Multi-Actor Partnerships and Private-Sector Engagement in Development Cooperation

Incentivising and Regulating Strategies

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Non-Paper
Acknowledgements

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Abstract

The inclusion of actors from the private-sector is a central challenge for multi-actor partnerships and multi-stakeholder platforms that aim at enhancing their engagement in development cooperation to implement the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The heterogeneity of approaches that shape development cooperation and rather abstract, long-term agendas (such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) make it difficult to incentivise the engagement of private-sector actors. Despite their variety, actors related to the “private-sector” typically prefer concrete and short-term activities with predictable outcomes. Moreover, the effectiveness of past development initiatives with actors from the private-sector has often proven to be limited.

The purpose of this analysis, which is based on a DIE discussion paper (Wehrmann, 2018), is to identify strategies to meet the challenge of including private-sector actors in effective sustainable development initiatives. In this regard, this analytical piece investigates the case of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC), a multi-actor partnership and platform striving for better effectiveness of development cooperation and aiming at the inclusion of private-sector actors at the same time. To meet both purposes, this advisory paper concludes that initiatives such as the GPEDC need to:

i) strengthen the institutional oversight that they provide,

ii) enhance the formulation of explicit and case-specific incentivising- and regulating-strategies,

iii) give more weight to context-specific particularities of cooperation that apply, for example, in South-South cooperation.

Specifically for the case of the GPEDC, this paper recommends (i) to better pool and disseminate information provided by partners, such as the Global Partnership Initiatives, and to adapt its monitoring framework in consideration of the different principles and philosophies that the diverse group of actors engaged with the GPEDC apply in their collaborations. It further suggests (ii) extending the number of country-specific workshops and case studies organised and developed under the auspices of the GPEDC to better understand the country-specific particularities and to adapt incentivising strategies for private-sector actors. Specifically in the context of South-South cooperation, this analysis advises the GPEDC (iii) to establish and strengthen contacts with think tanks and national development agencies in countries from the “Global South” to better include relevant topics of interest and to acknowledge South-South principles and methodologies in the work of the GPEDC.
Abbreviations

GPEDC Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
GPI Global Partnership Initiative
HLPF High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
MAP multi-actor partnership
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSE private-sector engagement
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SSC South-South cooperation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
Introduction

Despite the variety of development cooperation initiatives existing today, the overall level of engagement of private-sector actors in partnerships with development cooperation providers is still limited, even though it is considered to be more important than ever, as is also shown in the case of the GPEDC (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018). Partly, this is caused by the various disincentives that keep private-sector actors (for-profit companies and non-profit, business-related foundations) from collaborating in the field of development cooperation. This field is shaped, for example, by rather abstract agendas, a fragmentation of approaches and country-specific guidelines. It is a widespread conviction, however, that states alone are not able to address the complexities of sustainable development challenges (Adams & Martens, 2015; Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional, 2017; Klingebiel & Paulo, 2016; Watson, 2012). To implement the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), partnerships with sub-state, civil society and private-sector actors shall fill knowledge and financial gaps, in particular (SDG 17). The effectiveness (the output and impact) of such partnerships, however, has often been proven to be limited in the past (i.a. Beisheim, 2011; Chan, 2014; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2014; Romero, 2015).

To support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the purpose of this analysis is to outline avenues for enhancing both the engagement of private-sector actors in development cooperation and the effectiveness of partnerships with them. In this regard, research in the field of development cooperation increasingly investigates the supporting structures of multi-stakeholder networks and platforms that provide linkages among diverse actors, different issue areas and governance levels (see e.g. Abdel-Malek, 2015; Beisheim & Ellersiek, 2017; Paulo, 2014; Treichel, Höh, Biermann, & Conze, 2016). These networks and platforms shall ensure better synergy and coherence. In addition, this advisory paper concludes that multi-stakeholder networks and platforms are more likely to enhance the engagement of private-sector actors if they provide institutional oversight. Such institutional oversight supports the effective management of the different processes, instruments and the use of models in sustainable development initiatives.

Against this backdrop, this analysis focusses on the following questions:

1. How can networks and platforms such as the GPEDC incentivise the engagement of private-sector actors in development cooperation?

2. How are such networks and platforms able to contribute to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda by improving the effectiveness of multi-actor partnerships (MAPs) with private-sector actors at the same time?

The main part of the advisory paper is devoted to the analysis of challenges that multi-stakeholder platforms face when aiming at enhancing the engagement of private-sector actors in sustainable development initiatives and the effectiveness of MAPs.

The paper first discusses lessons already learnt from the existing body of evidence. From this, central incentivising- and regulating-actions for MAPs and multi-stakeholder platforms such as the GPEDC are derived. Under consideration of different conceptual perspectives, the paper then examines the implementation of these central actions and relates them to the specific case of the GPEDC.
Despite the GPEDC’s young age (formed in 2012) and the early stage at which the GPEDC finds itself regarding its engagement with private-sector actors, for the implementation of the SDGs, it is a very relevant case to look at because it:

- operates as a MAP and as a multi-stakeholder platform¹ at the same time,
- intends to be inclusive and global in scope,
- is driven by the objective to contribute to an improved effectiveness of development cooperation, and
- aims at scaling up private-sector engagement (PSE).

Furthermore, the two questions sketched above are of particular relevance for the GPEDC. In this light, the analysis outlines limitations and avenues for improvement concerning the GPEDC’s engagement with MAPs and private-sector actors also from emerging economies.

The uniqueness of partnerships generally limits the transfer of findings to other cases. Yet, the case of the GPEDC allows for a discussion of the potentials and limitations of strategies more generally promoted in debates on how multi-stakeholder networks and platforms can support the implementation of the SDGs by incentivising the collaboration of private-sector actors in MAPs. In addition, this analytical piece provides insights on the particularities of MAPs with private-sector actors in formats exemplifying so-called South-South cooperation (SSC). The latter have been widely neglected in the literature on networks and platforms so far but are important to consider not least because of the growing significance of partners and alternative concepts from the “Global South” and the structural dynamics and changes they enhance in the field of development cooperation. Moreover, their consideration matters greatly for platforms such as the GPEDC that intend to improve the effectiveness of MAPs on a global level.

This advisory paper builds on a desk-based analysis of policy papers, reports and secondary literature. Moreover, it considers information gained from interviews with researchers focussing on multi-stakeholder networks, and from political practitioners engaged in the GPEDC and in SSC who have been anonymised for the purposes of this paper.

**Conceptual background**

In the debate on multi-stakeholder networks, previous research has often criticised the missing goal attainment and the unintended side effects of such collaboration formats (Beisheim, 2012; Beisheim & Liese, 2014; Chan, 2014; Kindornay & Reilly-King, 2013; Loveridge & Wilson, 2017; Pattberg & Widerberg, 2014). To better incentivise and regulate collaboration in MAPs and multi-stakeholder platforms, researchers thus argued repeatedly

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¹ Multi-actor partnerships are composed of actors from at least three different (governmental, non-governmental, private) sectors. Multi-stakeholder platforms constitute one specific type of multi-actor partnerships: As a network, they are composed of different (individual) actors and of MAPs, they address a problem shared by all collaborating partners and focus on the provision of services to support the endeavours of MAPs (e.g. monitoring, research and data sharing, holding of events, capacity building). Similar to MAPs, multi-stakeholder platforms may differ in view of the sectors and objectives they address, their management structure, the services they provide and their scope.
in favour of strategies\(^2\) that derive from context-specific, case-by-case assessments because of the heterogeneity of networks and platforms and the difficulties encountered when comparing them (Treichel et al., 2016). Regardless of the distinct objectives, focus areas, modalities of cooperation and actors engaged in such formats of multi-stakeholder collaboration, more policy-oriented research has resulted in the publication of various hand- and guidebooks (i.a. Brouwer, Woodhill, Hemmati, Verhoosel, & Vugt, 2015; Prescott & Stibbe, 2017; Tennyson, 2011; United Nations Global Compact, 2013). These hand- and guidebooks repeatedly recommend the following central actions to regulate and enhance PSE in MAPs and multi-stakeholder platforms:

![Central actions to incentivise and regulate PSE](source: Author)

Both the implementation of strategies deriving from case-by-case assessments and of these central actions requires institutional oversight, which is why, researchers demand “a proper” meta-governance. Such meta-governance is important for reflecting on how different actors pursue the implementation of these strategies and how, in this regard, MAPs integrate and balance different approaches and conditions. By pooling and assessing such information, a functioning meta-governance shall improve the accountability and the effectiveness of MAPs.

But what might such meta-governance look like? Of the different approaches discussed in the field of international relations – and specifically in the context of global governance-research – the concept of orchestration has gained prominence. Orchestration:

- addresses the dimension of leadership that transnational multi-stakeholder networks may provide,
- considers that actors fulfil different functions in a (global) multi-actor system, and in this regard
- corresponds to the universalist framing of the 2030 Agenda because of the pluralist global governance view that the concept of orchestration is bound to.

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2 Such incentivising strategies mirror the understanding that certain structural factors as well as individual interests can enhance collaboration among different actor groups. Regulating strategies reflect, among other things, the desire to secure the effectiveness of the modes of cooperation that collaborating actors commit to.
The concept of orchestration (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, & Zangl, 2016) is a model of indirect governance, according to which orchestrators (e.g. multi-stakeholder platforms) provide ideational and material support to like-minded intermediaries (e.g. MAPs), who then address individual targets or target groups (e.g. private-sector actors). In general, orchestrators and intermediaries cooperate to achieve a shared goal that they are unable to achieve on their own. Orchestrators benefit from collaborating with intermediaries who may provide direct access to targets, material resources, information and technical expertise (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, & Zangl, 2012, p. 3). Intermediaries, on the other hand, are able to take advantage of the exchange of information and cooperation with other intermediaries involved that are also of potential interest to the targets or target groups they wish to engage with (e.g. concerning the technical expertise of other actors from the business sector). Under the auspices of an international organisation or platform, intermediaries thus receive access to a network of intermediaries and may further influence discourses within the network (e.g. by shaping the language of high-level documents to transmit norms and policy ideas; Pegram, 2014, p. 4; VanDeveer, 2005).

Instead of determining one strategy shared by all collaborating partners, the concept of orchestration supports the integration of different approaches and processes to achieve a shared goal (Caplan, 2013). In line with researchers demanding the consideration of context-specific particularities, the concept thus recognises that partners have different visions and means of how to reach a common goal. As it is up to the orchestrators to set the goal and the related agenda, however, orchestrators are not apolitical or impartial and obtain more powerful positions when compared to the individual and collaborating intermediaries.

**Figure 2: Concept of orchestration**

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<tr>
<th>Orchestrator</th>
<th>Main incentive for cooperation: shared goal</th>
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<tr>
<td>Intermediary</td>
<td>Main incentive for cooperation: access to information and resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target Group</td>
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<td>Intermediary</td>
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Source: Author
When transferring the concept of orchestration to the case of the GPEDC, the GPEDC can be considered both an intermediary and an orchestrator. In the global architecture of development cooperation, for example, the GPEDC takes the role of an intermediary. Although the GPEDC does not operate under the auspices of any other international organisation or platform such as the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), the GPEDC is widely perceived as contributing to the work of the HLPF on sustainable development governance (in which, for example, findings from the GPEDC’s monitoring round feed into). Moreover, the GPEDC benefits from ideational and material support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which offer strategic advice to the secretariat of the GPEDC. The states contributing to UNDP and the OECD also provide most of the GPEDC’s funding. Furthermore, the GPEDC replaced the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and it is committed to international frameworks such as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and to the principles of the Paris Declaration (i.a. to country ownership and mutual accountability). As an orchestrator, on the other side, the GPEDC provides a platform for knowledge-exchange and learning that individuals and MAPs (such as the Global Partnership Initiatives – GPs) can use on a voluntary basis. To achieve the shared goal of advancing the effectiveness of development efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda, the GPEDC adopted a monitoring framework that intends to hold partnering governments accountable and shall also mirror the existing environment for inclusive development partnerships.

This double-role also has an impact on the GPEDC’s scope of action. Its commitment to international frameworks and the respective principles, for example, requires the GPEDC to prioritise the say of governmental actors over non-state actors. In other words: Despite its integrative order, as a multi-stakeholder platform the GPEDC is bound, amongst other things, to the principle of country ownership (a country’s commitment to policies and “the control over the process and outcome of choosing policies”, Whitfield, 2009, p. 5). Consequently:

1. as a multi-stakeholder platform, the GPEDC does not have any legally binding force (which also explains the voluntary format of its monitoring framework);
2. only governmental representatives – no (intermediary) individual or MAPs – can become an executive Co-Chair and represent the GPEDC (even though the implementation of a non-executive Co-Chair representing non-state actors is currently being discussed).

Governmental representatives further form the majority of the Steering Committee, the GPEDC’s main decision-making body, which identifies the strategic priorities (its agenda/programme of work) and coordinates the GPEDC. Because of this unequal representation of different constituencies – and in addition to the political power that orchestrators have per se – the work of the Steering Committee is shaped in particular by the interests and priorities of governmental representatives.
Challenges and strategies

In its first Programme of Work, adopted in April 2017, the GPEDC specified the intended implementation of its inclusive multi-actor approach by emphasising, among other things, its objective to enhance PSE (Strategic Output 4) and to learn “from different modalities” (Strategic Output 5; GPEDC, 2017, p. 5). In contrast to the majority of MAPs in the field of development cooperation that focus specifically on the means to co-finance sustainable development initiatives, the GPEDC is thus one of the very few partnerships that aims at enhancing public–private dialogue and knowledge-sharing. Its most recent and planned country-level workshops in Bangladesh, Egypt, El Salvador and Uganda, which are guided by country studies developed under the auspices of the GPEDC, as well as its ambitions to implement a business-leaders caucus and organise Specialised Policy Dialogues are specific examples in this regard. Most multi-actor platforms with private-sector actors, moreover, do not prioritise the effectiveness of their efforts. Also in this regard, the GPEDC’s approach3 and its related mandate to help partners scale-up the effectiveness of PSE efforts have been exceptional (GPEDC, 2018a).

However, despite these well-intended objectives and similar to other partnership initiatives, as an orchestrator, the GPEDC still faces challenges when intending to enhance the engagement of private-sector actors in MAPs by implementing the central actions outlined above.

Firstly, the roles that private-sector actors are expected to perform in any format of multi-actor collaboration differ due to the heterogeneity, the specific functions and the structures of MAPs. Thus, when operating as an orchestrating platform, the GPEDC is not in the position to assign whether private-sector actors shall contribute, for example, as resource- or knowledge providers to MAPs. However, it can contribute to the suggested clarification in this regard by enhancing the transparency of the structures and needs of collaborating MAPs.

To do so, the GPEDC would have to:

(i) specify their understanding of “the business sector”, and

(ii) identify those involved in deciding about the roles of private-sector actors in MAPs.

Considering the first point, official documents, such as the Nairobi Outcome Document of the GPEDC’s Second High Level Meeting or the 2017-2018 Programme of Work, currently do not clarify whether “the business sector” includes only private-sector actors or also state-owned companies. In its publications and the four country-studies that are currently being developed, the GPEDC further discusses philanthropies, small and medium-sized enterprises and multi-national corporations. However, as the GPIs exemplify, not all collaborating MAPs co-operate with the same “type” of actor from “the business sector”. In addition to a general definition summarising the actors from “the business sector” that the GPEDC partners with, the GPEDC would also have to reflect the respective differences

3 The GPEDC promotes the understanding that “[e]ffective development co-operation, as a term, goes beyond ODA and captures aid and development effectiveness issues related to all types of development cooperation–financial and non-financial, public and private. It relates directly to the development cooperation effectiveness principles included in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda in OP 58” (GPEDC, 2015).
when collaborating in MAPs. This requires all partnering MAPs to provide information in this regard.

With regards to the second point – and under consideration of the different settings in which the partnering actors operate – the GPEDC should provide an overview of those involved in deciding about the roles of private-sector actors in MAPs. Are these decisions based on a multi-stakeholder dialogue that includes the perspectives of civil society or instead generated by governmental agencies? Such information could be included in the GPEDC’s monitoring report and would thus help to hold the actors involved accountable (e.g. in cases in which actors are accused of corruption or of undermining national development programmes). Moreover, such an overview would enhance a more specific knowledge exchange among those MAPs engaged in the GPEDC that aim to collaborate with the same types of actors from “the business sector”, which then allows them to adapt and improve incentivising strategies.

A central challenge that the GPEDC faces derives from its commitment to the principle of country ownership. According to this principle, states, in particular, should manage sensitive multi-stakeholder processes and thus decide on the roles that private-sector actors are expected to perform; only states are accountable to national and international frameworks and are regarded as being able to secure political commitments. This principle thus conflicts with the understanding of MAPs, defined as cooperation projects between actors from the public sector, the private-sector and civil society in which the organisations involved cooperate transparently and as equals, in order to achieve a joint objective for sustainable development. To this end the partners use their complementary competencies and resources, and agree to share the risks and the benefits of the joint project. (BMZ [Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung], 2011, p. 4; emphasis added).

Moreover, as studies demanding context-specific, case-by-case assessments point out, to enhance the effectiveness of incentivising- and regulating-strategies, it is necessary to adapt them to contextual challenges that states alone are not able to identify. To address both aspects, as an orchestrating platform, the GPEDC would have to strengthen its support of inclusive dialogues at the country level and motivate state actors to contribute to and consider these dialogues when deciding about the roles of private-sector actors in the multi-actor formats they are collaborating within.

Secondly, transparent and inclusive dialogues generally help to clarify expectations and aid discussions on potential challenges in MAPs early on. Ideally, such dialogues thus allow collaborating partners to adapt and balance priorities. Especially for private-sector actors, these dialogues are important to better classify the potentials and risks that may also arise from the various meanings ascribed to the objectives of MAPs targeted towards enhancing sustainable development. Whereas in the context of the 2030 Agenda, for example, sustainability is based on a holistic understanding that relates to the combination of social, economic and environmental dimensions, in the business context the term “sustainability” is primarily connected to sustainable economic growth and to the “sustainable development” of corporations themselves (Davis, 2011). As an orchestrating platform, the GPEDC cannot interfere in these dialogues, but it can address the lacks of respect and trust that may result from power asymmetries among partners engaged in MAPs.
In practice, by providing a meta-governance, the GPEDC can demand that intermediaries (MAPs and individuals) provide transparency concerning the operating principles of MAPs and the inclusion of the partnering actors in deliberations. The GPEDC’s monitoring framework is a central element in this regard. However, the framework has often been criticised for not reflecting the realities in which the GPEDC’s partnering actors operate (GPEDC, 2016). The monitoring framework is currently under revision. It is crucial that indicators are adapted also with regards to the concepts and principles on which they are based, which derive from experiences in “traditional development cooperation” but often do not mirror, for example, practices in “South-South cooperation”. In addition, the monitoring framework currently only considers information bundled by governmental partners (the degree of consideration of information provided by non-state actors in voluntary monitoring exercises at the country level differs) and does not include any reflections on MAPs affiliated with the GPEDC, such as the GPIs. The GPEDC thus gives away much of its orchestrating potential and does not actively enhance transparent and inclusive dialogues in nor the knowledge exchange among the GPIs (even though their focus areas are often interconnected and their work contributes substantially to the GPEDC’s endeavours, as has also been pointed out by the GPEDC and representatives of the GPIs). Moreover, neither the GPEDC nor the GPIs themselves have formalised the duration of GPIs, their output nor to what degree the work of these initiatives is taken into consideration by other GPEDC bodies (including other GPIs). Information on the partners collaborating in the GPIs and their efforts are only available upon request because, for example, most GPIs do not have a website that is linked with the GPEDC. Voluntary (not systematic) information on their work is considered in biannual updates shared by the GPEDC. From the perspective of the GPEDC and the GPIs (see also i.a. the Global Partnership Initiatives Engagement Workshop, 2018), more institutional oversight could accordingly improve the effectiveness of the GPIs (BMZ, 2018).

When intending to enhance transparent and inclusive dialogues via its monitoring framework, a central challenge that the GPEDC would have to address concerns the varied financial and human resources of MAPs and individual intermediaries. Not least, these resources determine whether partnering actors are able, for example, to collect all the information required for the monitoring process or to participate in meetings, workshops and conferences organised under the auspices of the GPEDC to contribute to the envisioned knowledge-exchange. Furthermore, although the indicators used in the GPEDC’s monitoring framework need to better mirror the complexities that shape development cooperation, if these indicators are too broad or too narrow – and thus not of significance to the majority of collaborating partners – the monitoring framework will fail to allow for comparisons and to demand commitment. To address both aspects, the GPEDC should thus provide support to initiatives that aim at a better understanding of the different modalities in development cooperation. It should include the knowledge gained from these initiatives to adapt its monitoring framework by following the objective of keeping it as specific as possible and as broad as necessary.

4 The Working Group on Knowledge-Sharing for Increased Development Effectiveness has been focusing on this problem in the past months and developed terms of reference for the implementation of a Knowledge-Sharing Platform, a “meta-platform” that essentially draws information from other existing platforms and also includes the GPIs (GPEDC, 2018b).
Thirdly, private-sector actors are more likely to contribute to MAPs in development cooperation if regulating frameworks are clarified and specified early on. This allows them to develop avenues for balancing the different priorities in their endeavours and to justify their collaborations to their shareholders. Although it is equally important that the GPEDC clarifies and specifies its monitoring framework to avoid any misunderstandings, it is not up to an orchestrating platform to clarify and specify regulating frameworks, which falls under the responsibility of its intermediaries. Thus, the GPEDC cannot determine the conditions under which its partnering actors collaborate with private-sector actors. However, it can demand and provide transparency concerning the different regulating frameworks to which state actors and affiliated multi-actor partnerships apply and are bound to in their cooperation.

The monitoring framework of the GPEDC could serve this purpose by including country-specific regulations in its Indicator 3 on the “Engagement and Contribution of the Private Sector to Development” and by encouraging the GPIs to include “terms and conditions for collaboration” on their websites. In both cases, it is crucial that this information is constantly updated and accessible to all interested actors. However, even if both are “clarified and specified early on”, in a dynamic context, regulating frameworks are never constant pillars but are most often adapted to changing conditions and needs.

A central challenge deriving therefrom is the risk of undermining advantages arising from the (monitoring) meta-governance that the GPEDC provides, which requires the GPEDC to offer regularly updated and comprehensive information on the regulating frameworks that apply. To address this challenge, the GPEDC should incentivise all actors collaborating in MAPs to become engaged in systematic dialogues in which they are informed early on if regulations change. This would allow them to adapt their objectives and the various strategies they use to reach these objectives. Such regular dialogues further enhance the likelihood that the GPEDC would receive information on changing regulating frameworks.

Fourthly, strategies to incentivise PSE in MAPs are more successful if they are adapted towards the specific actor being sought to take part in the partnership. Particularly in consideration of the objectives of MAPs, it is thus important to first identify the most suitable private-sector actor and to revise incentivising-strategies. It is beyond the scope of the GPEDC to develop such individualised strategies due to the different contexts, the heterogeneity of its partners and the specific functions that private-sector actors may have (e.g. of for-profit and state-owned companies). Furthermore, the GPEDC does not obtain the authority to develop such strategies because of the principles to which it is committed. However, the GPEDC can contribute to the selection process by developing recommendations and non-binding guidelines based on experiences from collaborating partners.

In addition to the promotion of inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogues at the country level, and a more detailed reflection on multi-stakeholder collaboration in its monitoring framework, the GPEDC could thus provide additional space to exchange experiences with private-sector actors among affiliated partners. Side events or workshops back-to-back with the GPEDC Steering Committee and High-Level Meetings could serve that purpose. Based on these experiences, guidelines for use for other actors could be developed (e.g. by the GPIs).
Due to the heterogeneity of MAPs and of private-sector actors whose roles are also influenced by the actor constellation in which they operate, similar to the monitoring framework, such guidelines may either remain too vague to be effective or run the risk of not being applicable when being too specific. To address this challenge, the GPEDC should use such guidelines and recommendations to draw attention to the different factors that influence the behaviour and practices of private-sector actors. Although it is often argued that MAPs should collaborate with “like-minded” private-sector actors to contribute towards sustainable development, it should be emphasised that it is highly unlikely that private-sector actors will collaborate on an altruistic basis. As the concept of social business illustrates, even private-sector actors pursuing social goals such as the implementation of the SDGs are determined by (and determine) the economic systems in which they operate.

Similar to these challenges that apply to the implementation of the central actions recommended by more policy-oriented research – also for the implementation of strategies deriving from case-by-case assessments – the GPEDC can only share insights gained from their partners but does not obtain any enforcement power. However, official documents such as the Nairobi Outcome Document may raise different expectations when outlining the various advantages that the GPEDC expects from the inclusion of “the business sector”. In this regard, context-specific particularities that apply at the national levels, for instance in the BRICS-countries, complicate the formulation (and effectiveness) of any generalised hopes and strategies. Furthermore, when considering the different formats of cooperation that are summarised under the umbrella of SSC, it becomes clear that neither political practitioners nor researchers share similar understandings of what SSC actually encompasses, or could potentially encompass. Still, particularly for private-sector actors, collaboration with emerging economies is considered attractive because of the business opportunities they present due to their growing integration within the global economy. Partners from emerging economies, on the other hand, are seen as benefiting from their access to resources and knowledge. In practice, however, actors from emerging economies are still significantly underrepresented in MAPs for sustainable development, and the clear majority of MAPs have been formed in collaboration with actors from the “Global North” (United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation, 2016). Often international organisations – particularly those under the auspices of the United Nations – support (the establishment) of these MAPs, provide institutional oversight and thus represent triangular cooperation rather than SSC. Similarly, MAPs that include civil society organisations and private-sector actors are also rather new in the context of SSC.

Overall, development cooperation among partners from the “Global South” is still mostly based on government-to-government engagement. Thus, it is no surprise that different formats for enhancing multi-stakeholder dialogues either do not exist or are often not used by Southern providers. Consequently, for private-sector actors interested in collaborating with MAPs from the “South”, these MAPs are often invisible because they are not linked to a systematic database for MAPs, which could similarly monitor the effectiveness of these MAPs. Particularly SSC can thus be considered a niche for initiatives intending to enhance the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder collaborations and incentivise PSE, such as the GPEDC, which has already initiated research on a new conceptual framework for PSE from the perspective of “Southern partners”.
Policy recommendations

This advisory paper concludes by providing three policy recommendations that contribute to the general debate on means to improve MAPs in order to implement the 2030 Agenda but are also of relevance for the specific case of the GPEDC.

First, for actors that seek to enhance PSE and the effectiveness of MAPs in development cooperation the paper recommends the establishment of a functioning meta-governance to:

1. incentivise the specification of goals and related strategies pursued by MAPs and other intermediaries
   ➢ the GPEDC may, for example, establish a database to pool and disseminate information provided by partners in this regard, which enhances their visibility, facilitates knowledge-exchange and, thus, reduces the duplication of efforts;

2. make the development of MAPs and other collaborating initiatives transparent
   ➢ for the GPEDC, this implies, amongst others things, systematically evaluating the work conducted by the GPIs and adapting its monitoring framework;

3. develop a flexible monitoring framework that takes context-specific particularities into consideration
   ➢ to better understand the reasons behind successes, challenges and potentials for improving the effectiveness of MAPs, the GPEDC should include more open questions in its monitoring framework and different principles and philosophies should be shared, for example, among the diverse group of actors from the “Global South”.

Trade-offs resulting from a flexible monitoring framework are reduced levels of comparability among MAPs and less accountability of collaborating partners. Moreover, a flexible monitoring framework increases the risk that established norms and standards, for example, for PSE in development cooperation are undermined. The respective “politics of difference”, which reduces reputational risks, will, however, likely enhance the engagement of private-sector actors with the GPEDC and contribute to the identification of individual challenges.

Second, the advisory paper strengthens the often-stated assessment that incentivising and regulating strategies need to be case-specific in order to be successful. In this regard, it is suggested to:

1. encourage the formation and evaluation of in-country platforms
   ➢ in this regard, the GPEDC may extend the number of country-specific workshops that are organised under its auspices (such as the 2018-Technical Workshop on Private Sector Engagement in Bangladesh) – particularly in countries, in which the quality of public-private dialogues has been assessed as low – to also facilitate cross-sector dialogues needed for the implementation of the SDGs;

2. adapt strategies to local contexts
   ➢ for the GPEDC this means that instead of working specifically on general strategies to incentivise PSE (e.g. by developing a business leaders caucus exclusively at the global level), it should contribute to a better understanding of country-specific
particularities and guidelines for PSE, for example by encouraging stakeholder dialogues at the local level and by supporting country-specific formats for multi-stakeholder exchanges (e.g. a GPEDC at the country level and the formation of a business leaders’ caucus at the national level).

These dialogues support the consideration of different perspectives, a better classification of the potentials and risks for the many stakeholders engaged and the development of case-specific incentivising- and regulating-strategies.

Third, the paper demands a better understanding of – and more differentiation concerning – approaches that are summarised under the umbrella of SSC. These approaches are too diverse to make general suggestions about ways to enhance the formation of MAPs and the engagement of private-sector actors. Accordingly, this analytical piece recommends:

1. clarifying what SSC can be
   - meeting the GPEDC’s ambition of enhancing PSE in development cooperation – particularly the different roles and functions that state-owned companies may obtain – matter greatly;

2. enhancing dialogue with SSC providers to identify shared topics of interests, potentials and difficulties for collaboration
   - the GPEDC may put this into practice by establishing and strengthening contacts with think tanks and national development agencies. Such dialogues are of particular use to the GPEDC, as they contribute to the identification and inclusion of topics of interest for partners from the “Global South” and to the consideration of South-South principles and methodologies in the work of the GPEDC.

A possible trade-off arising from the different priorities ascribed to topics of interest can be the formation of more subsidiary bodies under the auspices of the GPEDC, which would require the provision of more resources to maintain these bodies and the strengthening of the Joint Support Team to oversee and report on them. Both the need to further include Southern partners and strengthen the role of the Joint Support Team as a connector has also been emphasised by representatives of the GPIs, for example at the 2018 Global Partnership Initiatives’ Engagement-Workshop.

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5 Although from the perspective of political practitioners, the implementation of this policy recommendation may fall particularly under the auspices of researchers, it is important that political practitioners consider the scientific findings in this regard to enhance dialogues and develop more targeted approaches in practice.
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References


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