Agricultural Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa

Understanding CAADP and APRM Policy Processes

Roukayatou Zimmermann
Michael Bruntrüp
Shashidhara Kolavalli
Kathleen Flaherty
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The German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) is a multidisciplinary research, consultancy and training institute for Germany’s bilateral and for multilateral development co-operation. On the basis of independent research, it acts as consultant to public institutions in Germany and abroad on current issues of co-operation between developed and developing countries. Through its 9-months training course, the German Development Institute prepares German and European University graduates for a career in the field of development policy.

Roukayatou Zimmermann, German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn
E-mail: roukayatou.zimmermann@die-gdi.de

Michael Bruntrüpp, German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn
E-mail: michael.bruentrup@die-gdi.de

Shashidhara Kolavalli, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC
E-mail: s.kolavalli@cgiar.org

Kathleen Flaherty, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC
E-mail: k.flaherty@cgiar.org
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Research Project “Agricultural Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding and Improving Participatory Policy Processes in APRM and CAADP“

Roukayatou Zimmermann
Michael Brüntrup
Shashidhara Kolavalli
Kathleen Flaherty

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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AAGDS</td>
<td>Accelerated Agriculture Growth and Development Strategy</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AgGDP</td>
<td>Agricultural Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHSG</td>
<td>African Head of States and Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Partnership Forum</td>
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<td>APR</td>
<td>African Peer Review</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCU</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>ASM</td>
<td>Agricultural Sector Ministries</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BIPP</td>
<td>Bankable Investment Project Profile</td>
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<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme</td>
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<td>CBK</td>
<td>Coffee Board of Kenya</td>
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<td>CILSS</td>
<td>Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel / Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Centre for Democratic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOBOD</td>
<td>Cocoa Marketing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRF</td>
<td>Coffee Research Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFOG</td>
<td>Classification of Function of Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRR</td>
<td>Country Review Report</td>
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<td>CSIR</td>
<td>Council of Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>Donor Coordination Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS/CEEAC</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States / Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAP</td>
<td>ECOWAS Common Agricultural Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programme</td>
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</table>
ERS Economic Recovery Strategy
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FASDEP Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy
FINSAP Financial Sector Adjustment Programme
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GPRS Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit / German Technical Cooperation Agency
HAC Harmonisation, Alignment, and Coordination
HSG Heads of State and Government
HSGIC Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF International Monetary Fund
KARI Kenya Agriculture Research Institute
KCC Kenya Cooperative Creameries
KCDA Kenya Cotton Development Agency
KCG Kenya Coordination Group
KDB Kenya Dairy Board
KIPPPRA Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KPCU Kenya Planters Cooperative Union
KJAS Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy
KRDS Kenya Rural Development Strategy
Ksh. Kenya Shilling
MAP Millennium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery Programme
MDAs Ministries, Departments and Public Agencies
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MENR Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
MoA Ministry of Agriculture
MoCDM Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoFA Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development
MoLFD  Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development
MP    Member of Parliament
MRDA  Ministry of Regional Development Authorities
MTADP Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme
NAI   New African Initiative
NAPRM-GC National APRM Governing Council
NCSF  National Cotton Stakeholders Forum
NDP(C) National Development Plan(ning Commission)
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NFPP  National Focal Point Person
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organisations
NMTIP National Medium-Term Investment Programme
OAU   Organisation of African Unity
ODA   Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
PDNC  Provisional National Defence Council
PER   Public Expenditure Review
PoA   Programme of Action
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAIP  Regional Agricultural Investment Programmes
RECs  Regional Economic Communities
REOs  Regional Economic Organisations
(Re)SAKSS (Regional) Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
SACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisations
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SAPs  Structural Adjustment Programmes
SIDA  Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNA   System of National Accounts
SPS   Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
SRA   Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture
SSA   Sub-Saharan Africa
TCM   Thika Coffee Millers
ToRs  Terms of Reference
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>TWC</td>
<td>Technical Working Committee</td>
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<td>TWG</td>
<td>Technical Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAES</td>
<td>Unified Agricultural Extension System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBOS</td>
<td>Uganda Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td><em>Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFEE</td>
<td>Uganda National Farmers Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Summary

It is widely acknowledged that a well-performing agricultural sector is fundamental for Africa’s overall economic growth, as well as for addressing hunger, poverty, and inequality. Throughout world history, increases in agricultural sector productivity have contributed greatly to economic growth and the reduction of poverty. However, in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agricultural productivity and production growth are not very high. Land degradation is a problem in many areas. Furthermore, climate change is projected to have a negative impact on the agricultural sector in SSA. All these challenges call for bold action.

Since the 1980s, the African agricultural sector has been neglected by both African leaders and donors. The sector is undercapitalised and underdeveloped even in relatively advanced countries like Ghana and Kenya. This neglect is made manifest by underinvestment in the sector. By the end of the 1990s, there were tentative initiatives from both African heads of state and government and donors to reverse the negative trends in and concerning agriculture in SSA. However, these initiatives have failed to modernise the sector. The reasons include, among others: the challenges cited above are still predominant and therefore continue to hamper the development of the sector; furthermore, the sector is weak in responding to new challenges posed by development cooperation. The new aid effectiveness agenda (keyword: Paris Declaration), which is increasingly abandoning the project approach to emphasise alignment and harmonisation of interventions within locally owned, comprehensive sector programmes enshrined in national poverty programmes, is unable to take off as it should because agriculture has great problems in convincingly creating such sector programmes and linking up with and defending its interests in national policy arenas. This is due, among other factors, to its openness and intense interactions with other sectors, its diversity, and its mostly private, often poor, disorganised, and highly dispersed actors. However, good agricultural strategies, programmes and policies are considered essential to relaunch agriculture and attract donor interest under the new aid modalities.

Agriculture in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – the economic programme of the African Union (AU), officially established in 2001 –
early on recognised both the importance of agriculture for development and poverty reduction on the continent and the weaknesses of member countries’ agricultural policies. NEPAD developed a special initiative, namely the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) to improve agricultural policies on the continent. The ultimate goals are sustainable (agricultural) growth and poverty reduction. It is one of NEPAD’s seven broad sectoral priorities.

Another NEPAD initiative, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), likewise has the potential to have major impacts on agriculture. The APRM is not a sector initiative but one targeted on improving governance in general. Since agriculture is the largest sector in many SSA countries and – being an open and diverse sector – affected by many policy fields, the APRM should be concerned with agriculture in many ways.

Some key aspects for any NEPAD initiative geared to improving policymaking are:

1. Broad participation in – and thus ownership of – the development of policies and strategies;
2. Better harmonisation of these policies and strategies and stronger efforts to embed them in regional and pan-African agendas;
3. Evidence-based policymaking, including peer learning and review;
4. Building partnerships to enhance private and public investment.

It is assumed that improvement to policymaking processes will lead to better policies and policy environments, including: various aspects of governance; state capacity to ensure effective planning, regulation, and service provision; and eventually more and better public and private investments.

African countries’ ownership of these initiatives and leadership in implementing them are expected to distinguish them from other initiatives, past and present. One novel aspect of NEPAD initiatives is the increased importance they attach to regional and continental level organisations. This is an expression of the growing willingness and capacity of African countries to collaborate at supra-national levels, as well as of the realisation that national level processes can be usefully supported by regional and conti-
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In fact, continuing globalisation and open market economy policies are increasingly exposing African agriculture and food markets to international competition. Individual African nations are often too small and weak to be able to act in isolation. The establishment of AU / NEPAD as well as regional organisations, most prominently the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), is the most important attempt of African nations to join forces in order to be able to shape their own policy space and to influence their fate in the world.

The study question and approach

This study examines how CAADP and APRM can and do influence agricultural policies and strategies at the country level by bringing them closer into line with the objectives, values, and principles espoused by these initiatives. The study is based on detailed case studies conducted in Ghana and Kenya and a rapid assessment in Uganda. The two case study countries were selected from among those that had completed the APRM review by early 2007 and that were expected to finalise a first CAADP exercise by the end of that year. Only three countries satisfied these conditions. In addition, the case study countries were expected to have good local research partners, and this resulted in the selection of Ghana and Kenya.

The study of the processes involved in introducing the initiatives, of the resulting policy documents, and of early implementation was expected to offer sufficient insights to assess their impact on agricultural policy. However, the two countries have as yet not organised the roundtable (mid-2009). This has diminished the scope of the study, but on the other hand the reasons for the delays have provided some interesting insights into the strengths and weaknesses of CAADP.

The approach of this study is a) to benchmark the NEPAD processes in the countries based on an analysis of past and ongoing policy processes, and b) to then examine any incremental effect that CAADP or APRM may have had on such processes. Among the key issues analysed – which, in keeping with the new aid effectiveness agenda and NEPAD principles, were expected to improve policy processes and their impacts – are ownership, participation, use of scientific evidence, including peer review elements, and alignment. The APRM processes in the countries were re-
viewed only to examine whether they adequately addressed governance issues critical to agriculture and to see what lessons the implementation processes, which are significantly different from those of CAADP, may have for more effectively implementing CAADP. By comparing the NEPAD initiatives with one another and with past policies, it is possible to identify strengths and weaknesses and potential improvements in efforts to utilise the initiatives to improve agriculture in SSA. In addition to a better understanding of NEPAD processes, the study can also contribute to a general understanding of agricultural policy processes in SSA and ways to improve them.

CAADP design

CAADP must be regarded more as a framework than as a programme. Among the key elements are:

- Values and principles reflecting general NEPAD principles (see above) that are expected to add value to country processes, including: changing the quality of policy development and implementation, building of partnerships, dialogue, peer review and mutual accountability at all levels, and exploitation of regional complementarities.

- The two most tangible targets that the countries have committed to are to allocate at least ten percent of their national budgets to agriculture and to achieve six percent agricultural growth.

- Four thematic pillars are recommended around which agricultural strategies should be built: sustainable land and water management, rural infrastructure and market access, food security, and agricultural research.

All the members of the AU and signatories to the Maputo Declaration are expected to implement CAADP. RÉCs are supposed to guide implementation in individual countries and provide limited amounts of money. Beyond supporting national processes, CAADP also involves regional activities, but these have not been analysed and are not considered in this study, which focuses on the country level.

CAADP implementation following the Maputo Declaration has gone through two phases. In the first phase, the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
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The FAO has provided significant leadership. The main approach was to elaborate country investment programmes and bankable projects validated in national stakeholder workshops. The reason why this approach was not taken up is basically for lack of integration with the countries’ national strategies. NEPAD therefore proposed a different approach, with a REC-led process that highlights the CAADP objectives and pillars as a framework.

For the second phase, since 2005, a new approach was designed which takes CAADP principles more seriously into account. Under the leadership of the RECs, country processes are suggested that follow certain steps: i) taking stock of existing policies and strategies in the country and modelling whether they are adequate to achieve the CAADP objectives, ii) developing strategies to fill any gaps identified, and iii) facilitating dialogue among various stakeholders at a roundtable conference organised to discuss policies and investment opportunities, develop partnerships, harmonise development assistance and develop a framework for review and accountability. The final outcome of a national CAADP process is a document called the Compact, which is signed during the roundtable by all groups of stakeholders (including the ministry of finance) and donors in agricultural policy and commits them to implement the Compact.

APRM design

The aim of the APRM is to promote good governance and help countries achieve the objectives of NEPAD through “constructive peer dialogue and persuasion” and information sharing. The objective of the APRM is the “the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration.”

Evolved from the original NEPAD framework document and the AU’s declaration on democracy, political, economic, and corporate governance, the APRM requires participant countries to evaluate themselves and also be evaluated by an independent continental panel on: democracy and political governance; economic governance and management; corporate governance; and socio-economic development. Coordination and organisation at national level are secured by a focal point and a coordination
mechanism that must represent all major stakeholders. The results of the
evaluations and a companion Plan of Action are then submitted to the
NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee for
peer review before going on for implementation.

Participation in the APRM is voluntary. It requires substantial buy-in (in
terms of funding) from applying countries. Supplementary funds are pro-
vided by donors through the United Nations Development Programme.

*Past and existing agricultural strategy and policy processes*

The benchmark analysis starts with a review of agricultural sector budget-
ing and performance. It finds that the key CAADP targets have not yet
been achieved in the case study countries, although agriculture had been
identified as a key sector for many years. By the time the Maputo Declara-
tion was signed in 2003, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda had already developed
national development frameworks for poverty reduction and agricultural
sector development. All the national strategies emphasised development of
the agricultural sector and the agricultural sector strategies stressed revi-
talisation of the sector through creation of an enabling environment for
private sector development.

However, implementation often reveals serious flaws. Measured against
the Maputo target of ten percent, budgets for agriculture remain at low
levels in the three countries, although in recent years an increase could be
observed (to three percent in Uganda and to almost seven percent in Kenya
in 2007). The growth rates for agriculture were five to six percent in
Ghana and Kenya, but below one percent in Uganda. Poverty and food
insecurity in rural areas are still very high, both in absolute terms and
compared to urban areas. All this shows that agriculture still needs more
support.

In terms of the quality of policy processes, both Kenya and Ghana were
found to have made significant progress in pursuing policy processes in
the spirit of NEPAD/CAADP:

- As regards participation, in both countries consultations with stake-
  holders have become routine after periods of low participation before
  and during Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). In Ghana,
adequate participation is required by law to be documented for each policy. In Kenya, some reform processes were even pushed through by the private sector against government interests. Donors continue to play a major role. However, meaningful and quality participation at all levels remains a challenge in agriculture: The main actors, smallholder farmers, are weakly organised. In general, weak stakeholder groups suffer from lack of means to prepare, produce or commission expertise and follow debates on a continuous basis.

- With regard to ownership, it was found that participation generally improved ownership. However, from an implementation point of view, adequate ownership can also emerge from selective participation. What is important is that technocrats and policymakers are convinced of the measures. Whether this is enough to assure implementation depends on the scope of the reforms, in particular whether the measures are adequate to solve the problems concerned, whether the reforms can be implemented during a democratic cycle, and whether private sector actors are required to implement a reform. If the latter is the case, broad ownership is indispensable. This also helps to stabilise reforms over longer periods against the vagaries of party politics, a risk inherent in democratic regimes. Support of policies through independent and strong national research organisations helps to create national ownership, too. Dependency on donors could reduce national ownership, but this should not necessarily be the case, and it depends on the design of the policy process.

- The use of evidence in policymaking has also increased compared to times prior to SAPs. Outcomes of past policies are routinely reviewed. Relevant knowledge is brought into decisionmaking processes by commissioning studies and by involving consultants with academic or practical backgrounds. Strong national research organisations and consultants play a major role as carriers of knowledge and evidence, although such entities do not exist or exert such strong influence in all countries. Efforts to bring evidence to policymaking are often constrained by lack of availability of basic information for analysis and analytical outputs in all countries. For example, expenditure analyses cannot provide adequate guidance on relative benefits from investing in different activities, as the data required for such analysis are not avail-
able in all the case countries. Funding for key studies is still often provided by external donors, and in this way small but flexible and attentive organisations are also able to exert important leverage on policy processes.

- Alignment of donors with agricultural policies and harmonisation of approaches is improving, though progress is slow. Donors are increasingly coordinating their activities and moving towards budget support instead of financing projects. The key conditions include significant efforts to improve fiscal management, monitoring and evaluation, and policy development at the ministry level to provide assurances that the funds will be spent effectively. The situation varies among the three countries.

Assessment of CAADP and its contribution to agricultural strategy and policy development

While at the continental and global levels CAADP has been a strong instrument to obtain commitment to agriculture from governments and donors alike, CAADP at the country level seems to be weak and not to be meeting expectations, at least in the case study countries and with respect to the criteria of this study:

- The level of participation in CAADP processes is lower than it usually is in country policy processes. Materials for the roundtable are prepared by government professionals, and this means that non-governmental actors have few opportunities to participate, except at the roundtable.

- The commitment made in Maputo was found to be only weakly owned in the case study countries. In general, ownership is weak due to low participation levels, low levels of knowledge on CAADP and a general impression in the countries that the process is not emanating from the country and not aligned with its internal policy processes. Not even government actors seem to own CAADP: Agricultural ministries in the countries have not taken CAAPD up enthusiastically to make their concerns heard and enhance their share of the budget. Nor have the presidents’ offices, which are supposed to support the implementation of NEPAD initiatives at home, done much in this regard. At least until now, it is RECs which have initiated and financially sup-
ported the countries in initiating the processes. Within the countries, the processes are managed or led by mid- to senior-level bureaucrats. The civil servants leading the processes look to the roundtables as an opportunity to bring the political leadership on board.

- The evidence that is brought to the CAADP process internally includes some fundamental aspects of planning. Stocktaking and particularly modelling have been judged to add value to the process by more realistically connecting expenditure-growth/poverty alleviation linkages with available means. However, the brevity of the process and lack of funds limit the exercises to the use of readily available information and models. This may not be enough to significantly improve the quality of policies and investments, as analyses are not designed to generate insights on “why” past policies have not had the expected results and “how” they can be improved and desired outcomes achieved, in particular by looking at governance and capacities.

- Also, the external evidence-enhancing instruments of CAADP have hardly materialised: The different peer elements provided for in the CAADP process (see above) were close to absent, except for some personal exchanges during the roundtable (observed in Rwanda); the opportunities to take advantage of regional complementarities have not been exploited, although some attempts may be made to do so in the regional compacts that the RECs are expected to develop in the longer run; the pillar framework does not, for the time being, provide any substantial guidance for policymaking, except clustering to form topics; the technical support from pillar organisations has not materialised so far. What role they may play and how is still not clear to member countries; the processes observed have reinforced early concerns that fishery, forestry and particularly livestock are not adequately taken into consideration in CAADP.

- With regard to alignment and harmonisation of donors buying into country policy progresses, the response of donors has been slow. Moreover, the support of donors for the CAADP framework was very weak, at least in the first two years of CAADP introduction in the countries. We have observed that local donor representatives were quite reluctant to support the CAADP process, because many saw no value added and feared that CAADP could prove to be an unnecessary
duplication of existing agricultural programmes, which could lead to confusion, delay or even deterioration of efforts already underway. Since more and more information is now available on the CAADP process, donor awareness has increased, thus diminishing their reluctance.

In summary, implementation of the CAADP framework in the case study countries has not led to the desired improvement in participation, ownership, use of evidence and alignment compared to the policymaking processes previously in place. However, there are signs that this must not be the end of the story, and that the potential of CAADP to positively influence national agricultural policymaking may be and in fact is growing:

- CAADP is becoming part of the agricultural development discourse at the international level, again fostered by rising attention to agriculture and food security. Donors at the international level (e.g. the G8) require a harmonised approach to agriculture not only at national level but also in international dialogue, and CAADP promises to provide a platform for discussion and bargaining.

- The target of a ten percent share for the agricultural sector in national budgets has set a benchmark for countries to demonstrate their commitment to the sector, and the associated CAADP processes profit from this benchmark.

- At the country level, alignment, harmonisation and the move towards budget support in agriculture are still at low levels and difficult to achieve (see above). Additional support in developing sound national agricultural policies is needed and CAADP would be appreciated if it proved able to contribute to this goal. Alternatives are not visible yet, except the possibility of opting for strictly autonomous country processes.

- Many of the most valuable elements of the CAADP process agenda have not yet materialised, for example regional coordination, peer elements and a thorough implementation of the CAADP principles. Due to CAADP’s dynamic, it is assumed that they may materialise in the future. Also, other substantial parts of CAADP, such as the pillars, have not yet really been applied, and pillar institutions are not yet functional. Pillars institutions have yet to provide technical solutions that might improve the effectiveness of interventions in the sector. Here too, these institutions will be playing an important role in the near future in CAADP implementation.
Assessment of APRM and its contribution to the agricultural sector

The APRM, with its different implementation process, may have some lessons to learn for CAADP. The APRM has a good record concerning participation, ownership and use of evidence:

- Both the Ghana and Kenya governments have created national councils or commissions with considerable autonomy as principal bodies to manage the peer reviews. The instructions from headquarters were sufficiently open to allow adaptation to local conditions through open but structured questionnaires. The processes were sufficiently funded by the government, with support from various donors. The national structures created considerable awareness for the process in the countries. Both the technical institutions and continental missions that reviewed internal assessments held extensive consultations with civil society groups, the media, business associations, parliamentarians, religious leaders, and youth and women’s groups to capture the views of both experts and ordinary citizens – although probably not enough was done to systematically include all stakeholders, particularly from remote rural areas and the private sector.

- Some important elements of the process design seek to foster broad national ownership against domination by the state, including independent eminent persons along with balanced and transparent reporting procedures, though this may not always be sufficient, particularly under non-democratic regimes. Country ownership was moderate to high, as civil society was very engaged, which can be said less of the private sector and public entities outside the ministries directly linked to NEPAD.

- The technical research institutions that were appointed were highly regarded national independent think tanks and had important resources to carry out research aimed at creating new evidence. They were assessed by continental experts headed by an eminent person.

In summary, the APRM must be seen as a positive policy process induced by NEPAD, though it may well be too limited to a certain number of sectors and issues which are dominated by civil society dealing with larger governance issues and corporate governance.
For agriculture, however, the APRM has not adequately captured governance issues in the sector. However it did determine that land-related issues were the most important governance topics that directly concern agriculture. Other issues that were raised were related to provision of public goods, unfavourable macroeconomic environment, terms-of-trade shocks, an inadequate regulatory framework, women’s rights and roles, lack of irrigation, inputs, credit, storage and market facilities, and low soil fertility. Obviously, not all of these are governance issues in the strict sense, but due to the broad scope of the APRM they were accepted for inclusion. Several of the issues exceed the narrow focus of CAADP, which tends to neglect the macroeconomic level. Thus, agricultural issues did get attention, but not the depth and focus that would have led to a deeper understanding of them and the development of a general guideline and blueprint for agricultural policymaking.

These weaknesses of the APRM concerning agriculture may simply be explained as the result of the non-focused approach and may also be observable for other sector policies. Yet, there are signs that there is a systematic bias against agriculture (and rural areas more generally). This stems on the one side from the particularities of the sector – the remoteness of the places and actors concerned, the lower degree of organisation, the greater difficulty involved in circulating information, etc. (see above). On the other side, the design of the APRM and local APRM institutions did not do enough to actively counteract these sector handicaps.

More important, and a key lesson for the agricultural sector, agriculture advocacy groups, the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) representing the sector and the sector ministries had limited participation in the APRM process. Therefore, awareness of APRM results in agricultural policy processes is very limited, and implementation through agriculture related ministries is very weak. This is mainly due to the lack of involvedness and participation of sector actors. In addition, the programme of action has not been synthesised and consolidated for agriculture (or for other sectors), making it difficult for its actors to become aware of and pick up the issues raised.

Despite good process management, implementation of APRM recommendations is considered rather weak and slow. This is due to a lack of funding from government and donors, most probably bound up with the fact
that the APRM had neglected its alignment with general (in particular Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers [PRSP]) and sector programmes, which usually serve as guidelines for more specific policies, budget allocation and development cooperation. The APRM national councils have no influence on the executive and only monitor implementation. If donors or special pressure groups push for the implementation of specific activities, this tends to spur implementation.

Conclusions

The overall conclusion of this study is that the two NEPAD initiatives investigated, namely CAADP and APRM, can add value to national agricultural policy processes, and have even more potential to do so. However, it is a long way from improved policy processes to implementation of elaborated recommendations, and in this regard both initiatives still have a long way to go. For very different reasons, at present they do not fully live up to their potential, at least in the field of agricultural policymaking. Participation, ownership, evidence-based policymaking and donor alignment have been found to be key factors for the immediate success of the initiatives. Both process design and particularly implementation decisively shape the degree to which these principles are achieved, they are much more important than any presumed “African ownership” of NEPAD-led initiatives.

Some of the reasons for the weaknesses observed in CAADP and APRM agricultural policymaking processes are to be found in the complicated nature of the agricultural sector itself. Agriculture is a complicated policy field; it is a cross-cutting sector that overlaps with several other policy fields, particularly with natural resource management. Other reasons are to be found in the process design and implementation of the two initiatives at the national level. These are very different, although the fundamental principles and values are similar.

The APRM provides a good example of how continental NEPAD initiatives could create a participatory evidence-based policy process which creates ownership at the national level. The buy-in may have contributed to ownership. Some of the key factors for this success include: voluntary participation of nations; sufficient resources at the national level; flexible implementation of guidelines; peer elements and sufficient capacities at
the international level to accompany the national processes. Concerning communication, APRM is visible and well known as a NEPAD initiative both nationally and internationally. However, the dissemination and implementation of the recommendations remain very weak. Moreover, the lack of a comprehensive and systematic coverage of sector governance issues is a weakness of the APRM agenda.

CAADP is much weaker than APRM in terms of creation of national policy processes. Commitment to CAADP itself based on the Maputo Declaration was voluntary – although countries would have found it difficult not to sign up to a continental initiative – and implementation is also voluntary. But the efforts of regional and other organisations are being dissipated by the need to work with a large number of countries, many of which are reluctant to go along. Efforts to hasten implementation in a number of countries with low ambitions to implement the self-established rules, low budgets, and low visibility do not appear to be effective, and at the same time this may diminish the value of the process in important ways. Implementation has neglected peer elements, evidence generation is weak, and participation is cursory. Communication is another essential problem in CAADP.

It is important to highlight some common weaknesses of both APRM and CAADP which strongly hamper their effectiveness in influencing national agricultural policy processes and the policies themselves:

- Both initiatives, when implemented at the national level, are not well linked to ongoing national policy processes. This hinders alignment with existing national policy processes, standard frameworks like PRSP and adoption of recommendations via existing programmes.
- The invitation to participate in the process is not well organised, and this has sometimes led to a situation in which disadvantaged groups are excluded and thus unable to get involved in national policy processes.
- Similarly, the initiatives overestimate the flexibility and the mechanisms of donor support and probably also the lack of willingness to align. Despite the lip-service paid to agricultural development, the agricultural sector is insufficiently funded through aid allocations, although recently the food price crisis may have changed that.
- National and regional policy arenas are not yet well linked, although
much emphasis in the African regions is put on regional integration. CAADP has taken on board the regional connections of agriculture, food security, and trade policies through the involvement of RECs, but they are not yet taken into account in setting the agenda. APRM neglects regional issues even more.

- Another weakness is a lack of realism in the creation of long-term, less costly second-round process designs. Both initiatives place weight on the first round, with policy documents assumed to remain valid for the next few years. Although it could be claimed that the first round is only the first step in the implementation of the initiative, the common understanding is that they are a significant step in implementing the framework, one to which various stakeholders, including donors, would commit in specific ways. In many cases, this underestimates the protracted and long-term nature of policy processes.

- Finally, both initiatives show weaknesses in building up additional evidence-creating capacity. In the case of APRM, local capacity is used to gather opinions and facts, but there is no capacity development element. In the case of CAADP, there are a few elements of evidence use, but not enough, and again, there is still a lack of capacity development. Pillar institutions, peers, and Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) could become valuable tools for capacity development, but they are not yet visible, at least in our case studies.

In summary, all this would mean that in any case the benefits from CAADP and APRM – in terms of improving policies, governance, expenditure effectiveness, and the resulting increased investments – would be obtained only after longer periods of time had elapsed in each country. The key challenges, therefore, are to shape the initiatives in such a way as to strengthen the above fundamentals while maintaining incentives for the countries to continue to implement them.

Policy recommendations

The following sections formulate several recommendations. However, these recommendations are not identical for both initiatives, due to their different scopes, strengths, and weaknesses. Often, elements of one initiative can be regarded as a guide for the other.
• **Selective engagement of countries and significant costs for buy-in:** Specifically for CAADP, it might be useful to focus on a few countries and show that they are benefiting from the processes. These countries should clearly demonstrate willingness to implement their commitment to carry the process forward. This would also facilitate the gradual capacity development of key organisations such as NEPAD, RECs, ReSAKSS, and pillar institutions, which are unable to deal thoroughly with dozens of country processes all at once while they themselves continue to build their own capacities.

• **High profile implementation and quality of participation:** CAADP can gain a lot from better involving high ranking national actors and policymakers from the whole range of institutions governing agriculture in the broad sense. International personalities and institutions can add to the quality, visibility and credibility of the process. Both APRM and CAADP should be used to shift from **ad hoc** participation to form well defined networks of stakeholders with institutionalised participation in NEPAD and other processes. This is of particular relevance for agricultural stakeholders who are poorly organised at present, particularly farmers.

• **Broadening the evidence base, improving peer-driven and regional elements:** These NEPAD principles are for good reasons very important in SSA but need to be improved in terms of concept and implementation. APRM needs to better handle the overwhelming broadness of its governance definition. In the area of agriculture, it would be very useful to bring together APRM and CAADP agendas and actors in order to avoid overlapping, duplication of efforts or – even more harmful – contradictory findings and resulting advice. For APRM, this would mean that CAADP national and pillar documents and institutional structures should be consulted in any APRM assessment. Most helpful would be a cross-cutting pillar on agricultural governance issues in CAADP, including an issue paper, a pillar institution and a continental network. CAADP would have to more thoroughly implement the existing evidence and peer mechanisms. In addition, more information is crucially needed, in particular expenditure reviews, governance analyses, capacity assessments and the firm integration of a research agenda of this kind into ongoing country economic policy
planning. Both initiatives must more systematically integrate regional linkages into analysis and policymaking.

- **Longer-term processes but discrete steps, more focus on later steps:** Whereas the start of CAADP and APRM may have to be broad exercises, in later steps of NEPAD-supported policy cycles, more focus is needed to make progress in implementing past decisions, overcoming obstacles to progress, learning, and recognising new opportunities and threats. Second-round process design must take these issues into account.

- **Improve communication strategies:** For APRM, the key communication issue to improve implementation is dissemination of information to sector communities, administrations, and non-state actors. For CAADP, a comprehensive information strategy should clearly lay out how the process will lead to achievement of the principles of CAADP and also set reasonable expectations.

- **Capacity development:** Capacity development is necessary for most of the issues discussed and proposed, and at all levels, particularly for the CAADP agenda. To fuel the entire machinery, capacities have to be enhanced in areas such as facilitation of policy processes, data gathering and analysis, sector planning, and M&E of policies.

- **Transferability to other countries:** While it is not certain whether APRM for agriculture and CAADP reveal similar traits in other SSA countries, it seems quite likely given the available literature, the ongoing strategic discussion within NEPAD on both processes, and some of the proposed reforms. It is likely that agricultural policy processes in other SSA countries are weaker than in the two case study countries, given that Kenya and Ghana are among the most advanced countries in SSA as regards some key factors affecting agricultural policy, such as democracy and internal scientific and administrative capacities. Thus, it is highly probable that other countries could profit even more from NEPAD initiatives for their agricultural policies, provided that they are better designed.
Agricultural policies in Sub-Saharan Africa

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

For most Sub-Saharan African countries, agriculture is key to achieving broad based (pro-poor) economic growth and attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Approximately 70–80 percent of employment and 40 percent of the continent’s export earnings derive from agricultural activities (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] 2006, 4; IMF 2006). A stronger performing agricultural sector is considered fundamental for Africa’s overall economic growth, as well as addressing hunger, poverty, and inequality. Throughout history, increases in agricultural sector productivity have contributed greatly to economic growth and the reduction of poverty (Eicher / Witt 1964, 239; Jones / Woolf 1969, 123; OECD 2006). However, in the last decades, the agricultural sector in Africa has been neglected by both governments and the donor community for various reasons.

The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – the economic programme of the African Union (AU) – has recognised the importance of agriculture and wants to boost Africa’s growth through agriculture-led development. A novel aspect in this respect is the increased importance attached to regional and continental level organisations to foster agricultural development. This is an expression of the growing willingness and capacity for African countries to collaborate at supra-national levels, as well as the realisation that national level processes can be usefully supported by regional and continental institutions, through capacity building, peer review, policy harmonisation and advocacy. In fact, continuing globalisation and policies of open market economy increasingly expose African agriculture and food markets to international competition. Individual African nations are often too small and weak to be able to act in isolation. The establishment of AU/NEPAD as well as regional organisations, most prominently the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), is the most prominent of attempts of African nations to join forces in order to be able to shape their place and to influence their fate in the world.

Two out of the seven initiatives, namely the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), are NEPAD activities concerning agricultural policies and institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
CAADP is directed at agricultural sector policies including: (a) improving national agricultural policy frameworks, (b) strengthening institutions and governance, (c) enhancing agricultural productivity, (d) fostering trade, investment, economic growth and sustainable development, and (e) promoting regional integration.

APRM aims at improving national governance and institutional settings in general. Given the prominence of agriculture in the economies of Africa, APRM may be expected to influence the agricultural sector as well.

Both initiatives have received high political attention internationally in the last years (see Chapter 4). However, they are still in early stages of execution, the spread across the continent has been slow, and there are very few reports of measurable impacts at the national level. Continental initiatives on agriculture may be particularly difficult to implement for a number of reasons:

- Agriculture depends, more than most other sectors, on location specific conditions and factors outside policy influence such as natural resources, climate, settlement patterns, food habits, and so on.
- Agriculture is an open sector with many different segments and actors of extremely diverse interests and economic power.
- The agricultural sector encounters many externalities both in the upward and downward sectors, including food security, environmental, and natural resources issues.
- Stakeholders in the agricultural sector are often neither well organised nor well informed about policy options.
- Agricultural policies are formulated in highly politicised arenas, and stakes for potential losers of policy changes (as well as winners, but less articulated) are high.
- Agriculture is touched upon by a variety of ministries and policies with partially diverging objectives. Therefore, agriculture policy coordination is difficult.

The NEPAD initiatives do not start from scratch but almost always fall into ongoing policy debates. For instance, on the role of agriculture in poverty reduction strategies, NEPAD itself is not yet well established and
lacks capacity for planning and implementing its programmes. According to some observers, it even lacks political legitimacy and credibility to foster new policies in its member countries, making allusion to the unclear relationship between the AU and NEPAD (see Chapter 4). For all these reasons, CAADP and APRM may not succeed in influencing national agricultural policies. Failure to effectively implement these programmes may weaken African supranational governance, undermining the credibility and reputation of the AU, NEPAD, and other institutions which are expected to foster growth and development in the continent.

1.2 Study objectives and research questions

The overall goal of this paper is to understand the potential of CAADP and APRM initiatives in influencing national agricultural policies and to improve their performances. However, since serious implementation particularly of CAADP (the RECs led process, see Chapter 4) has started only recently, it is not yet possible to look beyond the impact of the two initiatives on policy formulation. Until now, only Rwanda has completed the CAADP process. Concerning APRM, at the moment of the project start, only twelve countries had finalised a first set of policy recommendations and only few observations of implementation could be expected to be gathered, particularly in the field of agriculture (see Chapter 4). For empirical observation of policy implementation of the outcomes of the two NEPAD processes and even more for impact on MDGs much more time would be necessary.

Bringing these considerations together, the value of APRM and CAADP for improving agricultural policies will be assessed by the following indicators:

(i) Improvement of the quality of (agricultural) policy processes, assessed by:

- Ownership of policies, assessed by level and quality of participation and any other measure of involvement of the general population in decisionmaking. This includes participation of other stakeholders who may influence policies, notably NEPAD, the respective RECs, associated institutions, and (probably and if relevant) donors.
• Existence of a culture of evidence-based policymaking or strategy development including research, consultations, and feedback from stakeholders along with the additional qualities that APRM and CAADP have brought to this culture by their different mechanisms to improve evidence-based policy formulation.¹

• CAADP and APRM policy processes will be compared to the prior situation by analysing agricultural policy processes in the recent past. By understanding how agricultural policymaking generally works in the country, it is possible to determine the mechanisms through which CAADP may improve the situation.

(ii) Allocation of government expenditure to agriculture. Budgetary allocation is one of the indicators to assess commitment to agriculture as adopted by HSG of the AU and as pushed forward by CAADP. Establishing this benchmark will indicate the extent to which countries diverge from the CAADP target at the time of the commitment in 2003. However, a change of allocation may not necessarily be due to the CAADP commitment, and even if it is, it could have been triggered by the Maputo Declaration, rather than CAADP.

The initial plan included a comparison of various aspects of policies contained in CAADP compacts in the two case study countries against existing agricultural policies. The CAADP processes had been scheduled to be executed within 2007, thus within the project timeframe. However, since the compacts were not concluded by the end of 2008, this part of the project could not be carried out.

Beyond possibly improving policy processes, the particular impact of APRM on agriculture will depend on the extent to which the Programmes of Action (PoAs) are implemented. Here too, benchmarking awareness about the governance related problems in agriculture, the existing solutions and strategies for addressing the problems, along with the level of implementation and related constraints will form the basis of assessing the value added from APRM.

¹ That is, participation as information source, stocktaking, modelling, pillar frameworks and pillar institutions, as well as peer learning (see Chapter 4).
With an understanding of the influence of APRM and CAADP on country agricultural processes, suggestions can be made on specific ways in which continental programmes can be better shaped and integrated into national processes. The caveat in both cases is that there should be caution in attributing change to the programmes. The recording of individual stakeholders’ perceptions is an important yet imperfect component of drawing the picture of the influence of APRM and CAADP on national agricultural policy processes.

In sight of the early stage of CAADP and APRM implementation and of the desired effects, the main research question of this study has been formulated as follows: How do the two NEPAD initiatives CAADP and APRM impact national agricultural policy processes? Specifically, this paper seeks to elaborate on:

- How is the performance of the agricultural sector in SSA, and what are the major general challenges in SSA to which the two initiatives have to respond?
- How are the two initiatives designed in general and how do the designs influence their implementation at the national level?
- How have selected countries implemented the initiatives?
- To what extent are the initiatives interlinked (intentionally and unintentionally) in the area of agriculture?
- How is participation fostered in developing agricultural policies?
- Who are the drivers of change?
- How are scientific information and evidence used to enrich the policy processes?
- How do the initiatives address the challenges of an agenda of agriculture for development?
- Are the processes consistent with the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness principles of ownership and alignment?

The paper will also identify other factors that influence the processes and the outputs. In addition, we look at the outputs that were available for this study. This is only relevant for APRM because CAADP has not yet produced policy outputs (except in one country, see Box 6–1). Although both the
CAADP policy processes and APRM have a multilayer dimension, the focus of the study is to examine specifically what is happening at the national level where most agricultural policy measures have to be implemented.

1.3 Structure of the document

The paper is divided into seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapter two presents the analytical framework. In this chapter, conceptual issues and methodology are presented. Chapter three provides an overview of African agriculture and agricultural policy issues. The chapter addresses the linkages between agriculture, economic development, poverty, and food security in SSA. It summarises the performance of the agricultural sector in meeting the MDGs, sums up the challenges the sector is facing, and describes the new approaches undertaken to improve the sector’s performance. Chapter four gives a brief overview of NEPAD and describes CAADP and APRM in more detail. It analyses and assesses the content of these two initiatives and their potential role for the agricultural sector. Chapter five gives the profiles of agriculture in the case study countries. This chapter also describes the role that agriculture plays in these countries, its performance, and the policies and strategies for strengthening agriculture and food security. Chapter six addresses the role of NEPAD in African agricultural policymaking. The national agricultural policy processes are analysed and the potential contributions of APRM and CAADP, to enhance agricultural policies and strategies, are presented. Finally, chapter seven provides conclusions and policy recommendations for improving the described NEPAD initiatives.

2 Analytical framework

APRM and CAADP aim at improving governance and agricultural policy respectively (see Chapter 4). In the absence of the possibility of assessing the impacts of CAADP and APRM on agricultural policies ex-post, as only one country has developed the compact which is the first significant step in the implementation, only an ex-ante assessment of both initiatives that concentrate on the processes by which they are implemented at the national level is feasible. In this chapter it is argued that under the special conditions of SSA where good data and analytical capacity is rare, where market failure and government failure are both common, and where stan-
standard lessons from more advanced economies are difficult to apply, such an assessment has to focus on how the initiatives foster participation, create ownership, and encourage the use of evidence and knowledge in the formulation of policies and governance in and for the agricultural sector (process criteria). Other elements of assessment can include consistency of the policies developed, budget allocation, and first signs of implementation as far as these are perceivable at this time.

The following section elaborates upon characteristics of good agricultural policy and governance and how, in an analysis of policy processes, it can be assessed whether resulting policies will be ‘good’ or at least improved.

2.1 Conceptual issues

CAADP and APRM do not shape agricultural policies and environment in a vacuum; they are one component of many factors that exert influence. Thus, the level of influence or value added of APRM and CAADP can only be measured against benchmarks that establish where African countries are in relation to the previously mentioned process criteria. NEPAD initiatives are implemented in countries in which policymaking processes are developed to various degrees. They are based on the African leaders’ own perceptions that the member countries need assistance in improving policy frameworks in both methodological genesis and content. CAADP processes are designed to improve the way policies are created and implemented in member countries. Some of the principles and values which are likely to improve quality of policymaking are 1) ownership, 2) participation, 3) evidence-based policymaking, 4) harmonisation or alignment, and 5) partnerships. Strengthening these dimensions is expected to improve the ‘quality’ of policies and subsequently of investments in the agricultural sector. This improvement will, in turn, bring significantly more and better investments into the sector and thus ultimately contribute to achieving growth and poverty targets.

The revised implementation guide (NEPAD 2008) notes that the introduction of the CAADP agenda in a country is not the introduction of a new intervention but a reminder to the government and partners of NEPAD and CAADP of the commitments they have made to achieve these programme objectives. Implementation of the agenda should therefore be based on relevant government and partner institutions fully understanding and pur-
suing CAADP principles and value in their own strategies and programmes. The ultimate objective is to increase the effectiveness of planning and execution of government efforts and the delivery of external assistance in the agricultural sector. NEPAD states that the CAADP process:

“Promotes partnerships and alliances that should: (i) facilitate the alignment of development efforts by national governments and their development partners, (ii) improve incentives for long term investments by the private sector, (iii) raise participation in the policymaking process by farmer organisations and other stakeholders. At the level of policy and strategy planning and implementation, the CAADP process promotes consistency and continuity, in that it defines a concrete and limited set of shared long-term growth and financial targets, eases access to greater technical expertise, emphasises the practice of evidence and outcome-based planning and implementation. NEPAD’s option for an agriculture-led growth strategy to achieve the MDG goal of poverty reduction, which underlies the CAADP agenda, greatly raises the prominence of agriculture and strengthens the negotiating position of agricultural sector constituencies in national fora.”

(NEPAD 2005, 3)

Obviously, these CAADP principles are closely related to those of the Paris Declaration of 2005 which aims to foster aid effectiveness through greater ownership, alignment, coordination, and results based management and partnership. In this sense, NEPAD has been a forerunner of the new aid philosophy or is at least highly compatible with it – putting the national policy processes into the focus of its activities. This shows that NEPAD initiatives, at least in principle, transport a modern understanding of policymaking and development partnership.

However, the fact that NEPAD initiatives such as CAADP and APRM emanate from a continental level and have to be brought back to the national level, brings not only new opportunities but also new challenges. Meeting these challenges begins with terminology, since in fact programmes in the new aid effectiveness agenda are meant to be national or sector programmes enshrined in national policymaking, whereas NEPAD “programmes” such as CAADP are continental in scope and have as their output the improvement of national programmes and policies. Thus, the continental initiatives have to be integrated into and aligned with national policy formulation principles and processes with the specific national
problems and available solutions in a manner compatible with the capacities of stakeholders. This is a long process during which many challenges arise as to ownership, participation, and alignment of procedures and contents. The ease of these feedback processes will obviously depend on issues such as the legitimacy and ownership of the NEPAD initiatives felt by the national stakeholders. It is to be assumed that the origin and the nature of NEPAD itself are important components of the likelihood of success of its initiatives. Other factors of course add to this, such as sufficient capacities, realistic procedures, transparency, good timing, and openness to dialogue and mutual learning.

In the following, some general reflections are presented about the key issues of the NEPAD agenda on fostering ownership, participation, and alignment which are supposed to add value to the national policy processes.

Ownership

Ownership is expected to play a key role under the NEPAD frameworks at two levels: the initial ‘buy-in’ of the principles of CAADP by political representatives of African governments and societies, which would lead to their implementation; and, subsequently, by the development of policies and strategies adopting these principles and values.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), an organisation for which country ownership of the policies that it recommends is a delicate matter, defines ownership as

“a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed programme of policies by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the programme is achievable and is in the country’s own interest” (Boughton / Mourmouras 2002, 3).

The key phrase here is “willing assumption of responsibility.” Ownership, by this definition, implies believing that a policy is achievable and implementable, that the executing persons and organisations are convinced of that, and that they are taking the responsibility to implement the policy. However, if a government does not carry out a policy, even after it commits to do so, lack of ownership may be only one of several reasons.
Ownership is built through processes of interaction and negotiations that involve the participation of various stakeholders. Along this line, the IMF recommends that countries develop a plan of their own, providing lots of options, and being flexible in negotiations (Boughton / Mourmouras 2002). Nonetheless, who needs to own policies strictly from the point of view of implementation alone would depend on the nature of policies. As we will see later, macro-economic policies may be implemented even if ‘owned’ by a small set of technocrats and political leaders, while sectoral policies, particularly if requiring private stakeholders to act, require a wider buy-in for successful implementation.

A number of indicators of ownership exist and may be expressed in different contexts during the development of a policy. These contextual indicators include: initiation, during the process of development, in the expression of political will for reform, and in the level of public support and participation (Johnson / Wasty 1993 cited in Tsikata 2001). Who initiates the policy process, whether it was by policymakers themselves or imposed by donors as part of “conditionalities” or quid pro quo for support, is obviously also an important indicator of ownership.

Translated to the NEPAD initiatives, the often cited “African ownership” is only half of the story. In fact, they derive from African governments, most prominently from Heads of State and Governments (HSG), but the fact that they have to be re-integrated into national policies, where stakeholders have only to a very limited (if any) extent contributed to and agreed on NEPAD (see Chapter 4) brings back some of the challenges of owning an externally brought-in impulse. In consequence, it can be assumed that NEPAD initiatives are only to be expected to bear fruits for national policies if many national stakeholders, in particular government officers but also other organisations and persons, are convinced of the benefits from adoption.

Participation

Participation in a development context is understood as people acting in groups to influence the direction and outcome of development programmes that affect them (Paul 1987). It involves mutual adjustment and orientation of behaviour among participants as opposed to one doing what the other wants (Leaf 1988). It involves sharing of information, negotia-
tions, and owning or having some rights over processes (Picciotto 1995). Participation may be viewed as the process that leads to ownership as the outcome.

It is useful to note that whether and how intensively stakeholders participate in policy processes is not only a function of opportunities provided but also of incentives faced by them in terms of whether they believe the policies are of consequence to them. The further they perceive the policies are from real changes that are likely to affect them, the lower the likelihood of their participation. Technical staff and administrators from bureaucracies may participate largely because of professional reasons, without really having a significant stake in the outcomes of the processes. Who should participate and how to provide appropriate representation to stakeholders such as smallholder farmers are some of the challenges in strengthening participation in policymaking.

Also in this context, it is useful to distinguish between strategies such as the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) in Ghana or the Strategy for Revitalising Agriculture (SRA) in Kenya which are statements of objectives versus broad directions and policies that entail specific actions, such as the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in Ghana or National Extension Programme in Kenya (see Chapter 5). To the extent the stakeholders expect strategies to become actionable, by, for example, the budget being tied to them as in the case of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), they may show interest in shaping them. Deciding who should participate and designing processes to offer meaningful opportunities to participate are important aspects to consider in strengthening participation.

Another reason for participation to be of high relevance in policymaking is its potential contribution to evidence-based policymaking, in particular in a situation of lack of sound information. This is often the situation in SSA countries where statistical data are absent or weak, often contradictory, and rarely up-to-date. Also scientific or policy analysis of required quality is rarely available for sound policymaking. Under such circumstances, the information that can be assembled and evaluated through involvement of stakeholders would be of high value. However, the challenge in a participatory approach to evidence-based policymaking is to ensure that information used is not biased by particular interests. It therefore requires careful design and ways to evaluate the information brought in by stakeholders so
that their informational value is not necessarily taken at face value. This evaluation can occur through measures such as cross-checking or independent analysis. The most important mechanism is the interactive negotiation of shared evidence through the participation process itself – though this can be a very long and cumbersome approach which also constitutes one of the main potential disadvantages of participation.

A similar argument in favour of participation may be constructed for the explicit participation of donors in policy processes of poor countries. However, it is clear that there is a very thin line between advice and conditionality if the advisor is able to withdraw funding. Yet, it is unrealistic to think that the important role of donors in shaping policies will fade in the near future, at least in the case of weak states and governments found in most SSA countries. Transparent roles for participation of both real stakeholders and donors combined with advice and information sharing may be a way to reduce that dilemma.

**Evidence-based policymaking**

Evidence-based policymaking refers to

> “an approach to policy development and implementation which uses rigorous techniques to develop and maintain a robust evidence base from which to develop policy options. All policies are based on evidence. The question is more whether the evidence itself, and the processes this evidence undergoes to turn it into policy options, are of sufficiently high quality”

(Pawson 2001; National Audit Office 2003)

Obviously, better evidence has a high potential to improve policies. Evidence-based policy development facilitates good decisions in terms of policy choice, strategy design, and implementation (Onamo 2004; Marston / Watts 2003). Types of evidence include research results, economic and statistical modelling results, analysis of stakeholder opinion and public perceptions, as well as anecdotal evidence and cost/benefit analyses. The quality of evidence also needs to be assessed in terms of the quality of the methods that are used to gather the information. As mentioned above, participatory processes are an important way of generating evidence particularly in the case that other sources are weak.

**Alignment**

Alignment, in the sense of greater harmony between two elements, is applicable to a number of situations in the case of NEPAD initiatives: be-
between aspects of country strategies and continental priorities; between country and regional policies that enable exploitation of complementari-
ties; and between country strategies and donor priorities.

The alignment of donors is the most widely discussed alignment issue in
the framework of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and carries the
notion that donors should back nationally owned policies and reduce their
own conditionalities (Rogerson 2005). Though it is common phrasing that
donors should align to national policies, it is a matter of fact that donors
have their own stakes when providing assistance to a certain country,
sector, or programme. These stakes can take different forms with different
levels of legitimacy: real self-oriented stakes (such as strategic interests in
a region, a regime, resource access and so forth); convictions about the
appropriate goals and targets (such as poverty versus natural resource
protection); convictions about the best ways to reach the goals (from very
fundamental issues such as democracy or authoritarian regime over inter-
mediate issues such as open or closed economy to some practical issues
such as free or fee-based education); up to almost undisputed issues re-
lated to procedural best practices to protect donor tax payers money (for
example public financial management and accountability which in prac-
tice, however, can deeply question national institutions). However, since
in many SSA countries donors are the main financer of development pro-
grammes, in order to align to national policies and programmes they must
be convinced about their feasibility, their well-foundation – and often the
participatory nature of the process by which they have been formulated as
an emanation of most donor’s conviction that democracy fosters develop-
ment.

One alignment that is frequently mentioned in the NEPAD setting and
indeed describes the new quality of alignment challenge of a continental
initiative is that of country policies paying adequate attention to continen-
tal priorities. In CAADP, these priorities are called pillars and in APRM
they are referred to as substantive areas (see Chapter 4). The nature of this
kind of alignment is not always conceptually very clear, whether it refers
to principles and values, processes, or specific contents. For instance, the
respect of human rights or the implementation of international agreements
a country has signed is part of the APRM check, but how for instance food
security is to be achieved and what prescriptions or recommendations
CAADP can give to this, in light of the great variety among individual
SSA countries’ situations, is far from easy to answer in a continental
framework. This challenge will be dealt with in chapter 4 when reviewing the continental frameworks of CAADP and APRM and when discussing their implementation in individual countries in chapter 5.

2.2 Methodology and data collection

This study mostly relies on qualitative information and consequently most methods used in data collection and analyses are qualitative in nature. Quantitative information is also used, albeit to a much lesser extent, mainly when reviewing past macro-economic or budget trends. Methods used for gathering information include review of documents, key informant interviews, participants’ observation, and network mapping. The extent to which each method was used depended on the focus.

In this study, case studies of past policy processes in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda were undertaken, so as to understand agricultural policymaking, gain benchmarks for NEPAD policy processes, and identify positive drivers of change that the NEPAD initiatives can use to better link with the national agricultural policymaking processes. This entailed a historical perspective detailing all events and stakeholders involved in the chosen policies. One main challenge encountered at this level was that policy processes in these countries are not usually documented and are in fact difficult to document since many processes bear strong informal components. As a result, a review of documents yielded little information and reliance had to be made on key informant interviews and stakeholder network mapping. Interviews with agriculture ministry officials or statutory organisations involved in the chosen sub-sectors helped identify stakeholders knowledgeable about the policy processes. Interviews were undertaken with these persons so as to capture the chronology of events and network mapping was conducted with a few of them to better understand the level and type of interaction by different stakeholders.

In order to understand the role of agriculture in national policy as well as its performance and challenges, historical government records including national plans, past strategies, various government reports, and project documents were reviewed. A review of budgetary papers, expenditure reports, statistical abstracts, past governments’ books, agriculture annual reports, and other publications helped in establishing the amount of resources allocated to agriculture and absorption rates for various ministries.
within the Agricultural Sector Ministries. Appraisal of more recent policy and strategy documents and programme reports enabled the outlining of current government policies, strategies and programmes/projects within the agricultural sector ministries.

Various methods were used to capture information on the processes and stakeholder participation of the two NEPAD initiatives. This started with a review of NEPAD documents so as to understand the principles and frameworks under which the two initiatives were formulated. The original APRM and CAADP documents were reviewed to capture the general overview and to understand the goals, inherent characteristics, and political frontloads of these programmes. At the country level, documents analysed for APRM were the country self-assessment, reports that included the PoAs, along with progress reports on the implementation of the PoAs. For CAADP, documents examined included the Stock Taking Reports, proceedings of different CAADP related meetings at the regional level, and the National Medium-Term Investment Programme (NMTIP) and Bankable Investment Project Profiles (BIPPs). The review of written material was augmented with interviews and discussions with key implementation partners and relevant actors in the APRM and CAADP processes. These included the CAADP focal point persons, and the NEPAD secretariat who are implementing APRM at the national level. In addition, interviews were conducted on a selection of individuals from participating institutions within the agricultural sector. For APRM, those interviewed included stakeholders that did not participate in the process so as to get their views on the process, how well it covered agricultural issues, and how it would have been conducted differently so as to address agricultural governance issues. Participants’ observations about CAADP and its associated events were elicited through simple feedback mechanisms. So as to understand the level of stakeholder participation, their levels of influence, and others’ interactions amongst these stakeholders, network mapping was undertaken on the implementers and those who took part such as the resource person on the stock-taking for Kenya.

According to the nature of the gathered information, most analysis was qualitative in nature. For some parts of the study, Atlas.ti, a software for qualitative data analysis was used.
3 African agriculture: Importance, challenges, and policy strategies

3.1 Importance of agriculture for growth, poverty reduction, and food security in Africa

Agriculture plays a dominant role in most African societies. Despite its current weaknesses, it is a key for spurring growth, getting large numbers of people out of poverty, and is a principal route to meeting the MDGs. Agriculture is to be considered more than simply an economic activity – it is a key for food security and thus for survival, a means of livelihood and culture, and a provider of environmental services but also a major source of environmental degradation if unsustainable practices are used.

Agriculture currently accounts for about 30 percent of SSA’s GDP, at least 40 percent of export value, and approximately 70-80 percent of employment (FAO 2006; IMF 2006; World Bank 2006; World Bank 2007b). More than 75 percent of the total population live in rural areas and the majority of them are smallholder households involved in agricultural activities (FAO 2006; ILO 2007). Their employment in the agricultural sector gives them an opportunity to earn their livelihood mostly by a combination of subsistence and market production. Their purchasing power is a key driver of demand for African industrial/manufactured goods and services. In a number of smaller and resource-poor countries, agriculture plays an even more dominant role, representing 80 percent or more of export earnings (World Bank 2007b). There are, however, also some African countries, particularly in the extreme North and South, where its role has already greatly declined. In some African countries, agriculture’s importance is camouflaged by the dominance of a few industries, often based on mineral resources.

It is to be well noted that two-thirds of manufacturing added value in most African countries is based on agricultural raw materials. Indeed, food products constitute a large proportion of overall consumption in developing countries – in poor countries and for poor households more than 60 percent. While with economic development this relative position is slowly diminishing, it takes a long time, all the more because during economic transformation the value of natural products in food consumption is de-
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creasing in relative importance through value addition by services for transformation, packaging, and convenience (World Bank 2007b).

Growth in Africa has been very low for a long time. Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth was a sluggish 2.9 percent in the 1980s and 1.7 percent in the 1990s (Arbache / Go / Page 2008). However, from 1994 to 2006, the annual growth in GDP and per capita income, when weighted by each country’s GDP, approaches 6 and 4 percent, respectively (Arbache / Go / Page 2008; World Bank 2008). Although improvement in aggregate output does not necessarily indicate broad economic development of the region, this growth episode has nonetheless lasted 12 years altogether, a period that is neither trivial nor brief.2

As a result of recent policy improvements, backed by higher commodity prices until mid-2008, real agricultural GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has accelerated from 2.3 percent per year in the 1980s, to 3.3 percent in the 1990s, and to 3.8 percent per year between 2000 and 2005. Growth is even higher in countries such as Ghana which has recorded an average agricultural growth of 4.2 percent and 5.2 percent over the periods 1994-2006 and 2000-2006 respectively. Rural poverty has started to decline in 10 of 13 countries analysed over the period 1990–2005. In Ghana, where rural population accounts for more that 60 percent of the population, rural poverty declined from 63.6 percent in 1992 to 39.2 percent in 2006, a decline of about 24 percentage points (Breisinger et al. 2008).

Despite real agricultural GDP growth, the number of people living on less than US$1 per day has increased and is expected to increase further by 45 million in 2015 compared to 1999 (FAO 2006; Gallup / Radelet / Warner 1997; Ndulu et al. 2007). In the other developing regions, the poverty numbers are expected to decrease by 330 million in the same period (FAO

2 The current economic and financial crisis, which has started at the end of the empirical phase of this study, will presumably put an end to the long growth period mentioned. Already since the beginning of 2008, the world food crisis has had major repercussions on African food and agricultural markets, finishing a long period of low and ever decreasing food prices. The crisis is alarming many African governments that a continuation of reliance on cheap food imports would probably be a major risk for their food security. However, it also offers producers a chance to earn more through higher agricultural prices. These two very recent developments did not have an influence on available agricultural statistics or observable agricultural policymaking for this study, but they make its topic even more relevant.
According to FAO (2006), Africa is the region with the highest prevalence of under-nourishment, with one in three people deprived of access to sufficient food.

Until now, the demand for and shortages of food have usually been covered by massive food imports making most of SSA dependent on the rest of the world (FAO 2006). However, some 200 million Africans are undernourished despite commercial food imports of US$ 15–20 billion and about US$2 billion in food aid per year (UNECA 2007). Domestic production for achieving food security is particularly critical in a dozen countries of SSA, with a combined population of about 200 million and with highly variable domestic production, limited tradability of food staples, and foreign exchange constraints in meeting their food needs through imports. These countries are exposed to recurrent food emergencies and the uncertainties of food aid. Thus, for them increasing and stabilising domestic production is essential for food security.

FAO’s projections suggest that the prevalence of hunger in this region will decline by 2015 but that the number of hungry people will not fall below that of 1990–92. By then, SSA will be home to around 30 percent of the undernourished people in the developing world, compared with 20 percent in 1990–92. Moreover, the regional average food consumption level in Africa is expected to increase only by 7 percent in the next 15 years to 2360 kcal/person/day compared with 2700 for South Asia, 2980 for Latin America and 3060 for East Asia (FAO 2006; IFPRI 2007). Imports meet much of African countries’ need for agricultural products to close the growing gap between production and consumption. Africa has become a net food importer during the last decades.

Due to its large share in the economy, particularly in SSA, agriculture must be an important source of growth for national economies (AfDB 2002; FAO 2006; Ravallion 2001; World Bank 2007b). Closely linked to other sectors of the economy, growth in agriculture can contribute significantly to general economic growth, providing new engines of growth, particularly in the countryside, as well as an opportunity to substitute imports – and to generate exports (FAO 1996; FAO 2006; World Bank 2007a; World Bank 2007b; World Bank / IFPRI 2006). Studies on economic development in other regions indicate the potential of the agricul-
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tural sector in growth and development in Africa (Diao et al. 2006; Johnston / Mellor 1961; UN 2005; van de Walle 2001). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2006), agricultural growth has powerful leverage effects on the rest of the economy, especially in the early stages of the economic transformation, and it can generate employment intensive patterns of development favourable for the poor (see Box 3-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 3-1: Evidence for the impact of agricultural growth on poverty alleviation</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>The recent decline in the US$1-a-day poverty rate in all developing countries, from 28 percent in 1993 to 23 percent in 2002, has been due mainly to falling rural poverty (from 37 percent to 30 percent) while the urban poverty rate remained nearly constant (at 13 percent) (IMF 2006). More than 80 percent of the decline in rural poverty is attributable to better conditions in rural areas rather than to out-migration of the poor (Hazell / Diao 2005; Scoones / Devereux / Haddad 2005; UN 2005). Evidence consistently shows that agricultural growth is highly effective in reducing poverty. Gallup et al. (1997) reported that every 1 percent increase in per capita agricultural output led to a 1.61 percent increase in the incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the population. Thirle et al. (2001) concluded from a major cross-country analysis that, on average, every 1 percent increase in agricultural yields reduces the number of people living on less than US$1 a day by 0.83 percent.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Another aspect which pleads for an agriculture-led development path in many African countries is the fact that for standard mass manufactures, several Asian countries, particularly China, have a strong comparative advantage and a position in world markets that is hard to attack for newcomers.

Probably the biggest and most basic challenge for Africa is how to feed its growing population. While it is generally acknowledged that food security is more a problem of access to food (and, thus, of poverty) than of food production, it is important to realise that under the special conditions of many parts of SSA this may be an over-simplification and neglects the importance of national agricultural production. Agricultural production, poverty, and food security are intrinsically linked for several reasons:

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3 The recent food crisis has clearly increased the attention to the fragility of world food markets.
1. Agricultural production for subsistence as well as for national and international markets is the major source of income for the majority of the rural poor.

2. In many regions of Africa, staple food crops are non-tradable meaning that the basic food of poor people in rural areas cannot be purchased on international markets.

3. In many African rural areas, food markets are not functioning well and suffer from high transaction costs, lack of transparency on prices and stocks, lack of liquidity and credit to carry out transactions at due time, important fluctuations, and even complete break-down particularly during the rainy seasons. Often, political decisions to stop food trade exacerbate the situation.

4. Lack and instability of foreign currency earning hamper the ability of governments and private actors to continually purchase food on the world market in sufficient volumes.

5. Governments often do not have the financial, logistics, planning, and human capacities to provide sufficient food to vulnerable groups in rural areas. Sometimes, even the willingness is lacking.

3.2 Obstacles for agricultural sector performance in Sub-Saharan Africa

There are numerous obstacles that make it difficult for agriculture in SSA to perform in the way necessary to meet the challenges it is expected to do. Some external, more or less immutable factors to the under-performance of agriculture in SSA are the prevalence of poor soils, unsuitable conditions for irrigation, difficult conditions of animal husbandry and problems of integrating agriculture and livestock, as well as large variations in growing conditions in many parts of the continent. In former times, land use techniques were adapted to these conditions. For example, farmers in SSA have traditionally relied on extended fallow periods of 10−15 years following a two to three year production cycle to maintain crop yields and soil fertility. While SSA population densities remained relatively low, it was feasible to simultaneously maintain fallows and increase aggregate agricultural production by bringing new land under cultivation. Another
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major adaptation was that livestock and agriculture were separated in several ways including space, ethnic groups, and transhumance.

Population increases of nearly 3 percent a year since the mid-1940s, however, have made it difficult to maintain soil quality and increase production using these extensive techniques. Population is now doubling approximately every 25 years. It is estimated that by 2010, SSA fallows will have disappeared in 20 countries and will constitute less than 25 percent of arable lands in another 29 countries (Angé 1993). Declining fallows lead to various forms of land degradation: the soil fertility of cultivated land is no longer able to regenerate naturally; farmers are pushed onto marginal, environmentally fragile lands; and vegetative cover, which protects soil against erosion, progressively disappears. In addition, increased livestock density on the remaining pastures degrades natural vegetation. It has been estimated that 72 percent of African arable land and 31 percent of pasture lands have already been degraded as a result of soil erosion (Oldeman / Hakkeling / Sombroek 1991). Fragile soils with poor buffering capacity have been particularly susceptible to this type of degradation when cultivated continuously. The soil erosion has caused a 7 percent loss of agricultural productivity on irrigated lands, 14 percent loss on rain fed crop land, and 45 percent loss on rangeland (Crosson / Anderson 1995). Declining soil fertility is considered by some scientists to be the most fundamental impediment to agricultural growth and a major reason for decreasing trends in food production in SSA (Sanchez et al. 1995).

Productivity enhancing inputs, notably mineral fertiliser are very little used. Experience elsewhere has shown that fertiliser can provide a substantial productivity boost. A third of the increase in cereal production worldwide and 50 percent of the increase in India’s grain production has been attributed to fertiliser-related factors (FAO 2006). According to Morris et al. (2007), in 1970, SSA used less than 5kg/ha while other developing regions used more than 15 kg/ha. Current use is only 9 kg/ha, down from highs of 11–12 kg/ha (FAO 2006). This contrasts sharply with more than 50 kg/ha used in Latin America and more than 80 kg/ha in Asia. Integrated soil fertiliser management including organic fertiliser could play a very important role for crop productivity in SSA. But in particular, new plant breeds have to be introduced which make it economically attractive both in terms of yield increment and stability to use higher fertiliser doses.
Furthermore, access to water and irrigation is a major determinant of land productivity and the stability of yields (FAO 1997). Irrigated land productivity is more than double that of rainfed land (FAO 1995a). However, in SSA, only 4 percent of the area in production is under irrigation, compared with 39 percent in South Asia and 29 percent in East Asia (FAO 1995a; FAO 1995b; World Bank 2007b).

The low level of productivity enhancing technologies and management are explained, apart from unfavourable natural environments in many cases, to a large extent by man-made weaknesses of the socio-economic and political environment of agriculture which prevailed in the last decades and partially continue up to the present.

Macroeconomic policies such as overvalued exchange rates, trade, and price policies strongly disfavoured and continue to disfavour internal terms of trade against agriculture (World Bank 2008b). Inadequate public investments, a reflection of policy biases against the sector, have contributed to poor delivery of services such as research and extension. The share of public spending on agriculture has declined steadily in the last 20 years and is presently very low, about 4 percent on average compared to the 10 percent and more allocated by transforming countries during their periods of agricultural growth. In addition, agricultural spending was biased towards subsidising private goods (fertiliser and credit) constituting social regressive transfers which according to the World Bank (2008b) are substantially less productive than investments in public goods such as research, rural infrastructure, education, and health. Heavy borrowing by governments raises interest rates and crowds out agriculture and other productive sectors.

Apart from framework conditions, many national policies and institutions more specific to rural development and agriculture exacerbate poor agricultural performance. Many issues of land access remain unsolved, especially for women. This reduces investments due to uncertainty about reaping the fruits of investment and hampers agricultural credit due to lack of collateral. Credit to the agricultural sector for investment and technology adoption is further hampered by the higher risk of the sector and high transaction costs in rural areas, while policy has ceased to encourage agricultural credit. The same is true for public agricultural extension services
that were drastically compressed in the last decades. Limited statistics on agriculture hinder effective planning and policymaking for the sector. Poor general rural infrastructure, as well as poor legal and regulatory environments, and the weak imposition of the rule of law especially in rural areas, increase transaction costs in rural investments, contracts, and trade. The poor infrastructure also limits development of rural agro-industry. In general, poor governance and corruption in key institutions supporting agriculture have either led to the collapse of many rural support organisations or weakened them in terms of finances, human resources, and performance.

Internationally, policies and market trends have also contributed to the weakness of African agriculture. Decreasing prices for agricultural products, due to high productivity growth in other parts of the world often supported by subsidies and protection particularly in industrialised countries, have weakened export earnings and sharpened the competition for local products. Low world market prices have contributed to make policymakers confident to rely on cheap imports for achieving food security. They lowered import tariffs, often under additional pressure of structural adjustment programmes, which followed an open trade paradigm. Thus, low food prices reduced the attractiveness of agriculture for foreign and local investors including farmers.

Policies of Africa’s development partners have also not been favourable to agriculture. The share of agriculture in official development assistance (ODA) declined from 18 percent in 1979 to 3.5 percent in 2004 (World Bank 2007b). Some of the reasons for the decline in donor support to agriculture and rural development are supposed to be falling international commodity prices that made agriculture less profitable; increased competition within ODA from social sectors; and failed agricultural development efforts. Implementation of large-scale agricultural development projects were faced with weak governance and special dispersion of programmes; emergency responses to numerous crises; opposition from farmers in some donor countries to supporting agriculture of international competitors; and opposition from environmental groups that saw modern agriculture as a contributor to natural resource destruction and environmental pollution.
In the last two years, there are signs that the times of ever decreasing food prices are probably over. Global food prices have been rising sharply until early 2008, and although they have fallen sharply again since then, they are likely to remain higher than before the food crisis (OECD / FAO 2007). These projections are due to structural changes such as continuing population increase, urbanisation, changes in consumer habits, and strong income increase in many developing countries, leading to increased demand for food and particularly for animal products which triggers increased feedstock demand. Changes in economic support to agriculture in wealthy countries are another factor. Increased absorption of agricultural output through bio-fuel production may further contribute to pressure on food markets and higher prices. Box 3–2 gives more information on food prices and donor support to agriculture.

**Box 3–2: Food prices and donor support to agriculture**

Higher food prices have positive effects on agriculture but contradictory effects on the poor: On the one hand, they are threatening the livelihoods and nutrition of poor people because they spend more than half their income on food and food price increases are detrimental to their purchasing power. On the other hand, they may actually increase the incomes of most poor because they rely on agriculture – directly or indirectly – for earning their livelihoods, and rising food prices increase their agricultural incomes, labour wages, or they profit from higher economic growth in the rural areas. Negative price effects on the demand side are immediately felt while positive effects on the income side are more often medium to long-term, since they can only be realised through supply increases which assume capacity reserves and require increased use of productive resources. Public policies to deal with rising prices have to balance both effects (Ahmed / Hill / Smith 2007).

In summary, rather than being simply a technology and productivity problem, agriculture performance has a strong political dimension. Hence, policymakers have an important role to play in agricultural policymaking, to guarantee agricultural growth, poverty alleviation, and food security in Africa. The next section presents the actions that NEPAD has undertaken to revitalise African agriculture.
4 NEPAD attempt to revitalise African agriculture

As repeatedly indicated in the last chapters, agriculture and the support of African governments and donors to it have experienced a long-term stagnation and even decline in amount and performance. It is only in recent years that the crucial role of agriculture for the development of SSA seems to have been recognised again, not only with regard to food security and the fight against poverty and hunger, but also for a broader economic development of the continent. It was at the beginning of this century that new plans emerged to revitalise agriculture at the pan-African level, often in a package with other political and economic attempts to renew Africa. These plans have been consolidated within NEPAD, which officially is the economic programme of the African Union (AU) (see below).

APRM and to a lesser extent CAADP are arguably the two most important NEPAD initiatives. While APRM is not sector specific and intends to improve general governance, CAADP has the specific goal to help African countries to reach a higher path of economic growth through agricultural-led development. The two NEPAD initiatives cannot be understood without understanding NEPAD. In order to understand NEPAD it is necessary to gain a sense of how it came into existence and what the ideas behind it are. In the next sections, a brief overview of NEPAD is presented, while CAADP and APRM are described in more detail.

4.1 AU / NEPAD

According to its key document, NEPAD is

“a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politics”

(NEPAD 2001).

Thus, the three main interrelated long-term objectives of NEPAD are eradicating poverty, accelerating growth, and reversing the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process. NEPAD resulted ultimately from a merge of the Millennium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery Programme
(MAP) and the Omega Plan. The MAP was a far-reaching plan that embraced many aspects of development, including conflict resolution, governance, investment, aid, and debt. The plan was initiated by Presidents Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria), Thabo Mbeki (South Africa) and Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria). The Omega Plan, put forward by President Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) after he came into office in 2000, focused on four priority sectors: agriculture, education, health, and infrastructure. The merger of the MAP and the Omega Plan led to the New African Initiative (NAI), which was approved by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit of Heads of State and Government (HSG) and endorsed by the leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) countries in July 2001. The Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) finalised the policy framework in October 2001 and the NAI was renamed NEPAD.

4.1.1 NEPAD’s principles and goals

NEPAD is based on a number of principles: most importantly African ownership and leadership, broad participation by all sectors of the society, domestic and international partnerships, and, more generally, a commitment to the MDGs. To help achieve these goals, NEPAD calls for attaining and sustaining an average growth of real GDP of above 7 percent a year for the next 15 years (NEPAD 2003a).

To translate the goals of NEPAD into action, Section V of the October 2001 NEPAD document, entitled “Programme of Action: The strategy for achieving sustainable development in the 21st century” is central. The NEPAD document starts with three opening sections which introduce the document, set the stage by reviewing the place of Africa in today’s world, and state the new political will and resolve of African leaders in the context of the spread of democracy. Afterwards the document moves rapidly to set out the strategy, to a discussion of general programmes of action, and to an implementation plan. The programme of action is divided into three parts, in each of which major initiatives are laid out (see Box 4–1).
### Box 4-1: NEPAD’s programme of action

#### Conditions for sustainable development

- Peace, security, democracy and political governance.
- Economic and corporate governance – a set of concrete and time-bound programmes aimed at enhancing the quality of economic and public financial management.
- Sub-regional and regional approaches to development

#### Sectoral priorities

- Infrastructure – bridging the infrastructure gap (roads, highways, airports, seaports, railways, waterways, and telecommunications facilities).
- Human resource development – developing the region's human resources, including reversing the brain drain.
- Agriculture – improving performance in agriculture and achieving food security.
- Environment – protecting the environment (combating desertification, wetland conservation, coastal management, and other issues).
- Culture – protecting and promoting Africa's culture.
- Science and technology platforms – ensuring connectivity and cooperation in science and technology.

#### Mobilisation of resources

- Capital Flows – mobilising resources (domestic resources, debt relief, ODA reforms, private capital flows, etc.).
- Market access – taking steps to ensure market access for Africa's exports (diversification of production, value-added agricultural exports, mining, manufacturing, and tourism).

### 4.1.2 NEPAD’s structure

NEPAD is run by a number of organs at different levels (see Figure 4–1). These include the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), the Steering Committee, the Secretariat, and special Task Teams.
The HSGIC is tasked with the execution of top decisions and the implementation of NEPAD policies. The HSGIC reports to the AU/OUA Summit, which provides leadership to the NEPAD process, meets at least three times per annum to review progress and takes decisions on strategic issues, and reports annually to the Assembly of the AU. The HSGIC is comprised of 15 states with five being initiating states (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa). The other 10 states have been selected according to the five OUA regional groupings of the continent, with each region to be represented by a total of three countries including the initiating states.

The Steering Committee is made up of personal representatives of the five initiating presidents. This committee is responsible for the development of
terms of reference for identified programmes and projects and it oversees the Secretariat. The Steering Committee meets regularly with full participation of the AU Commission.

The Secretariat is a small team of professionals based at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in Midrand, South Africa. It carries out the functions of liaison and coordination, administration, and logistics. It also outsources work on technical detail to lead agencies and/or continental experts. The Secretariat is not a decision-making entity.

4.1.3 Critical appreciation of NEPAD

According to NEPAD’s critics, the NEPAD vision was not the product of broad national consultation and regional deliberations, but was conceived and articulated by a few African leaders, unveiled initially in the West, and subsequently brought back and “marketed” to the African people (Snoddy 2005). NEPAD therefore cannot summarily assume that broad-based assent to and ownership of the vision currently prevails or will necessarily prevail in the future (see African Civil Society Declaration on NEPAD 2002). The exclusionary manner of its conception has led NEPAD to be accused of being an elite initiative, in some quarters, which is more likely to benefit governments and big business than ordinary citizens (see Afrobarometer survey of 2002–2003). It has even been accused of being little more than a “home-grown” variation of the stabilisation and conditionality policies advanced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in their relations with African governments (see African Civil Society Declaration on NEPAD 2002).

It is difficult to accept or reject these critics in an objective way. It is certainly true that NEPAD suffers from a certain lack of democratic roots and practice. In contrast to the AU, the legitimacy of NEPAD is not based on clear, transparent, and democratic principles. On the other hand, the AU – though more corresponding to a common democratic undertaking of equals – is not free of problems and critics. In fact, on a continent of 52 countries with the bulk of the world’s weakest countries in terms of governance, human rights, and political and economic development, there is no simple solution to find common values, policies, and rules. Nor is it simple to create effective representative organisations. However, since programme implementation will to a large degree take place at a national level, the historic
and theoretical legitimacy of NEPAD will depend ultimately on individual countries’ willingness and ability to implement suggested reforms.

4.2 CAADP: An emerging African agricultural agenda?

To foster agricultural development, in 2003 NEPAD launched CAADP. The common framework is reflected in a set of key principles and targets defined by the HSG. The CAADP initiative takes a continent-wide view, but builds on national and regional plans for the development of agriculture. It is a manifestation of African commitment to address issues of growth in the agricultural sector, rural development, and food security and has been instrumental in bringing agriculture back to the center stage of economic development and poverty alleviation.

4.2.1 Early CAADP process and implementation

The origin of CAADP dates back to the year 2001 when the FAO organized a brainstorming on the role of agriculture in the implementation of NEPAD, which had been created just some months earlier (see Chapter 3.1). During a consultative process of about two years (see Box 4–2), a central document was elaborated by the FAO under close cooperation with the NEPAD secretariat (FAO 2004). In early July 2003, in the first conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the AU in Maputo, Mozambique, a CAADP Plan of Action for national and regional levels was drafted and presented to the participants. In the second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU in mid-July 2003 in Maputo, CAADP was approved by the HSG and the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa was adopted (NEPAD 2003a).

At the meeting of Agricultural Ministers of the NEPAD Implementation Committee at Rome in September 2003, the participants requested that the FAO assist in implementing the Maputo Declaration by preparing National Medium-Term Investment Programmes (NMTIP) and portfolios of Bankable Investment Project Profiles (BIPPs) as implementation modalities for CAADP in each country (see Box 4–1). The aim was to create an environment favourable for improved competitiveness of the agricultural and rural sector; achieve quantitative objectives and mobilisation of resources to the extent needed for the associated investments in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td><strong>Brainstorming Workshop – Agriculture and Water (FAO, Rome):</strong> FAO organised in Rome, in December 2001, a workshop for the 15 member countries of the NEPAD Implementation Committee which focused on required investments on land and water improvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2002</td>
<td><strong>Work-in-progress Workshop (Benoni, RSA):</strong> FAO made a case for giving prominence to agriculture – both in terms of production and trade – in the NEPAD process at the meeting organised by the NEPAD Steering Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2002</td>
<td><strong>Twenty-second FAO Regional Conference (Cairo, Egypt):</strong> The agenda of the Twenty-second FAO Regional Conference for Africa (4–8 February 2002) included a major item on NEPAD, for discussion at both ministerial and experts levels. The discussion led to increased awareness of NEPAD and a resolution was adopted which recommended actions for governments and encouraged FAO to continue extending support to the process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Second quarter 2002 | **CAADP preparation through a consultative process:** At the invitation of the NEPAD Steering Committee, FAO worked with African experts on a draft CAADP document which was finalised after consultations with relevant ministries, Regional Economic Groupings, regional development banks and farmers’ organisations, among others. On 17 May 2002 a first draft was presented to the NEPAD Steering Committee in Maputo to secure guidance before finalising the version to be presented to African Ministers for Agriculture in Rome, in June 2002.  

**CAADP Endorsement:** The CAADP was endorsed by African Ministers for Agriculture on 9 June 2002 in Rome at a Follow-up Ministerial Meeting on NEPAD (additional session of the Twenty-second FAO Regional Conference for Africa). |
| December 2002 | A special set of meetings was organised 5–12 December 2002 in Abuja by the Government of Nigeria, African Development Bank (AfDB), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the NEPAD Secretariat |
| Box 4-2 (cont.): Consultative process for preparation and follow-up of CAADP from 2001 to 2003 |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **December 2002**               | and FAO for Regional Economic Communities. The meetings, which consisted of segments at expert, ministerial, and HSG levels, led to the adoption of an Abuja Declaration that included commitments and decisions on action as well as creating an enabling environment for agriculture. The Declaration also committed to the preparation of a comprehensive and detailed Action Plan that would convert the broad thrusts of the CAADP document into more bankable projects reflecting the priorities of Regional Economic Organisations (REOs) / Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (and their national memberships) as well as NEPAD “Flagship Programmes” to be proposed by the REOs/RECs. |
| **Late March – early April 2003** | The NEPAD Secretariat organised, in Johannesburg, an inter-agency workshop to prepare the Action Plan recommended at Abuja. |
| **July 2003**                   | Mozambique-AU-NEPAD-FAO expert (1 July 2003) and ministerial (2 July 2003) meetings on the NEPAD agriculture programme. The meetings considered three documents: (a) The state of food and agriculture in Africa 2003; (b) Responding to agricultural and food insecurity challenges – Mobilising Africa to implement NEPAD programmes; and (c) The process of converting the CAADP to implementable Plans of Action at national and regional levels. The recommendations of the ministerial meeting were conveyed to the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which adopted them and concretised their commitment in the form of the Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa (Maputo Declaration). |


agriculture; achieve the targeted allocation of national budgetary resources to this area, reflecting the commitment made in the Maputo Declaration; and create a framework for coordinated bilateral and multilateral financing of the sector.

FAO worked with more than 50 countries in preparing the NMTIP and BIPPS but for reasons that are not fully clear they were not implemented.
One possible reason may have been that these plans were not integrated with national strategies. Therefore, NEPAD proposed a different approach with a RECs-led process that highlights the CAADP objectives and pillars as a framework. The NMTIPs and BIPPs may still be considered as part of the stocktaking exercises that occurred in the new process.

**Goal and objective of CAADP**

The CAADP initiative takes a continent-wide view, but is expected to be implemented at regional and national levels (see Section 4.2.2 and Figure 4–2). The goal of CAADP is to “help African countries reach a higher path of economic growth through agriculture-led development, which eliminates hunger, reduces poverty and food insecurity, and enables expansion of exports.” The original focus was to promote immediate interventions that best respond to the widely recognised crisis situation of African agriculture. Thus, CAADP had been cast to deliberately focus on investment in the three pillars that were deemed to make the earliest difference to African agriculture’s dire situation: i) sustainable land use, ii) rural infrastructure and trade related capacities, and iii) food security (see Section 4.2.5). At the request of Africa’s Agricultural Ministers, a “Research and Technology” pillar was added and subsequently incorporated into the CAADP main document (FAO 2004).

By signing the Maputo Declaration, African HSG endorsed and accepted CAADP as a vision for the restoration of agricultural growth, food security, and rural development in Africa. As a programme of the AU/NEPAD, it is said to emanate from and be fully owned and led by African Governments. More specifically, the Maputo Declaration sets key principles and goals to be achieved by the year 2015:

- Improve the productivity of agriculture to attain an average annual growth rate of 6 percent, with particular attention to small-scale farmers, especially focusing on women.
- Allocate 10 percent or more of their budget to agriculture.
- Have dynamic agricultural markets within countries and between regions.
Figure 4-2: Framework for CAADP and APRM policy processes

Source: Own compilation
- Have integrated farmers into the market economy and have improved access to markets to become a net exporter of agriculture products.
- Achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth.
- Be a strategic player in agricultural science and technology development.
- Practice environmentally sound production methods and have a culture of sustainable management of the natural resource base.

The main document has not been redrafted since though a Companion Document has been added to better cover livestock, fisheries, and forestry (AU / NEPAD 2003). The Companion Document was submitted to the AU Summit of July 2004 (see Section 4.2.5). An Implementation Road Map was approved by the African Partnership Forum (APF) in October 2004 (NEPAD 2004a). Nowadays, CAADP is usually referred to as a “framework” rather than as a development programme or plan.

4.2.2 Reasons for implementing CAADP at different levels

**Continental level**

There are two main objectives of AU / NEPAD to implement CAADP at the continental level:

- Ensuring the alignment of development assistance with CAADP objectives and principles.
- Securing commitment by partners to work with national governments and the private sector to meet the required level of investments.

**Regional level**

The main objective of the implementation of CAADP at the regional level is to provide the region with a single and unifying framework with several countries for programming and implementing actions for the development of the agricultural sector. The specific objectives are: (a) preservation of ownership and leadership of the CAADP implementation process by RECs, (b) identification of regional priorities, (c) establishment of coordin-
nation and governance mechanisms at the regional level, and (d) building
the capacities of RECs to coordinate the implementation process
(NEPAD 2004a; NEPAD 2005; NEPAD / Agricultural Unit 2007).

In the framework of the AU, RECs are the building blocks for Africa’s
economic integration (NEPAD 2003a). The RECs are seen as playing an
increasingly important role in the harmonisation and implementation of
agricultural policies, particularly with respect to agricultural and food
security aspects of regional integration, trade, and market development.
Several RECs have developed regional agricultural policy frameworks\footnote{For instance, Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) has adopted
its 'Politique agricole de l'UEMOA in 2001; ECOWAS has adopted a comprehensive
regional agricultural policy (the ECOWAP) in 2005; COMESA has developed its Agri-
cultural Strategic Framework; and Economic Community of Central African
States/Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Central (ECCAS / CEEAC) has
been given the mandate for agricultural policy harmonisation and for the development
of a common agricultural policy by 2008.}.

Besides providing strategic orientations for regional agricultural policies,
the frameworks also serve as guidelines for agricultural development in
relation to CAADP. Several of them will need updating and adaptation in
view of CAADP priorities, but also in view of ongoing regional integra-
tion efforts in the framework of Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
negotiations (EU-Commission 2007).

The roles of CAADP at the regional level include:

- preparation and implementation of related Regional Agricultural In-
vestment Programmes (RAIP),
- harmonisation of national agricultural policies,
- development of common agricultural policy,
- facilitation of joint management of cross-border intra-regional re-
ources (fish stocks, forestry, pasture grounds, water resources),
- promotion of intra-regional trade, by \textit{inter alia} adoption of com-
mon/international Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards and
reducing/eliminating tariffs on cross-border trade,
- guidance to and implementation of (sub)regional research pro-
grammes and coordination of national research programmes,
● coordination and standardisation of national information and early warning systems,

● regional strategies for emergencies/disasters,

● exchange of information/peer learning on agricultural practices, technology, and policies,

● strengthening of regional producer and sector organisations, and

● assistance in capacity building of national-level producer and sector organisation.

**National level**

The principles of the implementation of CAADP at the national level are to (a) avoid setting up a new process and build on ongoing efforts at national level, (b) align national efforts with the CAADP growth and budgetary objectives, and (c) add value to national efforts where needed.

Under the CAADP framework, the responsibility for programme implementation rests with the individual countries; the coordination role is designated to the RECs; and that of facilitation to the Continental NEPAD Secretariat. The Country Review Report (CRR) gives a framework condition for the policy implementation at the national level (see Chapter 4.3).

Each country will hold a Country Roundtable (CR) to work with stakeholders to elaborate a Country Compact (CC) to guide the implementation of CAADP in the long term by:

● building commitments in terms of sector policies, public expenditures, and development assistance,

● establishing partnerships and alliances for successful implementation of CAADP, and

● creating a mechanism for peer review and dialogue to track implementation performance and the progress in meeting the agreed upon commitments (NEPAD 2004a; NEPAD 2005; NEPAD 2007b).
The tasks of CAADP at the national level are:

- the development and implementation of agricultural policies and strategies on land tenure and management, input supply, marketing, and sector organisation,
- fostering of public-private partnerships and consultation mechanisms,
- drawing up of investment programmes (in line with PRSPs) in rural/agricultural productive and supportive infrastructure such as irrigation, storage, roads etc,
- guidance to and operation of national research and extension systems,
- facilitation of access to credit,
- facilitation and capacity building for producer and sector organisations,
- quality assurance, and
- national market and production information systems (EU-Commission 2007).

4.2.3 Implementation design of CAADP at the national level

Since the aim of this study is to better understand the role of CAADP at the national level, the following description of the implementation steps of CAADP is restricted to this level. This is not to say that regional and continental level implementation is not happening, and those levels of implementation may influence the national level CAADP policies. In fact, a limited number of programmes with the CAADP signet have been launched in a selected number of regions with several countries involved, such as Ghana and Kenya. It is highly probable that they will lead to additional CAADP activity at the national level. In addition, they are in particular raising the visibility of the NEPAD secretariat and RECs. However, these higher levels are difficult to track, except for the regular meetings and official statements, and they are not subject to this study.
Figure 4–3 shows the steps leading to a national CR which an individual country has to follow. The REC that is mandated to oversee the implementation usually sensitises the national governments on what CAADP entails and the process of implementation. After a government buys in (see below), it is supposed to appoint a National Focal Point Person (NFPP) at the directorate level in the Ministry of Agriculture. The NFPP will then organise the CAADP launch during which the Technical Working Committee (TWC) is formed. The Committee is mandated with the responsibility of running the CAADP process in a country, with the NFPP being its chair.

The TWC drafts the Terms of Reference (ToRs) for engaging two consultants to carry out a stocktaking exercise, which intends to describe past agricultural policies, the development of the sector and weaknesses, strengths, and lessons learned. The TWC is also responsible for identifying and selecting the consultants in close coordination, while payment is done by the responsible REC. The consultants present the report to the TWC. The committee then discusses the report and provides further input. The final report is forwarded to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) which further analyses the data and uses them to model options of investment on growth and their impact on poverty, thereby informing the identification of priorities for the agricultural development programme. A stakeholder workshop is then held followed by the CR Conference and Compact signing.

By endorsing the Compact:

- The government of the country pledges to fulfil the commitments specified therein, in line with the goals, objectives, principles, and modalities laid out in the countries strategic documents.
- The development partners pledge, collectively, to fulfil the commitments specified therein.
- AU, REC and other regional partners pledge, collectively, to fulfil the commitments specified therein in line with the Maputo Declaration and global principle of CAADP implementation.
- The private sector and civil society, collectively, pledge their support to realising the aspirations of the compact.
Figure 4–3: Steps leading to compact roundtable implementation

Step 1
National Focal Point appointed and attends meeting

Step 2
Steering and Technical Committees appointed

Step 3
Policy guidance Technical input

Step 4
Government support and backing

Step 5
Identify gaps and investment options

Step 6
Consensus building

Step 7
Stakeholder endorsement

Step 8
Fund raising and implementation

Source: Daka (2007)
By the time of finalising this study, only Rwanda has completed its CR Conference and Compact. Malawi has undertaken the stakeholders’ workshop and awaits the CR. Zambia and Uganda have submitted their final reports awaiting the stakeholder workshop. For a general overview of where countries of COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) regions stand in implementing CAADP (see Annex 2 and Annex 3). For other regions, no comprehensive information is available.

4.2.4 The new attempt to revive CAADP and new guidelines for CAADP implementation

In 2005, the NEPAD Secretariat undertook a new initiative to implement CAADP. Five regional “CAADP implementation planning meetings” were organised, followed by a high level “wrap-up” meeting in Accra in May 2005. This meeting produced the “Post-Accra Action Plan” for actions to be taken at the level of countries, RECs, and the NEPAD Secretariat. Furthermore, a CAADP Retreat on the Post-Accra Action Plan and on advancing the implementation of the CAADP agenda at regional and country levels was held in Pretoria in October 2005. This retreat brought together RECs, AUC, NEPAD, and Development Partners to agree on actions, commitments, and partnerships (NEPAD 2005; NEPAD 2006; NEPAD / Agricultural Unit 2007; NEPAD 2007b). In these meetings, bilateral and multilateral development partners committed to support the implementation of CAADP. Furthermore, they promised to seek aligning their assistance strategies and their activities in the agricultural sector with CAADP priorities and targets.

Moreover, a multi-donor CAADP Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank, has recently been established. The fund will support the development and implementation of CAADP processes and the institutions leading these processes such as NEPAD and the RECs. It will also support the development, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of CAADP pillar programmes and the institutions responsible for them at continental, sub-regional, national, and local levels. Finally, it will support the strategic management of the Trust Fund and the harmonisation of the activities of Africa’s development partners in their support of CAADP.

In addition to these high-level meetings, several other events were organised in the implementation of CAADP. Table 4–1 provides a list of CAADP expected changes at the continental level.
### Table 4–1: New CAADP agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Expected/desired change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country level</td>
<td>• Inter-ministerial collaboration, especially between Agriculture, Finance, Environment, and the Natural Resources Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased direct participation of in-country partners, such as civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, private sector, and faith institutions, in the development and implementation of agriculture and rural development investment programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Interaction and collaboration between government and development partners harmonised and more coherent and coordinated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Countries getting direct expert input/backstopping support in analytical work from local / African specialised institutions and knowledge centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Governments increase and sustain budget expenditure support to agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Quality agriculture investment programmes designed and implemented including regional programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strengthened capacities and competencies in local institutions including government to identify, formulate, and implement quality investment programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Governance arrangements and empowerment of in-country partners including community organisations provide for inclusive participation and support to agriculture development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Partnership between farmers and private sector organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level</td>
<td>• REC's taking more and better leadership in stimulating, coordinating, and facilitating support (financial, expert/technical, information, etc.) to country CAADP implementation processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regions better prepared to engage in global issues that affect or are affected by agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Environment for quality regional investment programmes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (cont.): New CAADP agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Expected/desired change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continental</td>
<td>● Resource mobilisation and lobbying in support for the CAADP strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Brokering and mitigation in political issues around agriculture and building consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Mutually interactive regional and continental information and knowledge system and a peer review framework based on an effective M&amp;E system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Increased evidence at all levels on the impact and value of the CAADP agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Africa more and better prepared to engage in global issues that affect or are affected by agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.5 CAADP content – pillars and cross cutting areas for investment and national level action

CAADP has technical thrusts, described as four main pillars (see Box 4–3). In addition, two cross-cutting themes have been identified. These cross-cutting themes are sometimes also referred to as “Pillars 5 and 6”. As mentioned above, a Companion Document has been added to the CAADP main document in order to cover the sub-sector livestock, fisheries, and forestry. The following information has been extracted from the core documents and general information of the CAADP (AU / NEPAD 2003; AU / NEPAD 2006; NEPAD 2004b; NEPAD 2005; NEPAD / Agricultural Unit 2007; NEPAD 2007b; NEPAD 2007b).

In the following, the four pillars, the cross-cutting areas, and the companion document of CAADP are sketched according to CAADP’s own logic. Although CAADP has undergone substantial changes in its character (see Chapter 4.2.1), the pillars have remained the same and are currently CAADP’s best known elements. The cost estimations date back to the initial document of 2003 and are reported here as an indication of the enormous size of the tasks to be tackled.
Box 4–3: The technical thrusts of CAADP – pillars, and cross-cutting areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The four pillars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Improving rural infrastructure and trade related capacities for market accesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Increasing food supply, reduce hunger, and improve responses to food emergency crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Improving agriculture research, technology dissemination, and adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cutting areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Capacity strengthening for agriculture and agribusiness: academic and professional training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Information for agricultural strategy formulation and implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Companion document: development of livestock, fisheries and forestry resources

**Pillar 1: Extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems**

This pillar recognises the importance of water and its managed use in raising the productivity of agriculture and ensuring sustainable and predictable outputs. Major efforts need to be undertaken to build up fertility and the moisture holding capacity of agricultural soils and to rapidly increase the area equipped with irrigation, especially small scale water control. Investment requirements for land and water development were estimated by AU / NEPAD at US$37 billion for the period 2002–2015, while operation and maintenance would require an additional US$32 billion.

**Pillar 2: Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market accesses**

Africa’s rural infrastructure is inadequate by any standard and its road network is particularly underdeveloped. Under this pillar, a major focus will be put on complementary investments in rural infrastructure, particularly rural roads, storage, and processing and marketing facilities that will be required to support the anticipated growth in agricultural production

Pillar 1: Extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems

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Pillar 2: Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market accesses

Africa’s rural infrastructure is inadequate by any standard and its road network is particularly underdeveloped. Under this pillar, a major focus will be put on complementary investments in rural infrastructure, particularly rural roads, storage, and processing and marketing facilities that will be required to support the anticipated growth in agricultural production
and improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. Investments were estimated at US$89 billion for rural infrastructure and US$2.8 billion for trade-related capacities for improved market access. The protection of infrastructure investments would require an additional US$37 billion for continuing operation and maintenance.

**Pillar 3. Increasing food supply, reduce hunger, and improve responses to food emergency crises**

Hunger still remains widespread in Africa. Two approaches are thought to have the potential to make an immediate impact on farmers’ livelihoods: (a) provision of safety nets; and (b) food security through agricultural production enhancement. Raising the productivity of 15 million small farms through improved technology, services, and policies was estimated to require US$7.5 billion while funds needed for emergencies and safety were estimated at US$42 billion.

**Pillar 4: Improving agriculture research, technology dissemination, and adoption**

In Africa, as elsewhere in the world, agriculture will need a scientific and technological underpinning to maintain sustained productivity gains which are necessary to remain competitive. Several lines of action will be necessary, including: (a) increasing investments in research and technology development; (b) increasing the share of private sector funding of agricultural research; and (c) institutional and financial reforms for greater research sustainability. A total of US$4.6 billion was estimated for this pillar.

**Cross cutting issue 1: Capacity strengthening for agriculture and agribusiness: academic and professional training**

The need for increasing capacity in agricultural science as well as agricultural and development economics in Africa arises out of the fact that Africa is experiencing a significant capacity shortage. The capacity gap must be addressed if the advances made thus far in agriculture-led poverty reduction in the continent are to continue and the regions currently experiencing serious declines in food security are to reverse their situation. There are many ways to tackle this problem, including by (a) significantly increasing the number of Africans with Post-Graduate degrees in agricul-
tural sciences and agricultural/development economics, (b) modernising smallholder farming through broad-based access to professional training, and (c) reforming and restructuring training and technology institutions, where necessary, raising efficiency of use of existing resources and improving the quality of services.

Cross cutting issue 2: information for agricultural strategy formulation and implementation

An important part of strategy and policy formulation and implementation is to have access to adequate benchmarks, best practices, statistical information, and other relevant technical information. This access is lacking in most African countries. The situation can be remedied by using modern communication technologies to collect, store, and expand access to the above information. Doing so collectively at the regional level would allow economies of scale and encourage mutual learning and exchange of experiences.

It is also critical to achieve consistency of long-term development efforts in African countries and in particular to maintain the focus on poverty reduction through higher productivity and incomes among the poorer segments of the population. It is therefore necessary to ensure that the CAADP agenda is in line with the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) processes. As more and more countries advance on the PRSP process, it is important that the associated budget support programmes reflect the pro-poor and pro-smallholder options that underlie the CAADP programme. To reach this goal, the following objectives were set: (a) improve the quality of sector governance and strategy formulation and implementation in the agricultural sector by African countries; (b) raise the allocation of resources by countries to the agricultural sector and (c) improve the implementation effectiveness of support programmes based on PRSPs, as well as the impact of such programmes in terms of their contribution to the objectives of growth, higher smallholder productivity, and poverty reduction.

Companion document: integrating livestock, forestry and fisheries sub-sectors into the CAADP

The Companion Document to CAADP elaborates strategies for improving livestock productivity and increasing the production of meat and milk
directed towards the three major production systems: (a) mixed crop livestock systems; (b) pastoral systems; and (c) intensive commercial systems. Special attention is devoted to strengthening policy coherence, institutions, and implementation capacities. Livestock research would focus specifically on feed supply, animal health, and genetic improvement. Total resource requirements for the 2004-2015 period were estimated at US$21.2 billion, with US$5.3 billion for policy and institutional development and US$15.9 billion for livestock infrastructure development.

The main areas of intervention in the forestry sub-sector include: (a) policy and legal reforms and improved land use planning (US$2.5 billion); (b) strengthening the institutional framework (US$9.9 billion); (c) sustainable forest management to enhance supply of goods and services (US$25.6 billion); and (d) complementary investments for the development of industries and supporting infrastructure (US$9.0 billion). Specific priority areas of action under each of the above were identified. The total investment is about US$47 billion for the period 2004 to 2015.

Priority investments for fisheries and aquaculture would be undertaken in the following strategic areas: (a fishery policy and institutional framework; (b) fishery equipment and infrastructure improvement; and (c) development of a vibrant commercial aquaculture. Over the period 2004-2015, estimated total resource requirements amount to US$35.3 billion, of which US$11.3 billion will be for sustaining and increasing production, US$7.4 billion for developing and adding value, US$4.9 billion for management and implementation, and US$5.9 billion for human and institutional capacity, learning, and exchanging of knowledge.

4.2.6 CAADP stakeholders

Box 4–4 presents the most important CAADP stakeholders involved at each level – national, regional and international. Stakeholders are defined here as persons, groups, or institutions with interests in CAADP and its outcomes. The most important stakeholders are those who can significantly influence, or are important to the success or the failure of the CAADP programme.
### Box 4–4: Most important CAADP stakeholders

#### Stakeholders at the continental level

Stakeholders at the continental level are African Union (AU) and NEPAD as main drivers of CAADP (and APRM). The task of the AU is mainly focusing on policy formulation in areas of continental relevance, policy harmonisation, monitoring of national policy undertakings, stimulating implementation of AU-level decisions and fostering of regional networks and partnerships. The NEPAD Secretariat is the technical arm in the CAADP process.

#### Stakeholders at the regional level

At the regional level, RECs such as ECOWAS and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are responsible for the implementation of the CAADP principles at the regional and national level. They are intended to play an important role in harmonisation, implementation and monitoring of CAADP agricultural policies. NEPAD shall provide technical guidance and work closely with RECs to stimulate the implementation of CAADP.

#### Stakeholders at the national level

At the national level, stakeholders include the CAADP focal points and organising committees and the different private stakeholders of agricultural policies and their organisations, i.e. farmers, processors, traders, consumers, input distributors, finance institutions providing agricultural credits, etc., as well as different public stakeholders, i.e. agricultural and related sector ministries such as those responsible for land ownership, water, natural resources, cooperatives, trade, etc. as far as they are responsible for issues concerning agriculture, and the respective public executing organisations.

#### Pillar institutions

Leading African institutions have been mobilised to provide the necessary technical expertise and facilitation to guide programme planning and implementation. In particular, these institutions are helping develop framework documents for the each of the pillars to serve as technical reference and guidance for RECs and their member countries as they develop and implement policy intervention and investment programmes. The documents analyse key challenges and issues, identifying success factors, best practices, and successful partnerships and alliance models that can be scaled and adapted to accelerate progress and improve implementation outcome.

**The institutions are:**

- The University of Zambia jointly with *Centre Inter-État de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel* (CILSS) for Pillar 1.
Box 4–4 (cont): Most important CAADP stakeholders

- The Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa (CMAWCA) for Pillar 2.
- The African Center for Food Security (ACFS) of KwaZulu Natal University and CILSS for Pillar 3.
- The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) for Pillar 4.

Stakeholders at the international level

Apart from these “official” stakeholders acting within the system, several “outsider” actors can or may play an important role in the implementation of CAADP. The following institutions are major providers of assistance to agriculture in Africa at the national level, which in principle and according to the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness, will align to national strategies and thus, to CAADP as far as it can shape national agricultural policies. The role of donors in implementing CAADP at the national level is part of the analysis of this study and further elaborated in Chapter 4. In addition, some declarations or additional initiatives by these donors are enumerated which are transnational in character and have more or less explicit relations to CAADP as a continental programme. The collaboration and alignment with organisations at the regional level is less clearly conceptualised, but some initiatives exist as well.

The World Bank provides the so called Country Performance Institutional Assessment (CPIAs) to NEPAD on request. It helps to develop a multi-country infrastructure programme and technical assistance to regional institutions and strategic support. With regards to CAADP, the World Bank supports the implementation of CAADP pillars.

European Union (EU) and AU cooperate on agricultural development in Africa. The main objective is to identify challenges to agriculture in Africa, on the African priorities, as reflected in CAADP, as well as on the EU policy focus to sustainable intensification of production, competitiveness, risk management and research. A discussion paper from the European Commission (2007) entitled “Advancing African Agriculture. Proposal for continental and regional level cooperation on agricultural development in Africa” reflects the envisaged activities and contributions of the European Commission to support CAADP.

US Agency for International Development (USAID) committed itself to collectively work with other Development Partners to improve economic governance, increase foreign and domestic investment, and improve aid effectiveness by aligning its policies and programmes around integrated and
strategic CAADP objectives. Further objectives are to secure real commitments against pledges made by African leaders to increase their own budgets for agriculture, align their investments with CAADP, and implement key reforms and policies to enable the sector to play its role in reducing poverty.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) plays an important role in CAADP’s development and implementation. Furthermore, it gives technical and financial support in the following three activities:

- Follow-up of the Maputo Declaration.
- Update the Horizon 2015 and Agriculture and Development and Food Security Strategies.
- Prepare NMTIPs consistent with the Maputo Declaration and, building upon NMTIPs, prepare BIPPs.

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) together with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and USAID, holds the leadership for consultations between the NEPAD Secretariat, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and several development partners to support the CAADP implementation process through research programmes. Development partners including DFID are committed to provide assistance to strengthen the capacities of RECs to enable them to successfully carry out their responsibilities of coordinating the CAADP implementation process.

IFPRI is presently the main scientific body to support CAADP through a collaborative Research and Capacity Building programme between NEPAD and IFPRI to inform and track the implementation of CAADP. Being basically funded by DFID and USAID, IFPRI uses additional research funds and projects to support its advisory services.

The recent multi-donor supported programme TerrAfrica forms an important implementation initiative in support of CAADP pillar 1 on land and water management.

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The recent multi-donor supported programme TerrAfrica forms an important implementation initiative in support of CAADP pillar 1 on land and water management.
4.2.7 Conceptual challenges of CAADP

The actual observation and analysis of the implementation of CAADP at the national level is one of the key objectives of the study and will be dealt with in depth in Chapter six. However, it seems to be appropriate to highlight already some conceptual challenges of CAADP which derive from the history and design presented so far. This makes it easier to understand some of the problems encountered at the national level.

One fundamental weakness was the lack of a clear roadmap and guide for CAADP process implementation in the initial period. Since this was a new process, it could be understood that RECs and AU were also learning and adjusting from the country experiences. This, to some extent, led to the delays and reduced speed for country process implementation. This was, however, addressed after the second and third CAADP Partner Platform meetings which directed that a clear roadmap of the CAADP country process implementation to be developed.

Another challenge is how to define thrust areas (in terms of pillars) that take due account of the extremely different situations of agriculture in SSA countries. These differ from very high to very low population densities, very poor to relatively high levels of economic development, presence or absence of alternative driving sectors of growth (notably mineral and oil resources), trade opportunities and geographical isolation, challenges and opportunities to achieve poverty alleviation and food security and to foster agricultural productivity increases, and other variations. Finding common denominators for agricultural policies which are general enough to be acceptable as a chapeau, but concrete enough to provide real guidance, is a major challenge of agricultural related continental frameworks.

The definition of agriculture under CAADP is very wide and comprises areas of responsibility which belong to a variety of Ministries in African countries. A non-exhaustive list of these ministries includes: Agriculture, Livestock, Water, Environment, Fishery, Forestry, Natural Resources, Land, and Infrastructure. The further design of the CAADP process does not seem to be appropriately taking into account this multi-sector dimension of agricultural policy when proposing the establishment of a unique focal point in the ministry of agriculture. Until now, the national CAADP focal point person has had other activities and he or she is not fully working on CAADP issues only. In contrast, the Presidencies and the Ministries
of Finance do not have an institutionalised role in implementing CAADP although the commitment of CAADP emanates from HSG and the major tangible commitment is the 10 percent budget allocation.

Only recently has the conceptualisation of the CAADP pillars become clearer. However, the coordination of the Pillar Institutions for the associated frameworks to inform the country process is very weak. From the timeline presented above, it is clear that the country level CAADP process has not had an opportunity to interact with, and therefore benefit from, Pillars and Pillar institutions in a bid to strengthen the design of agricultural policy frameworks and investment programmes. Though, this was meant to be one of their key roles.

4.3 APRM: creating a framework for good governance including for agriculture?

The second NEPAD programme that is the object of this study is the APRM. This section describes the principles and areas of review of the APRM, in general, preparing the ground for the analysis of its influence on the agricultural sector and agricultural policies in the two case study countries in Chapter 5.

4.3.1 Overview

APRM is for the time being the most prominent and operational Pillar of NEPAD. The primary purpose of the APRM is

"to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building”

(NEPAD 2003b, 1).

Countries are assisted to achieve NEPAD’s objectives through constructive peer dialogue and persuasion and sharing of information. Additionally, countries open themselves to critical scrutiny by other African countries and independent and widely respected, so-called eminent persons
who assess the country on a set of objectives, standards, criteria, and indicators in various domains of governance and development.

The prominence of the APRM can be explained by several reasons:

1) Governance is seen by many as key for achieving sustainable development in SSA (Herbert / Gruzd 2008), particularly by the donors of industrialised countries (Nuscheler 2009). This is not only true for donors, but also for other stakeholders in African development such as some African governments, civil society, and many private sector actors. However, not all share the same notion of good governance, their perception being influenced by different values, which in turn are influenced by history, ideology, experience, resources, and partial interests.

2) Since governance is closely linked to power, the debate on governance is politically extremely sensitive (Herbert / Gruzd 2008). This includes dialogue with donors around conditionality of development assistance. Often, political dialogue on national governance by the international community is refused by African governments, other governments, and other actors on the grounds of interference in internal affairs, neo-colonialism, policy space, and so on. The Organisation of the African Union, the predecessor of the AU, was based on the principle of non-interference.

3) The long-time reluctance of governments to discuss internal affairs including governance explains why it is perceived as a seminal step that African countries are opening themselves up to critical policy dialogue on governance. The AU has explicitly acknowledged this willingness. The most explicit process is the APRM, where review peers (see above) are invited to assess and discuss the internal organisation of African nations. The APRM provides criteria for good governance which are explicitly “African owned” and therefore not subject to the above-mentioned tensions.

Participation in the APRM is open to all member states of the African Union and so far twenty seven countries have acceded by signing the Memorandum of Understanding. However, only twelve have completed the full review cycle to date (Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda); several others are well underway, though programmes are not yet implemented at a substantial level (which is often criticised but probably not surprising given the often far-reaching recommendations for re-
form). Within the broadly defined framework, each country has organised the process in its own manner, differing in the degree of independence of the NEPAD structures from government and the role and clout of the various stakeholders. Figure 4–2 shows the design of CAADP and APRM framework at different levels.

4.3.2 APRM content – substantive areas

The APRM identifies four substantive areas, namely Democracy and Political Governance, Economic Governance and Management, Corporate Governance, and Socio-economic Development (NEPAD 2003b, 3). The purpose of the exercise is “to provide a clear framework to guide the design and implementation of the assessment in each of these areas” (NEPAD 2003b, 4). The framework for operationalising the four areas, as well as the key objectives, is further specified in Table 4–2. For each key objective various standards are set as well as indicative criteria and examples of indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4–2: Framework for the operationalisation of the APRM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democracy and political governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Prevent and reduce intra- and inter-country conflicts;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Constitutional democracy, including periodic political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law,</td>
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<td>a Bill of Rights and the supremacy of the constitution are</td>
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<td>firmly established in the constitution;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural,</td>
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<td>civil, and political rights as enshrined in all African</td>
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<td>and international human rights instruments;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Uphold the separation of powers including the protection</td>
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<td>of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective</td>
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<tr>
<td>parliament;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Ensure accountable, efficient, and effective public office</td>
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<td>holders and civil servants;</td>
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<td>● Fighting corruption in the political sphere;</td>
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<td>● Promotion and protection of the rights of women;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Promotion and protection of the rights of the child and</td>
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<td>young persons; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable</td>
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<td>groups, including displaced persons and refugees.</td>
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<td>Table 4–2 (cont.): Framework for the operationalisation of the APRM</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Economic governance and management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Promote macroeconomic policies that support sustainable</td>
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<td>development;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Implement transparent, predictable, and credible govern-</td>
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<td>ment economic policies;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Promote sound public finance management;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Fight corruption and money laundering; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Accelerate regional integration by participating in the har-</td>
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<tr>
<td>monisation of monetary, trade, and investment policies</td>
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<td>amongst the participating states.</td>
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<td><strong>3. Corporate governance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>● Provide an enabling environment and effective regulatory</td>
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<td>framework for economic activities;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Ensure that corporations act as good corporate citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>with regard to human rights, social responsibility and</td>
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<td>environmental sustainability;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Promote the adoption of codes of good business ethics (e.g.</td>
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<td>Cadbury and King Codes) in achieving the objectives of</td>
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<tr>
<td>the organisation;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Ensure that corporations treat all their stakeholders</td>
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<tr>
<td>(shareholders, employees, communities, suppliers, and</td>
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<tr>
<td>customers) in a fair and just manner; and</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Provide for accountability of corporations and directors.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. Socio-economic development</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>● Promote self-reliance in development and build capacity</td>
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<td>for self-sustaining development;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Accelerate socio-economic development to achieve sustain-</td>
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<tr>
<td>able development and poverty eradication;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Strengthen policies, delivery mechanisms, and outputs in</td>
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<td>key social development areas (including education for all</td>
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<td>and combating of Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired</td>
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<td>Immunodeficiency Syndrome [HIV/AIDS] and other</td>
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<td>communicable diseases);</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Ensuring affordable access to water, energy, finance (in-</td>
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<tr>
<td>cluding micro-finance), markets, and ICT to all citizens,</td>
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<tr>
<td>especially the rural poor;</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Progress towards gender equality, particularly equal ac-</td>
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<td>cess to education for girls at all levels; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Encourage broad based participation in development by all</td>
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<td>stakeholders at all levels.</td>
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</table>

Source: NEPAD (2003b)
4.3.3 APRM stakeholders

The APRM has four major organisational layers (see Figure 4–4). An African Peer Review Forum (APR Forum), composed of the HSG that have volunteered to participate, oversees the review process. This APR Forum in turn appoints a panel of seven eminent persons to serve as the African Peer Review Panel (APR Panel)\(^5\), which manages the review process and protects its integrity through overseeing the appointments of the technicians or institutions involved in the review process and reviewing the country reports. A Country Review Team (CRT) will conduct the actual review, which will receive technical and research support from the APRM Secretariat. The teams are constituted only for the period of the country review visit and are assembled specifically for one country. The building of the team is overseen by the APR Panel. Members usually are selected from long-term cooperating partner institutions (Grimm / Gyimah-Boadi 2008). These African partner institutions are *inter alia* the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which provide technical expertise and financial support not available within the AU and NEPAD.

4.3.4 Implementation design of APRM

There are five stages to the Africa Peer Review Process (APR Process):

- As a first step, after having formally acceded to the APRM, the country under review will provide data on the economic and political situation to the secretariat to develop a draft country Programme of Action (PoA).

- As a second step, the country review team will visit the country to evaluate the criteria provided by the country under review and meet with stakeholders, such as government representatives, parliamentarians, political party members, civil society, and the business community to develop a final PoA.

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\(^5\) An APR Panel consists of seven eminent Africans who command great respect on the continent and whose task is primarily to ensure the credibility and integrity of the APR Process.
In the third step, the country review team uses the PoA to develop an assessment of the country’s economic and political practices to create a Draft Country Review Report, which is discussed with the country in question. The government has a chance to respond to the country review and its comments will be attached to the review report.

In the fourth step, the country review team submits the review report to the APR Panel, which then submits it to the APR Forum with recommendations for the country under review.

In the final step, a country’s APR Report is publicised through regional and sub-regional organisations such as the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, the Peace and Security Council, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union, and the RECs to which the country belongs. Following the publication of the APR Report, the states are expected to undertake the reforms needed to improve governance.

According to the APRM philosophy, an unfavourable peer review does not result in sanctions from the peer countries. Instead, the imminent persons will undertake a “constructive dialogue” if a country does not show a “demonstrable will to rectify the identified shortcomings.” The constructive dialogue will be accompanied by “technical and other appropriate assistance.” If a country still refuses to comply, member states will take “appropriate measures by a given date.”

**National APRM Structure**

At the national level, each participating country must establish an APRM focal point, preferably at the ministerial level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or higher (Presidential Cabinet) to facilitate access to the Head of State and relevant ministries that will participate in the review (see Figure 4–5). As recommended by the eminent persons to the APR Forum, the country must also set up a national coordinating mechanism, including all the key government and civil society stakeholders that should be part of the review (APR Forum 2004).

The exact nature of the national focal points and coordinating mechanisms varies from one country to another, depending on each country’s resources and political makeup. Ghana, for example, had a dedicated Ministry for NEPAD, now integrated into the Foreign Ministry (and the Presidency), via which these structures were established. Kenya, on the other hand, established a semi-autonomous national NEPAD Secretariat, which is setting up the APR structures.

The Civil Society Panel shown is an option that some countries may incorporate into the National Coordinating Mechanism or as a substructure of the Coordinating Mechanism. The danger is that, in less democratic societies, the composition of this panel will be tightly controlled by government, effectively providing a barrier between civil society on the ground and the APR process instead of facilitating greater civil society involvement. In Ghana on the other hand, the “Governing Council” consisted exclusively of persons from civil society organisations.
The four somewhat nested areas of governance in APRM have different foci. Democracy and political governance, the first focus area that includes the rule of law, equality before the law, freedoms, and so on, is important because it is essential to be able to offer economic, corporate, and socio-economic governance. Economic governance, which includes promotion of market efficiency, control of wasteful spending, encouragement of private sector flows, and so on, comes next because of its importance in promoting growth and reducing poverty. The next focus area, corporate governance, at micro levels deals with how both public and private corporations are directed, controlled, and held to account. Transparency and accountability, including social responsibility, are considered important here, largely to develop and maintain investor confidence. The fourth area, social development, deals with state responsibilities in targeting outcomes to ensure that there is continuous improvement in the well-being of people, through appropriate policies and delivery mechanisms, particularly in social development areas. Self reliance, delivery of education and disease
control, access to water, energy, and markets, especially for the poor, are some of the areas of concern here.

4.3.5 Governance in agriculture

The recent World Development Report on agriculture notes that “Government is responsible for creating an enabling environment for the agriculture-for-development agenda, because only the state can establish the fundamental conditions for the private sector and civil society to thrive: macroeconomic stability, political stability, security, and the rule of law,” (World Bank 2007b, 246–247). Going further, the report notes that reductions in state interventions during structural adjustments that focused on “getting the prices right” may have left many market failures unresolved where private sector could not develop. A responsibility, therefore, that the state needs to take up is to “overcome market failures in agriculture while avoiding government failures” (World Bank 2007b, 248).

A sample of governance issues of different types relevant to the agricultural sector can be presented as follows:

Property rights
a. Appropriate tenure rights – access to land and security of tenure
b. Rights over plant genetic resources – relating to seed policies, for example

Rule of law/regulation
a. Of commons/environment – maintenance of grazing lands, pasture burning
b. Of input quality (seeds, pesticides, machinery, and so on)
c. Preventing theft (for example livestock)

Conflict resolution/contract enforcement
a. Contract enforcement (adequate to make contract farming feasible, for example)
b. Credit recovery that would make credit institutions sustainable
c. Tribal conflicts
Participation (of farmers and the rural public)

a. In local/regional development planning and budgeting
b. In national agricultural policy/strategy/rule-making and budgeting

Accountability (of the Ministry of Agriculture and other agricultural agencies as service-providers)

a. Responding to needs of clients as demanded
b. Monitoring of corruption, in service-provision, fee collection, procurement, and so on.

Government effectiveness (provision of public goods, coordination, and dealing with market failures)

a. Capacity for policymaking and improved public management
b. Provision of public goods including roads, irrigation, markets, and price information
c. Coordination
   1. Of public, private, and civil society actors in the sector
   2. Of various public agencies due to the multi-sectoral nature of agriculture
d. As a provider of last resort for sector-essential goods that the market fails to provide (for example rural credit, mechanisation inputs, and so on.)

Chapter 6 will respond to the question of whether these agricultural issues were adequately addressed in the APRM.

4.3.6 Conceptual challenges of APRM

While challenges of APRM with regard to issues of the agricultural sector (and, more generally, of rural areas) will be dealt with in more depth in Chapter 5, here some more general challenges will be highlighted which derive from the design of the APRM. Since APRM has been implemented already in several countries some indications on the manifestation of these challenges are already known (see Kückelhaus / Wolz / Brüntrup 2007).
• The country review agendas contain recommendations on how to overcome weaknesses. Therefore, the APRM process could push countries to adopt reforms. However, in reality, this is not the case. The catalogue of actions foreseen in case of unsatisfactory accomplishment of the PoA is too vague to put sufficient pressure on a country to change its attitude. Neither does APRM penalise a country for an unfavourable review nor does it provide credible incentives (except uncertain donor funding) to undertake the recommendations of the review or to take steps to avoid an unfavourable review.

• Another unsolved issue is the relation between the APRM’s PoA and other strategic plans of national importance, notably the PRSPs. These have become the guidelines for donor interventions and presumably, for governments. The domains of APRM and PRSP widely overlap, but are not identical with PRSP having as its main focus poverty reduction which may neglect political governance and overall economic growth (at least in first generation PRSP), whereas APRM has a unique focus on political governance issues. It is unclear how the strategies and plans should be brought together, how priorities are derived, and what alignment of donors means if several strategies exist. This is all the more important as many activities of the PoAs bear important costs which countries are not able to or do not expect to finance from own budgets.

• The very broad categories of the APRM bear the risk of overstretching the meaning of governance and the capacities of African governments and consultative groups to carry out a thorough assessment, all the more since the APRM is not only supposed to name problems but also to indicate solutions (in the PoA). Particularly the substantive areas “socio-economic development”, “economic governance and management”, and to a lesser extent “corporate governance”, tend to become very large topics which not only require specific expertise but also touch fundamentally unresolved and disputed questions such as the role of the state overall and in different sectors, juridical set-up and so on. Over ambition risks making APRM too unspecific and toothless in many individual policy areas, a conceptual risk that will be encountered in the specific area of agriculture.
5 Profiles of agriculture in case study countries

This chapter provides a profile of the agricultural sector in the case study countries and describes the role, the performance, and the challenges of the sector in these countries. Moreover, it explores the policies and strategies used by the countries to revitalise the agricultural sector and presents the past policy cases that were examined in detail.

5.1 Roles of agriculture

Agriculture in Ghana contributes between 36–40 percent to GDP since 2000, having declined from about 50 percent in the 1980s. Agriculture is a main source of livelihood especially in rural Ghana. According to the latest population census in 2000, 50.6 percent of the labour force, or 4.2 million people, are directly engaged in agriculture. The staple crop sub-sector, particularly roots and tubers, is the dominant sub-sector and stands for about two-thirds of the agricultural GDP (GSS 2002). Agricultural production is therefore a major contributor to food security. Cocoa, the largest foreign exchange earner, provides 12–13 percent of agricultural GDP. Two-thirds of foreign exchange earnings derive from agriculture. Growth in agriculture is essential for poverty reduction because of the size of the population who depends on the sector for their livelihood and the relatively high incidence of poverty in rural Ghana. Agriculture also supplies the raw materials (palm oil, cotton, cocoa, and more recently horticultural produce such as mango and pineapple) for industries.

Similarly for Kenya, agriculture is still the backbone of the economy despite its relatively high industrialisation in an African context, as it is directly responsible for 26 percent of the GDP and 60 percent of the export earnings. The agriculture sector also indirectly contributes a further 27 percent to the GDP through linkages with manufacturing, distribution, and service related sectors. The agricultural sector accounts for 60 percent of total national employment, with women providing 75 percent of the labour force. Agriculture is an important instrument for promoting national development because of the structure of Kenya’s population, which is mainly rural. About 80 percent of the population lives in the rural areas and de-

6 Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda, although the Uganda study gives less detailed information on past policy process, since the study is not a full-fledged case study.
rives its livelihood predominantly from agriculture. Of the 66 percent of the Kenyan people living below the poverty line, more than 80 percent live in the rural areas and over 50 percent are subsistence farmers and pastoralists. In addition, even for the urban poor, a majority of them eke a living on agriculture related activities. It is estimated that 50.6 percent of the Kenyan population is food insecure and the little food they get is of poor nutritional value and quality (Republic of Kenya 2004a).

In Uganda as well, agriculture is a core sector for economic growth, food security, income enhancement, and employment. Although the sector’s share in total GDP has declined from over 50 percent in the early 1990s to 21.4 percent in 2007/08 (UBOS 2008), due to faster growth in the service and industrial sectors, agriculture socially remains the most important sector because most Ugandans derive their livelihood from agriculture. The sector employs 77\(^7\) percent of the population aged 10 years and older (UBOS 2005). Of the 5.13 million households in Uganda in 2002, 75 percent were engaged in agriculture, and 68 percent of all households derived their livelihoods predominantly from subsistence agriculture. Further, the 2005/06 Uganda National Household Survey estimated that there were 4.2 million agricultural households, constituting 78.8 percent of all households in the country (UBOS 2007b).

In consequence of the important roles of agriculture in the three countries, their national development strategies identify the sector as the main vehicle for the realisation of growth and poverty reduction as described in: The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy GPRS II, (Republic of Ghana 2005), the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) in Kenya (Republic of Kenya 2003), and Uganda’s Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture.

5.2 Past policies and agriculture sector performance

Specific country cases of Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda illustrate the oscillating policies and performances that were and are prevailing in most of SSA as described below. A good understanding of where the countries are when entering into NEPAD-driven continental initiatives and where they have

\(^7\) Out of this, the proportion of women employed in agriculture is higher (83 percent) than for men (71 percent).
come from is essential in order to understand their significance and assess their innovativeness.

**Ghana**

Agricultural policies have played a key role in determining the performance of the Ghanaian economy. Agricultural price distortions, in particular, were a primary cause of the crumbling state of the economy after independence (Stryker et al. 1990). The distortions resulted from macroeconomic instability, inflation, currency overvaluation, state controls, and poorly targeted and implemented state interventions in areas such as input and credit subsidies, credit allocations, and heavy state involvement in production, distribution, and marketing. There were deliberate price settings in cocoa, whereas domestic prices for food crops were determined by import restrictions rather than pricing policy. Over all, distortions were at the disadvantage of agriculture since the price distortions caused by inflation and inflexible exchange rates could not be offset by increased producer prices or subsidisation of agricultural inputs.

These distortions have since been removed for the most part since the introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983–84 (Brooks / Croppenstedt / Aggrey-Fynn 2007). The post-1983 period has been characterised by privatisation of state farms, removal of price controls, and reduced subsidies on inputs leading finally to the removal of guaranteed prices and abolishment of input subsidies altogether – at least until the recent introduction of fertiliser subsidies in 2008. A key element of ERP was the exchange rate policy with overvaluation of the currency eliminated by the 1990s. In the cocoa sector, the government enhanced farmers’ share of the world price (FOB). In the non-traditional export sector, the government pursued a policy of duty drawback and graduated increase of the rate of export retention. A few distortions still remain, however. In the cocoa sector the government marketing board (COCOBOD) has increased its share of export earnings since the 1990s while rice and maize are still heavily protected (Brooks / Croppenstedt / Aggrey-Fynn 2007).

The first post-ERP agricultural strategy document was the Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP). It was initiated in 1988 jointly by the Government of Ghana and the World Bank, under the conviction that there was a need to develop a more meaningful food and agricul-
tural policy and consolidate the gains made in agriculture under the ERP during the 1988–93 period. The MTADP, which provided a rolling 5–10 year programme, began in 1991. The general design was to establish and support market-led growth in agriculture. The government accordingly further reduced interventions in input and output markets while increasing support for agriculture with the objective of providing an enabling environment for efficient and profitable agricultural development through public goods and services including feeder roads, marketing infrastructure, irrigation, research, and extension. The MTADP projected annual agricultural growth of 4 percent. In addition to the general agricultural policy reforms, a number of projects were implemented to address specific sub-sectoral issues.

The changing pattern of agricultural policies is reflected in the development of growth of the agricultural sector, which in turn heavily influenced the overall growth rate (see Figure 5-1), although special influences also played a role.

In the period of 1966–1984, overall growth fluctuations closely followed fluctuations in agricultural growth, indicating the dominant role of agriculture and the economy’s high dependence on this sector’s performance. Although there were policy reversals on account of Structural Adjustment beginning in the mid-1980s, agricultural performance did not pick up significantly largely because of poor infrastructure that limited the response of producers to new policy incentives.

In 1990 and 1992, for example, the economy grew by more than 3 percent despite negative agricultural growth rates. The period of 1996–2006 is characterised by stable growth in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.

Since 2000, the agricultural sector also has grown more rapidly at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent than the rest of the economy which expanded at 5.2 percent in recent years (Bogetic / Bussolo / Medvedev 2008). However, growth has been more erratic: between 2000 and 2005, growth rates ranged from 2.1 to 7.5; between 1990 and 2006, growth rates were negative for two years and less than 4 percent for six years (Breisinger et al. 2008).

Growth in food production has outpaced growth in population, suggesting improved aspects of food security. Between 1995–97 and 2001–03, the FAO estimates that food production increased by 3.6 percent while
population grew at 2.2 (FAOSTAT). Although food security is not determined by availability or domestic production alone, it is useful to note that food deprivation has declined during this period. The number of malnourished fell from 5.8 million in 1990–92 to 2.4 million in 2001-2003 while the proportion of the population that is malnourished fell from 37 percent to 12 percent.

Favourable weather conditions and world market prices for cocoa have contributed to rapid growth in agriculture between 2000 and 2006 but land expansion has been the driving factor for agricultural growth in the long-term. Yields of most crops have not increased significantly. In some cases, yield growth may have been negative over the last 13 years as with maize, sorghum, and yam in the Northern Savannah. This limits the potential for area expansion led growth of production. In cocoa too, some of the increase in production has come at the expense of destruction of valuable forests.

Since the liberalisation policies of the mid-1980s and removal of subsidies on inputs, agricultural policies and strategies have shifted to identifying investment areas to remove structural constraints in the sector. Incentive policies include tax exemptions for agricultural inputs, low tax rates on agricultural producers, and investments in rural area, however the response
to the tax incentives for investments in rural Ghana has been low because of the large magnitude of poor infrastructure for essential services.

**Kenya**

In Kenya, the performance of the economy is also closely tied to the performance of the agricultural sector and reflects both the internal and external challenges that the country has faced (Figure 5–2). During the early post-independence period (1964–1973), there was an impressive economic growth rate of 6.6 percent which was largely due to expansion in cultivated area, increase in yields following the adoption of high yielding maize and wheat varieties, and agronomic research in tea and coffee with heavy government investments. This was followed by a lower overall economic growth period (1974–79) of 5.2 percent which was matched by a reduced agricultural growth rate due to various factors including: the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, fluctuations in international commodity prices of key agricultural exports like coffee and tea, poor implementation of state run agricultural development projects, as well as the collapse of the East African Community regional agreement in 1977.

The period starting from the 1980s was characterised by structural adjustment resulting in an average economic growth of 4.1 percent. This period marked the beginning of external influence from the IMF and the World Bank in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and their “free market” philosophy. These programmes included changes in internal policies (notably privatisation and deregulation) as well as external ones, especially the reduction of trade barriers and exchange rate adjustments. In agriculture, the period reveals absence of sustained investment, limited scope for expanding into new lands, and mismanagement of agricultural institutions.

From 1990–1993, the growth rate further dropped to 2 percent in an atmosphere characterised by liberalisation, introduction of multi-party democracy, and poor economic management that led to high inflation and interest rates. A broad range of governance issues prompted both bilateral and multilateral donors to freeze aid and in some instances cancel programmes. Investor confidence sank due to a slow pace in implementing reforms by the government. Economic growth improved in the period of 1994–1997 as a result of favourable weather and favourable commodity prices due to a buoyant world demand for agricultural products.
However, this recovery was not sustainable, and agriculture and the economy in general embarked on a downward growth trend again after 1996, reaching a low of minus 2.4 percent and 0 percent respectively in the year 2000. In the period 2003–07, the old government party was replaced for the first time in Kenyan history by an opposition with a commitment to improved economic and political governance. During this period the growth of the economy increased from 1.8 percent in 2003 to 6.1 percent in 2006. Similarly, the agricultural sector registered a tremendous growth rate of 5.4 percent in 2006, up from 1.5 percent in 2003.

**Figure 5–2: Economic and agricultural growth rates in Kenya, 1964–2006**

![Graph showing economic and agricultural growth rates in Kenya, 1964–2006](image)

Source: Republic of Kenya, Economic Surveys (various issues)

**Uganda**

In Uganda, agriculture and overall growth seem to be less correlated than in the two other countries (see Table 5–1). Growth in agriculture output declined from 7.9 percent in 2000/01 to 0.7 percent in 2007/08, while other sectors thrived (UBOS 2008). The share of agricultural production in total GDP has declined from 23.8 percent in 2003 to 21.4 percent in 2007/08 (UBOS 2004; UBOS 2008). While the decline in share

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8 However, it is important to note that the 2006 rate is based on a new System of National Accounts (SNA) (1993- SNA). The growth figures before 2004 were based on 1968-SNA. The net effects of the new SNA included increased GDP as a result of taking into account activities in the Export Processing Zones (EPZ), horticulture, and the informal sector that were excluded in the earlier system.
of agricultural production in GDP is not a major cause of concern\(^9\), the continued decline in the sector’s growth rate raises concerns regarding performance of the sector.

The poverty trends in Uganda are interesting as they show that poverty reduction does not necessarily depend on agricultural performance, although generally the relation is rather close (Diao et al. 2006). In Uganda, poverty overall decreased from 44.4 percent of the population in 1997 to 31.1 percent in 2005/06 (UBOS 2003; UBOS 2007a). This happened despite the modest growth rates in agriculture over the years and coupled with the large proportion of the population depending on agriculture. Also in terms of food security, the trend since 1992 has been positive though still insufficient. The country’s average caloric intake per person per day has improved from 1,494 in 1992 to 1,971 in 2005 (about 2 percent annually) which is, however, still much less than the recommended 2,300 (UBOS 2007b). In spite of the modest per capita improvement, the population who is food insecure increased from 12 million to 17.7 million in the same time span.

\(^9\) The decline in value of agricultural production as the share of total GDP may not be a bad sign per se especially if other sectors, like services and industry, are growing very strong. It is generally expected that with growth the structure of the economy is undergoing transformation, in particular because demand for food is less elastic than for other items when incomes are growing. Often, it is growth in agriculture that triggers a more than proportional growth in other sectors, but the linkages in individual countries depend very much on the economic structure such as absolute level of incomes, forward and backward linkages of agriculture, and patterns of income and consumption of different population groups (World Bank 2008a). However, transformation needs to be balanced between productivity increases in agriculture and absorption of agricultural excess labor in non-agricultural sectors in both rural and urban areas.
5.3 Expenditure allocation to agriculture

It is widely accepted that inadequate investment in agriculture by African governments is probably the main reason for the structural constraints that limit the growth of the sector (World Bank 2007b). The CAADP principle of allocating 10 percent of government expenditure to the agricultural sector is an acknowledgement of this insight, though there is no scientific justification for this precise number. For the case study countries, we examine the historical trends in allocation of public expenditure to agriculture in order to define the benchmarks against which this principle can be assessed now or at a future date.

Ghana

Government expenditures in the agricultural sector in Ghana have risen steadily by about 9.1 percent per year on average in real terms, increasing from GH¢ 30.4 million in 2000 to GH¢ 58.2 in 2005\(^{10}\). Government spending on the sector accounted for about 6 percent of total government spending on average over the 2000-2005 periods. In terms of expenditure allocation to agriculture relative to the economy, spending on the sector accounted for about 4.1 percent of agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP) and 1.5 percent of GDP (Figure 5-3).

The overall, though not always steady, increase in real government agriculture expenditure relative to several macroeconomic indicators (Table 5-2) shows a higher commitment of the government in investing in the sector compared to the 1990s. Government spending on agriculture ranks third after spending on education and health sectors. However, the share of the total budget spent on the agriculture sector has stagnated in the last years. The allocation to the Ministry for Food and Agriculture (MoFA), responsible for livestock and crops other than cocoa, has

\(^{10}\) Consistent with the guide developed by AU/NEPAD for the CAADP initiative (AU / NEPAD / APRM 2005), agriculture is defined as comprising of, in addition to the usual crops and livestock, fisheries, forestry, and natural resource management, agricultural research, agricultural extension services and training, agricultural marketing, agricultural inputs (such as seeds, fertilisers, chemicals, etc.), irrigation, and rural infrastructure (including. marketing information system, post-harvest, and so on).
Figure 5-3: Government expenditure on the agricultural sector in Ghana, 2000–2005

![Graph showing government expenditure on the agricultural sector in Ghana, 2000–2005.]

Source: Kolavalli et al. (2009)

Table 5-2: Government agricultural expenditure in Ghana, 2000–2005, in million GHC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (MoFA, FD, CSIR, COCOBOD; 2000 GHC million)</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total expenditure</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of discretionary expenditure</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of AgGDP</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of GDP</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural budget performance (ratio of expenditure to budget)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real expenditure per capita, agricultural population (2000 GHC)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kolavalli et al. (2009)
declined from 48–57 percent in the pre-1999 era (MoFA 2007), to less than 25 percent in 2005, indicating a shift away from MoFA to other Ministries, Departments and Public Agencies (MDAs) with roles in the development of the sector. The bulk of the government’s expenditure on the sector went into recurrent activities, but the share of development expenditure has been rising rapidly over the years albeit from a very low base in 2000 of about 1.5 percent.

The background analysis in GPRS estimated a 60 and 40 percent budgetary allocation to social and economic sectors respectively, while the estimated allocation to agriculture in that distribution was 14 percent (GSS 2002, 30). Obviously, less than 50 percent of this recommendation has been achieved and it remains to be seen how the 4 percentage point gap between the recent historical average and the 10 percent target set by CAADP will be closed.

Kenya

In Kenya, the overall budget allocation to the Agricultural Sector Ministries (ASM)¹¹, in nominal terms, increased steadily from Ksh. 11.05 billion in 1999/2000 to Ksh. 30.33 billion in 2007/08 (Table 5–3). However, in relative terms the percentage of government budget allocated to agriculture declined from a peak of 12.5 percent in the mid 1980s to 4 percent in 2000. There has been a steady improvement since 2000 with the allocation reaching 6.8 percent in 2007 (Figure 5–4). Development expenditure allocation to ASM increased by 185 percent from 21 percent in 2001 to 45 percent in 2007. However, the share of MoA’s development expenditure allocation declined from 65 percent in 2003 to 38 percent in 2007 (Table 5–4).

Figure 5–5 shows a decline in the absorption capacity of funds (proportion of budget allocation that is actually spent) suggesting a decline in the efficiency in use of funds. The inertia in actual spending is due to

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¹¹ The ASM is comprised of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (MOLFD), Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing (MoCDM), Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Regional Development Authorities (MRDA), and Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR).
development expenditure and has been attributed to: cumbersome procurement processes for development projects, lack of adequate information on expenditures under direct payments by development partners, cash flow problems at the district treasuries, and inadequate human capacity to support project implementation. The low absorption capacity could hinder successful advocacy for even more funding to the ASM.

| Table 5–3:  Overall budget allocation to ASM in Kenya, 1999–2007, in current Ksh millions |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | 1999/00         | 2000/01         | 2001/02         | 2002/03         | 2003/04         | 2004/05         | 2005/06         | 2006/07         | 2007/08         |
| Recurrent       | 8,204           | 8,613           | 10,146          | 10,764          | 11,261          | 11,343          | 14,291          | 15,180          | 16,643          |
| Development     | 2,842           | 2,982           | 2,690           | 4,378           | 5,100           | 6,457           | 5,722           | 9,108           | 13,693          |
| Total           | 11,046          | 11,595          | 12,836          | 15,142          | 16,360          | 17,800          | 20,013          | 24,288          | 30,336          |
| Recurrent as percent of total | 74              | 74              | 79              | 71              | 69              | 64              | 71              | 63              | 55              |
| Development as percent of total | 26              | 26              | 21              | 29              | 31              | 36              | 29              | 38              | 45              |
| Total           | 100             | 100             | 100             | 100             | 100             | 100             | 100             | 100             | 100             |

Figure 5–4: Percentage budget allocated to agriculture sector from government expenditure in Kenya, 1985–2007


Table 5–4: Development expenditure for ASM, 2003/04–2007/08, in current Ksh millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>3,121.50</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2,786.10</td>
<td>3,161.00</td>
<td>5,036.80</td>
<td>5,225.74</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoLFD</td>
<td>608.00</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,428.00</td>
<td>1,373.00</td>
<td>2,013.00</td>
<td>1,984.99</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENR</td>
<td>612.50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>431.00</td>
<td>937.00</td>
<td>1,246.80</td>
<td>2413.00</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRDA</td>
<td>215.60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>202.00</td>
<td>556.60</td>
<td>367.20</td>
<td>1,961.00</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoLH</td>
<td>161.40</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>268.70</td>
<td>194.20</td>
<td>361.70</td>
<td>1898.50</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoCDM</td>
<td>77.80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,467.30</td>
<td>58.90</td>
<td>188.60</td>
<td>210.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,796.80</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6,583.10</td>
<td>6,280.70</td>
<td>9,214.10</td>
<td>13,693.23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-5: Development and recurrent expenditure as a percentage of total budget to ASM in Kenya, 1999–2007


Table 5-5: Absorption rate (percent) of total expenditure to the ASM 1999–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>2003/04</th>
<th>2004/05</th>
<th>2005/06</th>
<th>2006/07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoLFD</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENR</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRDA</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoL</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoCDM</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>95</strong></td>
<td><strong>91</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
<td><strong>90</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Uganda

In Uganda, a comprehensive Public Expenditure Review (PER) of the agricultural sector (crops, livestock, fish, forestry, water for production, and agriculture land-related issues) was conducted in 2007 (Kebba / Ofwono 2007). The result of the assessment shows that the aggregate long-term expenditure allocated to agriculture is steady declining from 9.6 percent in 1980/81 to 3.0 percent in 2006/2007 (see Table 5–6). In fact, the PER report notes that since 1991/92, agriculture has not received more than 3 percent of the budget allocation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1991/92</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1988/89</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1989/90</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Partial summary

The budget analyses have shown that the three countries are short in reaching the CAADP target of allocation of government expenditure to the agriculture sector (see Chapter 4). However there have been improvements in this allocation in Ghana and Kenya since 2001. While Ghana’s allocation seems to have stagnated at the 6 percent level in recent years, Kenya is doing much better with projections showing further improvements. The situation in Uganda is worse than in the two other countries for agriculture, but other sectors seem to have experienced spectacular growth.
As the allocation between sub-sectors and between investment and recurrent expenditures shows, rationalisation of expenditure allocation is required to ensure balanced growth and promote investment. In Ghana and in Kenya, improvements could be made in expenditure allocation to research and agricultural technology.

Finally, the problems of absorption rates in Kenya show that higher budget allocation alone is insufficient to better finance agriculture if the different government agencies cannot spend the funds. These problems are known in all sectors, but in agriculture they may be particularly relevant for reasons including: the expenditures take place in remote rural areas, amounts are relatively small particularly if spent by decentralised agencies, and communication and competition of bidding firms is lower than in urban areas. Additionally, transparency and ease of monitoring and evaluation of utilising public funds is more difficult in rural areas.

5.4 Priorities of recent policies and strategies

The following section focuses on Ghana and Kenya policies and strategies only; these issues were not a research focus in Uganda.

5.4.1 Ghana’s food and agriculture sector development policy (FASDEP II)

The first Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) was developed in 2002 as a framework for the modernisation of agriculture (MoFA 2003). The strategic thrusts under FASDEP were adopted from the Accelerated Agriculture Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS). The strategic areas were based on analysis of constraints in the sector and objectives and included:

- promotion of selected products through improved access to markets,
- development and improved access to technology for sustainable natural resource management,
- improved access to agricultural financial services,
- improved rural infrastructure, and
- enhanced human resource and institutional capacity.
FASDEP did not differ significantly from the MTADP (see Chapter 5.2). Most of the interventions proposed in the FASDEP, to assist farmers with accessing services and inputs like credit, storage, mechanisation, and improved varieties, were also proposed in the MTADP. A revised FASDEP (FASDEP II), following the recommendations of a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) carried out on the FASDEP in 2004, has six strategic objectives as follows:

1. food security and emergency preparedness,
2. improved growth in incomes,
3. increased competitiveness and enhanced integration into domestic and international markets,
4. sustainable management of land and environment,
5. science and technology applied in food and agriculture development, and
6. improved institutional coordination.

These objectives form the basis for programme areas for the Agriculture Sector Plan (2009–2015) being developed to implement FASDEP. The first programme area includes sub-components addressing productivity, alternative livelihoods, nutrition, irrigation, rural infrastructure, and mechanisation. The remaining programme areas cover issues raised in all the CAADP pillars including the cross-cutting issues. The sixth strategy objective and programme details how the sector plan is to be implemented and addresses institutional issues of coordination between stakeholders, capacity building of human resources, data gathering, and management all of which affect the governance of agriculture sector management and are addressed by the second CAADP cross-cutting issue.

5.4.2 Kenya’s strategy for the revitalisation of agriculture (SRA)

The Strategy for the Revitalisation of Agriculture (SRA) has been developed to address the challenges and constraints that the agricultural sector is facing in Kenya, which are mentioned above (Republic of Kenya, 2004b). SRA was developed in 2004 and covers the whole range of economic activities in rural areas, including the transformation of primary
production, trade, and services. It proposes modernisation and mechanisation of the farm structures, improvement of the infrastructure, and increase in agricultural services. It also identifies six fast tracks requiring immediate action:

1. Reviewing and harmonising the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework.
2. Improving delivery of research, extension, and advisory support services.
3. Restructuring and privatising non-core functions of parastatals and ministries to bring about efficiency, accountability, and effectiveness.
4. Increasing access to quality farm inputs and financial services.
5. Formulating food security policy and programmes.
6. Taking measures to improve access to markets, for example rural roads and internal taxes.

SRA has some outstanding features compared to earlier sector strategies. First, the strategy embraces a sector-wide approach, with sector interpreted in quite a broad way. Second, an inter-ministerial Agricultural Sector Coordination Unit (ASCU)\textsuperscript{12} tasked with overseeing its implementation with the support of multi-donor funding was established in early 2005. The strategy was launched in February 2005 through a national conference with the theme ‘Revitalising the agricultural sector for economic growth’. The objectives for the conference were to: create a participatory forum to chart a way forward for the development of agriculture as a major player in economic growth and wealth creation; enhance the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of reducing hunger and extreme poverty; create awareness of the need for increased productivity; encourage value addition and agro-processing; enhance public-private sector partnerships and hence attract more investment in the agricultural sector; harness global and regional experiences to enrich agricultural production; assist with financing, policy reforms and implementation; increase the understanding of major issues that impact agriculture and provide a platform for appreciation of the sector’s budgetary requirements; and to inform the process of reviewing food and nutrition security policy.

\textsuperscript{12} http://www.ascu.go.ke/about%20us.cfm
5.5 Agriculture policy cases

To examine key aspects of policymaking, namely ownership, evidence-based policymaking, and participation that the NEPAD principles embody, case studies were made of the development of three specific policies in each country to assess how the two NEPAD processes would add value to national agricultural policymaking.

5.5.1 Policy cases in Ghana

The policy processes reviewed in Ghana are 1) Ghana’s participation in the development of the Common Agricultural Policy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), known as the ECOWAP, 2) the introduction of the Unified Agricultural Extension Service (UAES) and 3) the implementation of the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP). The case studies focused on factors that may have contributed to the policy changes, the nature and extent of participation of stakeholders in the process, and the extent to which knowledge or evidence was utilised in shaping the new policies. These three cases are summarised below.

ECOWAS Common Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP)

By a treaty adopted by the HSG, the member countries of ECOWAS undertook to adopt and implement a common agricultural policy in the region (ECOWAS, 2004). The executive secretariat of the ECOWAS commission was given the responsibility of implementing the commitment. Ghana’s involvement in this process is of interest as it entailed “alignment” of country policies with that of the region, in some ways similar to the way CAADP seeks to influence country policies. But there is a major difference in the sense that ECOWAP involves the development of a collective policy, whereas CAADP involves complying with a commitment made collectively.

Ghana’s participation in developing the regional policy appears to have been limited. ECOWAP policy drafting was a clear example of a process that was driven completely by consultants. The consultants, including those from Ghana, were hired by the ECOWAS secretariat. A number of meetings were held in Ghana and in other member countries, but many of these meetings were guided by consultants. Ghana was represented in the
task force that travelled to members’ countries. The Minister of Food and Agriculture, for example, chaired the meetings that were held in the country, but participation in terms of influencing the outcomes was limited. For example, the country was not even given an opportunity to comment on the Ghana document, which was also prepared by consultants. It can be said that Ghana participated in the process only to the extent that the regional body was developing the policy on behalf of all the countries and their interests were adequately represented. The reason for limited participation may have been that the benefits from the policy were not all that apparent and the outcomes, even if they were of consequence, would not be binding in any sense.

It is not clear whether the regional policy is a collection of key aspects of country policies or whether there were some elements of policy emerging in the regional processes that member countries needed to incorporate in their policies. The former appears to have been the case in the eyes of most Ghanaians. When ECOWAP was being developed, Ghana had a policy in place and it was by and large consistent with the regional policy. In the revised policy (FASDEP II), however, consistency with the regional policy is explicitly noted.

In developing the regional policy, ECOWAS relied on expertise from regional organisations and research organisations in member countries. Member country experts prepared country reports. But it appears that there was little research available to participants that provided adequate information on how the countries could benefit from having a common policy or what might have been some useful areas to focus on. The sources used appear to include only one study that may have focused on trade issues (Oduro / Kwadwo 2002). As the policy is a broad statement of objectives to be achieved, the process did not need this kind of information, nor did the process lead to suggestions that would be contested by any of the members.

*Unified Agricultural Extension System (UAES)*

Using the frame of the MTADP, the World Bank, which was leading the programme, had identified strengthened agricultural extension as one of the measures to be introduced along with privatisation of fertiliser marketing and improvements in producer prices for cocoa (see Birmingham, 1999). The idea of revamping the agricultural extension may have emerged from discussions between the government and some donors. The
decision to create a separate department was made at the highest levels, by
the then cabinet Secretary for Agriculture.

The objective of this reform was to centralise all extension activities in a
department and have it delivered by generalists (see Birmingham, 1999).
The level of participation in decision-making varied. The decision to cen-
tralise extension in a single department appears to have been made without
much consultation but significant consultations were held subsequently to
decide how this new department would function. Various stakeholders
including those among the NGOs who were providing the services were
given opportunities to air their concerns. For example, the veterinary ser-
vice managed to influence the policy so that all veterinary services would
be provided only by specialised staff. Although there were many that were
opposed to the policy, packaging and additional resources from a project
made the policy more attractive.

Considerable expertise was brought to bear on the process and evaluation
reports such as the one by Wanga (1994) were utilised. People from rele-
vant organisations were consulted on how best to structure the new de-
partment. The design of the new system was also influenced by the report
produced by extension experts from the local university. During the sec-
ond phase of reform – after the setting up of a separate department by
itself did not prove to be all that effective – several consultative workshops
were organised and the World Bank brought in expertise from other coun-
tries to design the unified system.

Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP)

In 1983, the poor state of the economy compelled the Ghanaian govern-
ment to accept IMF assistance and adopt the ERP. The IMF’s approval of
the programme came with the requirement to implement reforms in vari-
ous sectors including finance. At the time, the banks were in poor financial
condition and the financial system was generally ineffective. The financial
sector reform essentially meant significant changes in the way the banks
conducted their business and in the way they were regulated.

FINSAP I was implemented between 1988 and 1991 while FINSAP II was
implemented between 1992 and 1994. One of FINSAP’s objectives was to
give autonomy to the Bank of Ghana and to free the commercial banks
from excessive government controls. Government interventions included
frequent changes in management, especially the position of chief executive of the Bank of Ghana. To the extent possible, successful implementation of FINSAP was expected to grant some level of autonomy to the banks, lessen government intervention, and ensure job security for senior management staff of the banks (see Aryeetey et al. 1997; Aryeetey / Harrigan / Nissanke 2000; Mensah 1997).

As part of FINSAP I, a new banking law (PNDCL 225) was enacted in 1989 to replace the old Banking Act of 1970 (Bank of Ghana 2007). This law was passed to help improve the supervisory role of the Bank of Ghana over the commercial banks. Financial restructuring also involved cleaning the balance sheets of nonperforming assets. In addition, the government took steps to operationalise a policy limiting its ownership of banks.

FINSAP II attempted to consolidate the restructuring exercise that had begun under FINSAP I, to strengthen competition to improve efficiency, to improve the capacity and efficiency of the Bank of Ghana, and to formulate policies to reorganise and strengthen the non-bank financial sector. The Bank’s authorised capital was increased and a massive computerisation exercise was undertaken.

As in the other two cases, the decision to introduce reforms was made at the highest levels in the country. The process did offer opportunities for those in the sector to participate in discussions and perhaps influence the processes in minor ways. Although the reforms had significant implications for the agricultural sector, it does not appear that the interests of the sector were adequately represented. The introduction of FINSAP contributed to a reduction in access to agricultural credit by eliminating a requirement that banks allocate 20 percent of their loaned funds to the sector.

The World Bank prepared many studies which it shared with stakeholders in a series of policy seminars. Although the reforms may have been backed up with proper diagnosis, it is not clear whether alternative approaches to reforms were considered.

5.5.2 Policy cases in Kenya

The three case studies that were conducted in order to understand policy-making processes in Kenya were the sub-sector policies for 1) dairy and the Dairy Development Policy, 2) coffee and its policy of Restructuring of

*Dairy development policy*

The dairy industry contributes about 3 percent of Kenya’s GDP, supports over one million smallholder dairy households, and provides employment to 365,000 directly and over 500,000 people indirectly. The country currently produces 3.56 billion litres of which 1.99 billion (56 percent) are marketed (Cherono 2005). The production of milk grew from 1.03 billion litres in 1980 to 3.56 billion in 2006. Before liberalisation and the collapse of Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), which had the monopoly in urban markets, the company was processing 1.5 million litres per day while its installed capacity was 2.5 million per day. The company controlled 98 percent of the market share while two other processors controlled a mere 2 percent. After the sector was liberalised, 45 processors were licensed but some have closed operation over the years. Currently there are 22 processors that process about 423 million litres per year.

The dairy industry experienced rapid growth through heavy government investment in the sector. Through the provision of heavily subsidised artificial insemination and veterinary services in the 1970s and 1980s, dairy herds were improved by introducing high-yielding breeds. The national extension services developed and disseminated an intensive zero-grazing model to many small scale farmers that led to an increase in milk production in the 1980s. In the mid-80s, the private company status of KCC was suspended and it came under government control. The government gave KCC the monopoly of milk marketing in the urban areas thus controlling 98 percent of the market while it was purchasing milk primarily from the 800,000 small-scale farmers. It was illegal to sell raw milk in the urban areas and the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB), Local Authorities, and Department of Public Health (DPH) officials ensured this was observed by arresting traders who defied the orders.

The direct entry of government turned out to be the beginning of chronic problems at the KCC. Due to political patronage, the management committees and board of directors kept being reshuffled with no improvement in performance. Corruption, mismanagement, and high cost of operations meant farmers were paid low prices. The payment schedules continued to grow longer with farmers being paid up to six months after delivery. By
the late 1980s, KCC was in debt due to mismanagement and high costs of operations and rapidly losing on milk deliveries. Around the same time, farmers started agitating for liberalisation of the market by opening up to more players. The dairy sector was crucial to over 800,000 households who depended on the sector in the Rift Valley and Central Provinces. In 1990, the political situation in the country was also shifting with protests for liberation of political space from one party to a multi-party system. The protest by farmers for “economic freedom” from KCC began to acquire a political perspective as pressure mounted on the government to liberalise the sector. The Members of Parliament (MPs), especially in the Central Province and North Rift Valley, appealed to the government to liberalise the industry as their constituents depended on dairy. There were demonstrations by farmers and they boycotted delivering their milk to the KCC. In 1990, through funds from DANIDA, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development prepared a Dairy Master Plan for the sector that included the liberalisation of the sector. The industry was finally liberalised in 1992 and the monopoly of KCC was lifted, while provision of veterinary and artificial insemination services was privatised.

Liberalisation of the industry created incentives in the form of unsatisfied demands and new market opportunities. After the veterinary and artificial insemination services were privatised, dairy cooperatives took over the role of providing these services. Dairy cooperatives and farmers opted to sell raw milk directly in urban centres and to the new processors, where they received higher prices and prompt payment. Other than selling their milk to new processors and in urban centres, these cooperatives and individual farmers delivered a small proportion of their milk to KCC. The new processors’ brands became well known to the consumers who were previously used to KCC products. Due to the low milk delivery by the farmers to KCC, loss of its market share, high costs of operations, and debts owed, KCC was finally put under receivership in 1999 after it became insolvent. The government revived it in 2003 as New KCC. The informal market (sale of raw milk) rapidly grew in the country. In Nairobi, the market had grown to cover 70 percent or more of the consumers, and nearly 100 percent of the low-income markets (Argwings-Kodhek / Karin 1999). In 1993, the government published the Dairy Development Policy that was to guide the sector in a liberalised economy. However, the sector faced a number of constraints which hampered its development, thus limiting the ability of many agents to operate to their full potential. These challenges
were not envisioned in the policy as it was published immediately after liberalisation. Although the number of small scale vendors selling milk had grown, the KDB was still playing the role of policing the industry and the environment was still very hostile to milk hawking, despite the industry being liberalised. In 1995 the Dairy Act was reviewed and the KDB was restructured which entailed recruitment of qualified staff and capacity building.

In 2000, the Small Dairy Research & Development Project (SDP), a collaborative project between MOA, International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and the Kenya Agriculture Research Institute (KARI), started a pro-poor advocacy campaign based upon empirical evidence on the importance of the informal milk sellers in the country’s economy for the poor population. Research findings from the project showed that the informal milk market was a pro-poor industry and provided employment opportunities and nutrition to poor households. Thus there was a need to incorporate hawking into the mainstream so that the health challenges posed by hawking of raw milk would be addressed through training on proper handling of milk and other measures. Other institutions, such as the Tegemeo Institute, also carried out studies and used the evidence-based research to advocate for policy change through dissemination of its findings in national stakeholder workshops. The Policy was revised in 1997 and again in 2000. From 2000, KDB transformed from being hostile to broadly and proactively engaging stakeholders. There was a need to revisit the Policy, to incorporate changes, and to address challenges that the industry had undergone since 1992, such as incorporating the informal milk market.

In 2004, a task force that had been formed in 2001 was revived to review the draft policy paper and this was finalised in 2006. This taskforce had the following membership: MOLFD-Director of Veterinary Services & Director of Livestock Production, KDB, Breeders-World Wide Sires & African Breeders Services, Processors-Brookside, SpinKnit, Meru Central and other Cooperative based processors, Tegemeo Institute, Land O’ Lake, Equipment and Packaging Material Suppliers, USAID, MOCDM, DFID, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Technoserve. Additionally, the Strategic Business Options (SBO) provided research and GTZ supplied funding. This task force led the review and consulted various stakeholders. Kenya Dairy Board provided the secretariat to the task force. In addition, it used its own resources to facilitate the work-
ings of the task force. The task force interacted to a large extent with policy researchers. These researchers were very instrumental in advising the task force, especially on harmonisation of the draft policy with other government policies. In particular, Tegemeo Institute played a key role in transforming the draft into a policy document, and aligning to ERS, SRA, Livestock Policy, and Extension Policy. The draft policy paper was finalised in 2006. However, the policy has not yet been presented for discussion by cabinet or parliament.

Coffee industry restructuring

Coffee production is one of the most important activities in Kenya. In 2008, it was ranked fourth after tourism, tea, and horticulture and accounted for 10 percent of the total export earnings in 2000 and 6 percent in 2001. However, the production has been declining since 1987/88. During the last decade, the country's production averaged 77,514 MT of clean coffee. Production was 53,400 tons in 2006/07. Over 600,000 smallholders are engaged in coffee production and command a 48 percent share of the market. The decline in production is more pronounced in smallholder farms where it declined by 47 percent.

The reforms in the coffee industry can be traced as far back as 1989 when the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) came to an end and the national quotas were eliminated. At that particular time, the Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK) was the regulating body and it also doubled as the sole marketing agent of coffee. Kenya Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU) was the institution that had monopoly in milling coffee. Thus CBK would market coffee then pay proceeds to KPCU who paid the farmers after charging a commission. Around 1992, various reforms were taking place and the industry was opening up exposing farmers to market forces like high interest rates and a weakening Kenya shilling. The year 1992, being an election year, meant that the government had to address these issues. Through a delegate conference in October 1992, CBK passed the sale of coffee in dollars. Being a public institution with a transformation and trading monopoly meant there were opportunities for rent seeking and corruption. Grower's cooperatives, the business community, and farmers led by Thika Coffee Millers (TCM) spearheaded a campaign to advocate for the lifting of the monopoly of KPCU as the only miller. The vision of the reform group was to reduce bureaucratic procedures, eliminate rent seeking op-
opportunities, and give farmers the opportunity to pick their preferred commission agent. But some of those advocating for change had their own interests such as earning a commission and obtaining a share of the milling.

During 1993, the reform group advocating for lifting of the monopoly organised various forums and sought politicians’ assistance in their campaign. At the end of the year, the government lifted the monopoly and TCM and Scofina were licensed as millers. CBK appointed KPCU, TCM, and grower cooperatives as commission agents and farmers would choose their agent from the three. During the period of 1995-96, the farmers were paid through the commissioned agents they had approved. At the same time, CBK offered to pay farmers directly without charging a commission. Even with the monopoly of milling coffee lifted, the marketing of coffee was solely carried out by CBK since it owned 60 percent of the Kenya Coffee Auction, a private company responsible for auctioning coffee. This monopoly was another disturbance to farmers and there was pressure coming from politicians, farmers, and the licensed millers to open up marketing, which led to the Coffee Act of 2001 that liberalised the industry.

In 2002, MOA appointed three marketing agents, TCM, KPCU, and Scofina, on an interim basis to carry out the marketing of coffee. However, farmers still complained of collusion in the market to depress prices. Farmers and also cooperatives were threatening to open up a parallel coffee auction. In 2005, through the Finance Act, a ‘second window’ sale of coffee was established. Through the Act, 43 marketing agents were licensed and the earlier licenses of the three interim marketing agents were revoked. The ‘second window’ offered an alternative market to the farmers and the price offered by the marketing agent was to be at least higher than the auction price. The marketing agents operated from 2006–2007, but it was realised that institutions had licenses as coffee dealers and as marketing agents simultaneously, thus creating conflicts of interest. The government, through a circular, called upon the affected institutions to choose one license, which subsequently resulted in the number being reduced to 23 marketing agents. Some grower cooperatives that were licensed to carry out marketing coffee but did not have the capacity thus closed shop. In 2007 the Ministry of Trade through the Trade Licensing Act harmonised all licenses by legalising the harmonisation of licenses of dealers and marketing agents.
Research played an important role in restructuring of the coffee industry. A strategic study to enhance coffee production was commissioned and carried out by the private international consultancy Price Waterhouse Coopers on improving production. Though this report was widely referred to by the taskforce formed in June 2003, it was mostly on the technical production matters and it did not significantly address marketing. CRF also carried out studies on the constraints that were facing production, marketing, and research in the industry and made recommendations on how to overcome them which were shared with the taskforce. The World Bank and EU commissioned studies of the sectors especially with regards to marketing and processing of coffee. The recommendations from the various research efforts undertaken in the sector greatly informed the restructuring of the coffee industry.

Cotton industry revival

Cotton has been identified as a key sub-sector that is vital to the revival of the economy as stipulated in the ERS. Cotton is important in the promotion of industrialisation and value addition as it provides raw material for garment production, oil milling, and animal feed, among other manufacturing related activities. Kenya has a potential of over 350,000 hectare for rain-fed cotton production and could produce over 700,000 bales of lint annually. However, production has declined to 30,000 hectare of rain-fed cotton with a level of 20,000 bales of lint (Ikiara / Ndirangu 2002). This decline resulted from a lack of finance and credit facilities for small-scale farmers for land preparation and procurement of farm inputs; lack of organised supply of seed for planting; poor quality planting seed and poor agronomic practices leading to poor yields and low ginning outturns; lack of a reliable market for farmers’ produce; delayed payments for purchased produce; and the collapse of the irrigation schemes.

Before liberalisation of the cotton industry in 1990, the government through the Cotton Lint & Seed Marketing Board (CL&SMB) controlled all aspects of the cotton industry. After the liberalisation of the cotton industry, the Cotton Board of Kenya was no longer controlling the sector, hence farmers and ginners were free to sell and buy cotton from whoever was willing to do business with them and at whatever price they agreed upon. This period was also characterised by the influx of imported textile goods into Kenya, which resulted in reduced average capacity utilisation
in the textile mills from around 80 percent in 1992 to 50 percent in 1999. The cotton industry, which was the fifth foreign exchange earner, dropped drastically to a very minimal contribution towards GDP. A total of 92 garment making factories were closed down in the early 1990s after liberalisation, which resulted in the loss of 60,000 jobs. In addition to low cotton production, many ginneries, textile, and apparel manufacturers collapsed. The lack of legislation along with a review of existing legislation to be in tandem with liberalisation led to disharmony in the industry. This disarray resulted in a loss of investor confidence in the industry. During this period, cooperative societies and other credit providers collapsed preventing farmers from procuring inputs and credit.

After a period of nine years of disharmony and disarray in the industry, the government called for a National Cotton Consultative Forum (NCCF) to get input from stakeholders on what was happening in the industry and ways in which stability could be restored. Thus Kenya Cotton Growers Association of Kenya (KCGA) was born in 2000. Between 2001 and 2003, Action Aid, an international NGO, started strengthening farmers’ institutions and promoting cotton in the country. In 2003 through initiatives of Action Aid, a National Cotton Stakeholders Forum (NCSF) was formed.

In 2002, KIPPRa carried out a study on developing a revival strategy for the cotton and textile industries in Kenya. The NCSF used this study and its recommendations to advocate for an amendment in the Cotton Amendment Act of 2006. The EU did a study on the constraints facing cotton production with the recommendation that Kenya was not competitive in cotton production and hence it should abandon it and concentrate on other higher levels in the chain like ginning and textile manufacturing. The World Bank (WB) also commissioned a study on Micro, Medium, and Small enterprise competitiveness of cotton across the value chain along with access of information. It proposed a project to support cotton growers to attain knowledge and skills, and offered US$ 1 million, which the stakeholders viewed as unlikely to have a significant impact along the value chain. The reports by the EU and WB were, however, not presented directly to the NCSF, but to selected stakeholders in the sector. The NCSF therefore came to know of their details informally.

The NCSF suggested the formation of a Cotton Development Authority (CDA) that was to regulate and bring harmony in the industry. The gov-
ernment representatives in NCSF were perceived as not being open to the fast tracking of reviving the sector. The NCSF realised that they could push for changes through parliament since the government process was very slow. The NCSF decided to take up the initiative and sensitise the MPs. In March 2003, the NCSF held a sensitisation meeting with 20 MPs. One of the MPs, agreed to take up the matter and push the reforms through a private motion. The draft motion was introduced in 2004 and discussed in parliament in 2005. In the same year a bill was tabled in parliament. In early 2006, the MOA organised various stakeholders meetings which the NCSF attended. The aim was to try and harmonise the changes to be introduced and for the process to be spearheaded by the government. This would ensure taking care of the finance aspects as a bill driven through a private motion in parliament cannot have financial proposals like provisions for taxes. Since the amendment introduced the creation of an authority which had to be run by regulations governing its creation, NCSF had suggested the formation of the CDA whose membership was to have farmers as the majority. The idea for the Amendment Bill to be withdrawn and the government to introduce a harmonised bill was implemented when the Cotton Amendment Act of 2006 was passed and became effective in December 2006. The elections of the CDA were held in August 2007 with a membership of 15 including nine farmers, two ginners, and four government representatives.

Summary of the policy cases in Kenya

In dairy and in coffee, reform initiatives after the first restructurings came through strong demands for national organisations which were supported by research. After the government was convinced, the broad-based participatory roundtables created real sector ownership. Donors seem to have aligned to a great extent.

In cotton, ownership of the policy process was very high, particularly by the private sector. There was a strong bottom-up participation, due to the democratic structures. However, there was a long delay in the implementation of the policies. Donors are not really aligning with existing structures.
5.6 Assessment of agricultural policy and strategy development in the case study countries

In this chapter, we conclude from the case study findings and from additional country background information on the status quo of agricultural policymaking processes in Ghana and Kenya. As outlined in chapter four, we consider the following variables: a) nature of participation of stakeholders; b) ownership towards the policy or strategy; c) generation and use of evidence to guide the content of policies and strategies; d) alignment of donors to the national policy, and e) drivers of change. We have found that a high level of participation, including of decisionmakers and those responsible for implementation, ensures ownership of content and strategy and a higher likelihood of implementation. Participation would also be an aspect of evidence-based policymaking.

5.6.1 Stakeholder participation

Ghana

On the whole, participation in policymaking in Ghana has increased with the introduction of democratic rule (Leiter et al. 2000). Under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government in the 1980s, major policies such as ERP were not subject to public consultation (Gyimah-Boadi 1990). Since then, participation has become an important aspect of policymaking processes that have been established in the country. For developing medium term plans, for example, the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) recommends establishing a sector planning team consisting of key staff from the lead ministry (such as MoFA for agriculture), other MDAs, gender officers, and a cross-section of the public, including representatives of civil society organisations and umbrella organisations of the private sector among others. The NDPC organises sensitisation workshops on these guidelines and provides technical assistance to planning teams on request. A number of institutions that have been developed to generate broad-based participation in national policymaking include the national economic dialogue, homecoming summits, stakeholder workshops, memoranda to parliament, peoples’ assembly, and ministers’ “meet the press” (APR Secretariat 2005). The guidelines for preparation of the memorandum for presenting policy documents to the
cabinet require a description of all the consultations held and evidence to prove how the public input was reflected in the final document.

The agricultural case studies provide an illustration of how participation may vary at different levels with varying incentives for participation as well. Ghana’s participation in the development of the ECOWAP was driven from outside. This can be explained by the low level of commitment to the regional policy process and the lack of felt relevance of the policy to Ghana. The extent of participation appears to have been higher in the development and implementation of the other two policies. But participation differed at various stages. The decision, for example, to centralise extension in a new department as a strategy to improve the effectiveness of extension was made without much consultation. However, significant consultations were held subsequently with many stakeholder groups including NGOs to decide how this new department would function. However, while those whose work would be affected, such as veterinarians, were consulted, the farmers, who are the recipients of these services, were not. Additional external funds supporting the policy change seem to have supported the acceptance of the new policy, but the support was not conditional on that specific shape of the reform but on reform per se and probably on the general idea of centralisation of extension.

Kenya

Stakeholder participation in Kenyan policymaking has been changing over time, too. During the immediate post-independence period, policy formulation was least consultative, leaving the government as almost the sole stakeholder of policy review. At that time, other stakeholders in the sector were still in their formative stages, and the government did not trust the private sector or the civil society. During the liberalisation period, external influence in policymaking become prominent, and the SAPs were literally subscribed by the Bretton Wood institutions, though the implementation was sluggish and deep privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation were often delayed for decades. These cases support the notion that without real participation and ownership the implementation and ultimate success of a policy is difficult to reach.

With the experience from the reform period, donors saw the need to emphasise the use of participatory methodologies in policymaking and implementation. The PRSP was prepared through a consultative process
involving public and private sectors and civil society. The PRSP process was another form of external influence on local policies. In the meantime, with deeper democratic ruling and learning by the government, participation is now more deeply enshrined in Kenya’s own policymaking principles. The current main strategy, Vision 2030, that has identified agriculture as one of the six sectors to drive the economy, was formulated following deep engagement of other stakeholders like the private sector, civil society, research organisations, and academia.

Policy-making at the sector level is widely participatory. The ASM ministries have been important in initiating policy reviews following agitation by producers. They have also provided leadership by organising stakeholder workshops or forming task forces that have come up with recommendations for policy review. Whether they have remained active and relevant all through the processes is another matter altogether.

The policy process is mainly public-led, meaning that they are championed by government agents, such as ministries and parastatals, before they go to parliament as government-led bills. Reforms within the cotton sub-sector, which was largely a privately-led process, took a shorter time to complete. However, private-sector leadership has some limitations, in that it can not propose matters with financial implications. In almost all cases, donors have facilitated these processes through provision of funds.

However, our case studies have also shown that participation comes at a cost. With so many stakeholders, the processes have been lengthy, as different objectives and interests delay the processes. Lack of information symmetry amongst the various stakeholders has been counterproductive at times as stakeholders with more knowledge of the sector have tried to influence the policy to their advantage. The advancing of vested interests among different stakeholders usually leads to a stalemate or the process taking longer. The reform process was faster in the cotton sector, where it was private sector driven, and where a smaller committee was formed to steer the process.

**General lessons learned**

As discussed above (Chapter 2.1), participation can benefit policymaking by enhancing relevance and ownership, if those who are likely to be affected by the policy and those who could contribute to designing an effec-
tive policy are given the opportunity to influence the policy content. The
two participant groups identified need not always be mutually exclusive.
The first may include the entire population, as in the case of global poli-
cies such as PRSP, or a subset of the population, primarily farmers and
extension workers in the case of sector or even sub-sector policies. The
latter group may include administrators – who have the understanding
necessary to design effective policies as well as policymakers, researchers,
and consultants.

Specific elements that enhance a high quality of participation are general-
ised to be:

- Democratisation, through several channels including a general atmos-
phere of co-determination, accountability, and freedom of speech;
competition of ideas; and members of parliament as accountable ad-
vocates of rural population.
- Institutionally enshrined participation in policy processes.
- Free private market economy, creating more actors, some of them
economically powerful enough to set own agenda, thereby balancing
the power of the state and parastatals. In addition, interdependence of
many private actors in modern multi-level value chains increases of
the need for participation to resolve policy challenges. In contrast,
powerful actors who would lose in a reform (including the bureaucc-
racy) can block participatory processes.
- International organisations which provide funds for participatory
processes and for capacity building particularly of weaker stake-
holders, but do not link their support to a specific type of outcome.

5.6.2 Ownership

Although ownership generally emerges from broad and diverse participa-
tion, from an implementation point of view adequate ownership can also
emerge from selective participation. The scope of participation required
depends on the nature of the policy. Though generally perceived to be
imposed from outside, both ERP and FINSAP, for example, may have
benefitted from high Ghanaian ownership, if ownership is characterised
strictly as the governments’ conviction that it has an interest in the policy
outcome (Tsikata 2001). Ghanaian technocrats, both in the country and in
multilateral organisations, were heavily involved in designing the pro-
Programmes (Agyeman-Duah 2008). Because the country was committed to reform, the multilateral organisations also provided considerable leeway in designing the reforms. The government was also able to push through many of the reforms in the country by claiming that they were required to meet imposed conditions. Macroeconomic reforms that do not directly affect particular interest groups are more likely to experience ownership even with limited participation in their creation (Tsikata 2001).

On the other hand, more complex institutional reforms that upset existing interests, such as privatisation and civil service reform, require greater participation to develop the ownership required for effective implementation. The government may have faced difficulties in implementing institutional reforms largely because consultations were not broadened adequately to include the private sector, civil society, academics, and trade unions. Other factors that may have negatively affected the level of ownership of policies in Ghana were the influx of aid and donor involvement and the transition to a multiparty democratic system representing more divergent interests (Tsikata 2001).

Does aid dependency result in lack of ownership? Tsikata, in fact, argues that after successful adjustment, there were increased donor flows and with them greater dependency, which may have resulted in a more donor-led agenda. Aid dependency came up as an issue in the APRM, but it found that aid dependence does not necessarily reduce ownership and having the domestic capacity to design and implement sound programmes is adequate to bring about ownership (APR Secretariat 2005). One distinct possibility is that, although Ghanaians themselves have played a greater role in articulating their policies in recent years, donor priorities may also have played a significant role in the policies (Sarpong, D., personal communication, 3 Dec. 2008).

Kenya

Participation of the stakeholders in the policymaking process has increased ownership and thereby diminished the influence of the donors in the last decades. Previously, ownership of the SAPs was low, as they were largely prescriptions from the Bretton Wood institutions.

This has changed now, with Kenyans taking initiative in policy formulation and the donors embracing the products. For instance, donors in Kenya have now embraced the SRA and aligned their programmes to it. It is
important to note however that most of these processes are funded by donors, who in most cases also sit on the committees that drive the policy reviews.

The implementation of the SAP policies has been sluggish and privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation were often delayed for decades, supporting the notion that without real participation and ownership policies are hardly effective.

**General lessons learned**

Ownership may emerge from several sources:

- With democratisation and after the first massive wave of structural adjustment measures which have created entirely new groups of private actors, ownership of agricultural policies may have improved in the two study countries, but even under participatory processes donor expectations influence policies considerably.

- Under democratic regimes, agricultural policies become part of democratic competition. Thus, long-term ownership of specific policies developed under a certain party cannot be taken for granted to be owned by competing parties or subsequent governments. This implies that more stability is to be expected if ownership for a specific policy is anchored in the consensus of many stakeholders and not only in a political party programme.

- Participation greatly enhances ownership. This is true both for the government level of national policymakers and central administrative staff that are supposed to elaborate a policy, as well as for the broader range of state and non-state actors that are expected to implement it or to live with its consequences.

- Donors are important players in agricultural policymaking and implementation, even in relatively well-off countries such as Kenya and Ghana. They have their own priorities, convictions and models, which most probably shape their willingness to align (see below). Therefore, the need for donor ownership of policies should not be underestimated nor neglected.

- Active and independent national research organisations can support policies based on evidence, thereby reducing the impression of individual stakeholder groups that decisions are made due to power plays, which helps to create a more general feeling of ownership.
5.6.3 Knowledge, evidence, and information used for policy and strategy development

Ghana

The case studies in Ghana have revealed that knowledge is used to very different extents in guiding policy processes, depending on circumstances. In developing ECOWAP, ECOWAS relied on expertise from regional organisations and research organisations in member countries. Member country reports were prepared by experts in the countries. However, it appears that there was little specific research that provided adequate information on how the countries could benefit from having a common policy or what might be some useful areas for cooperation. This low level of knowledge ambition may be explained by the low level of perceived impact of the policy (see Chapter 5.5.1.1).

Kenya

Policy formulation in Kenya has increasingly become evidence-based. Beginning with the liberalisation period, policy formulation has relied on research and reports of task forces. SRA formulation was highly dependent upon the work of research organisations. This was the same case with the Vision 2030 formulation, where various think tanks were engaged in the deliberations, simulations, and in identifying the flagship projects.

Research plays a big role in the policy processes within the sector. All the policy case studies were guided by knowledge, either in the form of research or in the form of taskforces that collect information from stakeholders and then recommend the way forward. This knowledge has clearly influenced the direction taken by these processes, at times against the will of the Government. However, it has also become clear that without one or several drivers of change that are willing and interested in using it, knowledge will not play a major role in policy processes.

General lessons learned

The case studies show that several sources of knowledge may guide policies: 1) widely accepted beliefs that may have developed from research and experience, such as the belief that regional cooperation is beneficial; 2) experience of individuals that have in some way been involved in re-
lated activities, such as that of an extension agent or of a banker; 3) knowledge embodied in consultants, who might come from academia or have relevant experience, and 4) specific pieces of relevant research. The type of sources that would make processes more efficient depends on the nature of the policy.

Some other lessons can be drawn:

- Regular research seems to have direct influence on policies basically if results come during a window of opportunity where policy processes are active;
- National research bodies and researchers, often acting as consultants, seem to be very important carriers of knowledge and evidence in a policy process characterised by strong national ownership and participation.
- Funding of key studies is still often provided by external donor organisations.
- Strong stakeholders, such as the government, or large donors can and do dominate policy processes by selecting researchers and evidence. However, through well placed and timed research, small organisations, such as NGOs, can also gain important leverage on policy processes.

5.6.4 Alignment, harmonisation and coordination

_Ghana_

Both internal alignment of national and sector policies and alignment of government and donor priorities have improved over the past decades. As in other countries, Ghana has established a planning organisation which has instituted procedures for policy development. The National Development Planning System Act of 1994 entrusts the oversight role for planning to the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC). The Act also requires that development planning under any ministry or sector agency should be consistent with national development goals and that such plans should be presented to the NDPC for approval to ensure harmonisation of development plans at different levels. Agricultural policies and strategies are therefore designed to respond to the roles assigned to the sector in the national development strategies.
The development partners are organised into sector working groups which use structured dialogue to share responsibilities in the sector and avoid duplication on the one hand and on the other hand to dialogue with the partner country, creating common visions and programmes. Dialogue between the ministry and the donor partners is well established with the current practice involving meetings once every three months. Some of these meetings are a part of the requirement or conditionality for budget support. Donors have been increasingly willing to move towards budget support from project support. However, this support is contingent on the acceptance of a development strategy for the sector.

In 2001, the government decided to move away from a project-approach to a sector-wide approach (SWAp) in the agricultural sector, to better coordinate agricultural development. FASDEP I was developed to be the vehicle for achieving the SWAp, which provides for a central pot into which development partners would make contributions for use by the ministry to pursue its development agenda. However, the success of this approach is not yet examined. The revision of FASDEP was a clear result of partnership between the government as represented by the NDPC, other sector ministries, and development partners to enhance the effectiveness of agricultural policies and strategies in reducing poverty and to be willing to change for the sake of achieving desired results.

Kenya

The Kenyan government’s efforts to coordinate, harmonise, and align development cooperation are concentrated in the Kenya Coordination Group (KCG) under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The coordination and harmonisation of support—with a view to aligning development cooperation fully with Kenyan policies and structures—are expected to reduce transaction costs and improve the quality of development cooperation in the medium and long term.

On the donor side, the major development partners in Kenya are organised in the Donor Coordination Group (DCG). The DCG has a number of sector sub-groups, including a special group on Harmonisation, Alignment, and Coordination (HAC), which has been set up to streamline procedures. A sector group system on the government side exists, although, not all the groups are functioning. In the agricultural sector, ASCU is the most important coordination unit (see Chapter 5).
In general, coordination, harmonisation and alignment of the agricultural sector in Kenya is progressing only slowly. This is mainly due to legacies from the previous government, where government and donor cooperation cooled down. This has left the Kenyan side unaccustomed to development coordination at all levels. However, the situation is improving. The Kenyan government, as well as development partners, adheres to the Paris Declaration and the parties work towards improving aid effectiveness. The special donor harmonisation group, HAC, coordinates its efforts with the government, especially the MoF, which in turn works to improve the coordination of line ministries.

As the latest initiative, the HAC-donors, in cooperation with the Kenyan government, have embarked on the development of a Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), along the same lines as joint strategies that have been developed or will be developed in Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The work on the KJAS is in its initial phases.

General lessons learned

Alignment of donors is a generally accepted principle of the aid effectiveness agenda, assuming that donors are willing to support policies even if they are not completely convinced of their content (that budgets have to be spent correctly is another, undisputed issue, see Chapter 2.1). However, it is illusionary to think that donors will blindly align to any policies and refrain completely from interfering in the substance of policies in their partner. Interference can be carried out through advisory services, government consultations, selective search, use of evidence, or simply abstinence from or selection of a certain sector. This is particularly likely to happen and to be justified in the case of weak/fragile states and governments perceived as badly governed. However, if countries such as Kenya and Ghana, which are among the few non-LDCs in Africa, already experience continuous interference, it may be assumed to be even stronger in other SSA countries.

In order to improve and facilitate alignment some lessons can be learned from the case studies:

- Donors should participate in policy processes from the beginning in order to develop ownership.
- Defining processes and not outcomes may help to force donors to comply with their own alignment rhetoric.
• SWAps are an appropriate way to help donors align, by designing a coherent overall policy framework, by reducing freedom of choice, and by providing a possibility to provide sector funding as well as niches for continued direct intervention. However, as the case studies have shown, agricultural policy is a highly complex field with partially independent sub-sectors and many actors with important stakes in these sub-sectors. It is unlikely that any SWAp will prescribe policy solutions for all sub-sectors from its start, leaving many uncertainties to later stages. Thus, a SWAp is no panacea for alignment. It can only facilitate a long process of confidence building, which is necessary for enhancing alignment.

5.6.5 Drivers of policy and strategy change

Ghana

A review of recent policies in Ghana suggests that agricultural strategy and policy changes may be driven by one of more of the following factors:

• changes in political leadership that lead new administrations to offer their own vision for the country (GPRS),
• constitutional requirements for developing plans or visions (Vision 2020),
• the need for articulation of a policy as a requirement to become eligible for donor support (FASDEP, GPRS),
• dire conditions of the economy or the need to improve performance of a particular sector (ERP/SAP, FINSAP, UAES). and
• the desire to maintain leadership in the region (ECOWAP).

FINSAP and the introduction of the UAES were in response to situations that demanded policy responses in a particular sector or sub-sector. The ERP was introduced when the country was in a dire condition because of the financial crisis and exogenous shocks including: foreign exchange reserves that were barely enough to cover two months of imports; external creditors had downgraded creditworthiness; most donors had halted flows; the country faced a major drought in 1981 and bush fires had ravaged cocoa; and Nigeria forced more than a million Ghanaians to return to their country. Additionally, there was no support forthcoming from friendly socialist countries. Ghana may have had little choice but to enter into the ERP.
The introduction of UAES was then considered to be essential to achieve higher agricultural growth, under MTADP. The World Bank, which was leading the programme, had identified strengthened agricultural extension as one of the measures to be introduced along with privatisation of fertiliser, marketing, and higher producer prices for cocoa growers. A further incentive may have been an offer of support from donors. Financial sector reform was a part of the ERP since the IMF’s approval of ERP came with the requirement to implement reforms in various sectors including finance.

Ghana’s participation in the development of ECOWAP may have been led largely by Ghana’s beliefs in the benefits of regional integration and interest in maintaining its leadership in the region. As a signatory to a treaty that was adopted by the HSG, Ghana, as a member of ECOWAS, undertook to adopt and implement a common agricultural policy in the region. Although the belief that regional integration benefits economic development may have been a motive, this policy per se did not offer any such benefits, and therefore, the country did not lead the process and was quite willing to have the regional body take the lead.

The World Bank and IMF significantly influenced the development of the UAES and FINSAP, both of which were derivatives of the SAP. FINSAP was pushed by the IMF as part of restructuring and introducing prudential principles into the financial system. In the case of the ECOWAS Common Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP), external influence was inevitable. Ghana participated in the process of developing the policy as any other member of ECOWAS, but as noted, had willingly signed to implement such a regional policy. The transition from prescriptive policies to more participatory ones with state leadership suggests that external influence in policy processes and choices could be diminishing. However, in so far as external partners contribute to the funding of the agricultural sector, influence in managing the sector will continue to show up through subtle conditionalities now referred to as triggers.

**Kenya**

Development of country and sector strategies has been caused by various factors over the different periods in Kenya. In most cases, this has been driven by the general political economy thinking at the time, with external influence playing a significant part. During the post-independence period,
the sector strategy was driven by the idea of using agriculture to help build the still young economy. During the second phase however, most policy-making was externally influenced, with Bretton Wood institutions insisting on SAPs and market reforms. The thinking at that time was that market controls were causing economic inefficiencies and therefore that deregulation and liberalisation would be necessary. With the notion that liberalisation alone was not enough, other strategies and policies starting with the PRSP had the intention of making policy participatory and actively shaping sector policies and institutions.

Within the agricultural sector, policy reviews in Kenya have mainly come about due to agitation by producers backed by politicians. Producers’ agitation has been a result of poor conditions within the sector, mainly caused by two issues. First, the liberalisation that took place in the 1980s and 1990s was hurriedly done, in most cases not being followed by appropriate legislative changes. In other instances, the market was left totally unregulated, leaving room for farmer exploitation by private players that came into the market. The other reason for poor performance of sub-sectors and hence agitation by producers was poor governance mostly in the form of corruption and management problems. This led to the collapse or near collapse of parastatals that were acting as regulators and marketing agents, in turn leading to poor services to farmers, declining producer prices, and in some cases non-payment for farmers’ deliveries.

This reactive modus of policy processes has changed with the formation of ASCU, which is now coordinating policy review within the sector. This is likely going to lead to a situation where policy review and formulation is not reactionary but pro-active.

General lessons learned

Strong drivers of change for agricultural policy reforms have been shown to include the following:

- External pressure by donors such as SAP and PRSP especially if linked to funding. However, this driver is dangerous for ownership and for finding adapted solutions as well as implementation. Is it important that internal actors fully subscribe to the measures imposed from outside.
• Larger political transitions such as democratisation, large policy cycles, and strategies such as the PRSP and ERP, which drive diverse policy changes.

• Strong actors, which are disadvantaged. If actors are weak such as farmer organisations or civil society groups, they can be strengthened by institutionalising their participation, as well as by direct capacity support.

• Regional integration can potentially be a driver of change, but only if regional policies and initiatives are perceived as relevant at the national level, either by binding policy space or by promising new options. Until now, this does not seem to be the case.

6 The contribution of NEPAD to agricultural policy and strategy development in Africa

6.1 The contribution of the APRM to enhancing governance in and around the agricultural sector

In this section we examine the APRM processes and first signs of implementation in Ghana and Kenya with regards to agriculture to see whether they adequately addressed governance issues that constrain agricultural development and have the potential to improve governance in and around the sectors. Ghana and Kenya are two of twelve countries in which APRM reviews have been completed. For a description of the process organisation as prescribed by NEPAD, see Chapter 4. In the following, national particularities are presented.

6.1.1 Structure for assessment

With few details on how to structure the local institutions for the APRM review, both Ghana and Kenya created national councils or national commissions as principal bodies to manage the processes. While the structures were established by the highest government authorities, provisions were made to keep the steering of the process to a certain degree independent from government. In Ghana, the autonomous National APRM Governing Council (NAPRM-GC) was established. The Council was made up of
representatives of civil society from the academic, religious, diplomatic, and legal communities. The NAPRM-GC was placed under the Ministry of Regional Cooperation and NEPAD and was supported by a Secretariat. In Kenya, an inter-ministerial task force, chaired by the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Planning and National Development, at its second large stakeholder workshop selected eight members to serve on the National Governing Council, an independent body to direct the APRM process. The membership of this was later expanded, based on recommendations of the APRM support mission, to 33 to include more representatives from the civil society, technical institutions, and ministries.

The technical research institutions that were appointed to lead the self assessment in each of the four thematic areas were highly regarded independent think tanks including: the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA), Private Enterprise Foundation (PEF), and Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) in Ghana and African Center for Economic Growth (ACEG), Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research (KIPRA), Institute for Development Studies (IDS), and the Centre for Corporate Governance (CCG) in Kenya.

6.1.2 Review process

After the structures were put in place by the countries, APRM support missions led by one of the members of the panel of eminent persons visited the countries to assess the structures, methodology, and participatory processes that were put in place in preparation for the implementation of the APRM. In Kenya, the mission consulted with civil society groups, the media, business associations, parliamentarians, religious leaders, youth, and women groups. On the basis of complaints received from civil society groups during these consultations, the mission to Kenya recommended that the membership of the NGC be expanded (see Chapter 6.1.1). The mission later returned to the country to resolve some operational issues. In Ghana, the NAPRM-GC organised a National Stakeholders Forum and a three-day stakeholders workshop.

The national structures created awareness of the processes in the countries by organising meetings in regions and provinces. The technical institutions employed inclusive processes in collecting the information. In Kenya for example, data was collected through desk reviews, expert surveys while
perceptions of the general population were captured through a national survey of 1,800 rural and urban households. In Ghana too, such surveys were conducted. In addition, in both countries, focus group discussions were organised.

In line with the prescribed APRM methodology, the self-assessment issue papers were submitted to the APRM secretariat which identified the areas that required further information as well as major shortcomings and areas for further investigation by the final Country Review Missions (CRM). The CRM discussed the issues papers extensively with partner institutions and evaluated the draft PoA submitted by the countries. The country review missions were led by the same eminent persons that led the earlier support missions. The team spent nearly 10 days in Kenya and travelled to all the provinces. In Ghana, all regional capitals were visited. Kenya’s APRM report was tabled to the APR HSG forum in June 2006 and Ghana’s was provided in June 2005 (see Kimenju, et al., 2009).

The processes were primarily funded by the government with support from UNDP.

### 6.1.3 Agricultural governance issues identified in APRM

Overall, agricultural issues are inadequately covered by the APRM in both countries, compared with the many topics what are to be expected (see Chapter 4.3.5).

However, several issues that are specifically relevant for agriculture were captured in the processes in both countries. Chief among them are land issues. Ownership of land, access to land, arrangements for transfers, registration of land, and the protection of land ownership are issues on all four thematic areas in Ghana. In Kenya as well, land is one of the issues raised under all four thematic areas with competition for land and other natural resources being at the heart of rivalry and conflicts (Wakhungu / Nyukuri / Huggins 2008 ). In addition, the problem of gender equality focusing on a woman’s right to inherit land is also one of the controversial land related issues.

Apart from land, the other agriculture linked issues raised deal with provision of public goods and other services by the government as a provider of last resort to overcome market failures. Kenya’s PoA, under the substan-
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tive areas economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic development, identifies problems facing agriculture as unfavourable macroeconomic environment, terms of trade shocks, insufficient market information systems, and an inadequate regulatory framework. It also identifies issues it terms “technical” such as lack of access to credit, weak extension, and declining fertility of land, which are felt to be related to governance and the failure of rural institutions. Women’s protection and promotion was highlighted as a cross-cutting issue including inheritance laws, but land rights were not specifically mentioned in the context of agriculture. In Ghana, other issues identified with regard to agriculture include 1) provision of small scale irrigation projects to complement the traditional rain fed agriculture; 2) storage, processing, and management to reduce post-harvest losses; and 3) marketing of agricultural produce. Ghana’s PoA, in the three substantive areas cited above, includes a range of agricultural issues to be addressed including: (1) low agricultural productivity and over-reliance on rainfall; (2) limited access and high cost of credit; (3) lack of proper storage and marketing of agricultural products, and (4) limited access to land (APR Secretariat 2005).

However, even if agricultural issues have been detected, it is not necessarily assured that they are covered adequately. In Kenya, more comprehensive and in-depth analysis should have been carried out particularly if substantial policy recommendations are to be made through the PoA. An example is land, which is mainly addressed under the economic governance and management theme. Here, the focus is the issue of conflicts and skewed distribution of land. Important agricultural related issues not addressed are land subdivision and economically inefficient units of land. Interviews with agricultural stakeholders reveal that this is an important issue amply discussed in the agriculture policy arena that should have been addressed in detail. Related to this, settlements are gradually taking away land in the high potential areas, in essence reducing potential farming land and worsening land subdivision.

Governance related issues that touch on agriculture that are not addressed include:

- low budgetary allocation to agriculture despite importance of the sector to GDP,
- un-harmonised government programmes where in several instances, government programmes and projects, including the ones supported
by donors, are not coordinated leading to duplication of effort and wastage of resources. This is especially the case in programmes that run across the ASM, with some ministries feeling that some programmes belong to certain ministries.

- low agricultural productivity and the role of agricultural research,
- food security and policies on abandoned or orphan crops,
- subsidies and procurement of inputs,
- energy and food,
- efficiency and management of parastatals,
- rigidities and bureaucracy of agricultural services,
- problem solving for agricultural challenges (see Chapter 5),
- the particular government services that are needed by small farmers compared to commercial farmers,
- the absence of an organised political voice among non-cash crop farmers, and
- the management of fisheries in Ghana.

6.1.4 Why agricultural issues were not adequately covered

Agricultural issues were not neglected in the APRM process on purpose. Rather, they were submerged under the four broad thematic areas and received little specific attention.

A number of biases against agriculture and the rural sector in the way the APRM was implemented in Ghana prevented an adequate assessment of agricultural governance issues:

- The primary document that emerged from the self-assessment had more on agriculture than the subsequent versions. When the 300-page original document was reduced to about 50 pages by the external review, many specific agricultural references disappeared.
- The basic questionnaires were offered as frameworks and the country teams had the flexibility to broaden the coverage of general issues raised in the framework to suit the conditions in the country. Many of the agricultural issues should have been covered in more detail under
corporate governance, but they were not because the questionnaire focused on the formal sector.

- The content and the later programme of action were influenced to some extent by the advocacy groups that participated in the process. Groups from the agricultural sector were not well represented. The ministry also played only a marginal role.

- While significant efforts were made to consult widely and consultations were considered superior to ones held as part of the development of GPRS, the process may have reached only the elites in the sector. MoFA offices in all 10 regions of Ghana were visited, as well as agriculture directors at 138 District Assembly offices. Other institutions engaged in agriculture-related activities were also contacted. But only a limited number of opinion leaders and individual farmers were consulted.

- The scope of consultations was limited because the process had to be completed within three months.

- Even if consulted, the inputs of smallholders might be neglected because they often ask for interventions and services from the state that may not be considered to be legitimate activities of the state.

In Kenya, according to agricultural stakeholders interviewed agricultural issues were inadequately addressed because of the way the process was understood, the way it was carried out and the level of engagement of agricultural stakeholders. For example, most of the governance issues that concern agriculture and are identified in APRM were already being addressed in other forums as noted in the response by the government during the presentation of the APRM report at Banjul in Gambia. For instance, governance problems in agriculture were well outlined in the SRA and were being addressed already. However, interviews with stakeholders have revealed that APRM strengthened the resolve for the reforms and it increased the political will for the same.

KIPPRA, the scientific organisation that handled economic governance and management understood the process as a macroeconomic issue, with no need to deal specifically with agricultural-related issues. Therefore, the lead technical agent did not make much effort to give agriculture more weight in the process despite its importance in the economy and the specific governance issues that reign in this sector. In addition, the agricultu-
tural key stakeholders were either not adequately engaged or they were left out of the process completely. For instance, key departments in the Ministry of Agriculture were not involved in the stakeholders’ forums, meaning that governance issues in such departments were left out. Moreover, farmer organisations and other organisations and institutes involved in agricultural issues were not represented.

6.1.5 Impact of APRM on the agricultural sector

As it has only been a few years since APRM was initiated, the overall impact of APRM is difficult to determine. Possible effects of the APRM process are observed in Kenya and Ghana at the following levels:

*On policy processes*

In Kenya, the level of attention given to governance issues in new agricultural policies has increased. However, it is not clear how much of this is due to APRM. For instance, the recently launched Vision 2030, the national vision that is intended to drive Kenya to two-digit growth rates, has paid particular attention to governance issues. In the political pillar, one of the guiding principles of the vision is “Public Participation in Governance” which seeks to have the people participate in development policies and social activities and to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure accountability of government at all levels and strengthen transparency. This will be undertaken through judicial and legal reforms. The Medium Term Plan, the document detailing how agriculture will contribute to achieving Vision 2030, identifies good governance of institutions, and especially cooperative societies as key to their improvement of service delivery. This is due to the realisation that many cooperative societies collapsed in the past due to poor management and corruption. Thus, a Savings and Credit Cooperative Organisations (SACCO) bill has been prepared that will ensure administration of an Ethics Code of Conduct for cooperative societies and the decentralisation of the Governance and Ethics Commission. It also envisions good governance in the redistribution of resources, especially land, to enhance accessibility and improved agricultural production.

In Ghana, the NAPRM-GC is mandated with the monitoring and evaluation of the APRM but it does not appear to have any particular influence over the executive or MoFA in terms of agriculturally related policies.
Although it catalogues the progress made on each item of the PoA in the annual progress reports, it does not have the authority to instigate any reforms. The process of compiling the progress reports involves two steps. Report cards are sent out to each MDA to be filled out with the status of the relevant PoA items. In addition, citizen report cards are also sent out by the District APRM Oversight Committees to various civil society stakeholders to ask their opinion on progress. The TRIs then conduct expert group surveys. The draft is circulated to experts and presented at validation workshops, held at the district, zonal, and national levels. The final progress reports are then submitted to the APR Secretariat (NAPRM-GC 2007).

The MDAs are not held to account in a general way for progress on PoA items. Rather, specific items that generate interest by certain groups are likely to see more immediate action. For example, the NAPRM-GC newsletter (NAPRM-GC 2008) notes that the APRM recommendation of reducing government expenditure led to a cabinet reshuffle in 2006 to decrease the number of ministries. However, the instigating factor in this action was a donor conditionality imposed by the Millennium Challenge Account programme which requested the reduction before releasing funding. In another example of action taken on an APRM recommendation, a civil society group actively lobbied for a law protecting persons with disabilities that was passed in 2006.

The need for greater integration between the PoA and the GPRS II has been recognised by the NAPRM-GC and NDPC. The thematic areas of the PoA are said to have been incorporated into the pillars of GPRS II. However, coordinating the overlapping mandates for M&E has been a challenge for these agencies (NAPRM-GC 2007). The current agricultural sector strategy, FASDEP II, mentions some of the same issues as the PoA, but is not specifically linked with the PoA.

Therefore, currently any impact that APRM would possibly have on agricultural policy processes would be related to certain issues raised in the PoA. APRM is not likely to have the kind of effects at a general level of agricultural policymaking that the CAADP seeks to achieve.
On implementation of the programme of action

The primary purpose of the PoA is to guide and mobilise the country’s efforts in implementing the necessary changes identified in the review. The responsibilities of various stakeholders in government, civil society, and the private sector are indicated in the PoA. Kenya has had two progress reports on the implementation of the PoA – a six month progress report covering the period July 2006 to January 2007 (Republic of Kenya and APRM 2007b), and a full year progress report covering the period July 2006 to June 2007 (Republic of Kenya and APRM 2007a). Another full year progress report has almost been completed by the NEPAD secretariat to cover the implementation and progress after June 2007. In Ghana, two biannual and two annual progress reports are now available publicly for the years of 2006 and 2007 on the NAPRM-GC website.

The Kenyan progress reports track the implementation of the activities identified in the self assessment and noted in the PoA. Progress is mentioned with regard to land policy including: a) the establishment of a Land Reform Unit at the Ministry of Lands, b) gender and inequality with improving in legislation, c) the establishment of a Women’s Enterprise Development Fund, d) institutions and public sector reform allowing for private actors to provide public services, and e) several improvements in the provision of market information for farmers. However, it is important to note that progress on the implementation does not necessarily translate to impact by the APRM process, as it difficult to attribute the impact to APRM, particularly if they were already part of an ongoing reform programme. Yet, APRM seems to have had some influence in strengthening the reform plans (see Chapter 6.1.4).

The Ghana progress reports note achievements in various areas such as tax reforms, service provision, and decentralisation (NAPRM-GC 2007). As with Kenya, it is difficult to trace the exact impact of APRM on the reforms, especially those relating to the agricultural sector. Many of the reforms were already planned as part of other strategies and programmes. For example, on the issue of land tenure, the second annual report states that Land Registries have been set up as part of the Land Administration Project. The Project, funded by various donors, was set up to implement the National Lands Policy of 1999. Other agriculturally related actions noted in the progress reports, such as increased mechanisation and irrigation schemes, fall under the mandate of MoFA and would have occurred without APRM.
6.1.6 Challenges facing the APRM process at the national level

APRM has faced various challenges in Kenya and Ghana. Although the APRM process has received a lot of attention and advertisement (newspapers, radio, TV, and so on), awareness about what the process entailed remains very low among the general population. Many people believe that APRM was just about judicial and legal reforms, widening of democratic space, tackling corruption, and nothing more. Despite the participative processes, actual participation was unbalanced, with stakeholders from the agricultural sector under-represented compared to civil society groups. For example, in Kenya, civil society was very strong and ended up having a large representation in NAPRM-GC and more or less controlled the APRM agenda.

The lack of institutional and implementation capacity of APRM in both Ghana and Kenya remains a problem. In Kenya, the APRM secretariat, which is supposed to undertake reviews and coordinate the implementation of the PoA is understaffed. Therefore, it does not have enough capacity to follow-up and coordinate the PoA. In Ghana, the overlap with NDPC and the multiple ministries involved in implementing the PoA complicate coordination issues for the NAPRM-GC. A weak Parliament also means that pressure for implementation would mostly come from either donors or civil society, whose interest is usually at the level of a particular issue, rather than overall implementation of the PoA.

Unlike in CAADP, RECs are not involved in the coordination of the implementation of APRM at the national level nor at the regional level. The ECOWAP and the COMESA Agricultural Policy and Strategy\textsuperscript{13} stress the importance of cooperation and co-ordination of regional agricultural policies, food security responses, product marketing, research and development, plant and animal disease and pest control, training, irrigation development, and exploitation of marine and forestry resources. These elements are also mentioned in the PoAs of Ghana and Kenya, but are not linked with regional policies. Thus, the chance of strengthening regional agricultural policy in the APRM has been missed, because of the lack of policy harmonisation between RECs and national governments. This further

\textsuperscript{13} See http://programmes.comesa.int
shows the continuing disconnect of national governments and regional bodies outside of CAADP.

To address the lack of coordination and exchange at the regional level, the NEPAD secretariat in Nairobi, which is acting now as a regional secretariat for East Africa, is developing an East African Action Plan.

6.1.7 Lessons learned

• It is possible to design NEPAD initiatives that are widely consultative. The APRM process has seen broad participation, with the National Governing Councils having representatives from many stakeholders. In past policies, it was shown that wide consultation often led to delays in the processes. However, APRM shows that a good structured and well organised policy process can combine participation and acceptable speed. However, it must be taken into consideration that APRM is not a policymaking process per se but “only” a step before – sensitisation for policymaking. Hard conflicts of interest are not fought. So, this lesson must be seen with a necessary portion of reserve concerning conflictive policies. However, the APRM structure of organising participation is a model.

• Balanced stakeholder representation is very important for the quality of the output of a policy process. APRM experiences show that “good” representation cannot be expected to develop from inside the process. Information, power, and capacity can easily keep weaker groups outside – in this case agricultural groups. Process design such as minimum representation requirements, capacity support for weak groups and as a last resort external advice or pressure (such as that provided by the Support Team in the APRM process) may be required in order to facilitate the participation of weaker groups.

• Participation has led to ownership at least of those groups of society that have been involved. In APRM, civil society groups have taken the lead more than private sector actors and sector ministries such as those responsible for agriculture and green themes.

• There are also concerns over the capacity to cover issues broadly or in depth. The already discussed conceptual risk of APRM, that it may overstretch governance capacities of African governments and consultative groups to carry out such all-embracing assessments (see Chap-
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ter 4.3.6) have been confirmed for the agricultural sector. Although
many governance issues have been included, as least as many have
not. Additionally, in some cases it seems that those issues were in-
cluded because they had already been identified and addressed prior to
the APRM. The risk of such an un-comprehensive coverage is that it
may prevent sector stakeholders from taking the exercise seriously.

- External policy initiatives must align to existing national processes.
The lack of influence of APRM over agricultural policies, although
having mobilised important parts of societies and touched upon im-
portant agricultural issues, shows that an external initiative must be
aligned to ongoing policy processes if it is to have impact – unless, as
seen in some of the past policies analysed, massive allocation of do-
nor funding for the acceptance literally buys in ownership.

- If not explicitly demanded, regional aspects of national policies are
not automatically brought into the policy processes. This is shown by
lack of inclusion of existing regional mandates and strategies within
the agricultural parts of the APRM. It reveals a lack of awareness of
the regional level and its institutions.

- The implementation of a continental initiative is clearly favoured by a
level of funding that permits implementation of participatory ele-
ments. In the case of APRM and the establishment of the APRM unit,
funding to encourage participation included: financing research or-
ganisations’ work, facilitating national and sub-national stakeholder
meetings, and publishing results.

6.2 Contribution of CAADP to enhancing agricultural
policy/strategy development

As described in chapter 4, CAADP seeks to improve agricultural policies
and strategies through national participation and ownership, peer learning,
partnership building, and evidence based policymaking. A key aspect of
CAADP is the process through which it is implemented, as it seeks to
strengthen country policymaking processes. The primary objectives of
developing compacts are to improve the effectiveness of planning and
execution of development strategies and to harmonise the delivery of de-
velopment assistance with country strategies. As the CAADP progresses,
the organisation of roundtables in particular, have not been completed in
the three case study countries within the duration of this study (contrary to what was initially foreseen in the project methodology). Thus, their impact or the value added by them cannot be assessed directly in policy documents, even less in implementation (see Chapter 2). The CAADP process and compact in Rwanda could probably provide more insights, but there is no literature on it, the project was not capable of generating reports, and in general the process must be considered as an experiment under unusual circumstances (see Box 6–1).

However, the analysis of the processes revealed a wealth of information on the likelihood of its future impacts and on lessons to be learned. In addition, understanding why the roundtables were delayed reveals process design characteristics that offer additional lessons. In the following, we examine the processes in the two case study countries and in Uganda to see how they may have added value to policymaking and harmonisation in the countries.

6.2.1 FAO-led process

CAADP implementation following the Maputo declaration has gone through two phases. In the first phase the FAO provided significant leadership (see Chapter 4). By the time the Maputo declaration was signed, members of the AU, Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda had already developed their national development frameworks for poverty reduction and agricultural sector development. These were the GPRS I and the FASDEP in Ghana, the Kenya Rural Development Strategy (KRDS) and the SRA in Kenya, and the National Development Plan (NDP), the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) as well as the Development Strategy and Investment Plan for Agriculture in Uganda. All the national strategies emphasised the development of the agricultural sector and the agricultural sector strategies emphasised the revitalisation of the agricultural sector through creation of an enabling environment for private sector development.

The FAO-led phase of CAADP began in the three case study countries along with most of SSA in 2003 with a series of NEPAD awareness workshops. In Ghana, these were conducted by the ministries of NEPAD and of regional integration in cooperation with COMESA. In Kenya and Uganda, similar activities were carried out by the corresponding ministries. In
Ghana, the awareness workshops were conducted in various regions as well.

Following requests from the governments, the FAO Investment Centre assisted the ministries of agriculture in developing NMTIP with portfolios of bankable projects relevant to various priority areas of CAADP. These NMTIPs drew on current plans – for example, in Kenya, they drew on the KRDS, SRA and the PRSP. The plans were also discussed in national stakeholder workshops. In Kenya, this workshop was held in June 2004. Of the several projects identified in the three countries through these organised consultations, the following were selected for implementation by CAADP:

1. in Ghana a small-scale/micro-scale Irrigation and Drainage Project and Post-harvest Systems and Agro-processing Support Project,
2. in Kenya the Agriculture Focused Rural Finance Project, Integrated Land and Water Resources Management, and Disease Control and Facilitation of Livestock Commodities Marketing, and

However, the NMTIP and the bankable investment projects were not followed up one of the reasons is because they were not integrated in the countries national strategies. Therefore, NEPAD proposed a different approach with a RECs-led process that highlights the CAADP objectives and pillars as a framework. NEPAD subsequently initiated a new approach in which the processes were led by RECs with the support of various organisations as already noted (compare with Chapter 4.2). The countries are still free to fall back on this earlier exercise or consider them as part of stocktaking exercises, but there are no indications of any country having done so.

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14 As of the end of January 2006, preparations of NMTIPs and BIPPS, as well as in-country multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral consultations had been completed for thirty-eight countries. Documents are found under http://www.fao.org/te/Tca/nepad/caadp_en.asp (accessed May 17, 2009).
6.2.2 RECs-led process

After a gap of two to three years, CAADP was revived under the leadership of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in 2006 and 2007 (see Zimmermann 2009; Kibaara et al. 2009). Both ECOWAS and COMESA began the process with the organisation of several regional meetings for government representatives from member countries. By the time these meetings began, the agricultural policy that was in place in 2003 in Ghana, for example, had been revised in a consultative process that lasted more than a year.

The objectives of the regional meetings were to brief member countries how the CAADP agenda would be implemented and what the role of different organisations would be. The representatives from the countries were informed about the steps involved. RECs also indicated when they would like the roundtables to be organised. ECOWAS suggested that the roundtables should be organised by the end of November 2007, in advance of the Heads of State meeting scheduled for December. Ghana’s representatives at the meeting committed to do so by September 2007. COMESA wanted to fast track the processes to organise the roundtables in Kenya and Uganda in 2006 under its own leadership.

Rwanda, under the leadership of the regional economic body, was the first country to go through process. And, it is the first and the only country to have completed the significant step of organising the roundtable and signing a compact with stakeholders (see Box 6–1). The two case study countries, Ghana and Kenya, are now expected to organise their roundtables before the end of 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6–1: Some observations and lessons for the CAADP in Rwanda</th>
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<td>Rwanda was the first country to have started a RECs-led CAADP process, and is the only one that has yet finalised a Roundtable (March 30–31, 2007). Its experience may offer interesting lessons for other countries. The efforts of this study to review the process adopted in the country and assess the post-roundtable situation were not fruitful for a number of reasons. However, some information from documents, participant observation of one of the authors, and a few interviews suggest the following:</td>
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The process was improvised, as it was the first country to organise the roundtable.

The process was not broadly owned. The drive for implementing CAADP came from the presidency, not from the agricultural or other related ministries. The ministry of finance was not sufficiently involved. NEPAD and COMESA pushed the process considerably in order to produce an early success story.

CAADP could massively profit from an ongoing review of the agricultural programme (Strategic Programme for Agricultural Transformation, PSTA) which is the operational framework for implementing the Rwandan PRSP in agriculture. The PSTA did and does not have the same pillars as CAADP. Key programmes are: Intensification and Development of Sustainable Production Systems, Support of Professionalisation of Producers, Promotion of Commodity Value Chains and Development of Agriculture Institutional Development. However, it was argued that the compact was aligned to CAADP by stating, "The first and third programme of the PSTA fall entirely under Pillars One and Two of CAADP, respectively, and the second and fourth programme of the PSTA under Pillar Four, while elements of Pillar Three are contained in the first programme of the PSTA" (Government of Rwanda 2007). All substantive parts of the exercise including funding, government budget allocation, and concrete donor commitment were left until after the Roundtable.

Local representatives of donors were at least initially not very supportive of CAADP because they regarded it as an unnecessary repetition of exercises, including modelling which had been done for developing the PSTA, and even feared that it could derail or delay PSTA implementation. Lack of knowledge about the nature and ambition of CAADP was an important reason for that behaviour.

During the roundtable, representatives from COMESA countries actively contributed to discussions. But this was the only opportunity for peer learning in the process.

Although representatives of all stakeholder groups have signed the compact including the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, AU / NEPAD, COMESA, the private sector, civil society, and development partners, the compact is vague in terms of commitments. It does not commit signatories to specific activities, nor does it include a plan for monitoring adherence to commitments.

There has not been a formal review of the experience or documentation of the post-roundtable developments that would offer useful information to guide other countries.
Working through focal points

The CAADP methodology (see Chapter 4) foresees that most of the work at the national level is executed by the National Focal Point Persons (NFPP). COMESA, for example, requested from Kenya that a person of director’s level or adequate seniority in the ministry be appointed as the focal person. Kenya appointed the director of policy research in the agricultural ministry in 2006. In Ghana, the ministry decided that the task would be left to the entire Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation (PPME) unit, but eventually the responsibility fell on an assistant director within the Policy Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Division.

The NFPPs are expected to implement the processes in their countries through committees. In Kenya, two committees were set up: the TWC to steer the CAADP agenda, and the Multi-Sectoral Committee comprised of a wider representation of stakeholders drawn from the sector. The TWG was later converted to one of the Technical Working Group (TWG) under the ASCU which is responsible for the implementation of SRA in the country (see Chapter 5) so that CAADP implementation would be mainstreamed. In Ghana, the TWG committee is comprised of representatives of various ministries relevant to the sector.

The level of engagement of these committees in implementation has varied. In Kenya, the committee has met five times while the Ghanaian committee met fewer times. COMESA has facilitated some regional learning by sending a consultant who had worked with the government of Rwanda in the organisation of their roundtable to brief the technical committees in Uganda and Kenya. The focus of this learning support appears to have been on roundtable preparation processes. The technical working groups were briefed on the size and content of the key documents required for the roundtables including the main CAADP document, a stocktaking report, a synthesis, and an investment plan for the future.

The retreats

The country processes were initiated with a day-long meeting or retreat organised by the RECs or the local agricultural ministry. They were organised in Kenya in 2006 by GTZ because NFPP did not have the capacity to do it alone due to funding and personal capacity. In Ghana and Uganda the process was organised in 2007 by their governments. The retreats in
the three countries were attended by representatives of various government departments, development partners, and other stakeholders, including political leaders. Participation in the retreats appears to have been stronger in Kenya – where nearly 80 attended – and Uganda compared to Ghana. In Ghana, where the process was driven by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Food and Agriculture (see Chapter 4), deputy ministers for agriculture and foreign affairs attended the meeting, but not the chief director of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

The RECs used the occasions to brief the stakeholders about the objectives, principles, and targets of CAADP and the processes that were to be followed in its implementation. During the launch in Kenya, for example, presentations encompassed the role of NEPAD initiatives with a focus on CAADP on the African development. They also discussed the role of pillars in CAADP and the CAADP process that countries were expected to implement. Additionally, they highlighted the on-going COMESA programmes in the region and ways to align and harmonise the CAADP processes with national plans like the SRA. At the meeting, some early interventions that could be undertaken through CAADP were also identified including sustainable land management, a regional model on value addition, and enhanced livelihoods in pastoral areas.

Harmonisation of the CAADP agenda with country strategies was also raised in the meetings. The Ghana retreat decided that as the agricultural ministry had just revised its own policy and was preparing a sector plan to implement the policy, the roundtable would be held when the sector plan was ready.

In Ghana, harmonisation with the policies of ministries other than agriculture, which under the CAADP framework are assumed to be part of the CAADP review, was not on the agenda. In Kenya, this harmonisation was partially taking place because the key ministries were already regrouped in the SRA under ASCU. However, other ministries not assembled in ASCU were not taken on board.

Although donors have participated in some aspects of the process, their overall participation in the process has been muted. Donor group representatives were included in the technical working group in Kenya, but not in Ghana or Uganda. GTZ supported CAADP meetings in Kenya through its permanent programme called “private sector development in agriculture”.
The agricultural donor groups in the three countries felt that the CAADP processes, to some extent, duplicated the processes that were already taking place in the country, questioning the value added by the CAADP processes. Despite the fact that major donors have committed to support CAADP at the highest levels, CAADP has not appeared until recently on their agenda at country levels (see Chapter 4). However, there is greater awareness now as USAID recently supported the CAADP secretariat in Uganda with some communication equipment and SIDA, which is developing its regional agricultural strategy, also sought a briefing on CAADP processes from the NFFP in Uganda.

The national CAADP processes have been weak, particularly in facilitating the participation of non-governmental stakeholders. While representatives of farmers’ organisations may participate in meetings, these organisations often have a weak membership basis and their capacities for internal communication are weak so that a constructive dialogue within farmers’ organisations and between them and the national processes such as CAADP are hardly taking place.

In Ghana, for example, an association of award winning generally large scale farmers represented farmers at the CAADP retreat. The members of a farmers’ organisation in Uganda, Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFEE), complained bitterly about not knowing anything about CAADP although their representatives had been attending the meetings. Also nearly all of the members of the task force set up to review the stocktaking documents in Uganda were members of the government while farmers and the development partners were left out.

*Financing the CAADP process*

The financial support of the CAADP process through RECs in the three countries was not sufficient. The countries have carried out the processes either with or without the financial support of the RECs. Although the RECs are amended to financially support the whole process, REC’ support was limited only to the payment of the local consultants for stocktaking. No resources were available for supporting national stakeholder meetings, independent travel of NFPP, invitation of peers, commission of additional studies, or development, printing, and distribution of documentation on CAADP.
Stocktaking and modelling

Stocktaking and modelling are key elements for evidence-based policy-making in the CAADP process (Chapter 4). At present, they are by far the most important activities. Their content is expected to importantly shape the outcome of the national compacts and their comparison allows some judgment on the pertinence of some basic assumptions of CAADP. Therefore, the main findings are reported in the following, together with the description of major process elements.

The RECs made draft terms of reference available to the countries. The countries hired consultants with the approval of the RECs. The process was delayed because of poor communication and disagreements about compensation. For example, a consultant proposed by Kenya felt that the compensation proposed was too low. The stocktaking exercise itself is based on the review of the existing agricultural policy papers. No further surveys were conducted to obtain new information. The consultants interacted with only some ministries in preparing the reports.

In Ghana, the first draft of the stocktaking report was presented to the TWG in November 2007 and the revised version was ready by April 2008. At the same time, IFPRI also made available the report with modelling results. Stocktaking was done by two consultants in Ghana one of whom was a consultant to the Ministry of Agriculture on a donor supported capacity development programme. The Ghana stocktaking report noted that the key constraints to growth are low productivity and poor post-harvest management due to low usage of improved seeds, inability to get reasonable prices in markets, heavy reliance on rainfall, and inadequate skills in agricultural and post harvest management. The report noted that poor access to inputs and financial services are some of the root causes of low adoption of modern inputs and that dependence on family labour for intensification is another constraint.

IFPRI provided modelling support based on an economy-wide model that had been built earlier to demonstrate the need to develop the agriculture sector to achieve the growth rates required for Ghana to become a middle income country, to reduce poverty, and to evaluate the impact of various agricultural strategies on growth and poverty reduction objectives. Modelling was conducted outside of the countries and without involvement of local researchers or much interaction with the national stakeholders, al-
though various scenarios that were tested were based on the targets that were set by the ministry.

The modelling exercise suggested that the targets for productivity that MoFA had set were adequate to achieve the 6 percent growth. But the key gaps for achieving CAADP objectives were low productivity in the agricultural sector, a 4 percentage point gap in achieving 10 percent share for agriculture in the government budget, and a skewed distribution of funding between cocoa and other sub-sectors in the current expenditures. The exercise, however, noted that the government’s approval of FASDEP II, which calls for a 10 percent share for agriculture in the budget, is a reflection of the governments’ commitment to increase the sector budget share. It noted that although growth sought under CAADP would reduce poverty considerably, poverty will remain high in the North.

In Kenya, the first draft of the stocktaking report was presented to the TWG in February 2008. While revising the draft, the TWG realised that the ToRs had overlooked the livestock sector. Two additional consultants were then engaged to complete the assignment within 30 days. The preliminary results were presented to the TWG in August 2008. The modelling report from IFPRI identified maize, livestock, and sorghum/millet as priority enterprises for a national agricultural strategy, as maize is produced widely and is important as a source of income for poorer rural farmers and urban consumers while sorghum and millet are key for drier and transition zones outside of the main bread basket higher-altitude region. Although livestock is a key growth sector, given its strong upstream links to dairy and other products, it was found to be less effective at reducing national poverty despite some importance in the pastoralist lowlands.

The report noted that government spending on agriculture would have to grow by about 14 percent per year in order to meet the target of six percent agricultural growth under the CAADP agenda and MDG1. The government would also have to allocate 8–11 percent of Kenya’s total budgetary resources to agriculture by 2015. This assumes an optimistic assumption about the efficiency of government spending with a 0.46 percent increase in agricultural GDP for every one percent increase in its total agricultural spending. For a less optimistic scenario of 0.14 percent increase in agricultural GDP for every one percent increase in its total agricultural spending.

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15 Interestingly, this is the same omission that had already been noted for the CAADP central document (see Chapter 4).
tural GDP per percentage spending increase, public spending on agriculture would have to grow at 21–27 percent per year to 14–22 percent of the total budget. This demonstrates the importance of not only meeting quantitative goals but also improving qualitative aspects of public agricultural investments. The report also estimates that approximately 60–70 percent of the additional resources should be allocated to infrastructure such as improving market access and information services, followed by agricultural research, and then extension and other technical services.

Uganda finalised its stock taking report in May 2007. The subsequent modelling results from IFPRI indicated that it is possible for Uganda to reach the CAADP target of six percent agricultural growth, but that it will require additional growth in a number of crops and subsectors and Uganda cannot rely on a few crops or sub-sectors to achieve its growth targets. Broader-based agricultural growth, including increases in fisheries and livestock, will be important if this target is to be achieved. So, too, is meeting the Maputo Declaration of spending at least ten percent of the government’s total budget on agriculture. In fact, even under an optimistic and efficient spending scenario, the Ugandan government will have to increase its spending on agriculture in real value terms by about 25.3 percent per year between 2006 and 2015, and account for at least 14 percent of its total expenditure by 2015, in order to achieve the first Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015. Therefore, the CAADP growth target should remain a high priority, since it will substantially reduce the number of people living below the poverty line and significantly improve the well-being of both rural and urban households.

Overall, the stocktaking is a technical process conducted by a few individuals. It is a top down process because the countries have very little influence in the selection of the consultants and in the preparation of the ToRs. The modelling exercise is generally considered to be very useful. Our interviews reveal that in all three countries the exercise has added value to the stocktaking and therefore to the CAADP process in general.

**Roundtables**

The roundtables are now expected to be held in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda in 2009. Although, briefs had been prepared for the roundtable in Uganda, it was postponed so that an updated strategy could be taken to the roundtable. Updating has been necessitated because of a revision in the
way GDP is estimated. In Ghana, a draft of the sector plan is now ready. In all the countries, the processes followed have been as recommended by CAADP. Now, it will be important to see whether CAADP has added value. One way to examine that would be to see to what the extent processes, such as the commitment, stocktaking, and the retreat, have added value in terms of strengthening policy development and implementation in the countries.

6.2.3 Indications of value added

*Drivers of change/ownership*

Who drives the process along with participation is a key indicator of ownership. While at the global and continental level CAADP has been a strong instrument to claim and gather commitment to agriculture from governments and donors alike, our findings suggest that the commitments made in Maputo are not adequately owned in the countries. At least until now, it is CAADP HQ and the RECs that have driven and financially supported the countries to initiate the processes. Although they had external and donor resources available to do so, they were very limited and often come with long delays. Additionally, RECs do not have as much leverage over countries relating to national agricultural policies as they do in trade-related policy components and in some case food security (for example SADC). CAADP does not seem to be linked to regional integration or trade agreement processes such as Economic Partnership Agreements negotiated between RECs and the European Community or only very loosely. In the three country processes no such links have been established to our knowledge. However, the regional and continental levels were beyond the scope of this study and therefore how different regional processes are treated could not be systematically analysed.

Moreover, CAADP is presented as a framework for countries to adopt in the design and implementation of their own strategies. Some of the guidelines suggest that CAADP would be implemented on a demand-driven basis, but the REC-driven processes make the countries feel that the processes that are expected to be unique are thrust on them. Rather than strengthening processes that are on-going in the country and building on them, CAADP implementation seems to seek exclusive attention. In Ghana, for example, there is a government initiative, which is supported
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by donors, to develop and implement a strategy to develop the northern part of the country. While it is important both politically and for reducing poverty, it does not figure prominently in either the country strategy or the stocktaking done for CAADP. Thus, the countries have failed to take advantage of important opportunities to integrate existing activities into a cohesive country strategy.

The processes are managed or led by mid to senior level bureaucrats within countries. The civil servants look to the roundtables as an opportunity to bring the political leadership on board. The agricultural ministries are not using the commitment the country has made to CAADP to increase their share of the budget. Nor have the presidents’ offices, which are supposed to take up NEPAD commitments of HSG and which often also tend to be involved directly in agricultural related matters, done much. Agricultural ministries, the key actors for implementing CAADP, do not seem to have either the conviction or the strength to gather other stakeholders around CAADP without strong assistance from one of the real power poles of a country such as the Presidency, Ministry of Finance, or sometimes Planning. For other potential drivers of the CAADP agenda such as farmers’ organisations, this is even more the case. They lack capacity, are extremely diverse, and very often they do not even know about the CAADP agenda prior to the initiation of national processes.

Participation

The level of participation in CAADP processes so far was weaker than normally is the case in the case study countries’ agricultural policies and strategies. Both Ghana and Kenya have established policymaking processes that require extensive consultations with a range of stakeholders. In the case of CAADP, as noted above, stocktaking and modelling is done by few experts. The RECs suggested broad terms of reference, which the countries were free to tailor to their conditions, but the countries did not change them significantly. The outputs of these two exercises were also vetted by committees comprising of mostly technical people. The suggested CAADP process was not explicit about participation of non-technical people in the process before the roundtable. The preparation of briefs that go to the roundtable was also done by professionals. Thus, the

16 Rwanda may have been an exception with the presidential office as the driver of CAADP.
roundtables are the only major opportunities for non-governmental actors to participate in decisionmaking. The process appears to have largely been led by technical experts. In summary, the CAADP process in practice seems to be one largely led by technical experts.

Evidence based policymaking

CAADP processes include some aspects of the fundamentals of planning: taking stock of the current situation to see whether it can lead to the desired outcomes, identifying the key gaps, and developing strategies to overcome those gaps. All stakeholders acknowledged the merit of CAADP in bringing together the major information available in the country with relevance to agricultural policy, and that modelling provides a better understanding of expenditure-growth-poverty alleviation linkages. However, the short period of time that is available for stocktaking and modelling combined with the absence of any financial support does not permit generation of additional information that may be valuable for analysis. It is useful to note, however, that in the three countries, stocktaking and modelling were based on outputs of many processes independent from CAADP that had involved substantial consultations among the stakeholders.

The potential for peer elements has not been exploited. Interactions were limited to the visit of a consultant from Rwanda to Uganda and Kenya and exchanges of information at the regional and continental CAADP meetings. Pillar documents, use of ReSAKSS, exchange of experts, comparative analysis of country experiences, or formalised screening of CAADP documents at regional or continental level have not been carried out.

The suggested process cannot be expected to produce policies and investment plans that are likely to be superior to those that are already done since the analyses carried out are not designed to generate insights on how certain outcomes can be better achieved. For example, the modelling support is well suited to examine whether the outcomes expected from broad investment areas such as cash or food crops are likely to have the desired impacts on poverty and other aspects of welfare under certain assumptions such as efficiency levels. They are not useful to help decide what interventions may be appropriate to achieve the desired outcomes and how to improve efficiency.
Availability of information also limits what is feasible analytically. For example, there is limited data on expenditure, output, and impact available to carry out analyses that would answer the question as to where and how investments may be best made within the sector, beyond gross estimates of the resources required for the sector as a whole and for broad areas. Quickly done reviews and modelling support are not likely to offer superior investment plans for the roundtable compared to the situation before.

Alignment

As discussed in Chapter 4, alignment in the context of CAADP has two meanings: alignment of national policies with that of CAADP pillars and alignment in the classical sense of donor policies with that of national strategies. At a superficial level, the first response in the three case study countries to the CAADP framework is that alignment is easy to achieve for several reasons:

- With regard to principles and values, as argued in the previous paragraphs and chapters, participation, ownership, and evidenced-based policymaking are already in place in all three countries, at least to some degree. In the analysis of past policies, it has been shown that these principles are not always thoroughly applied, but also CAADP in its present form does not warrant any improvement of that situation. The situation may turn out to be different in countries in which policy processes are less well established.

- Alignment of any national agricultural policy with the four pillars of CAADP is relatively easy to achieve since they are very broad. However, both CAADP and country strategies seem to ignore livestock issues which are of high importance in SSA.

- With regard to regional integration, alignment of individual countries to regional strategies, or better harmonisation according to regional complementarities, SSA is definitely not yet very far along. This may be due to the lack of countries’ involvement in regional agricultural policies (see Chapter 5 for the case of Ghana in ECOWAS), the problems of formulating common agricultural trade policies in general and Economic Partnership Agreements in particular (see UNECA 2008), and to the general weakness of regional integration in Africa. Theoretically, CAADP has the alignment of regional and national agricultural policies high on its agenda and is
potentially well situated to foster it since operating through AU / NEPAD (which has the role of coordinating and steering overall regional integration processes in Africa) and the RECs. But it has not yet done so in practice.

● With regard to the quantitative CAADP targets, one has to distinguish among them. The governments may claim that they are aligned to the growth targets, as they have reached or surpassed the growth rates of 6 percent. Eleven countries have met or exceeded that rate in 2005 (Teshome 2008)\(^{17}\). However, many countries are far from reaching this target. Whether this will be achievable in times of global economic crisis is another question, but a drop due to adverse world market conditions is widely out of the reach of government policies. With regards to budget allocation, six of the 19 COMESA countries are allocating more than the CAADP recommended 10 percent of their budgets to agriculture (Teshome 2008)\(^{18}\). However, in the majority of African countries there is still much to do.

● With regard to the CAADP process, articulated as, and generally understood to be, a short discrete succession of activities that includes some basic elements of planning and dialogue, alignment has been controversial. Both country administrators and donors have perceived CAADP to be an unnecessary duplication of activities that usually takes place in the country and not necessarily an initiative that might add value. In Kenya, for example, the ASCU which has the mandate to coordinate the implementation of the SRA, views CAADP as a programme parallel to SRA. The attempts to include CAADP as one of the Technical Working Group under the ASCU have not been well received. Development partners and members of ASCU felt that SRA had already captured most of the issues addressed under CAADP pillars. But still, there are some ministries that are not part of the SRA/ASCU exercise.

● Agricultural development is a multi-organisational challenge. Only in Kenya does there appear to be significant coordination between

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17 The countries that achieved or surpassed this target in 2005 were: Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mauritius, Mali, Senegal, Kenya, Chad, Guinea, and DRC Congo.

18 These are Niger, Ethiopia (16 percent), Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Malawi (11 percent)
various relevant ministries on developing and implementing agricultural strategies. The CAADP process does not directly encourage greater coordination by seeking to work through a single focal point person, although they are expected to work through a technical working committee with representation of various stakeholders.

- For the time being, the prospect of receiving additional donor funds might offer incentives to carry through the process, but that is somewhat moderated by the knowledge of previously developed bankable projects not being funded. In addition, the linkage of CAADP to increase government spending on agriculture limits the prospects of donor-only funding of CAADP-inspired programmes. More importantly, the donors at the local level are not suggesting that they would increase their aid flows. Donors at country levels may not have the flexibility to significantly increase the support in the short-term. Many donors, under the Paris agenda and according to their usual procedures, wait for national comprehensive programmes like PRSP and sector projects to design their own support efforts. That these commitments are negotiated in bilateral agreements and therefore not spontaneous makes the process slower and more challenging.

6.2.4 Lessons learned

Strengths of the process

On a positive note, although CAADP was not on the agenda of donors at the country levels, it has now, to some extent, become a part of the agricultural development discourse. Some donor organisations are beginning to view the CAADP compact as a potential instrument to channel support to the sector, particularly after the increased interest in the sector because of the global food price crisis.

At the country levels too, the target of 10 percent share for the agricultural sector in the national budget has set a benchmark for countries to demonstrate their commitment to the sector. There are indications that CAADP may be, as anticipated in some of its documentation, seized by stakeholders in the sector, primarily the agricultural ministries, as an opportunity to highlight the importance of the sector to the economy. The ministry in Ghana, for example, is considering the organisation of a regular round-
table during the annual farmers’ day celebrations, which have become a tradition in the country. The current processes, however, do not explicitly seek out ways to build greater political support for the agriculture sector.

In addition, regional organisations and the finance ministry have been brought in as stakeholders in the process. Regional integration has often been cited as a goal in Africa, yet at least our case studies suggest that countries have not taken concrete steps towards regional coordination in the agricultural sector. Finance ministries have a central role in allocating resources to the agricultural sector, yet, as in Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda, they are often skeptical of the usefulness of such an increase. Including these actors in the process and dialogue is an important first step, although as noted in the next sections, their involvement may need some refinement.

**Weaknesses in the process**

As noted already, the commitment made at Maputo is not owned by key actors in the countries, despite the fact that it was made by heads of state. CAADP did not emanate from a national bottom-up process of grassroots, technical or ministerial levels. The commitment made at the continental level is now making its way to regional and national levels. This would not be necessarily a serious handicap if at least presidencies would lead the processes. But, this is not really the case, at least not in the three case study countries. This shows again that ownership is a prerequisite of successful policy change and that ownership is extremely sensitive to balance with the right issue needing to be owned by the right level of people or institution. Civil servants that are engaged in the process view the roundtable as an opportunity to bring the political leadership on board, which is fine so long as the roundtable is seen as the beginning of the process.

CAADP is presented as a framework for countries to adopt in the design and implementation of their own strategies and some of the guidelines suggest that CAADP could have been implemented on a demand-driven basis. However, the REC-led processes make the countries feel that processes that are expected to be unique are thrust on them. Rather than strengthening processes that are on-going in the country and building upon them, CAADP implementation seems to seek exclusive attention. Some important opportunities to integrate existing activities into a cohesive country strategy are thus not taken advantage of.
Developing partnerships with the private sector and civil society as well as achieving donor harmonisation in terms of increased coordination and their buying into country policies and strategies are important objectives of CAADP. In countries where some level of harmonisation has been achieved already – driven largely by other forces such as the Paris Declaration and gradually negotiated arrangements that are unique to countries – it is not clear whether CAADP processes will lead to greater harmonisation.

The pillar institutions have not played the role they were supposed to play, namely the technical support that may strengthen the quality of investments to certain outcomes, such as the need to increase productivity in the three countries.

More generally, creating an expectation of being able to raise significant resources at the roundtable can be problematic, particularly if investment plans that are very similar to the earlier bankable projects are taken to the roundtable. The problems stem from two issues. One is that the countries may engage in policy reforms only in order to get access to funds, not because they are convinced of their pertinence. The other is that the countries may lose the incentives to implement the CAADP process and wholeheartedly search for better policies if they feel that the countries that have gone to the roundtable have not succeeded in attracting aid flows. NEPAD seeks to offer its member countries a changed relationship with donors through their participation in programmes such as CAADP and APRM. It is certain that without key incentives, such as fresh money, the national CAADP drivers will find it too difficult to gather participation, but the expectations need to be moderated. Local donor representatives are not able or willing to promise ad hoc additional funds at the Roundtable because their agencies usually require longer term planning and other types of alignment, such as through the PRSP process.

The case studies suggest that one of the weaknesses in implementation may be the failure to clearly articulate how the principles and values of CAADP would lead to a changed relationship among various stakeholders in the sector, especially the government and donors. As the roundtable and compact are considered to be important milestones in the implementation of CAADP, the processes leading up to them have been made fairly simple. This, in turn, has led to the kinds of perceptions that were noted and unreasonable expectations from the roundtable itself (see above).
process is also not clear on operationalising of the principles. For example, apart from inviting stakeholders to the roundtable, the process is not clear on how partnerships would be built. Similarly with evidence-based planning, the process is weak in examining the experience with past investments or generating new information. Modelling support is provided only in countries for which models are already available, and it is not accompanied by efforts to build modelling capabilities locally. Some of these issues have to be addressed by regional and country knowledge systems in order to develop a strategy that can lead to donor support.

Finally, the principles, targets, and pillars, while simple to understand and adopt, divert attention away from more significant changes in policy processes that African countries need to make to strengthen investments in the sector. The next section dwells on these needs.

7 Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 Overall conclusions

The main finding of this study is that the two NEPAD initiatives under investigation, APRM and CAADP, have considerable potential to add value to agricultural policy processes in SSA countries. However, for very different reasons, presently they do not live up to this potential.

To start with, agricultural sectors even in relatively advanced SSA countries such as Ghana and Kenya are still not performing as they must in order to realise the full potential for economic growth and poverty alleviation and to conciliate productive social and environmental concerns in and around the sector. The prevalence of poverty and hunger in rural areas, growing degradation of land at low and stagnating levels of productivity, and high poverty fuelled migration rates towards urban areas are causes of concern. Uncertainties about future food availability and prices and the role of agriculture as both a source and a victim of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change are all calling for bold action.

Despite these necessities, agriculture is still a neglected and sub-optimally managed and financed policy field in most SSA countries for a variety of reasons including: agriculture is a complicated policy field with highly heterogeneous natural and socio-economic sub-levels; it has extremely
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diverse players, from subsistence farmers to multinational corporations and parastatal monopolists; transaction costs in the rural areas are very high; agriculture is affected by many natural and political risks and uncertainties, of local, national, regional, and worldwide origin; decisions in agriculture carry manifold externalities; agriculture is not well considered and integrated into larger policy processes at the national and regional levels; cooperation and coordination among the various ministries and many stakeholders that are involved in or are affected by agriculture are inadequate; capacities of public and most private actors are weak: and government budgets and donor fund allocations to agriculture are limited. Improvements in agricultural policymaking processes have been made in the last decades in the case study countries. Overall, however, available capacities, resources, implementation and results-based monitoring are still insufficient and not well-coordinated.

Key aspects that the two NEPAD initiatives intend to improve in agricultural policymaking (APRM is not a sector initiative, but it is supposed to improve governance in any sector including agriculture) are:

1) participation in development of policies and strategies, and thereby ownership,
2) better embeddedness and harmonisation of these policies and strategies into the regional and pan-African agendas,
3) evidence based policymaking including peer learning and review, and
4) the building of partnerships to enhance private and public investments.

In a second step, this should lead to better policies and policy environments including: various aspects of governance; state capacity to offer effective planning, regulation, and service provision; and eventually more and better public and private investments. The ultimate goals are sustainable agricultural growth and poverty reduction.

In order to add value to national agricultural policies, some of the outcomes that the implementation of the NEPAD initiatives at the national level are expected to achieve are:

1. increased opportunities and support for stakeholders in agriculture to organise themselves, to effectively voice their concerns, and to advocate on behalf of the sector,
2. strengthened capabilities in the sector to develop and implement strategies and work with non-governmental entities,

3. strengthened statistical, research, monitoring, and evaluation capabilities in a country to support evidence-based policymaking, and better channelling of the evidence into policy processes,

4. increased opportunities for countries to participate in regional issues and neighbouring country processes to facilitate mutual learning and advancements on regional issues, and

5. additional windows of opportunity to kick-start necessary reform processes.

The two NEPAD initiatives try to deliver these outcomes in quite different ways and achieve them to a different degree.

Generally speaking, APRM is strong in shaping visible national consultation processes, achieving good participation, and supporting genuine research and evidence, or at least broad opinion generation. The prescriptions from headquarters are sufficiently open to allow adaptation to local conditions and capacities through open but structured questionnaires. It relies on local capacities for evidence/opinion generation and for steering the process, but there is no element of capacity building in this area. Considerable resources are provided to fund the processes, although probably not enough is done to systematically include all stakeholders, particularly from remote rural areas and the private sector. Some important elements in the process design try to foster broad national ownership against domination by the state, including independent eminent persons along with balanced and transparent reporting procedures, though this may not always be sufficient, particularly under non-democratic rules. Country ownership is moderate to high, as civil society is very engaged, though the private sector and public entities outside the directly NEPAD-linked ministries are less involved, at least in our case study countries. Linkages to regional and continental frameworks are given through international treaties, the AU HSG forum, and eminent persons, though it is difficult to use commitments to external frameworks as binding benchmarks due to their qualitative character (unlike the 10 percent budget goal of CAADP). There is no strengthening of regional institutional networks, not even in the case of economic policies such as agricultural trade policy which has a clear regional dimension in SSA.
Content-wise, APRM is not as successful as might be expected from its process design and implementation, at least in the case of agriculture. Most likely, the main reason is that it is not sufficiently specific and is unsystematic with regards to governance in individual sectors. As a result, findings and recommendations towards a sector like agriculture are not comprehensive and deep enough to be able to serve as a guideline to sector policy processes. In addition, APRM is minimally embedded in national processes, both general and sector policies and strategies, and linkages are neither conceptually planned nor facilitated. In consequence, implementation is not yet remarkable, and the impact is low, at least in agriculture.

CAADP has a much more technocratic character than APRM as participatory and transparent elements are fewer. There are evidence generation elements like stocktaking and modelling, but they are not widely shared and transparent, not well embedded into the participatory process, and not sufficiently financed to create new data, analysis, and convincing power. Local capacity development is not subject to CAADP. Public and intra-sector visibility is very low as only the roundtables provide a platform for public attention and discourse. The sector steering institutions tend to be weak in their ability to develop ownership, and have limited resources and capacities to accomplish their work. The international benchmarks for monitoring are much clearer than in APRM, with two quantitative indicators: the public input indicator of at least 10 percent budget for agriculture, broadly defined, and the output indicator of minimum 6 percent agricultural growth. However, it is questionable whether such uniform indicators are always reasonable for the very diverse situations of SSA countries and agricultural sectors, which could reduce their usefulness for pushing CAADP and agriculture forward.

The embedding of CAADP into national agricultural policy processes is conceptually unclear, as it is difficult to determine who is aligning to what, and what alignment means, and raises concerns among national stakeholders and local donor representatives involved in the regular processes. The ownership in the countries by different stakeholders is weak, including the agricultural ministries, but even more so among other ASM or non-state actors.

The commitment to CAADP itself through the Maputo Declaration was voluntary – although countries would have found it difficult not to sign up to a continental initiative – and implementation is also voluntary, but the
efforts of regional and other organisations are being dissipated by having to work with a large number of countries, many of whom are reluctantly going along. Hastening implementation in a number of countries does not appear to be effective, and at the same time it may diminish the value of the process in important ways.

Peer elements such as neighbouring countries, regional bodies, pillar institutions, and ReSAKSS are foreseen, in principle, but their level of involvement in CAADP implementation at the national level has been minimal so far. The support from NEPAD and the RECs is relatively low, except for sensitisation and the funding of stocktaking and the roundtables.

Concerning communication, APRM is very well known as a NEPAD initiative both nationally and internationally, whereas dissemination and implementation of results is its crux. In contrast, communication is an essential problem in CAADP. Already at present, the information about CAADP at the national level is scarce, creating confusion and often even refusal. The change of approach without proper communication and overhaul of its strategy paper presently constitutes a problem. Further reforms as proposed here will increase the need for a good communication strategy.

It is important to highlight some common weaknesses of both APRM and CAADP which strongly hamper their effectiveness to influence national agricultural policy processes and the policies themselves:

- Both initiatives, when implemented at the national level, are not well linked to ongoing, national policy processes but instead are stand-alone initiatives. Not enough care has been devoted to the docking of the processes onto and the channelling of the results into national processes. The implementation of the initiatives at the country level is planned without taking into account the autochthonous policy cycles and windows of opportunities such as five-year plans, revisions of PRSP, or agricultural sector planning cycles. This, however, is crucially important since there can and should be only one relevant policy document per sub-sector. The incentives to adopt the results of the national exercises are not as high in cases like immediate additional donor support or government spending. Therefore, it is difficult to create new windows of opportunities. In most cases, this is not even desirable since reforms should not be bought but owned by convinced
insiders. The initiatives do not sufficiently take into consideration the lengthy processes of agricultural policymaking, including parliamentary procedures that most democratic countries are committed to, particularly at the level of specific law formulation.

- Both APRM and CAADP tend to invite participation in an *ad hoc* manner. They both, and particularly CAADP, overestimate the capacity, especially of disadvantaged groups, to get involved in national policy processes. They do little to improve long-term and quality of participation in terms of participation capacity, networking, stabilisation of participatory structures, mandates of participants and so on. Rural populations are easily left out in a self-organised process and disadvantaged in terms of representation by civil society organisations due to low media presence and population literacy, leading to an urban bias.

- Similarly, APRM and CAADP overestimate the flexibility and the mechanisms of donor support and probably also the lack of willingness to align. Despite the lip-service paid to agricultural development, the agricultural sector is nominally funded in aid allocations, although the food price crisis may have changed that recently. However, for governance issues in general, lack of interest is certainly not the case. Governance is rated very high on donor agendas. The fact that even the political governance findings of APRM are not acknowledged and supported quickly and massively by donors indicates that the lack of embeddedness into national policies (see above) and the lack of flexibility of donors may be important handicaps for such initiatives. Realignments are very slow, following the revision of key policies, and most often require lengthy adjustment processes such as bilateral negotiations and agreements. Donor representatives at the national level often do not have the mandate to react quickly.

- National and regional policy arenas are not yet well linked. The connections of agriculture, food security, and trade policies are not yet fully taken into account in setting the agenda for CAADP at the regional and national level. While much focus in the African regions is put on regional integration in general, the specific implications and regulatory consequences for agriculture are not yet fully recognised. The link is almost absent in APRM and theoretically strongly developed but in practice limited in CAADP. However, regional aspects of agricultural policymaking are predicted to increase in importance, if
not due to CAADP and agricultural policy mandates for RECs, then
due to regional trade policies which heavily affect agricultural sectors
of member countries. For the time being, however, regional links in
African agricultural policies are not yet very strong.

- Another weakness is the lack of realism in the creation of long-term,
less costly second-round process designs. Both initiatives place heavy
weight on the first round, with policy documents thought to be direc-
tive for the next few years. Although it could be claimed that the first
round is only the first step in the implementation of the initiative, the
common understanding is that they are a significant step in imple-
menting the framework, one to which various stakeholders including
donors would commit in specific ways. This, however, is unrealistic
in view of the lengthy and complicated reform processes that charac-
terise policymaking in these and most other countries. External initia-
tives which intend to influence such reforms have to be: flexible, able
to update and re-launch older findings and recommendations, to build
national and sometimes regional networks, and they have to support
drivers of change who are in the position to spearhead reforms. Both
initiatives are not very active in initiating and sustaining such longer-
term structures. The headquarters of NEPAD is too far away and too
small to actively, or even passively through requests, react towards
upcoming opportunities. The RECs are better suited to do so, particu-
larly if they have a mandate for regional information, coordination,
and harmonisation or policy formulation in the respective policy field.
Yet, RECs are not yet linked to ongoing national agricultural policy-
making processes (see above).

- Finally, both initiatives have weaknesses in building up additional
evidence-creating capacity. In the case of APRM, local capacity is
used for gathering opinions and facts, but there is no element of ca-
pacity development nor is there a mechanism foreseen to do so. In the
case of CAADP, there are some elements of evidence-use such as
stock-taking and modelling, but again there is not yet capacity devel-
opment taking place. Pillar institutions, peers, and ReSAKSS could
become valuable tools for capacity development, but they are not yet
visible, at least in our case studies.

All this would mean that in any case, the benefits from CAADP and
APRM, in terms of improving policies, governance, expenditure effective-

ness, and the resulting increased investments, would only be obtained after longer periods in each country. The key challenges, therefore, are to shape the initiatives in such a way as to strengthen the above fundamentals while maintaining incentives for the countries to continue to implement them. The activities that will be required for implementing the frameworks will include not just ‘policies’ or ‘agricultural investment projects,’ but also measures of institutional development that improve the basis for ongoing evidence-based, participatory, and sufficiently fast decision-making and implementation. In the end, it diminishes the credibility of AU / NEPAD as well as of HSGs if proclaimed initiatives are not implemented at home.

7.2 Recommendations

The following changes in CAADP and APRM may be considered. Note that the recommendations are not identical for both initiatives, due to their different scopes, strengths, and weaknesses. Often, elements of one initiative can be regarded as a guide for the other.

Selective engagement of countries and significant costs for buy-in

APRM is based on a selective engagement and relatively costly buy-in of countries, whereas CAADP puts its strategy upon a broad, continental-wide and simultaneous implementation. With regard to ownership in implementing the process in-country, it seems that APRM has the better approach. It might be useful for CAADP to focus on a few countries and show that they benefit from the processes and are willing to demonstrate their commitment to carry the process forward. The objective would be to clearly demonstrate how a country can benefit from adopting the CAADP principles and values through more elaborate processes. Several potential avenues exist to selectively engage with a few countries:

- The participation can be made voluntary, as is done with APRM, so that the countries can choose to participate when convenient to them.
- The countries may be required, as a sign of commitment to carry through the process, to pay a substantial fee to participate in the programme, again as APRM does. This fee can be tied to the level of income in the country.
• Countries should be asked to show commitment by assigning additional and particularly more diverse human capacities to the process by involving high-level representatives from all those ASM which CAADP regards as responsible for agricultural development (see also next point on “high profile implementation”).

More detailed processes can then be carried out in a few countries, which can also serve as a demonstration for other countries. This approach would also facilitate the gradual capacity development of key organisations such as NEPAD, RECs, ReSAKSS, and pillar institutions which cannot thoroughly cope with dozens of country processes all at once. At the same time, by progressively increasing the number of countries, these institutions can learn from experience and apply the lessons to newcomers.

High profile implementation and quality of participation

High profile participants can create new or widen existing windows of opportunity for change and achieve stronger political will at the level of ministers and administration to engage in a political process and achieve results. APRM has well integrated such highly visible and value-adding, symbolic, and substantial elements, from the naming and visit of eminent persons to the presentation at the AU HSG level. For CAADP, in a manner similar to APRM, more high profile interventions would be desirable:

• The countries may be required to set up a mechanism for implementation that would provide leadership to the agricultural ministry but would also strongly involve various other ministries including the finance ministry, civil society and the private sector. A multi-ministerial approach would most certainly need the kick-off and continuous monitoring and encouragement from the cabinet or even better the presidency, which can be easily justified by the AU / NEPAD-level commitment by HSG.

• Higher profile for the CAADP could also be achieved by more visits from high-profile peers such as CAADP delegations from neighbouring countries and RECs.

Not only the profile of the processes, but also the quality of broad participation, is to be enhanced. Both consultation and implementing mechanisms may be furthered in such a way that the implementation process includes the building of well defined networks of stakeholders, such as
input-deliverers, agricultural credit providers, agricultural commodity and food processing and trade representatives, agricultural research communities, water user communities, and natural resources use and environmental communities, among others. Their participation should be institutionalised in order to progressively reduce the *ad hoc* invitation of arbitrarily selected stakeholders for NEPAD-linked and other national consultations along with planning by the ASM towards an organised representation with clear information-provision as well as opinion- and decision-making rules. Through this approach, not only better informed and better legitimised stakeholders are invited, but also the longer-term continuity and the institutional memory of the processes and policies are strengthened.

One key objective specifically for agriculture oriented processes would be to provide farmers an opportunity at the national level to organise themselves and galvanise around the CAADP commitments that their countries have made. Support may be provided for participatory processes that focus not just on technical policy matters but adequacy of state support to agriculture.

**Broadening the evidence base, improving peer-driven and regional elements**

The NEPAD-principles of evidence-based policymaking, peer-review and peer-learning are for good reasons and conceptually very important in both APRM and CAADP. They may overcome key weaknesses of conventional agricultural policymaking and international policy advice: ad-hoc decision without taking into account lessons learned nor existing planning and implementation capacities, low use of African adapted knowledge, and resistance/perceived lack of relevance against external advice from the industrialised countries. However, the conceptualisation and implementation of these principles needs improvement.

APRM needs to better handle the overwhelming broadness of its governance definition, including economic and corporate governance and socio-economic development, which risks lack of systematic coverage, inclusiveness, depth, and relevance for individual sectors. In the area of agriculture, it would be very useful to bring together APRM and CAADP agendas and actors in order to avoid overlapping, duplication of efforts or, even more harmful, contradicting findings and resulting advice. Since both initiatives are independent and in most cases not working in parallel nei-
ther in the present nor most probably in the future in individual countries due to their different buy-in logic and procedures, the harmonisation must be achieved through better conceptual integration of agricultural issues in APRM and governance issues in CAADP, institutionalised use of respective documents, and actor networking.

For APRM, this would mean that CAADP national and pillar documents and institutional structures should be consulted in any APRM assessment. Most helpful would be a cross-cutting pillar on agricultural governance issues in CAADP, including an issue paper, a pillar institution and a continental network (see below). The important role agriculture is given by AU/NEPAD itself, which is based on the recognition of the importance of agriculture in SSA, justifies such a privileged treatment of this sector vis-à-vis other sectors.

For CAADP, several improvements in evidence creation by both internal and external sources are visible and should be integrated at different points in the cycle:

1. Additional information that is needed at the national level and instruments that might be employed include the following options:
   - Expenditure reviews should be commissioned to understand the factors that determine the level of expenditures in the country, the returns to these expenditures, perceptions of relative returns from various sectors, and opportunities to improve the effectiveness of spending.
   - Governance issues need to be addressed much more forcefully in CAADP itself. Institutional reviews are needed to examine public governance and the capacity to plan and implement policies in the sector, the roles of the private sector and civil society, as well as structures for participation and accountability of service delivery in general. A “pillar” organisation, perhaps a unit within NEPAD itself that can assist countries with institutional analysis, would be useful.
   - Knowledge system reviews are required to examine the adequacy of data and research capabilities to support evidence based policymaking and interventions necessary to strengthen them.
   - Modelling should be firmly embedded in national policy processes in order to rationalise debates, make use of monitoring data,
build up confidence in the models, and provide convincing arguments of agricultural stakeholders in national debates. There are many instances where such capacity could be useful: PRSP and national economic strategies, climate change adaptation and mitigation, integration of new agendas such as biofuels, and so on. For that, local capacities have to be built, continually nurtured, and demanded.

- In order to better integrate the research aspects of CAADP into the countries’ background for economic policy planning, to align IFPRI modelling with models used for overall economic planning, or to assist countries to develop such models research capacities must be enhanced.

2. Considering information from the regional and continental levels, a number of peer mechanisms are expected, such as REC coordination and facilitation, ReSAKSS, pillar institutions, continental monitoring, and AU level meetings of agricultural ministries, among others. To what extent these mechanisms will succeed is not clear but it is assumed that they can potentially be very useful and may ultimately even lead to greater exploitation of regional competencies and complementarities. In order to enable peer learning, several points could be realised:

- As the pillar organisations gear themselves to support countries, it is useful to think about how they will offer support in strategy development. For example, they could support the local consultants and the stakeholder participatory decision-making processes as ‘counsellors’.

- It would be useful to enhance peer participation in national strategy development itself, for instance during the revision of strategy documents and investment programmes.

- Regional dialogue at all levels of stakeholders should be improved, at the minister and lower levels of administration as well as among non-state actors. Although there are already activities going on, there is considerable potential to improve them, most notably through the systematic structuring of participation and the continuous dissemination and discussion of information. Keeping in mind the important costs involved in physical regional dialogue, ICT solutions have to be fostered. ReSAKSS could be a
good starting point for such a structured political dialogue within regions. Participatory elements, active moderation by RECs, and visible links from dialogue to political decision-making and budgetary allocations are crucial.

- RECs must play a greater role in the provision, monitoring, and dissemination of evidence. Given the real need for and potential benefit of regional integration in agricultural policymaking, greater attention should be given to what role regional institutions can potentially play and how their capacities are to be developed. The role and visibility of RECs in the areas of agriculture, trade, and food policy must be gradually developed, disseminated, and strengthened. This is also true for APRM which has not yet really integrated the issue of regional economic governance into its agenda. For this potential and role to be realised, mandates, capacities, and resources of RECs have to be strengthened by both member states and donors.

Longer-term processes but discrete steps, more focus on later steps

While it is appropriate to start NEPAD-initiatives at the country level with a very broad agenda, in later steps to do the same broad exercise again and again would be a duplication of efforts, a waste of resources, and would discourage participation. Instead, in later steps of NEPAD-supported policy cycles, more focus is needed making progress in implementing past decisions, overcoming obstacles for progress, and recognising new opportunities and threats. This could be done by focusing annual reviews on one or several more specific topics, such as sub-sectors, pillars, other cross-cutting topics, and new regional or wider trends, without completely abandoning the regular review of the entire set which is important for keeping up broad-based participation of all stakeholders.

For CAADP in particular, the initial assessment could have two stages. The first stage at the national level would include the current stocktaking but expand to a number of issues that are important to ensure effective implementation (see point above on broadening the evidence base). The outputs from this process would involve an assessment of sectoral gaps, strategies to fill those gaps, and an institutional assessment that identifies key actions required to increase effective utilisation of resources in the sector. Instead of identifying the investments that need to be made to
achieve the goals, as is foreseen in the current processes, the review may seek to find out why the investments in the sector are not any higher than they are. Additionally, they could investigate options, such as policies to be changed, scenarios, decision-making processes, stakeholders, and drivers of change, to overcome these obstacles.

In order to promote participation of stakeholders, encourage learning and allow immediate benefits from the NEPAD initiatives, a few ‘early harvest’ investment programmes could be initiated. There is, however, the risk that too much emphasis on early harvest is buying the alignment of local stakeholders instead of convincing them of the necessity of reforms (see Chapter 7.1).

The second phase of the assessment may be conducted by a team of experts from the continent including those from pillar organisations or eminent persons from neighbouring countries, countries within the same REC, or model reformers (see point above on peer elements). The objective would be to evaluate the internal assessment, strengthen early harvest investments proposals, and to assist in compiling the information that will go to the roundtable. These assessments may take 12 to 18 months to complete.

After this initial assessment, the objective of the first roundtable would be to consider the early harvest investment options, but more importantly to develop a programme that addresses the key constraints to investments in the sector such as limited capacity in the ministries relating to expenditure management, private-public sub-sector partnerships, inter-ministerial policy coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), and so on. Regional aspects would figure prominently and peer review would be provided (see point above on peer and regional elements). The compact would be a commitment to a specific programme of action that would propose some investments including in institutional development.

Subsequent annual roundtables would be used to review progress and newly identified investment opportunities which can be integrated with other country processes.

For the APRM, similar adaptation of second round assessments is advisable. Since most of the APRM issues fall outside the agricultural sector, more detailed recommendations are not developed here. For the agricul-
tural issues, harmonisation with ongoing processes including CAADP is highly recommended.

Communication strategies

For APRM, the key communication issue to improve implementation is the dissemination of information to sector communities, administrations, as well as non-state actors. This dissemination should take place before the process, in order to foster comprehensive participation and ownership, and after the process, in order to bring the information relevant to specific sectors, which is dispersed across the different documents, to the concerned actors. Sector-specific agendas, findings, and recommendation compilations would help, as would institutionalised contacts to sector organisations and networks.

For CAADP, a comprehensive information strategy should clearly lay out how the process will lead to achieving the principles of CAADP and also set reasonable expectations from various processes (see point above on longer term processes but discrete steps). The nature of CAADP should be clarified in practical terms: how exactly the principles and values will be operationalised, what alignment and ownership of CAADP entail at the regional and particularly national levels, the priority of national over CAADP policy cycles, the sources of support and capacity development associated with CAADP including regular and special funds and so on. This has to be done by various channels, such as through the ministries, media and non-state actors. High ranking visits (see point above on peer and regional elements) provide important occasions to disseminate information to the broader public.

Rural areas and their specific issues and needs have to be particularly targeted to get the majority of the population involved and profiting.

Capacity development

Capacity development is necessary for most discussed and proposed issues and at all levels, particularly for the CAADP agenda. To fuel the entire machinery, capacities have to be enhanced in several areas:

- facilitating policy processes,
- data gathering and analysis, sector planning, and M&E of policies,
- integrating peer and regional learning and review, harmonising regional policies, and
- internal communication and networking within and among stakeholder groups at national, regional and continental levels.

The presently ongoing establishment of a CAADP support fund is to be highly appreciated. A country’s own resources should complement this fund (see above on selective country buy-in). Careful and realistic design of rules and capacity building are important to allow the public sector to effectively and efficiently spend the money allocated to agricultural development. From the APRM process countries should learn that substantial buy-in improves ownership and reduces adverse selection, which means that their own resources should also be required when accessing grants from the fund. These requirements could be made dependent on neediness and capacities of a country and its specific stakeholder groups, with the fund, governments, and donors supplementing it.

APRM and CAADP could be used in several other ways to enhance capacities of stakeholders as well as national and regional networks in the mentioned areas. Most important would be to make them sustainable and long-term oriented, so that internal and external actors are willing to invest into and around them.

*Transferability to other countries*

While it is not certain whether APRM for agriculture and CAADP reveal similar traits in other SSA countries, it seems quite likely given available literature, the ongoing strategic discussion within NEPAD on both processes, and some of the proposed reforms. It is very likely that agricultural policy processes in other SSA countries are weaker than in the two case study countries, given that Kenya and Ghana are among the most advanced countries in SSA concerning key factors affecting agricultural policy such as democracy as well as internal scientific and administrative capacities. Thus, it is highly probable that other countries could profit even more from NEPAD initiatives for their agricultural policies, provided that they are better shaped.
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Stryker, J. D. (1990): Trade, exchange rate and agricultural pricing policies in Ghana, Washington, DC: World Bank (Comparative Studies)


ANNEX
## Annex 1: Timeline of continental CAADP related events

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Purpose / Results</th>
<th>Related documents</th>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>74th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers/Ninth Ordinary Session of the AEC, Lusaka, Zambia</td>
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<td>11 Jul 2001</td>
<td>37th Ordinary Session of the OAU Assembly, Lusaka, Zambia</td>
<td>OAU adopts NEPAD</td>
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<td>Dec 2001</td>
<td>Brainstorming Workshop on agriculture and water organised by FAO, Rome, Italy</td>
<td>For the 15 member countries of the NEPAD Implementation Committee, to discuss investments needed in land and water improvement</td>
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<td>4–8 Feb 2002</td>
<td>FAO 22nd Regional Conference for Africa, Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>Discussed support for NEPAD and the need for greater investment in the agricultural sector</td>
<td>FAO Support to ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development’: Land and Water Resources Issues and Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>2nd meeting of NEPAD HSGIC, Abuja, Nigeria</td>
<td>Potential CAADP themes presented by Director General of FAO</td>
<td>Communiqué Issued at the End of the 2nd Meeting of the HSGIC of NEPAD</td>
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<td>14−17 May</td>
<td>NEPAD Steering Committee Meeting, Maputo, Mozambique</td>
<td>Presentation of CAADP draft</td>
<td>NEEPAD (2003): The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Programme, Midrand, South Africa: NEEPAD</td>
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<td>9 Jun 2002</td>
<td>Follow-up meeting to the FAO Regional conference, Rome, Italy</td>
<td>Ministers of Agriculture endorse CAADP</td>
<td>FAO (2002): Report of the 22nd FAO Regional Conference for Africa Follow-Up Meeting</td>
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<td>11 Jun 2002</td>
<td>3rd meeting of NEPAD HSGIC (timed to coincide with the World Food Summit), Rome, Italy</td>
<td>Director-General of FAO gave welcome speech. Presentation on implementation plans for priority sectors, including agriculture</td>
<td>Communiqué Issued at the End of the 3rd Meeting of the HSGIC of NEEPAD</td>
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<td>13–22 Nov 2002</td>
<td>Joint ADB/FAO meeting of experts, Accra, Ghana</td>
<td>To draft a document on the role of RECs and REOs in the implementation of CAADP, in preparation for the high-level meeting in Abuja in December</td>
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<td>11–12 Dec 2002</td>
<td>High-level meeting with the Chairman of the NEPAD Steering Committee, the President of the ADB, and the Director-General of FAO, Abuja, Nigeria</td>
<td>To discuss the role of RECs and REOs in the implementation of CAADP, adopt Abuja declaration</td>
<td>Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Chairpersons of Regional Economic Communities on the NEPAD Vision for Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa, Abuja, Nigeria, 12 Dec 2002</td>
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<td>1–2 Jul 2003</td>
<td>1st Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of the AU, Maputo, Mozambique</td>
<td>Discuss CAADP plan of action and draft Maputo Declaration</td>
<td>A Brief Presentation of the Process of Converting the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) to Implementable Plans of Action at National and Regional Levels</td>
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<td>10–12 Jul 2003</td>
<td>2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, Maputo, Mozambique</td>
<td>Approval of CAADP and adoption of Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa</td>
<td>AU (2003): Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa</td>
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<td>Sep 2003</td>
<td>Meeting of Ministers for Agriculture of the NEPAD Implementation Committee, Rome, Italy</td>
<td>Agreed that the FAO should help develop National Medium-Term Investment Programmes (NMTIPs) and Bankable Investment Project Profiles (BIPPs)</td>
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<td>5–6 Dec 2003</td>
<td>Meeting of Ministers, Rome, Italy</td>
<td>Discuss Maputo follow-up and CAADP implementation issues</td>
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<td>12 Feb 2004</td>
<td>Meeting of Ministers on Agriculture and Water, Sirte, Libya</td>
<td>Pre-Assembly meeting</td>
<td>Draft Sirte Declaration on the Challenges of Implementing Integrated and Sustainable Development on Agriculture and Water in Africa</td>
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<td>27–28 Feb 2004</td>
<td>2nd Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, Sirte, Libya</td>
<td>Adopts the Sirte Declaration</td>
<td>Sirte Declaration on the Challenges of Implementing Integrated and Sustainable Development on Agriculture and Water in Africa</td>
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<td>1–5 Mar 2004</td>
<td>FAO 23rd Regional Conference for Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa</td>
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<td>Implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) of NEPAD – Progress Review</td>
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<td>NEPAD Secretariat (2005): Implementing the Comprehensive Africa</td>
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<td>Agriculture Development Programme and Restoring Food Security in Africa: The Roadmap, Midrand, South Africa</td>
<td><strong>Annex 1 (cont.): Timeline of continental CAADP related events</strong></td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>25−28 Jan 2005 East Central Africa, Regional Implementation Planning Meeting, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania</td>
<td>COMESA NEPAD Secretariat (2005): Implementing the CAADP Agenda through RECs and Member Countries: Organisation of Regional Implementation Planning Meetings, Midrand, South Africa</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>15−18 Feb 2005 Southern Africa RIP Meeting in Maputo, Mozambique</td>
<td>COMESA ECOWAS, the Conference of Agricultural Ministers of West and Central Africa (CMAWCA), and CORAF</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>15−18 Mar 2005 West Africa RIP meeting in Bamako, Mali</td>
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<td>12–13 Apr 2005</td>
<td>North Africa RIP meeting in Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>AMU/UMA</td>
<td>To review the outcomes of the five regional implementation planning (RIP) meetings. Chaired by President Kufuor</td>
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### Timeline of continental CAADP related events

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<td>12−13 Sep 2005</td>
<td>Consultative workshop, Johannesburg, South Africa</td>
<td>To endorse Questionnaire and Guidance Note for the Agriculture Expenditure Tracking System (AETS). Representatives of ministries of both finance and agriculture from selected countries.</td>
<td>NEPAD Secretariat (2005): Guidance Note for Agriculture Expenditure Tracking System in African Countries</td>
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<td>AU and NEPAD (2005): Agriculture Expenditure Tracking Questionnaire</td>
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<td>30 Jan–3 Feb 2006</td>
<td>24th FAO Regional Conference for Africa, Bamako, Mali</td>
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<td>18 May 2006</td>
<td>Parliamentarians’ Conference on CAADP, Somerset West, South Africa</td>
<td>To discuss CAADP and Parliamentarian support</td>
<td>2006: The Cape Town Proclamation: Parliamentarians’ Recommendations Supporting CAADP Goals in Championing Agricultural Successes for Africa’s Future</td>
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<td>13 Jun 2006</td>
<td>Africa Fertilizer Summit/ AU Special Summit of the Heads of State and Government, Abuja, Nigeria</td>
<td>To discuss the need and methods for increasing fertiliser use to achieve a green revolution</td>
<td>Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for the African Green Revolution</td>
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<td>26–27 Oct 2006</td>
<td>7th APF Meeting, Moscow</td>
<td>Reviewed progress on CAADP</td>
<td>The Progress Report on Agriculture in Africa</td>
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### Annex 1 (cont.): Timeline of continental CAADP related events

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<tr>
<td>7–10 Nov 2006</td>
<td>1st AU Commission, NEPAD and RECs meeting on CAADP, Midrand, South Africa</td>
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<td>Dec 2006</td>
<td>Food Security Summit, Abuja, Nigeria</td>
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<td>The Abuja Declaration on Food Security</td>
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<td>28–31 Mar 2007</td>
<td>CAADP Roundtable, Kigali, Rwanda</td>
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<td>Rwanda CAADP Compact</td>
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<td>26–27 Sep 2007</td>
<td>2nd AU Commission, NEPAD and RECs meeting on CAADP, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Reviewed coordination and progress on CAADP</td>
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<td>2007 (cont.)</td>
<td>27−28 Sep 2007 2nd CAADP Partnership Platform Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Reviewed progress on CAADP</td>
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<td>2007 (cont.)</td>
<td>3−4 Dec 2007 ReSAKSS/AU/NEPAD Workshop on Developing M&amp;E Framework for CAADP, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>9−10 Feb 2008 AU-NEPAD Interactive Learning Session on CAADP Country Roundtable Processes</td>
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<td>AU (2008): Plan of Action for the Abuja Declaration on Food Security</td>
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<td>16–20 June 2008</td>
<td>25th FAO Regional Conference for Africa, Nairobi, Kenya</td>
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<td>Oct 2008</td>
<td>High-level 5 year review meeting on CAADP progress, Maputo, Mozambique</td>
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## Annex 2: Implementation of CAAPD by COMESA Countries as of 29 February 2008

### Progress by steps leading to round-table processes and signing of compact in member states

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### Annex 2 (cont.): Implementation of CAAPD by COMESA Countries as of 29 February 2008

#### Progress by steps leading to round-table processes and signing of compact in member states

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## Annex 3: Progress in implementation of round-table processes by ECOWAS member states as of 18 Mar 2008

Progress by steps leading to round-table processes and signing of compact in member states

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<th>Focal point appointed</th>
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## Annex 3 (cont.): Progress in implementation of round-table processes by ECOWAS member states as of 18 Mar 2008

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