded. However, the dominant division between francophone and anglophone countries led

40 Cotonou Partnership Agreement: Article 1(5).

41 EU-EPA mandate: Directives for the negotiations of EPAs with ACP countries and regions; article 3.3(6).

to weak integration as the political and economic ties with former colonial powers remained stronger than with countries in the region. These conditions were illustrated by the creation of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which mainly includes francophone countries.⁴² Within the West African region, Nigeria plays a dominant role. It is the biggest country with over 100 million inhabitants. Nigeria is an oil-exporting country and member of the OPEC, thus it has very special source of revenue not depending on trade agreements.

The first regional phase of EPA negotiations between the EU and West Africa commenced on October 6th 2003. West Africa was one of the first regions to have started regional negotiations after the conclusion of the first negotiation phase between the EU and the whole ACP bloc. The 16 West African countries are represented by delegates from ECOWAS and WAEMU, even though Mauritania is not a member of both groupings. Unlike other regional groupings, EPA negotiators do not face the problem of overlapping regional organizations.⁴³ As for all EPAS, it is envisaged to finalize the negotiations in 2007, as EPA would come into force January 1st 2008.

On the West African side, the Regional Negotiating Committee (RNC) comprises the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, the President of the WAEMU Commission, two ambassadors of member countries in Brussels, two ambassadors of member countries in Geneva, one representative each of civil society and the private sector and two members of the Technical Support Committee. The latter includes three government members (mostly the Minister for Trade plus two other subject-related ministers, e.g. the Minister for Agriculture, Finance or External Affairs etc. according to the specific issues on the table), one private sector representative and one civil society representative of each member state.⁴⁴

The formal negotiation structure is divided into three levels:

- Chief Negotiators; West Africa is led by the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and assisted by the President of the WAEMU Commission, while the EU is led by the European Commissioner for Trade.
- Senior Officials; whereby the West African delegation is led by the ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary for Policy Harmonisation and assisted by the WAEMU Commissioner for Tax, Customs, and Trade Policy. The EU is led by the Head of the European Commission Directorate of Trade responsible for the relations with West Africa.

42 WAEMU members are all francophone countries except Guinea as well as the former Portuguese colony Guinea-Bissau.

43 See Seimet (2006) for a case study on Eastern and Southern Africa.

44 See UFig. 7.

- Technical Experts; comprising the Directors of Trade of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the WAEMU Commission furthered by other members of the RNC. The EU delegation is led by representatives of the Departments of Trade, Development and other relevant Departments depending on the subject of the negotiations.

Corresponding with the general objective of EPA, it is stressed that the outcome of the negotiations between the EU and West Africa will be more than a trade agreement, as it will go beyond the impacts of previous agreements. The common objective of the two negotiating regional groupings is to promote the development of West Africa. EPA is regarded as a trade instrument for development that will contribute to a genuine partnership between the EU and West Africa. Thus, there is a clear link between trade and development policy which is also manifested in the fact that both DG Trade and DG Development are involved in the negotiations. In order to support the West African countries in adjusting to the new trading environment, the EU intends to allocate a share of the EDF to cover EPA adjustment costs.

Hence, there is a need to coordinate two different policy areas. In order to achieve that aim in the EPA negotiation process, the Regional Preparatory Taskforce (RTPF) was created as a joint structure between West Africa and the EU. The RTPF is supposed to facilitate links and coherence between cooperation for development funding and EPA. It has an observer status at the meetings of technical groups and is supposed to inform senior officials of any problems arising in connection with the coherent implementation of development assistance.⁴⁵ Recently, even EU member states were involved in a joint meeting in Ouagadougou in March 2006 so as to enhance information sharing and to take into account potential additional sources of financing.

The first benchmark in the EPA negotiation process was the adoption of a Road Map for EPA negotiations on 4th August 2004. It clearly defines the two main objectives of the agreement; first, to promote the deepening of the regional integration process and second, to ensure sustainable economic development in the West African region. However, the ways to achieve these objectives are subject to interpretation, as they are not clearly formulated in the document. The Road Map also entails a participatory approach, requiring the inclusion of both private sector and civil society stakeholders. Furthermore the Road Map provides a guideline of the preparation and implementation of the negotiations including an indicative schedule, defining a three-phased approach.

1. September 2004 – September 2005: Regional Integration Priorities of the West African region; establishment of a Reference Framework in those identified areas; formulation and implementation of a programme to enhance competitiveness and of an upgrading programme

45 ECOWAS & European Commission (2004), p. 10f.

2. September 2005 – September 2006: Overall EPA architecture and draft agreement on all trade-related issues
3. September 2006 – December 2007: Negotiations on trade liberalization and conclusion of EPA

However, the negotiations are currently (July 2006) pending before the first phase could be finalized, due to dissension between the negotiation partners. At least two main conflict lines can be identified, which will be analysed in detail in chapter 4.5.

- West Africa demands EU support for the expected adjustment costs in connection with the incorporation of flanking development measures into the negotiations, while the EU rejects to put this topic on the negotiation agenda.
- West Africa refuses to talk about some of the so-called Singapore Issues (public procurement, investment and competition) which the EU is considering as critical for the development impact of EPAs.

As a consequence, the two negotiating partners have diverging views on the coming procedure. While the EU demands to start the second phase of the negotiations, West Africa insists that the currently pending issues of the first phase should be completed before heading towards the second phase. The following subchapters provide an overview of important features of the negotiations and place them in a wider context, with special emphasis on food security.

4.1 CET as a step towards regional integration

The WAEMU Common External Tariff (CET) was established in 2000 by WAEMU members, i.e. the francophone ECOWAS members except Guinea. It consists of four bands (20 %, 10 %, 5 %, and 0 %). In 2005, the whole ECOWAS region adopted a CET that to a great extent corresponds to the WAEMU-CET. A transitional timeframe of three years has been set up, so that by 2008 all ECOWAS countries will apply the same external tariffs. The EU perceives the CET as an optimal basis for EPA negotiations as it contributes to deeper regional integration by creating a customs union.

The CET is likely to impact differently on the prices of various products in each of the newly included anglophone countries. The general pattern however is that for most goods, including a large share of agricultural products, the new CET level is lower than the previously applied tariffs. Thus, consumers are most likely to pay lower prices for most goods, including agricultural commodities relevant for food security, provided that the reduced tariffs will also be reflected in the actual price (according to border price transmission) of the good. It is argued, for instance, that the establishment of a CET in Ghana will result in lower tariffs for basic food commodities such as rice and palm kernel oil, with reduced tariffs from 20% to 10% and 10% to 5% respectively. In Guinea, fish imports will have to face a 5% tariff instead of the previous 10%, while powdered milk will be charged with 5% replacing the earlier 20% tariff.

Sierra Leone will be confronted with an aggregated shift in tariffs for food products from 20.5% to 16.9%.⁴⁶

Due to the expected revenue loss for the anglophone countries, conflict lines became apparent between the WAEMU members and the other West African countries. This is especially valid for Nigeria, whose tariff structure was characterized by high protectionism. Up to now, Nigeria has a highly protected agricultural sector, with tariffs for instance for rice of up to 100% in 2002. These are expected to drop down to 10%. Similarly, sugar tariffs are supposed to decrease from 40% to 20% after successful implementation of the CET. Therefore, concerns are raised by many NGOs and other interest groups related to issues of dumping of cheap imports onto the Nigerian market. "Oxfam also believes that the current CET rates adopted are inimical to the ability of countries such as Nigeria to realise food security needs. It seeks to lower the tariff bar for Nigeria which will open up our markets to dumping."⁴⁷

In order to adjust its tariff system to the ECOWAS CET, Nigeria has recently been willing to reform and simplify its tariff structure. While there have been about 20 tariff rates ranging from 2.5% to 100% before, the new system – which became effective in October 2005 – comprises only five tariff rates between 0% and 50%.⁴⁸ Nigeria made use of the provision to exclude certain products from having to adapt the new CET tariff, especially in the agricultural sector, meaning that there still remains quite a high level of protection. For instance, protective duties of 50% apply for rice and cassava. In addition to that, import bans will continue to apply until 2007 for many products such as poultry and wheat flour. An IMF mission to Nigeria "welcomes the authorities' trade policy intentions, but encourages them to replace import bans with the temporarily higher tariff protection provided by the 50 percent tariff rate. At the same time, the mission notes the importance of not introducing new bans prior to fully implementing the CET."⁴⁹

By January 2007, Nigeria intends to fully adopt the newly proposed ECOWAS CET. As Nigeria has been perceived as the major obstacle for a CET for a long time, the gradual adaptation towards the common tariff is regarded as an important step towards regional integration. Hence, the conflict between Nigeria and WAEMU members might be solved by allowing for flexible CET arrangements with the opportunity to exclude sensitive sectors, especially agriculture, in the interest of the Nigerian economy.

The Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) for West Africa projected three major impacts of a joint ECOWAS CET;

46 Plunkett, D. (2005), p. 1ff.

47 Africa News (2006), p. 2.

48 BFAI (2006), p. 1.

49 IMF (2005), p. 9.

- An increase in inter-regional trade,
- a decrease in informal cross border trade,
- loss of customs duties, which will probably be compensated by an increased level of trade; however countries like Cape Verde and Nigeria might still experience severe losses (up to 70 %).⁵⁰

The implementation of the CET was almost simultaneous with the adoption of the Agricultural Policy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAP). With regards to the harmonization of regional sectoral policies, the following chapter addresses some of the challenges to coordinate and harmonize these two regional policies.

4.2 The ECOWAP as farmers' voice?

The ECOWAP was adopted by ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on 19th January 2005. This is in line with Article 25 (h) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 to cooperate towards the adoption of a common agricultural policy.⁵¹ The ECOWAS Ministerial Commission for Food and Agriculture hence approved principal elements of an orientation framework and instructed the Executive Secretariat to prepare the policy.⁵²

The policy emphasizes the leading role of agriculture in the West African economy and stresses the paramount relevance of efficient and effective family farms as the basis of a modern and sustainable agriculture in West Africa.⁵³ ECOWAP contains moreover the vision to guarantee food security and secure decent incomes for agricultural workers. This is further stipulated in the first and second specific objective. The first aims at ensuring “food security for the rural and urban population of West Africa and the health quality of its products, following an approach that guarantees food sovereignty for the region”⁵⁴. This objective highlights an approach which entails a country's right to protect its agricultural sector in order to achieve food security (see chapter 2). Even more pronounced, the second specific objective proposes “to reduce dependence on imports by granting priority to food production and processing and by developing regional complementarities and comparative advantage [...]”⁵⁵. It becomes evident that the focus of ECOWAP is on domestic food production rather than cash

50 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004), p. 109f.

51 ECOWAS (1993), p. 16.

52 ECOWAS (2005), p. 1.

53 ECOWAS (2005), p. 2.

54 ECOWAS (2005), p. 3.

55 ECOWAS (2005), p. 3f.

crop production. Thus, food sovereignty is perceived as the appropriate way to attain food security.

Regarding the adaptation of trade regimes with outside countries the policy has to take into account that many of the parameters have already been determined by the CET. Although the advantages of a customs union in terms of achieving economies of scale seem highly desirable, it is indicated in the ECOWAP to establish special measures for some agricultural products. This shall be achieved *inter alia* through differential protection. Unilateral protective action is justified with the absence of a viable WTO agreement on agriculture, while policies of the industrial countries “undermine world prices for such products [...] in which the region might have a comparative advantage in the absence of these policies.”⁵⁶ This measure is also said to be legitimate in order to protect investment for some agro-food chains.

ECOWAP was acclaimed by many farmers’ and rural development organizations as it puts the prominent role of family farm agriculture in the centre of the agenda. This is a major change compared with decades of urban bias policies that conceived this kind of agriculture as backward. The vision of decent incomes for the agricultural workforce was praised. Besides the policy emphasized the approach of food sovereignty and declared the aim to reduce imports. Those protectionist measures for some agricultural products also seem desirable for most rural non-state actors.

These potentially promising aspects of ECOWAP notwithstanding, regional farmers’ organizations such as *Réseau des Organizations Paysannes et des Producteurs Agricoles d’Afrique de l’Ouest* (ROPPA) have referred to several drawbacks in connection with the CET and the ongoing EPA negotiations. An adoption of the CET for non-WAEMU members could impose severe problems on the farmers, as in most cases the old tariff lines were higher than the new CET (see chapter 4.1). This is perceived by many farmers as a threat to their livelihoods. A drop in tariff rates would most likely result in an enlarged amount of agricultural imports on the markets of Ghana, Nigeria etc, which would thereby increasingly compete with domestic production. This development would run counter to the second specific objective of ECOWAP to reduce dependence on imports. “If Nigeria were to accept the WAEMU CET it would mean it is sacrificing its farmers in the hope of selling its industrial products to the rest of ECOWAS.”⁵⁷

Therefore the CET and EPA are in some ways conflicting with the common agricultural policy of ECOWAS. It might be predicted that ECOWAP will not be implemented adequately and even subdued compared with the CET. Similar processes have happened during the adoption of the WAEMU Common Agricultural Policy (PAC). In fact, to a certain extent political decision makers in West Africa acknowledge that there might be insufficient policy space to

56 ECOWAS (2005), p. 10.

57 Oudet, M. (2005a), p. 3.

implement the ECOWAP given the general environment (CET, EPA) in which it would be embedded.⁵⁸

Hence it was proposed to form a coalition of farmers' organizations and other relevant civil society actors in order to organize a debate about the agricultural policy of ECOWAS, to demand a rise in some tariff lines of the CET and to participate with a united position in the negotiations on the CET.⁵⁹ The farmers' and rural development organizations demand the introduction of a list of special products that should be exempted from the CET (see chapter 4.3). This list shall be supplemented with the imposition of a higher CET by adding a fifth or sixth band at 50% or 100% respectively (for an analysis on certain sensitive products see chapter 5).

4.3 The critical issue of sensitive products and timeframe

As indicated in chapter 3.1, GATT Article XXIV requires partners within a free trade area to liberalize on substantially all trade. In past agreements, this phrase has been interpreted by the WTO as about 90% of the value of current products. However, taking the trade agreement with South Africa as guidance, the liberalization of tariffs can be undertaken asymmetrically. That enables one bloc to liberalize say 80% of its duties, while the negotiating partner liberalizes 100%. As this GATT passage is quite vague and definitely subject to various interpretations, it is also imaginable for West Africa to liberalize 70%. However, this quantitative understanding of substantially all trade is challenged by a qualitative understanding, as proposed by the USA and Australia for instance, meaning that entire sectors cannot be excluded from liberalization, e.g. agriculture.⁶⁰

The criteria and selection processes adopted to come up with a list of sensitive products in the sense of a 20 % asymmetry interpretation of Art. XXIV are not clear as there are different options. While one criterion could be to look at the highest possible tariff revenue, infant industry protection and food security concerns might also be considered. For West Africa, food security seems to be a top priority issue when defining sensitive products. As indicated by West African representatives, several countries have already composed lists of sensitive products at the national level, most of them containing key agricultural and agro-industrial products. These will have to be compiled at the regional level to come up with a joint list for West Africa.

58 Information obtained in interviews with ACP actors. See list of interviews at the end of the paper.

59 Oudet, M. & Traoré, F. (2004), p. 2.

60 Borrmann, A., Großmann, H. & Koopmann, G. (2005), p. 36.

For West Africa, it would be theoretically possible to exclude all their agricultural and processed food products⁶¹ from liberalization. Given COMTRADE trade figures, the value of these products contributes only 16.97% of total import value from the EU in 2004.⁶² Given the fact that it is very controversial to exclude a major sector from liberalization (see above), using a more disaggregated approach should enable West African states to identify sensitive products with regards to food security. For instance, ROPPA and other CSOs already indicated potential sensitive products. They include poultry, beef, cereals (especially wheat and wheat flour), milk and dairy products, potatoes, edible oils, sugar and processed food products such as pasta and tomato purée.⁶³ An exclusion of these goods would account for 8.75% of total imports from the EU, thus providing space for a considerably large share of other sensitive products selected for other criteria than food security.⁶⁴ Hence these figures illustrate that negotiators are in a good position to implement the inclusion of food security related products in the group of sensitive products.

It must not be forgotten, however, that defensive and protectionist measures do not increase effectiveness of farmers. They provide a certain security for producers in terms of income, but productivity of the sector is not enhanced by that strategy. To the contrary, high protection might lead to inefficiency of farmers. Therefore one might also argue that the selection of sensitive products should be undertaken very carefully.

Another question being discussed is within which time period the liberalization of substantially all trade shall occur. It is stipulated that “[t]he “reasonable length of time” referred to in paragraph 5 (c) of Article XXIV should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases. In cases where Members parties to an interim agreement believe that 10 years would be insufficient, they shall provide a full explanation to the Council for Trade and Goods of the need for a longer period.”⁶⁵ In a proposal by ACP countries, it was aimed to achieve an amendment of Article XXIV, so that the transitional period recommended in the GATT would be extended from 10 to 17 years. However, the EU was opposed to that plan. Nevertheless with regards to EPAs, transitional periods of 25 years have been raised in the discussion.⁶⁶

61 Tobacco and beverages are excluded in this category, i.e. reference is made to chapters 01-21 in the HS system.

62 See UFig. 11.

63 Oudet (2005a), p. 5 and African and European Farmers Joint Press Release (2005), p. 1.

64 See UFig. 12.

65 GATT Article XXIV (1994), p. 6.

66 Erasmus, G. (2006), p. 4.

4.4 Participation of non-state actors in the negotiation process

The introduction of a participatory approach is a major innovation of the Cotonou Agreement as both negotiating partners have legally committed themselves to involve non-state actors. This is expressed by Article 2 of the agreement about fundamental principles: “Participation: apart from central government as the main partner, the partnership shall be open to different kinds of other actors in order to encourage the integration of all sections of society, including the private sector and civil society organisations, into the mainstream of political, economic and social life”⁶⁷ More precisely, apart from state actors, i.e. local, regional and national government bodies, non-state actors are further disaggregated as private sector, economic and social partners including trade union organisations and civil society in all its form according to national characteristics.

Within the EPA negotiation process between the EU and West Africa, the two parties reaffirmed the involvement of non-state actors in the Road Map through the implementation of “information seminars for the officials in charge of cooperation (both state and non state actors), to ensure their active involvement in the negotiation process.”⁶⁸ Moreover, non state-actors are supposed to be involved at every stage of the negotiation. This shall be done through meetings at various levels, initialised by states, regional organizations as well as the private sector and civil society organizations. Besides, non-state actors are part of the West African Regional Negotiating Committee.⁶⁹

According to WAEMU and ECOWAS representatives, the participation of non-state actors within the EPA negotiations is lively and active. Civil Society and the private sector contribute one member respectively to the RNC. Moreover, they are represented in the Technical Support Committee. Especially regional farmers’ and rural development associations seem to be deeply engaged in advocating their position on EPAs. Correspondingly, representatives of the civil society organizations appreciate the effective way in which they participate in the EPA negotiations as members of the negotiating structure.⁷⁰

Many farmers’ and rural development stakeholders are profoundly opposed to EPAs in their current form. A joint statement of the ‘Forum for Another Mali’, ‘ENDA Tiers Monde’ from Senegal, the ‘Africa Trade Network’ and a number of other NGOs including peasants associations such as ‘Coordination Nationale des Organisations Paysannes du Mali’ (CNOP) and ROPPA, described EPA as “an arm of mass destruction against African and ACP economies”⁷¹.

67 Cotonou Agreement (2000), p. 9.

68 ECOWAS and European Commission (2004), p. 8.

69 ECOWAS and European Commission (2004), p. 11.

70 CSO Consultations (2005), p. 1.

71 South Scan (2005), p. 3.

Moreover, several civil society organizations (CSOs), led by ENDA Tiers Monde and Third World Network (TWN), met in Dakar and issued a joint statement on the process of the EPA negotiations. Generally, the paper argues that the process of regional integration might primarily focus on European interests. “It can be considered as a diversion of the objectives of integration which will no longer be effected on the basis of development policies and strategies adopted by the region, but on the basis of the reforms required for the creation of a free trade zone with the EU.”⁷²

In addition to that, the extraordinary short period to complete both regional integration processes (CET) and EPA negotiations is bemoaned, as this would debar democratic debate and consultation of all stakeholders concerned. The CSOs are convinced that EPA for West Africa in its currently envisaged form is a purely commercial agreement focussing on the creation of a free-trade zone between the two regions, which would result in foreseeable negative consequences for West Africa. They demand therefore an alternative partnership framework that includes the principle of non-reciprocity, provides for the protection of West African producers and recognizes the policy space necessary for West African countries to implement their own development strategies. Concerning food security, it has been recommended that “West African countries should seek to protect their food sovereignty and preserve the interests of family farms. This requires the maintenance of significant tariff protections by refusing European dumping, particularly on products which represent an economic and food interest for the West African populations.”⁷³

Moreover, a coalition of ROPPA and some European farmers’ organizations (CPE, CBB, FWA and COAG) issued a statement turning down a potential EPA. It argues that European integration had been based on favouring regional agricultural markets, and demands that the same strategy should apply for West Africa. EPA would seriously endanger local farmers, even worsening the current problematic situation without an agreement in the poultry, beef, cereals and milk sector.⁷⁴ The farmers reaffirm that West African family farms play an essential role as the “basis of agriculture in the region, the driving force of economic activity, the primary source of food security and the main weapon against rural poverty.”⁷⁵ This corresponds with the ECOWAP, which also emphasizes the paramount role of West African family farms (see chapter 4.2). Another critical comment is raised concerning the different negotiation positions. As West African governments are highly dependent on EU assistance, their negotiating power is likely to be reduced, leading to ineffective and unfair negotiations.

72 CSO Consultations (2005), p. 3.

73 CSO Consultations (2005), p. 5.

74 African and European Farmers Joint Press Release (2005), p. 1.

75 African and European Farmers Joint Press Release (2005), p. 2.

4.5 Trade-related issues and EPA's development dimension

The main conflict between the EU and the West African delegation in the currently pending status of the EPA negotiations is the diverging view on EPA's development dimension. West Africa advocates for a stronger and more binding commitment of the EU in terms of covering likely adjustment costs that might occur in the process of increasing market access for the EU. Contrary, the EU insists that EPAs are, above all, trade instruments for development, indicating that the emphasis is clearly put on the positive contribution of increased trade for promoting development. From the EU's point of view, the two issues of trade negotiations and development cooperation are separated, though linked rather loosely through the RTPF. Development cooperation ideally involves on the one hand a considerable degree of empathy on the donor's side in order to best address the needs of the recipient and on the other hand is obliged to take into account conditionalities on recipient countries to avoid a waste of 'tax-payers' money'. To the contrary, trade negotiations are in the first place talks of equal partners on the same level.⁷⁶ This different approach indicates quite clearly why the EU is opposed to include flanking development measures in the formal trade negotiations. West Africa however, insists that the EU should assure the development dimension of EPAs by providing financial compensation for loss of revenue and adjustment costs within the productive sector. Additionally to the EDF, a special window for those costs is demanded by West Africa, as the EDF procedures are regarded as too cumbersome to be used for short-term adjustments. It can be argued that the different perceptions can be either seen as a tactical game to put the negotiating partner under pressure, or it is a demonstration of inadequate communication between the two sides of what should make up the development dimension of EPA.

The EU argues that the value-added of EPA compared with a conventional free-trade-agreement is that it fosters regional integration through the incorporation of strategies for trade facilitation, quality standardization and control, capacity building in SPS, investment and intellectual property. Furthermore capacity building and upgrading of productive sectors is supposed to improve competitiveness in West Africa. From an EU viewpoint, this entails the consideration of the so-called Singapore Issues, which include public procurement, investment and competition. West Africa, however, refuses to put these topics on the negotiation table. The conflict stems from an initiative of the G90 to remove the Singapore Issues from the Doha Development Round (DDA). Nevertheless, despite their abandonment in the multilateral Doha Round, there might be a tendency to eventually include them in the bilateral EPA negotiations between West Africa and the EU. Given the impressions from both negotiation partners, it might be assumed that the West African side rather acknowledges that EPA provides an opportunity to harmonize policies and regulations in these fields.

To sum up, while West Africa perceives that the question of reciprocal market access connected with its associated adjustment costs is paramount in the EPA negotiations, the EU

⁷⁶ A more detailed illustration of the relation between EPAs and the EDF can be found in Weinhardt, C. (2006), p. 35ff.

stresses that it is not the top priority to gain market shares in West Africa to the expense of local and regional producers. Far from that, reciprocity is a requirement for an EPA to be compatible with WTO rules. The overriding component of EPA is, according to the EU, the strengthening of regional integration and the development of a regional market in West Africa to enhance capacities and thus to make use of economic potentials. Eventually this is supposed to stimulate sustainable development and poverty reduction. The EU focuses hence rather on the importance of trade-related issues that could be beneficial to West Africa. Interestingly, this view is shared to a considerable extent by West African stakeholders as well.⁷⁷ They point out that EPA provides a great opportunity to make progress on the above-mentioned issues and on regional integration in general. It must not be forgotten that the ACP-countries signed the Cotonou Agreement and therefore agreed to EPAs as the best option. These opinions notwithstanding, the concerns about adjustment costs in connection with preferential liberalization remain predominant.

5 Trade effects of EPA

The impacts of EPAs on food security are estimated in this chapter, using the concept of trade diversion and trade creation of selected agricultural products for West African countries⁷⁸. The former entails the diversion of trade from a more efficient supplier outside the newly created free-trade area towards a less efficient supplier inside that area. The latter, trade creation, means that trade is created that would not have existed without the new free-trade area, thus displacing less efficient domestic suppliers. It must be acknowledged that the assessment of trade effects is a static approach, which assumes that trade barriers are removed but that everything else remain the same, e.g. technology, political risk and intensity of competition. Furthermore trade-related issues are not considered in the analysis. Lastly, since various groups within society are affected differently by the policy shift towards a free-trade agreement, the net effect of trade liberalization on income distribution is not clear-cut.

Several studies have tried to quantify the trade effects of EPAs with regard to welfare and revenue impacts on the West African region. In a study by the Economic Commission for Africa “rapid trade creation effects for EU producers and exporters” are expected using the WITS/SMART model, the largest benefits for the EU originating from growing trade with Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Substantial trade diversion from previously intra-regional trade will be experienced by Ghana, Burkina Faso, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire.⁷⁹ As far as government revenue is concerned, the study projects that West African countries will face

77 Information obtained in interviews with ACP actors. See list of interviews at the end of the paper.

78 Due to a lack of recent data, trade effects for Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone have not been compiled.

79 Economic Commission for Africa (2005), p. 70.

significant losses of 980 million US\$.⁸⁰ This is supported by findings from Busse and Großmann who estimate a total decline in import duties of up to 943 million US\$.⁸¹

Moreover, impact assessments were conducted assigned by the negotiating partners to provide insights as to what kind of repercussions an EPA could have on various sectors in order to formulate necessary adjustment programmes.⁸² Unfortunately, many of the national impact assessments carried out were of little use due to a lack of capacity on behalf of some West African governments and possibly also a lack of will to ensure a deep involvement of non-state actors. Moreover, the regional SIA commissioned by the EU has been criticized by some West African representatives because of inappropriate terms of reference and a lack of ownership of West African stakeholders.⁸³ In the regional SIA the potential impacts of EPA on West Africa have been evaluated. With regards to food security the results indicate that imported agricultural goods from the EU “can be considered as an obstacle to local production.”⁸⁴ The report mentions explicitly the potentially detrimental role of wheat and wheat flour as well as poultry imports from the EU, which could undermine local grain production and infant industries. Busse and Großmann quantitatively assessed the trade and government revenue effects of a potential EPA in West Africa. The results illustrate that lower import tariffs due to preferential tariff elimination might be of some cause for concern. It is demanded to implement complementary fiscal and economic policies. In addition a ‘gradualist’ approach to reductions in trade-protection measures is proposed, given the existence of adjustment costs.⁸⁵

5.1 Trade Effects of selected products

Based on these findings, the following analysis estimates the trade effects of some products of the agricultural sector. The data sets, containing figures for each product group at the HS4-level, have been obtained from Matthias Busse (unpublished) for 11 of the 16 relevant West African countries. Busse calculated trade effects based on the hypothesis that the tariffs for EU-exports to the West African region will become zero. The selection of analysed products is based on the potential magnitude of the impact that a preferential trade liberalization would have, as appraised by several non-state actors and indicated in the SIA.⁸⁶ Thus, four products (milk, poultry, wheat & wheat flour and processed tomatoes) were selected that could be ex-

80 See Table 3 for the countries examined.

81 Busse, M. & H. Großmann (2004), p. 13 and see UTable 4.

82 ECOWAS & European Commission (2004), p. 5.

83 Information obtained in interviews with ACP actors. See list of interviews at the end of the paper.

84 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004), p. 12.

85 Busse, M. & H. Großmann (2004), p. 21.

86 See Table 9 for the initial tariffs as the basis of calculation.

emplary for sensitive agricultural products as a whole. The data, however, does not take into account the introduction of a CET also in non-WAEMU countries in West Africa. Therefore the resulting trade effects⁸⁷ could not be considered. The following sections provide a summary of the findings, mostly on an aggregated West African level.⁸⁸ But first, the findings are substantiated by current trade statistics between the EU and West Africa and observations from the literature.

West Africa is the biggest region of all ACP regions currently negotiating an EPA in terms of trade, accounting for over 40% of all EU-ACP trade. The EU is West Africa's biggest trading partner, accounting for 30% of West Africa's exports and 40% of its imports between 2002 and 2004. The main categories of exports were minerals (fuels accounting for 43%, iron 3%, aluminium 2% and gold 1%), agricultural products (cocoa 19%, fresh fruit 3%), fishery products (5%) and forest products (timber 2%, rubber 2%). The share of agricultural and processed food products was 18% of total West African imports from the EU, whereby dairy and milk products contribute the largest bulk of agricultural and processed food products (17 %), followed by preparation of cereals, tobacco, fish and preparations of vegetables, fruits etc. However, West Africa represents a negligible market for EU exports as less than 0.5 % of total EU exports are destined towards the ECOWAS region.⁸⁹ The trade effects of the analysed products are as follows:

- Milk

Milk and dairy products⁹⁰ contribute the largest share of West African agricultural imports from the EU (17 %). Over the last decade, the import of milk and dairy products has increased significantly.⁹¹ At the same time, milk production is an essential part of pastoralist livelihoods in the Sahelian countries of West Africa, which are the biggest producers of milk.⁹² The crowding out of local producers was illustrated in a pamphlet by Oudet, claiming that a litre of EU milk in Ouagadougou sells at 0.30 € whereby a litre of locally produced milk costs 0.50 €⁹³

The trade effects of EPAs for milk are very uneven among the West African countries. The biggest total trade effect can be found in Ghana, which will face an increase in milk imports from the EU of 24 %. Guinea, on the other end, will import only marginally more than before EPA would have become effective. For all investigated countries the total

87 See chapter 4.1.

88 See Fig. 10–13 for more detailed figures for each observed country.

89 See Tables 5-8 and Fig. 5-8 for detailed trade statistics.

90 HS No.: 0402, Milk & cream, concentrated/sweetened.

91 See UFig. 17.

92 See UFig. 13.

93 Oudet, M. (2005b), p. 1.

trade effect will be 9.5 %. The trade creation effect has a magnitude of 7 % of current EU exports to West Africa. It is worth mentioning that 9.5 % of imports from non-EU countries into West Africa will be diverted to the EU.⁹⁴

- Poultry

Poultry exports⁹⁵ from the EU to West Africa have increased substantially in the 1990s, while stagnating and even decreasing in the last couple of years.⁹⁶

The poultry sector is likely to be highly affected by EPA. Apart from Guinea, every investigated country will import at least 12 % more from the EU than before the preferential trade agreement, Ghana again being most affected with an increase of 32 %. Moreover, total trade diversion is 21 % of non-EU imports, which is highly significant.⁹⁷

The potentially adverse effects of EPA on the poultry sector are also mentioned in the SIA. "If tariffs in ACP countries are lowered, EU exports of poultry could expand further, which could threaten the domestic poultry industry in Western Africa, which has implications for employment, for production for the domestic and regional market and for food security."⁹⁸

More specifically, in Ghana, "the domestic market -- which supplied 95 percent of Ghana's poultry requirements in 1992 -- only provided a dismal 11 percent by 2002."⁹⁹ This development might be worsened with liberalized entry of EU poultry products into the country. More often than not, poultry industry in Ghana has backward linkages with local grain producers, who supply chicken feed to the agro-industry. These relations might also be jeopardized with increasing crowding out of local poultry producers as the production of grains (e.g. maize) to supply the poultry farms with feed would also be affected.

Given a possible decline in demand for poultry products in Europe due to avian influenza, traders might look for expanded market opportunities in West Africa. However, the general outlook for the development of poultry production in the EU projects an increase of 6% from 2004 till 2012, while consumption within this period is expected to increase by 9.2 %.¹⁰⁰ With regards to trade, the EU is exporting more poultry parts compared to whole chickens as a result of EU consumer preferences for the breast, and a correspondingly lim-

94 See Table 10.

95 HS No.: 0207, Meat and edible offal, of the poultry.

96 See UFig. 18.

97 See UTable 11.

98 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004), p. 96.

99 Inter Press Service (2006), p. 1.

100 European Commission (2005), p. 34.

ited market for necks, legs and wings. “[A]s EU consumption of chicken increases (from domestic production and imports) the volume of chicken parts to be exported will increase in parallel.”¹⁰¹ This stresses the need to include the effects of the European CAP reform when trying to assess the impacts of EPA on West African producers. “The threat of further disruption of poultry markets in West Africa is thus very serious indeed, and one which would appear to demand the urgent attention of trade negotiators in the context of the on-going EPA negotiations.”¹⁰²

- Wheat & Wheat Flour

Trade in wheat and wheat flour¹⁰³ has increased steadily over the last ten years. However, recently the export value of EU products has declined.¹⁰⁴

Wheat and wheat flour trade liberalization between the EU and West Africa results in a total trade effect of 12.5 %. Once more, Ghana will experience the largest shift in their import structure, where EU exports would increase by 36.5 %, whereas Mauritania will see only a slight increase of 3.5 %. The trade diversion effect will be considerable, Benin and Niger diverting 18 % and 16.5 % of their previously non-EU imports to the EU. Trade creation will be more important with regards to local cereal production. In four countries, trade creation is above 10 % of current imports from the EU.¹⁰⁵

Net-producers of grains will therefore have to compete for the supply of the urban market with cheap, subsidized EU exports. “If tariffs are lowered, these imports could increase and become even cheaper, further displacing local production. Where this discourages the cultivation of traditional cereals (such as millet) and an over-reliance on imports, there could be issues associated with deteriorating food security and loss of employment in traditional production.”¹⁰⁶

- Processed Tomatoes

A considerable drop in EU exports to West Africa in 2004 notwithstanding, processed tomato products from the EU have increasingly entered the regional market.¹⁰⁷

101 CTA (2006), p. 20.

102 CTA (2006), p. 20.

103 HS No.: 1001, Wheat and meslin; 1101, wheat or meslin flour.

104 See UFig. 19.

105 See UTable 12.

106 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004), p. 95.

107 See UFig. 20.

After liberalization, West African countries will experience a further rise in EU exports of processed tomatoes¹⁰⁸ of 13 %. Trade creation will contribute the lion's share with 10.5 % of current imports from the EU. Again, the trade effects are unequally distributed. Most of the countries face a total trade effect of 10-15 %, while Senegal and Nigeria would be exposed to a higher increase of EU exports of 22 % and 25.5 % respectively. Senegal is an interesting case anyway, as it is the only country where the absolute value of trade diversion is higher than the value of trade creation.¹⁰⁹

Tomato processing industries are likely to be affected adversely by the influx of cheap food products that were previously produced domestically. Those industries cannot compete with mass production from the EU due to lacking economies of scale. In Senegal, for instance, the promotion of a viable agro-industry would be exposed even further to subsidized competition. The production of tomatoes has experienced a sharp drop at the beginning of the nineties.¹¹⁰ Over time, Senegal has become a noticeable exporter of processed tomatoes – especially into other West African countries. However, increasing imports of EU subsidized tomato concentrate undermined the domestic infant industry. From 1994 to 1996, exports of that commodity from the EU into Senegal jumped from 64 tons to 5348 tons, following a liberalization of tomato concentrate in 1994. As a result, the only surviving Senegalese processing firm buys imported triple concentrate and processes it into double concentrate.¹¹¹ Not only have rural Senegalese tomato farmers been sidelined by that process, also intraregional trade has been adversely affected as neighbouring countries such as Mali and Gambia similarly received the vast share of their demand through EU channels. Similar effects can be expected for Ghana and Nigeria in case all duties on processed tomatoes would cease to exist.

To sum up, the potential trade effects of EPA on key agricultural products in West Africa can be consolidated as follows. Trade creation usually outweighs trade diversion for every examined product. However, while a gain in consumer surplus is likely, the effects of crowding out of domestic producers would lead to losses in producer surplus. As government revenues will also be adversely affected by preferential trade liberalization, it is not clear if these losses will be outweighed by gain in consumer surplus, as also postulated in the ECA study. “Ultimately though, all the ECOWAS region countries are likely to experience positive consumer welfare and whether the net welfare gain will remain positive, depends on whether the supplanted producers in the region experience outweighing producer surplus losses.”¹¹² The following chapter will thus focus on a tentative appraisal of preferential trade liberalization on various stakeholders in West Africa.

108 HS No.: 2002, Tomatoes prepared otherwise than 2001.

109 See UTable 13.

110 See UFig. 21.

111 UNCTAD (2002), p. 160.

112 Economic Commission for Africa (2005), p. 74.

5.2 Potential Impacts of Trade Liberalization

In order to assess the impacts of EPAs with regards to food security, a differentiation of net-consumers and net-producers seems to be reasonable. On a national level, one can distinguish between net-food importers and net-food exporters. Figures show that in the West African context both groups are represented, however the current trend clearly tends towards net-food importers. While Nigeria and Senegal for instance are net-food importers, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire are net-food exporters.¹¹³ However, a disaggregation of the population seems more plausible, as there are both winners and losers within each country.

As food insecurity is intrinsically related to poverty, it is useful to put the focus on the poor population. Moreover, a differentiation between net-consumers and net-producers of food should be undertaken. Even more precisely, the geographical dimension of urban and rural population will be considered, as these groups are potentially affected in different ways. While quantitative data is available for the latter category (urban, rural), the former (net-consumer, net-producer) lacks adequate quantitative data. Only in some PRSPs the share of poor food-crop farmers and agricultural wage labourers are addressed, thus providing only vague hints towards the population share of each group.

In West Africa, the majority of the population (about 57%) still lives in rural areas, despite an ongoing urbanization process. There are significant differences however with regards to individual countries. For instance, the urban population in Senegal outweighs the rural population, with a share of 51% and 49% respectively; while in Burkina Faso 81% of the people live in rural areas. Poverty is predominantly a rural phenomenon, notwithstanding the specificities of urban poverty. In every West African country the share of the poor population in rural areas is higher than the corresponding figure for urban areas. This background is necessary to better understand the potential consequences of EPAs on these different stakeholders.¹¹⁴

- Urban areas

Food availability in the urban centres of West Africa will be improved. The preferential trade liberalization of EPA would result in an opening of the markets for European food products. As cheaper EU imports arrive in an urban area, and are distributed afterwards to other urban centres in the hinterland, the urban residents are the first group of the population to whom the food is available.

The question of access to food in urban areas is ambiguous. For the urban net-consumers the situation seems quite obvious. The price of relevant food items is likely to decrease and hence, economic access for urban dwellers would increase. Especially the urban poor can benefit from such a policy shift. Given the fact that poor people spend a larger share

113 See UTable 14.

114 See Table 2 and Table 15.

of their available income on food, the positive impact of lower prices would be disproportionately higher among the poor.¹¹⁵ In West Africa, urban poverty is much less pronounced than rural poverty, ranging from 17 % in Ghana up to 55 % in Sierra Leone.¹¹⁶ Thus, *ceteris paribus* one can rightly suppose that urban dwellers, mostly net-consumers, will benefit from liberalization of tariffs on food products. However, access also depends on many other factors than monetary income, e.g. social status, gender or age.

The case is different, though, for those urban residents who are engaged in agro-industries. Especially industrial centres in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire exemplify that point. These industries are likely to be affected adversely by the influx of cheap food products that were previously produced domestically. Those industries cannot compete with mass production from the EU due to lacking economies of scale. With eliminated tariffs, these industries will be potentially jeopardized, resulting in their closure and increasing the already great number of the urban unemployed. Once unemployed, access to food for many urban dwellers will be exacerbated despite the lower prices on food imports from the EU.

- Rural Areas

Availability of food in rural areas can be affected by EPAs in different ways. It varies according to the kind of rural setting to what extent the rural areas will actually be reached. Insufficient transport infrastructure and poor maintenance can undermine any positive price effects of the imports, as the products might not even reach the potential rural consumers. Moreover, one has to take into consideration that the majority of EU imports are destined to the big urban markets and hence, the rural areas might not be affected to a large extent by preferential trade liberalization in terms of additional food availability.

Food access for the rural population depends to large extends on whether people are net-producers or net-consumers of food. The effects of preferential trade liberalization for rural net-producers are likely to be reduced production and therefore reduced income, which is contrary to the intended integration into the market. The prices of relevant agricultural products will decrease and the EU will get a larger share of the market. Consequently, many farmers might not be able to produce at such low cost and withdraw from the market. Hence, rural net-producers will experience reduced economic access to food.

Rural net-consumers are those rural dwellers, which consume more than they produce, thus they need to buy a larger share of their food on the market. They include the landless rural population. In order to make a living, many of them work as wage labourers on other farms. Quite often agricultural workers reveal a high poverty incidence. In Ghana, 55 %

115 For example, people living below the poverty line in Burkina Faso spend 65% of their income for food items. In Sierra Leone, the share is 63%. See PRSPs of Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone.

116 See UTable 15.

of agricultural workers live in poverty, which is above the average of 40 %.¹¹⁷ In Sierra Leone, about 83% of the agricultural workers are poor, while overall poverty incidence is 70 %.¹¹⁸

If the rural population can be reached by the imported products, their prices are most likely lower than before the preferential trade liberalization. This however does not imply that the products will be economically more accessible to rural net-consumers. They might find it increasingly difficult to find employment in the agricultural sector as wage labourers, as production of certain crops will fall due to reduced price incentives to produce as a result of competition with EU products. Local producers for the market will have fewer incentives to produce, and consequently the demand for labour will decrease accordingly. Unless rural net-consumers find employment in the non-agricultural sector, which is not within the scope of this study, they will find it more difficult to get a job. Again, their capacity to access food might be hampered because of insecurity to get employment.

Notwithstanding that rather adverse tendency, trade liberalization might also contribute to greater productivity in the agricultural sector, as farm inputs such as fertilizers and machineries would become less costly for farmers. Hence, these products would be more economically accessible for some farmers whereby their production might be stimulated. However, tariffs on most inputs are already relatively low in West Africa, meaning that the benefit is likely to be small.¹¹⁹ In the same line, given the magnitude and severity of poverty in West Africa and the very low use of external inputs for many reasons apart their prices, there are serious doubts that the effects of cheaper inputs would eventually trickle down to smallholder farmers who are the group most intensely affected by poverty.

To conclude, under preferential trade liberalization scenario net-producers of food will most likely have to cope with stiff competition from the EU. Prices for some of their products will decrease and therefore reducing their incentives to produce for the market. As the vast majority of West African population depends on agriculture as their main source of income, the effect would be very pronounced. Not only smallholder farmers are affected, but also industries in the more advanced countries of West Africa, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal. However, net-consumers in urban areas are the main beneficiaries, as they have an increased access to food due to lower prices. As the impacts of EPA are very different depending on various socio-economic groups, it is important to assess possible negatively affected groups in detail. Adding to that an EPA monitoring process on sensitive markets and households could be an option to take into account potential adverse effects of EPAs.

117 Republic of Ghana (2003), p. 14.

118 Republic of Sierra Leone (2005), p. 33.

119 For instance, there are no tariffs on fertilizers in Ghana. Tractors are taxed about 5 % in countries like Senegal and Nigeria.

6 Conclusion/Recommendations

- The list of sensitive products for West Africa should take into account food security as the paramount selection criteria. Given the massive share of small-scale farmers in West Africa, the impacts of trade liberalization on poverty reduction in the region will to a great extent depend upon the effects on the agricultural sector. For the majority of the population, the impacts of trade liberalization in the agricultural sector might be adverse in the near-term. Especially the rural population will be affected by lower prices and thus reduced income from their farm work. Therefore, in order to ensure access to food for the vast share of net-producers, i.e. small-scale farmers, border measures should apply for the most important food products in the region. The claim to protect producers with these measures is justified because of the current lack of alternative income sources for the vast majority of the population. The transformation of small-scale subsistence producers into productive wage-earners in competitive sectors in West Africa is currently an unlikely scenario, considering the major obstacles within the region with regards to inadequate infrastructure and communication, lack of capacity, prevailing conflicts etc.
- However, protectionist measures do not improve competitiveness of agricultural production, rather the opposite. Thus in the long-run, it must be an aim to transform the primary sector of West Africa into an efficient and effective one, as also postulated in the ECOWAP. An adequate treatment of trade-related issues could prove vital for the promotion of regional integration and development. West Africa should see EPA as an opportunity to move forward in those issues towards a better integrated regional grouping. Tools to improve competitiveness might include the Singapore Issues, which have been rejected by the AU. However, EPA could be a new starting point to create an enhancement of competitiveness and to tackle supply-side constraints. West Africa should hence engage in the discussion on the still outstanding Singapore Issues, including investment. Harmonization in this area can facilitate the setup of a more efficient agriculture and a viable agro-industry, thereby contributing to food security.
- A very flexible approach with regards to the liberalization timetable should be strived for, as EPA aims at fostering regional integration in West Africa. Regional integration could be a cornerstone of development of the region. As many products are not yet competitive for the world market due to several factors such as lacking economies of scale, inadequate infrastructure or cumbersome custom procedures, an integrated West African market might provide the opportunity to get prepared for the more demanding global market. In order for West Africa to benefit from reciprocal trade liberalization, the negotiating partners should first and foremost put all efforts to strengthen and support regional integration to set the prerequisites for sustainable pro-poor growth and to tackle the immense supply-side constraints. For EPA to be viable in the sense of sustainable development and poverty reduction in West Africa, a long and flexible time-frame seems desirable in order to first make progress with regards to regional economic integration.

- Innovative instruments to support countries in their efforts to achieve the MDGs seem to be necessary. The issue of short-term adjustment costs has been raised by the two negotiating partners as a major point of diverging opinions. It is an undeniable fact that a considerable share of customs revenue will erode due to the conclusion of EPA. This will happen at a time when most countries are struggling to achieve the MDGs as well as to try to seize the opportunities offered by EPAs in exporting to regional and EU markets. It could be projected that the financial capacity of those countries would not be sufficient to realize and sustain the MDGs. This capacity might be enhanced by a tax reform, which focuses more on indirect rather than direct taxes. The support of this reform process is one cornerstone to supplement forgone government revenue.
- Information sharing among the West African non-state actors should be fostered and strengthened in order to create awareness of EPA. Also, on the side of national governments, parliaments and regional organizations in West Africa communication should be improved in order to stimulate a discussion. This could be supported by EU member states, using the platform of the RTPF. Additionally, political foundations should continue to collaborate with non-state actors in the region in order to stimulate political dialogue.
- The harmonization of sectoral policies is one cornerstone of strengthened regional integration. The adoption of ECOWAP was therefore a step in the right direction. However, coherence of policies must be ensured. Problems arose after the adoption of the CET related to some protectionist tendencies within the ECOWAP. Especially farmers' associations postulated to raise the newly adopted CET for agricultural products or to allow for exemptions. Hence, ECOWAP and CET should be better interlinked, especially with respect to products related to food security.
- As the study has demonstrated, the potential impacts of EPA on food security as a prerequisite for development are not straightforward but depend on social, economic and even geographical factors. Due to insufficient quantitative data on different stakeholder group within the region, it is not possible to unambiguously foresee the total effect for West Africa or for groups of households. Having that in mind, further research should be addressed to a more disaggregated impact assessment of EPAs taking into account vulnerable groups such as women and children.
- Finally, due to this uncertainty EPAs obviously require adequate safeguard mechanisms that enable countries to react to potential adverse developments with regards to EPA.

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Annex

Tables

Table 1: Food Security as a priority in the CSS in West Africa

Country	Amount (in million €)	Source of Finance
Burkina Faso	7	budget line B7-201
Guinea	23.7-31.6	9 th EDF (15-20%)
Niger	25.44-31.8	9 th EDF (12-15%)

Source: APRODEV (2003).

Table 2: Rural and Urban population in West Africa

Country	rural %	urban %
Benin	53.89	46.11
Burkina Faso	81.44	18.56
Cape Verde	42.41	57.59
Côte d'Ivoire	54.21	45.79
Gambia	73.85	26.15
Ghana	53.68	46.32
Guinea	63.53	36.47
Guinea-Bissau	64.43	35.57
Liberia	52.11	47.89
Mali	66.34	33.66
Niger	76.73	23.27
Nigeria	51.70	48.30

Country	rural %	urban %
Senegal	48.96	51.04
Sierra Leone	59.78	40.22
Togo	63.66	36.34
West Africa	56.69	43.31

Source: FAOSTAT (2006).

Table 3: Revenue Implications of an EU-ECOWAS EPA using WITS/SMART model

Country	Revenue Shortfall (US\$)
Ghana	-193,683,365
Burkina Faso	-22,003,938
Benin	-39,523,104
Cote d'Ivoire	-112,236,538
Guinea-Bissau	-1,990,217
Senegal	-80,203,189
Niger	-20,487,214
Nigeria	-426,902,558
Mauritania	-14,572,779
Mali	-33,141,747
Togo	-35,471,728
Total	-980,216,375

Source: Economic Commission for Africa (2005), p. 73.

Table 4: Decline in Import Duties in ECOWAS Countries using three different scenarios, 2001

Country	Decline in Import Duties (million US\$)		
	Low	Med	High
Benin	26.7	27.6	28.3
Burkina Faso	16.8	17.5	18.2
Cape Verde	23.5	24	24.5
Cote d'Ivoire	81.2	82.9	84.3
Gambia	13.5	13.8	14
Ghana	80.3	90.8	102.4
Guinea	16.3	16.7	17
Guinea-Bissau	2.14	2.16	2.18
Mali	16	16.6	17.1
Mauritania	11.4	11.8	12.1
Niger	6.3	6.6	6.9
Nigeria	460.1	487.8	512.8
Senegal	85.8	87.9	89.7
Togo	12.5	12.9	13.3
Total	852.54	899.06	942.78

Source: Busse, M. & H. Großmann (2004), p. 13.

Table 5: West African exports (total and to the EU)¹²⁰

Year	total (in \$ 000)	to EU (in \$ 000)	% of total
2002	25,591,891.708	7,501,913.074	29.31
2003	33,241,210.887	10,042,960.600	30.21
2004	3,763,605.788	1,637,938.840	43.52

Table 6: West African imports (total and from the EU)¹²¹

Year	total (in \$ 000)	from the EU (in \$ 000)	% of total
2002	19,721,941.634	7,969,711.843	40.41
2003	26,619,357.736	10,248,262.891	38.50
2004	9,163,209.753	3,755,399.151	40.98

Table 7: EU exports (total and to West Africa)¹²²

Year	Total (in \$ 000)	To West Africa (in \$ 000)	% of total
2002	2,492,954,659.269	12,157,553.55	0.49
2003	3,007,981,854.191	13,782,010.764	0.46
2004	3,597,944,928.192	15,055,965.953	0.42

Table 8: EU imports (total and from West Africa)¹²³

Year	total (in \$ 000)	From West Africa (in \$ 000)	% of total
2002	2,435,882,863.145	10,406,430.193	0.43

120 Compiled using COMTRADE (2006) data.

121 Compiled using COMTRADE (2006) data.

122 Compiled using COMTRADE (2006) data.

123 Compiled using COMTRADE (2006) data.

2003	2,969,687,327.559	13,495,253.301	0.45
2004	3,576,393,573.783	13,650,247.762	0.38

Table 9: Duties of selected sensitive products

2001	Meat and edible offal. of the poultry	Milk and cream. concentrated	Wheat and meslin.	Wheat or meslin flour.	Tomatoes prepared or preserved
Benin	20.00	13.36	5.00	20.00	17.50
Burkina Faso	20.00	12.21	5.00	20.00	17.54
Cote d'Ivoire	20.00	5.30	5.00	15.00	20.00
Cape Verde	30.00	10.69	5.00	20.00	17.56
Ghana**	20.00	20.00	10.00	20.00	20.00
Guinea*	20.00	18.70	5.00	20.00	17.50
Guinea-Bissau	20.00	8.92	n.a.	20.00	17.55
Mali	20.00	5.13	5.00	20.00	17.50
Mauritania	20.00	5.00	0.00	5.00	13.00
Niger	20.00	7.77	5.00	20.00	17.53
Nigeria	25.00	10.00	15.00	60.00	40.00
Senegal	20.00	5.08	5.00	20.00	17.54
Togo	20.00	12.76	5.00	20.00	17.51

*2002

**2003

Source: COMTRADE 2006

Table 10: Trade Effects of EPA for Milk (HS-code 0402)¹²⁴

Trade Effects of EPAs for 0402 (in US-\$)			Trade Creation		Trade Diversion		Total Trade Effect	
Country	Total Imports	Imports from EU-15	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.	US-\$	% of ROW-Imp.	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.
Benin	11805639	10936540	897476	8.21	122701	14.12	1020177	9.33
Burkina Faso	4995232	4337397	332065	7.66	81214	12.35	413279	9.53
Cap Verde	9578751	8886438	332282	3.74	44601	6.44	376883	4.24

124 Own calculations based on data obtained from Matthias Busse.

Ghana	17716118	14795633	2729205	18.45	835541	28.61	3564746	24.09
Guinea	5307169	4802607	65918	1.37	11639	2.31	77557	1.61
Guinea Bissau	880102	880102	50453	5.73	0	0.00	50453	5.73
Mauritania	3544219	3314199	266896	8.05	32169	13.99	299064	9.02
Niger	10643289	9116055	481425	5.28	128293	8.40	609718	6.69
Nigeria	123600247	87399931	5561814	6.36	3025205	8.36	8587019	9.82
Senegal	29290921	24223626	819749	3.38	263372	5.20	1083121	4.47
Togo	3334800	2130317	208781	9.80	140045	11.63	348826	16.37
Total	220,696,487	170,822,845	11,746,064	6.88	4,684,779	9.39	16,430,843	9.62

Table 11: Trade Effects of EPA for Poultry (HS-code 0207) ¹²⁵

Trade Effects of EPAs (US-\$)			Trade Creation		Trade Diversion		Total Trade Effect	
Country	Total Imports	Imports from EU-15	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.	US-\$	% of ROW-Imp.	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.
Benin	30716453	28051478	3272672	11.67	527315	19.79	3799987	13.55
Burkina Faso	117693	76128	8882	11.67	5825	14.01	14707	19.32
Cape Verde	2129489	1858083	433553	23.33	102620	37.81	536173	28.86
Ghana	11363447	7628335	1506775	19.75	919787	24.63	2426563	31.81
Guinea	520673	412298	18881	4.58	7298	6.73	26179	6.35
Guinea Bissau	685568	516719	60284	11.67	27574	16.33	87858	17.00
Mauritania	293744	277547	32380	11.67	3316	20.47	35696	12.86
Niger	73787	70817	8262	11.67	618	20.79	8880	12.54
Nigeria	233860	232195	32507	14.00	430	25.81	32937	14.19
Senegal	5248587	3340081	389676	11.67	263148	13.79	652824	19.55
Togo	3657274	3416041	398538	11.67	48820	20.24	447358	13.10
Total	55,040,575	45,879,722	6,162,411	13.43	1,906,750	20.81	8,069,161	17.59

125 Own calculations based on data obtained from Matthias Busse.

Table 12: Trade Effects of EPA for Wheat and Wheat Flour (HS-code 1001 and 1101)¹²⁶

Trade Effects of EPAs (US-\$)			Trade Creation		Trade Diversion		Total Trade Effect	
Country	Total Imports	Imports from EU-15	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.	US-\$	% of ROW-Imp.	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.
Benin	7187611	6491090	571578	10.58	113120	18.16	684698	12.85
Burkina Faso	8843387	6061688	411994	9.28	286434	10.30	698428	19.70
Cape Verde	3042862	1600879	54971	3.60	46587	3.23	101557	6.37
Ghana	42380892	4586486	687007	16.09	954731	7.29	1641738	36.49
Guinea	19639263	18102464	828991	4.58	108135	7.04	937126	5.28
Guinea Bissau	1342322	1342322	156604	11.67	0	0.00	156604	11.67
Mauritania	15830955	14195773	303685	3.33	0	0.00	303685	3.33
Niger	12405538	8386332	978405	11.67	453545	16.26	1431951	17.07
Nigeria	251350136	49188903	4491215	9.13	6708542	3.32	11199757	22.77
Senegal	46615659	41514883	1675036	5.36	321879	8.08	1996916	6.19
Togo	23234903	936463	31251	3.35	55611	0.25	86862	9.28
Total	431873528	152407283	10190738	6.69	9048584	3.24	19239322	12.62

126 Own calculations based on data obtained from Matthias Busse.

Table 13: Trade Effects of EPA for Processed Tomatoes (HS-code 2002)¹²⁷

Trade Effects of EPAs (US-\$)			Trade Creation		Trade Diversion		Total Trade Effect	
Country	Total Imports	Imports from EU-15	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.	US-\$	% of ROW-Imp.	US-\$	% of EU-Imp.
Benin	6927083	6791158	708014	10.43	25801	18.98	733815	10.81
Burkina Faso	1650155	1636320	170844	10.44	2660	19.23	173504	10.60
Cape Verde	483680	360335	22930	6.36	10860	8.80	33790	9.38
Ghana	10377709	8741806	1019877	11.67	298572	18.25	1318450	15.08
Guinea	3312114	3311053	151628	4.58	90	8.50	151718	4.58
Guinea Bissau	169475	169475	17712	10.45	0	0.00	17712	10.45
Mauritania	438851	400275	32235	8.05	5262	13.64	37497	9.37
Niger	796030	687592	71825	10.45	18171	16.76	89995	13.09
Nigeria	1592319	1354214	270843	20.00	75214	31.59	346057	25.55
Senegal	2467660	985408	103183	10.47	115104	7.77	218288	22.15
Togo	1417450	1236764	129002	10.43	30539	16.90	159541	12.90
Total	29,632,526	25,674,400	2,698,092	10.51	582,274	14.71	3,280,366	12.78

127 Own calculations based on data obtained from Matthias Busse.

Table 14: Food Import-Export Ratio in %

Country	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Benin	468.7	695.7	558.8	901.1	1501.3	937.8	475.0	556.2	427.2	460.0	336.4	358.7	278.4	294.7	352.1	362.0	583.4
Burkina Faso	511.8	622.9	368.3	444.5	373.9	335.2	411.1	389.3	559.5	499.8	291.3	528.2	469.5	162.8	227.3	216.9	232.6
Côte d'Ivoire	35.9	29.9	35.7	34.8	38.0	32.4	24.2	25.4	19.1	22.9	23.4	20.4	24.6	24.6	15.8	20.4	21.9
Gambia	370.5	537.7	402.7	700.9	491.3	323.8	495.2	585.3	484.2	809.1	715.4	849.8	463.3	395.3	387.7	303.5	651.5
Ghana	23.1	26.9	38.8	56.6	75.2	55.6	56.6	48.8	21.9	35.4	46.1	55.6	62.2	84.2	71.4	57.3	60.4
Guinea	474.2	589.7	588.3	630.2	617.6	658.2	748.6	1040.4	698.3	657.3	631.7	658.2	716.3	735.8	554.7	729.7	634.8
Guinea-Bissau	199.6	219.0	150.7	156.4	904.1	194.9	91.3	137.4	134.8	66.5	66.9	49.2	70.5	63.4	81.6	82.1	50.1
Liberia	912.4	1189.6	869.5	3433.6	4357.6	4904.5	4404.1	5522.1	3307.3	3202.4	1684.8	1756.9	1600.5	1682.0	5989.7	1902.5	3062.7
Mali	75.3	91.3	94.7	86.9	74.8	68.2	71.6	70.1	131.1	92.1	169.4	136.6	60.9	113.1	145.9	163.9	91.5
Mauritania	383.4	428.0	246.1	279.9	253.6	256.8	316.5	341.6	362.1	398.9	717.9	461.0	796.9	860.1	1097.1	1299.2	1372.9
Niger	204.7	198.9	193.8	144.2	144.8	185.6	433.1	236.1	122.9	206.6	274.7	161.7	123.1	212.5	198.6	189.3	415.6
Nigeria	111.5	232.3	304.4	388.6	560.7	511.3	332.1	491.0	311.7	425.8	467.1	290.9	426.8	571.9	475.6	356.3	517.8
Senegal	262.6	235.9	242.8	323.4	455.9	664.7	355.0	636.4	773.6	691.3	737.9	539.9	308.1	488.2	610.8	772.1	622.1
Sierra Leone	582.1	910.3	1310.2	620.1	1808.3	2134.8	938.7	3422.6	3066	2711.4	3112.7	2984.6	4745.8	4452.5	2752.8	1823.3	900.4
Togo	253	300	193.9	192.2	157	226.8	184.9	430.1	255	261.8	278.2	189.6	189.9	218.2	191.6	152.5	133.1
Total	87.3	91	108.4	123.0	146.7	137.7	118.7	128.5	93.6	109.6	114.1	103.9	120	139.8	103.6	107.4	119.2

Source: FAOSTAT (2006).

Table 15: Urban and rural poverty in West Africa¹²⁸

Country	Percentage of poor among urban population	Percentage of poor among rural population
Benin	23.3	33
Burkina Faso	19.9	52.3
Cape Verde	25	50
Côte d'Ivoire	23	42
Gambia	48	61
Ghana	17.3	36
Guinea	25	52.5
Mali	30.1	75.9
Mauritania	25.4	61.2
Niger	52	66
Senegal	44-59	72-88
Sierra Leone	55	79

128 Figures extracted from latest Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of respective countries.

Figures




Fig. 3: Share of undernourished people in West African countries (2001)

Source: UN Statistics Division website (2006).




Fig. 4: Share of undernourished population in West Africa¹²⁹

129 Compiled using UN Statistics Division data (2006).




Fig. 5: Absolute number of undernourished people in West Africa¹³⁰




Fig. 6: Rural and Urban Population in West Africa¹³¹

130 Compiled using UN Statistic Division data.

131 Compiled using FAOSTAT data.




Fig. 7: EPA negotiation structure between the EU and West Africa




Fig. 8: West African imports from EU (2004) by product group¹³²




Fig. 9: EU imports from West Africa (2004) by product groups¹³³

132 Compiled using COMTRADE (2006) data.

133 Compiled using COMTRADE (2006) data.




Fig. 10: EU exports to West Africa in 2004 (agricultural and processed food products)¹³⁴




Fig. 11: Share of agricultural imports from the EU to West Africa, according to import value¹³⁵

134 Compiled using COMTRADE (2006) data.

135 Latest available data (2001-2004) using WITS database.




Fig. 12: Share of selected food security related imports from the EU to West Africa, according to import value¹³⁶




Fig. 13: Milk Production in West Africa in 2005

Source: FAOSTAT (2006).

¹³⁶ Latest available data (2001-2004) using WITS database.




Fig. 14: Tomato Production in West Africa in 2005

Source: FAOSTAT (2006).




Fig. 15: Cereal Production in West Africa in 2005

Source: FAOSTAT (2006)




Fig. 16: Poultry Meat Production in West Africa in 2005

Source: FAOSTAT (2006)




Fig. 17: EU exports of milk products to West Africa

Source: EUROSTAT (2006).




Fig. 18: EU exports of poultry to West Africa

Source: EUROSTAT (2006).




Fig. 19: EU exports of wheat and wheat flour to West Africa

Source: EUROSTAT (2006).




Fig. 20: EU exports of processed tomatoes to West Africa

Source: EUROSTAT (2006).




Fig. 21: Tomato Production in Senegal

Source: FAOSTAT (2006).