(as part of the DIE's Development Cooperation with Africa Working Group)
Minutes of the conference "Developmental States in Africa: What prospects and whose interests?”

Most African states have not been able to achieve impressive growth and development over the last decades – at a time when Asia experienced rapid growth and successes in poverty reduction. Experiences in Latin America and more recently in Asia offer examples of strongly state-driven development and seem particularly appealing to numerous observers and policy-makers in Africa. The debate on possible “developmental states” in Africa has thus appeared on the agenda of public discussions at a time when the international policy context appears more favourable for their emergence. Indeed, the policy receipt of the Washington consensus – consisting of the belief in limited public sectors, deregulation and “lean states” – seems to be dead in the 21st century, not just since the most recent financial and economic crisis. What had been mistrust in the state has turned into a focus on state capacities.

The debate on ‘developmental states’ however raises numerous conceptual and contextual questions. For instance, how much substance does the concept of developmental states have? How much can African countries learn from other regions’ experiences, in other words, how suitable are they for an African context? How do donors engage with this new agenda and what conclusions can be drawn for tomorrow’s development cooperation policy towards and within Africa? The seminar addressing these questions was organised in two parts, the first one being a closed round of researchers and policy-makers from Africa and Europe.

I.

In the opening session, Obadiah Mailafia introduced the participants to a conceptual design and the history of developmental states. He called four key features. Firstly, a growth-oriented leadership, secondly, a strong tendency to be authoritarian, thirdly a commitment to property rights and finally an effective bureaucracy. According to Dr. Mailaifia these were the reasons why developmental states are characterized by a political stability and why they could react to political crisis in an effective way.
Dr. Mailafia further classified the debate about developmental states in three phases, beginning with the industrialization in Japan in the 1970s. This was followed by the transformation in the economies of countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea, throughout the 1980s. The last phase is the debate in Africa after the Cold War era. Drawing from the Asian experience, the most critical element is that the state acts as an “autonomous empire”, where power elites are fairly well insulated from contradictory societal pressures and demands. At the same time, the development orientation of the elite coalition is necessary, which should be able to forge a national consensus, including non-state actors, on economic development.

Mailafia also addressed the question as to why the Asian countries have been able to develop to an extent unmatched by African states. Firstly, he pointed out the different conditions between the African and Asian experiences. As a main reason he associated this difference to the colonial heritage in Africa. He argued that the colonial states had no interest in the development of African populations, but in the raw materials and that the “nationalist Bourgeoisie”, who took over after the independence in the sixties, had no interest in changing the deontology of the state either. That was why the postcolonial African states conserved the key features and characteristics of the former political order. Secondly, he pointed to the fact that competitive ethnicity had prevented the consensus at the core of the Asian experience to emerge in the African context. This could be explained by the distributional politics in most African countries, fuelled by the divided character of African societies: ethnic groups, cultures and languages are vastly different. Often this has resulted in a lack of vision and weak capacity of the leadership, insofar as power elites are more preoccupied with how to survive politically rather than thinking about how to promote economic development and progress. Linked to this, a third factor relates to the lack of demand for developmental outcomes: neither the African elites, nor the civil society have been able to strongly challenge the ruling powers for broad development. Hence, there have been limited incentives for leaders to develop the economies of their nations. Dr. Mailafia illustrated the approach practiced as one where the pressure is to share the cake, rather than trying to let the cake grow. The existence of a merit-based civil service bureaucracy is another element that has been crucial to the success of the Asian model of developmental states but absent in most African countries. Finally, developmental states in Asia had benefited from a favourable regional and international geopolitical dynamics. In his conclusion, Dr. Mailafia was rather optimistic and argued that it is feasible to have democratic developmental states in Africa, if the political elites are encouraged. But he admits that it this will be no easy task to achieve.

The discussion raised the following points:

• there is no single concept of developmental states. Yet it is an attractive one for many countries in Africa but whether the “developmental states” as a concept is a suitable one in an African context generated a lively discussion.
• Many interventions pointed to the potential tension between democracy and development. Would one come at the expense of the other? Can there be a democratic developmental state in Africa?
• Looking further into the historical features of the concept, it was underlined that while the objectives to achieve need to be clear, it remains to be seen whether growth should be the ultimate goal aspired to. Growth should not become a displacement for development.
• At the same time, participants warned against the risk of overloading the concept as it might come at the cost of prioritisation.

II.

For a better understanding of the concept, the second session dealt with the phenomenon and experiences of the developmental states in other regions, namely Asia and Latin America.

Aurel Croissant referred to the situation in Asia, the home region of the developmental states. He argued that just three Asian countries can actually be counted as developmental states. Concerning of the possibility to transfer the model to Africa, he was rather sceptical, especially because of the specific conditions and characteristics of the period in which the Asian countries could develop. These countries had a better opportunity due to the foreign policy concept of the United States that was favourable to the emergence of developmental states.

Kurt Weyland drew a similar sceptical conclusion from the experiences in Latin America. He argued that a state has to hold a wide range of capabilities. According to him there are two main questions. The first is how to create autonomy of the state from vested interests and the other is how to build rational bureaucracies. According to him, the thesis that structural adjustment has weakened states in Latin America was not undisputedly backed by evidence: weaker states lost capacity, while stronger states in Latin America actually succeeded to emerge stronger from the reform.

III.

In the third session about the issue of the relationship between democracy and developmental states was looked into more details.

Jörg Faust argued that there is a correlation, if not a causation, between democracy and a development outcomes. Democracies generally outperform autocracies, but the process of democratisation is a protracted one and entails short to medium term conflicts. He developed the model of “attractive autocracies”, , which could produce good developmental results. The development outcomes of the autocratic model of state would, however, be less sustainable in the long-run. Taking a normative point of view, Jörg Faust argued that the long-term perspective offered by the democratic path is worth the risk. But he also pointed to the role of donors who often seek fast results and tangible elements of a state structure that autocracies are maybe better equipped to deliver. In some occasions, donors thus end up also encouraging the autocratic model of a developmental state.
Ben Turok presented the situation of South Africa, which claimed to be a developmental state. He emphasized the importance of democracy and the relevance of social peace for a positive development. This, he pointed out, was the main challenge for South Africa. He insisted on the need not only of a democracy in a formal sense, but also in an economic dimension. In his view, a number of lessons were to be learnt from the South African experience for other African countries. These include putting in place an effective tax system to stimulate the economy and not consumption; the establishment of a functional public service and the empowerment of the parliamentary body for oversight and accountability.

Kojo Asante indicated that democracy was necessary for development and that there could be no “attractive autocracies” from an African perspective. African countries were indeed experiencing a political transformation. However, in many cases, the merit-based bureaucracy necessary to operate the developmental state, could not be formed because placing supporters at key posts was often the only way to reward them after the elections. The question is therefore what incentives should be provided to reorient the elite towards development outcome and it solving this political question that needs to be the focus, including for donors.

IV.

The relationship between ownership and donorship was discussed in the last session.

Stephan Klingebiel presented budget support as an instrument for donors to foster and support ownership of the development process while at the same time strengthening the recipient country’s structures. He made clear that Rwanda should not be seen as a model case, but there were some key factors of the developmental success in Rwanda that can be shared: firstly, the state was endowed with staff of a high educational level, which is the signal of a performance-oriented state. The Rwandan state was indeed effective and efficient in implementing policies, which were clearly designed. While it was true that the government was highly aid dependent, it had managed this constraining factor by putting a high priority on public financial management, and adopting a strong position on its aid policy. Thereby, the Rwandan government was making sure that national procedures, approaches and structures were adequately used. Despite the fact that general budget support was not an easy process for donors, Dr. Klingebiel warned against the potentially damaging effect of official development assistance when it bypassed national structures, as it can weaken the governance capacity and quality by overstretching it.

Looking into the case of Mozambique, Adriano Nuvunga reminded the participants that the context mattered; it would provide its characterising elements. The impact of party politics, conflict of interests or overlap between the party and the business community in shaping the character and capability of the state should not be overlooked. He therefore advocated for a greater understanding of donors of the politics in the partner country, in order to gain more knowledge on how the political systems operate, and as such, be more open towards development. He however wondered whether donors were truly prepared for this and concluded that while budget support was a key instrument for development over project aid, it also entails a non-negligible risk factor and requires trust. How donors deal with this tension will ultimately determine its success. 

Sven Grimm argued that there are different understandings of what ownership means: recipients would tend to understand ownership as control over the policy process whereas donors would rather focus on the commitment to policy content. Many donors are aligning to the countries strategies, but still find it difficult to change their mode of operation. He cautioned participants to see budget support as a panacea for development, as it could be handled in good or bad ways, for instance in terms of its predictability and reliability.

Two key questions remained: how to promote democratic ownership? And how to promote the accountability of donorship? It was suggested that taking a more detailed look at the capability of states in specific sectors could provide some elements of an answer in this respect.

On the second day of the conference an open panel discussion took place where the panellists from the conference discussed the results of the previous day’s debates, and addressed the question as to what can be made of the concept of developmental states in the African context.